III.P51

Diversi homines ab uno eodemque objecto diversimode affici possunt et unus idemque homo ab uno eodemque objecto potest diversis temporibus diversimode affici.

Different people are able to be affected by one and the same object in different ways and one and the same person is able to be affected by the same object in different ways at different times.

DEMONSTRATIO: Corpus humanum (per postulatum 3 partis II) a corporibus externis plurimis modis afficitur. Possunt igitur eodem tempore duo homines diversimode esse affecti atque adeo (per axioma 1 quod est post lemma 3, quod vide post propositionem 13 partis II) ab uno eodemque objecto possunt diversimode affici. Deinde (per idem postulatum) corpus humanum potest jam hoc jam alio modo esse affectum et consequenter (per idem axioma) ab uno eodemque objecto diversis temporibus diversimode affici. Q.E.D.

The human body (by IIPost.3) is affected by external bodies in very many ways. Thus, two people are able to be affected at the same time in different ways and to such an extent (see after IIP13, by A1 which is after L3) from one and the same object are able to be affected in different ways. Then (by IIPost.3) the human body is able to be affected now in this (way) and then in another and consequently (by the same A1) to be affected by one and the same object at different times in different ways.

SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque fieri posse ut quod hic amat, alter odio habeat et quod hic metuit, alter non metuat et ut unus idemque homo jam amet quod antea oderit et ut jam audeat quod antea timuit etc. Deinde quia unusquisque ex suo affectu judicat quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius et quid pejus sit (vide scholium propositionis 39 hujus) sequitur homines tam judicio quam affectu variare posse et hinc fit ut cum alios aliis comparamus, ex sola affectuum differentia a nobis distinguantur et ut alios intrepidos, alios timidos, alios denique alio nomine appellemus. Exempli gratia illum ego intrepidum vocabo qui malum contemnit quod ego timere soleo et si præterea ad hoc attendam quod ejus cupiditas malum inferendi ei quem odit et benefaciendi ei quem amat, non coercetur timore mali a quo ego contineri soleo, ipsum audacem appellabo. Deinde ille mihi timidus videbitur qui malum timet quod ego contemnere soleo et si insuper ad hoc attendam quod ejus cupiditas coercetur timore mali quod me continere nequit, ipsum pusillanimem esse dicam et sic unusquisque judicabit. Denique ex hac hominis natura et judicii inconstantia ut et quod homo sæpe ex solo affectu de rebus judicat et quod res quas ad lætitiam vel tristitiam facere credit quasque propterea (per propositionem 28 hujus) ut fiant promovere vel amovere conatur, sæpe non nisi imaginariæ sint ut jam taceam alia quæ in II parte ostendimus de rerum incertitudine, facile concipimus hominem posse sæpe in causa esse tam ut contristetur quam ut lætetur sive ut tam tristitia quam lætitia afficiatur concomitante idea sui tanquam causa atque adeo facile intelligimus quid p™nitentia et quid acquiescentia in se ipso sit. Nempe p™nitentia est tristitia concomitante idea sui et acquiescentia in se ipso est lætitia concomitante idea sui tanquam causa et hi affectus vehementissimi sunt quia homines se liberos esse credunt (vide propositionem 49 hujus). 

We see, thus, it is able to happen the what this one loves, another hates and what this one fears, another does not fear and that one and the same person now loves what before one hated and that one dares what another fears, etc. Then because each and every one judges from one's own affect what is good, what is bad, what is better and what is worse (see IIIP39S) it follows that people can vary by not only judgment by also affect and from here it happens that when we compare one with another, they are distinguished from us only by a difference in their affects and so we call some fearless, others timid and then others by another name. For example, I will call one fearless who disdains a bad thing which I am used to fear and if besides I will attend to this which his desire to do harm to one whom he hates and to do well to one whom one loves, it will not be restrained by fear of evil by which I am used to contain, I will call audacious. Then, that one seems timid to me who fears an evil which I am used to disdain and if, further, I will attend to this which desire of his is restrained by a fear of evil which does speak to contain me, I will call that one cowardly and judge thus each and every one. Then from this nature of people

III.P50: Wired to Correlate and to See As Causal

Res quæcunque potest esse per accidens spei aut metus causa.

Anything whatsoever is able to be, by accident, the cause of either hope or fear.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio eadem via demonstratur qua propositio 15 hujus, quam vide una cum scholio II propositionis 18 hujus.

This same proposition is demonstrated by IIIIP15; see along with IIIP18S2.

