Saturday, March 22, 2025

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P47

Lætitia quæ ex eo oritur quod scilicet rem quam odimus destrui aut alio malo affici imaginamur, non oritur absque ulla animi tristitia.

Joy which arises from where because of course a thing which we hate we imagine to be destroyed or affected by another evil, does not arise and from any sadness of spirit.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex propositione 27 hujus. Nam quatenus rem nobis similem tristitia affici imaginamur eatenus contristamur.

This is evident from IIIP27. For insofar we imagine a thing similar to us is affected with sadness to such a degree we are saddened.

SCHOLIUM: Potest hæc propositio etiam demonstrari ex corollario propositionis 17 partis II. Quoties enim rei recordamur, quamvis ipsa actu non existat, eandem tamen ut præsentem contemplamur corpusque eodem modo afficitur; quare quatenus rei memoria viget eatenus homo determinatur ad eandem cum tristitia contemplandum; quæ determinatio manente adhuc rei imagine coercetur quidem memoria illarum rerum quæ hujus existentiam secludunt sed non tollitur atque adeo homo eatenus tantum lætatur quatenus hæc determinatio coercetur et hinc fit ut hæc lætitia quæ ex rei quam odimus malo oritur, toties repetatur quoties ejusdem rei recordamur. Nam uti diximus quando ejusdem rei imago excitatur, quia hæc ipsius rei existentiam involvit, hominem determinat ad rem cum eadem tristitia contemplandum qua eandem contemplari solebat cum ipsa existeret. Sed quia ejusdem rei imagini alias junxit quæ ejusdem existentiam secludunt, ideo hæc ad tristitiam determinatio statim coercetur et homo de novo lætatur et hoc toties quoties hæc repetitio fit. Atque hæc eadem est causa cur homines lætantur quoties alicujus jam præteriti mali recordantur et cur pericula a quibus liberati sunt, narrare gaudeant. Nam ubi aliquod periculum imaginantur, idem veluti adhuc futurum contemplantur et ad id metuendum determinantur, quæ determinatio de novo coercetur idea libertatis quam hujus periculi ideæ junxerunt cum ab eodem liberati sunt quæque eos de novo securos reddit atque adeo de novo lætantur.

This proposition is also able to be demonstrated from IIP17C. For as much as we remember a thing, although it does not exist in actuality, nevertheless we contemplate the same thing as if present and the body is affected in the same way; which determination remaining to where the image of the thing is forced indeed the memory of those things which exclude its existence but are not lifted and to the degree that a person is elated to such a degree as much as this determination is forced and this happens so that this joy which arises from the thing which we hate badly, is always repeated for how much we recall this matter. For we have said to use when the image of some thing excites, because this involves existence itself, determines one for contemplating with the same sadness by which one is accustomed to contemplate it exists with itself. But because one's imagined thing is joined to others which exclude the existence of the same thing, then this determination is immediately forced to sadness and one is overjoyed by the new thing and this repetition occurs all the time. And this same thing is the reason why people are overjoyed as many times as they recall the prevention of some evil and why being freed from dangers they rejoice to retell. For when they imagine some danger, they contemplate the same thing as if still the future and determined to fear it which determination is compelled about the new idea of liberty which has joined to the ideas of this danger when they were liberated from the same which returns them secure from the new thing and they rejoice to such a degree about the new thing.

Wednesday, March 19, 2025

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P46 - Group Bias

Si quis ab aliquo cujusdam classis sive nationis a sua diversæ lætitia vel tristitia affectus fuerit concomitante ejus idea sub nomine universali classis vel nationis tanquam causa, is non tantum illum sed omnes ejusdem classis vel nationis amabit vel odio habebit.

If anyone might be from some of the same class or nation affected by their varieties of joy or sadness accompanied by its idea under the same of the universal class or nation as the cause, then not only will one have hatred or love for that person, but for all of that same class or nation.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus rei demonstratio patet ex propositione 16 hujus partis.

The demonstration of this matter is evident from IIIP16 [Correlation].

Friday, March 7, 2025

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P45 - Love Greater Than Similarity

Si quis aliquem sibi similem odio in rem sibi similem quam amat, affectum esse imaginatur, eum odio habebit.

If anyone imagines that another person similar to oneself is affected with hatred towards a thing similar to oneself - which one loves, one will have hatred towards that other person.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam res amata eum qui ipsam odit, odio contra habet (per propositionem 40 hujus) adeoque amans qui aliquem imaginatur rem amatam odio habere, eo ipso rem amatam odio hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) tristitia affectam esse imaginatur et consequenter (per propositionem 21 hujus) contristatur idque concomitante idea ejus qui rem amatam odit tanquam causa hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) ipsum odio habebit. Q.E.D.