SCHOLIUM: Res quæ per accidens spei aut metus sunt causæ, bona aut mala omina vocantur. Deinde quatenus hæc eadem omina sunt spei aut metus causa eatenus (per definitionem spei et metus, quam vide in scholio II propositionis 18 hujus) lætitiæ aut tristitiæ sunt causa et consequenter (per corollarium propositionis 15 hujus) eatenus eadem amamus vel odio habemus et (per propositionem 28 hujus) tanquam media ad ea quæ speramus, adhibere vel tanquam obstacula aut metus causas amovere conamur. Præterea ex propositione 25 hujus sequitur nos natura ita esse constitutos ut ea quæ speramus, facile, quæ autem timemus, difficile credamus et ut de iis plus minusve justo sentiamus. Atque ex his ortæ sunt superstitiones quibus homines ubique conflictantur. Cæterum non puto operæ esse pretium animi hic ostendere fluctuationes quæ ex spe et metu oriuntur quandoquidem ex sola horum affectuum definitione sequitur non dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe (ut fusius suo loco explicabimus) et præterea quandoquidem quatenus aliquid speramus aut metuimus eatenus idem amamus vel odio habemus atque adeo quicquid de amore et odio diximus, facile unusquisque spei et metui applicare poterit.

Anythings which, by accident, are the causes of hope or fear, are called everything good or bad. Then insofar as these same things are the cause of hope or fear - just so far (by the definition of hope and fear, on which see IIIP18S2) are the cause of joy or sadness and consequently (by IIIP15C) just so much by the same do we love or hate and (by IIIP28) we try to invoke as if the means to things for which we hope, or to remove as if their obstacles or causes of fear. Besides from IIIP25 it follows that we are, by nature so, constituted so that we believe easily the things which we hope for, moreover with difficulty, (the things) which we fear and as a result, from these, we feel more or less than is just. And superstitions arising from these by which humans everywhere are conflicted. I do not think that for the rest of the work it worth the reward to show the fluctuations of the soul here which arise from the hope or fear since it follows from the definition alone of these affects that hope without fear and fear without hope do not exist (as we will explain more fully in another place) and besides since insofar as we hope for or fear something just so much do we love or hate the same and to such an extent as we have talked something about love and hate, it might easily have been applied to each and every hope and fear.

III.P49 - Free Act is Solo Act

Amor et odium erga rem quam liberam esse imaginamur, major ex pari causa uterque debet esse quam erga necessariam.

Love and hatred towards something which we imagine to be free, either one ought to be greater from an equal cause than towards something (which we imagine to be) necessary.

DEMONSTRATIO: Res quam liberam esse imaginamur, debet (per definitionem 7 partis I) per se absque aliis percipi. Si igitur eandem lætitiæ vel tristitiæ causam esse imaginemur, eo ipso (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) eandem amabimus vel odio habebimus idque (per propositionem præcedentem) summo amore vel odio qui ex dato affectu oriri potest. Sed si rem quæ ejusdem affectus est causa ut necessariam imaginemur, tum (per eandem definitionem 7 partis I) ipsam non solam sed cum aliis ejusdem affectus causam esse imaginabimur atque adeo (per propositionem præcedentem) amor et odium erga ipsam minor erit. Q.E.D.

Demonstration: Something which we imagine to be free ought (by IP7D) be perceived through itself and away from others. Therefore if we imagine the same thing to be the cause of joy or sadness, by this itself (by IIIPS) we will love the same thing or hate the same thing and it (by IIIP48) with the highest love or hatred which is able to be aroused by the affect experienced. But if something which is the cause of the same affect that we imagine to be necessary, then (by the same IP7D), not only itself but also with others do we imagine to be the cause of the same affect and to such an extent (by IIIP48) the love and hatred will be lesser towards that thing.

SCHOLIUM: Hinc sequitur homines, quia se liberos esse existimant, majore amore vel odio se invicem prosequi quam alia; ad quod accedit affectuum imitatio, de qua vide propositiones 27, 34, 40 et 43 hujus.

Scholium: From this it follows that humans, because they estimate that they (as humans) are free, with greater love or hatred do they engage with each other than towards others (which are not humans); to which the imitation of the affects does occur, concerning this see IIIP27, 34, 40 and 43.   

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P48 - Power of Perceived Cause

Amor et odium exempli gratia erga Petrum destruitur si tristitia quam hoc et lætitia quam ille involvit, ideæ alterius causæ jungatur et eatenus uterque diminuitur quatenus imaginamur Petrum non solum fuisse alterutrius causam.

Love and hatred, for example, is destroyed towards Peter if sadness which involves the latter (hatred) or joy which involves the former (love), is joined to the idea of another cause and insofar as each of them are diminished to the extent that we imagine that Peter has not been the only cause of either.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex sola amoris et odii definitione, quam vide in scholio propositionis 13 hujus. Nam propter hoc solum lætitia vocatur amor et tristitia odium erga Petrum quia scilicet Petrus hujus vel illius affectus causa esse consideratur. Hoc itaque prorsus vel ex parte sublato affectus quoque erga Petrum prorsus vel ex parte diminuitur. Q.E.D. 

It is clear from the definition of love and hatred alone, which see in IIIP13S. For on account of this along joy is called love and sadness hatred toward Peter because of course Peter is considered the cause of this or that affect. Thus, this affect, removed either wholly or in part is also towards Peter diminished either wholly or in part.

 In III.P48, Spinoza is accentuating our causally-oriented mind. As we register an increase or decrease in perfection, so do we follow the source. This identification process is fraught with opportunities to get it wrong and lead to false ideas of love and hatred.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P47

Lætitia quæ ex eo oritur quod scilicet rem quam odimus destrui aut alio malo affici imaginamur, non oritur absque ulla animi tristitia.