For the beloved one [feminine nominative case] in return has hatred for that person who hates the beloved one itself, (by IIIP40 [Reciprocity of Hatred]) and to such an extent the lover who imagines someone has hatred for the beloved one, by this hatred itself one imagines that the beloved one (by IIIP13S [Conatus to Forget]) is affected with sadness and consequently (by IIIP21 [Responsiveness to Beloved]) is saddened and accompanied by the idea of who hates the beloved thing is as such, the cause, that is (by IIIP13S) one will have hatred for the person itself.

Sunday, February 23, 2025

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P44: Dynamic of Vacillation

Odium quod amore plane vincitur in amorem transit et amor propterea major est quam si odium non præcessisset.

Hatred which is overcome by plain love moves into love and love meanwhile is greater than if the hatred had not preceded it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Eodem modo procedit ac propositionis 38 hujus. Nam qui rem quam odit sive quam cum tristitia contemplari solebat, amare incipit, eo ipso quod amat, lætatur et huic lætitiæ quam amor involvit (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 13 hujus) illa etiam accedit quæ ex eo oritur quod conatus amovendi tristitiam quam odium involvit (ut in propositione 37 hujus ostendimus) prorsus juvatur concomitante idea ejus quem odio habuit tanquam causa.

This proceeds in the same way as IIIP38 [The Bigger the Love, the Bigger the Hate]. For whoever is accustomed to contemplating the one whom he hates or one with sadness, begins to love, by the way which one loves, is overjoyed and to this joy which love involves (see its definition in IIIP13 [Conatus to Forget]) that also happens which from this arising which persisting for removing the sadness which involves hatred (as we have shown in IIIP37 [Feedback Loop for Desire]) then is aided accompanied by the idea of that person whom one hated as if the cause.

SCHOLIUM: Quamvis res ita se habeat, nemo tamen conabitur rem aliquam odio habere vel tristitia affici ut majore hac lætitia fruatur hoc est nemo spe damnum recuperandi damnum sibi inferri cupiet nec ægrotare desiderabit spe convalescendi. Nam unusquisque suum esse conservare et tristitiam quantum potest amovere semper conabitur. Quod si contra concipi posset hominem posse cupere aliquem odio habere ut eum postea majore amore prosequatur, tum eundem odio habere semper desiderabit. Nam quo odium majus fuerit, eo amor erit major atque adeo desiderabit semper ut odium magis magisque augeatur et eadem de causa homo magis ac magis ægrotare conabitur ut majore lætitia ex restauranda valetudine postea fruatur atque adeo semper ægrotare conabitur, quod (per propositionem 6 hujus) est absurdum.

So even though it occurs this way, still no one will try to have hatred to something or be affected with sadness so that this greater joy might develop, that is no one by hope for recovering from an evil wishes to deliver an evil to oneself and will not desire to be sick with the hope of convalescence. For each and every one will always try to preserve oneself to be and as much as possible to be able to remove sadness. Because, in contrast, if one is able to conceive that a person is able to desire to hate something so that afterwards that person might follow with a greater love, then that person has always had hatred for the other. For so far as there might be greater hatred, in that way might be greater love and to such a degree will desire always that one might increase more and more hatred and from the same cause a person will try to be more and more ill so that with greater joy after it might produce from restored strength and to such a degree one will always try to be ill, which (by IIIP6 [Persevering in Itself]) is absurd.

Tuesday, February 18, 2025

Spinoza's Ethics: IIIP.43 - Hatred Dynamics

Odium reciproco odio augetur et amore contra deleri potest.

Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred and in return may be destroyed by love.

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui eum quem odit, odio contra erga se affectum esse imaginatur, eo ipso (per propositionem 40 hujus) novum odium oritur durante (per hypothesin) adhuc primo. Sed si contra eundem amore erga se affectum esse imaginetur, quatenus hoc imaginatur eatenus (per propositionem 30 hujus) se ipsum cum lætitia contemplatur et eatenus (per propositionem 29 hujus) eidem placere conabitur hoc est (per propositionem 41 hujus) eatenus conatur ipsum odio non habere nullaque tristitia afficere; qui quidem conatus (per propositionem 37 hujus) major vel minor erit pro ratione affectus ex quo oritur atque adeo si major fuerit illo qui ex odio oritur et quo rem quam odit (per propositionem 26 hujus) tristitia afficere conatur, ei prævalebit et odium ex animo delebit. Q.E.D.

Whoever hates a person who imagines to be affected with hatred towards oneself, from that itself (by IIIP40 [Reciprocity of Hatred]) arises a new hatred enduring (by hypothesis) to the highest. But if, on the other hand, one imagines that the same one one is affected with love towards oneself, insofar as one imagines this to such an extent (by IIIP30 [Looking at Others Looking at Us]) does one view oneself with joy and to such an extent (by IIIP29 [Influence of Opinion of Others]) will try to please the same one, that is (by IIIP41 [Power of Love]) to such an extent tries to not have hatred to the person and affect with no sadness; indeed, whatever persisting (by IIIP37 [Feedback Loop of Desire]) will be more or less an emotion by reason from which arises and to such an extent if more will have been by that which arose from hatred and from which one tried to affect with sadness that one whom one hated, to that one it will prevail and destroy hatred from the heart.