Joy which arises from where because of course a thing which we hate we imagine to be destroyed or affected by another evil, does not arise and from any sadness of spirit.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex propositione 27 hujus. Nam quatenus rem nobis similem tristitia affici imaginamur eatenus contristamur.

This is evident from IIIP27. For insofar we imagine a thing similar to us is affected with sadness to such a degree we are saddened.

SCHOLIUM: Potest hæc propositio etiam demonstrari ex corollario propositionis 17 partis II. Quoties enim rei recordamur, quamvis ipsa actu non existat, eandem tamen ut præsentem contemplamur corpusque eodem modo afficitur; quare quatenus rei memoria viget eatenus homo determinatur ad eandem cum tristitia contemplandum; quæ determinatio manente adhuc rei imagine coercetur quidem memoria illarum rerum quæ hujus existentiam secludunt sed non tollitur atque adeo homo eatenus tantum lætatur quatenus hæc determinatio coercetur et hinc fit ut hæc lætitia quæ ex rei quam odimus malo oritur, toties repetatur quoties ejusdem rei recordamur. Nam uti diximus quando ejusdem rei imago excitatur, quia hæc ipsius rei existentiam involvit, hominem determinat ad rem cum eadem tristitia contemplandum qua eandem contemplari solebat cum ipsa existeret. Sed quia ejusdem rei imagini alias junxit quæ ejusdem existentiam secludunt, ideo hæc ad tristitiam determinatio statim coercetur et homo de novo lætatur et hoc toties quoties hæc repetitio fit. Atque hæc eadem est causa cur homines lætantur quoties alicujus jam præteriti mali recordantur et cur pericula a quibus liberati sunt, narrare gaudeant. Nam ubi aliquod periculum imaginantur, idem veluti adhuc futurum contemplantur et ad id metuendum determinantur, quæ determinatio de novo coercetur idea libertatis quam hujus periculi ideæ junxerunt cum ab eodem liberati sunt quæque eos de novo securos reddit atque adeo de novo lætantur.

This proposition is also able to be demonstrated from IIP17C. For as much as we remember a thing, although it does not exist in actuality, nevertheless we contemplate the same thing as if present and the body is affected in the same way; which, since the determination is remaining, to where the image of the thing is forced, indeed the memory of those things which exclude its existence but are not raised, and to the degree that a person is elated to such a degree as much as this determination is forced and this happens so that this joy which arises from the thing which we hate badly, is always repeated for how much we recall this matter. For we have said to use when the image of some thing excites, because this involves existence itself, determines one for contemplating with the same sadness by which one is accustomed to contemplate it exists with itself. But because one's imagined thing is joined to others which exclude the existence of the same thing, then this determination is immediately forced to sadness and one is overjoyed by the new thing and this repetition occurs all the time. And this same thing is the reason why people are overjoyed as many times as they recall the prevention of some evil and why being freed from dangers they rejoice to retell. For when they imagine some danger, they contemplate the same thing as if still the future and determined to fear it which determination is compelled about the new idea of liberty which has joined to the ideas of this danger when they were liberated from the same which returns them secure from the new thing and they rejoice to such a degree about the new thing.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P46 - Group Bias

Si quis ab aliquo cujusdam classis sive nationis a sua diversæ lætitia vel tristitia affectus fuerit concomitante ejus idea sub nomine universali classis vel nationis tanquam causa, is non tantum illum sed omnes ejusdem classis vel nationis amabit vel odio habebit.

If anyone might be from some of the same class or nation affected by their varieties of joy or sadness accompanied by its idea under the same of the universal class or nation as the cause, then not only will one have hatred or love for that person, but for all of that same class or nation.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus rei demonstratio patet ex propositione 16 hujus partis.

The demonstration of this matter is evident from IIIP16 [Correlation].

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P45 - Love Greater Than Similarity

Si quis aliquem sibi similem odio in rem sibi similem quam amat, affectum esse imaginatur, eum odio habebit.

If anyone imagines that another person similar to oneself is affected with hatred towards a thing similar to oneself - which one loves, one will have hatred towards that other person.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam res amata eum qui ipsam odit, odio contra habet (per propositionem 40 hujus) adeoque amans qui aliquem imaginatur rem amatam odio habere, eo ipso rem amatam odio hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) tristitia affectam esse imaginatur et consequenter (per propositionem 21 hujus) contristatur idque concomitante idea ejus qui rem amatam odit tanquam causa hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) ipsum odio habebit. Q.E.D.

For the beloved one [feminine nominative case] in return has hatred for that person who hates the beloved one itself, (by IIIP40 [Reciprocity of Hatred]) and to such an extent the lover who imagines someone has hatred for the beloved one, by this hatred itself one imagines that the beloved one (by IIIP13S [Conatus to Forget]) is affected with sadness and consequently (by IIIP21 [Responsiveness to Beloved]) is saddened and accompanied by the idea of who hates the beloved thing is as such, the cause, that is (by IIIP13S) one will have hatred for the person itself.