Wednesday, February 12, 2025

Spinoza's Ethics IIIP.42 - Desiring Quid for Love Quo

Qui in aliquem amore aut spe gloriæ motus beneficium contulit, contristabitur si viderit beneficium ingrato animo accipi.

Whoever moved by love or hope of glory bears goodwill to someone, will be upset if one might see goodwill being received with an ungrateful heart.

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui rem aliquam sibi similem amat, conatur quantum potest efficere ut ab ipsa contra ametur (per propositionem 33 hujus). Qui igitur præ amore in aliquem beneficium contulit, id facit desiderio quo tenetur ut contra ametur hoc est (per propositionem 34 hujus) spe gloriæ sive (per scholium propositionis 30 hujus) lætitiæ adeoque (per propositionem 12 hujus) hanc gloriæ causam quantum potest imaginari sive ut actu existentem contemplari conabitur. At (per hypothesin) aliud imaginatur quod ejusdem causæ existentiam secludit : ergo (per propositionem 19 hujus) eo ipso contristabitur. Q.E.D.

Whoever loves someone similar to oneself, will try as much as possible to be able to effect that one might be loved in return from the other (by IIIP33 [Reciprocity of Likeness]). Thus whoever bears goodwill towards another on behalf of love, desire makes it in what way it is held so that one might be loved in return that is (by IIIP34 [The More We Do the More We Try]) by hope of glory (by IIIP30S [Looking At Others Looking At Us]) or joy to such an extent (by IIIP12 [Conatus of Mind]) to be imagined this cause of glory as much as possible or will try to contemplate its existence in reality. But (by hypothesis) one imagines something which excludes the cause of its own existence: thus (by IIIP19 [Impact on Loved One]) will be upset by that itself.

Thursday, February 6, 2025

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P41 - Power of Love

Si quis ab aliquo se amari imaginatur nec se ullam ad id causam dedisse credit (quod per corollarium propositionis 15 et per propositionem 16 hujus fieri potest) eundem contra amabit.

If anyone imagines that one is loved by another and does not believe that one has given that person reason for this (by IIIP15C [Association] and IIIP16 it is able to happen) one will love that person in return.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio eadem via demonstratur ac præcedens. Cujus etiam scholium vide.

This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding. See also its scholium.

SCHOLIUM: Quod si se justam amoris causam præbuisse crediderit, gloriabitur (per propositionem 30 hujus cum ejusdem scholio) quod quidem (per propositionem 25 hujus) frequentius contingit et cujus contrarium evenire diximus quando aliquis ab aliquo se odio haberi imaginatur (vide scholium propositionis præcedentis). Porro hic reciprocus amor et consequenter (per propositionem 39 hujus) conatus benefaciendi ei qui nos amat quique (per eandem propositionem 39 hujus) nobis benefacere conatur, gratia seu gratitudo vocatur atque adeo apparet homines longe paratiores esse ad vindictam quam ad referendum beneficium.

Whatever one might believe to have made oneself the just cause of love, will be celebrated (by IIIP30 with its scholium [Looking at Others Looking at Us]) which indeed (by IIIP25 [Love Bias]) frequently occurs and we said that its contrary occurs when someone imagines that one has hatred from another (see IIIP40S [Reciprocity of Hatred]). Next this love is reciprocated and consequently (by IIIP39 [Self-interest Perception]) persisting for doing good to that person who loves us and who (by the same IIIP39) tries to do good for us, is called thanks and gratitude and to such an extent appears that people are by far more directed to vindication than bearing goodwill.

COROLLARIUM: Qui ab eo quem odio habet, se amari imaginatur, odio et amore simul conflictabitur. Quod eadem via qua primum propositionis præcedentis corollarium demonstratur.

Whoever imagines that one is loved by another towards whom one has hatred, will be conflicted by love and hatred at the same time. Which was demonstrated in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding proposition.

SCHOLIUM: Quod si odium prævaluerit, ei a quo amatur malum inferre conabitur, qui quidem affectus crudelitas appellatur præcipue si illum qui amat nullam odii communem causam præbuisse creditur.

If some hatred might prevail, then one will try to bear evil to that person from whom one was loved, indeed which emotion is called cruelty especially if one believes that person who one loved to have presented no common cause of hatred.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P47

Lætitia quæ ex eo oritur quod scilicet rem quam odimus destrui aut alio malo affici imaginamur, non oritur absque ulla animi tristitia. Joy ...