III.D20: Indignation Defined

Indignatio est odium erga aliquem qui alteri malefecit.

Indignation is hatred towards someone who hurt another.

EXPLICATIO: Hæc nomina ex communi usu aliud significare scio. Sed meum institutum non est verborum significationem sed rerum naturam explicare easque iis vocabulis indicare quorum significatio quam ex usu habent, a significatione qua eadem usurpare volo, non omnino abhorret, quod semel monuisse sufficiat. Cæterum horum affectuum causam vide in corollario I propositionis 27 et scholio propositionis 22 hujus partis.

I know that these names signify something else from common usage. But my intention is not the significance of words but to explain the nature of thing and to point out with these words whose significance which have from usage, from a significance by which same word I wish to usurp, which is not altogether opposed, let it suffice to have been warned.   

III.D19: Favor Defined

Favor est amor erga aliquem qui alteri benefecit.

Favor is love towards someone who has benefited another. 

III.D18: Commiseration Defined

Commiseratio est tristitia concomitante idea mali quod alteri quem nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit. Vide scholium propositionis 22 et scholium propositionis 27 hujus.

Commiseration is a sadness accompanied by the idea of a bad thing which occurs to another whom we imagine is similar to ourselves. See IIIP22S and IIIP27S. 

EXPLICATIO: Inter commiserationem et misericordiam nulla videtur esse differentia nisi forte quod commiseratio singularem affectum respiciat, misericordia autem ejus habitum.

Between commiseration and compassion there seems to be no difference unless perhaps because commiseration might reflect a singular affect, while compassion reflects one's demeanor. 

Again Spinoza situates the affect in a bodily positioning. One can almost feel the difference here with commiseration feeling like a core experience (due to personal identification), while compassion is felt more at a peripheral level - like the skin. 

III.D17: Biting of Conscience Defined

Conscientiæ morsus est tristitia concomitante idea rei præteritæ quæ præter spem evenit.

Biting of conscience (or remorse) is a sadness accompanied by the idea of a past thing which turned out beyond hope. 

Here we have a hope unmet and Spinoza uses a phrase that exactly describes the physical sensation - consistent with the concept that the mind is the idea of the body and, thus, bodily-centered. 

III.D16: Thrilling Defined

Gaudium est lætitia concomitante idea rei præteritæ quæ præter spem evenit. 

Thrilling is joy accompanied by the idea of a past thing which occurred beyond hope. 

Spinoza is describing a pattern in which not only are expectations unmet, met or exceeded, but also hopes are similarly unmet, met or exceeded. Here is where hope is exceeded. 

III.D15: Desperation Defined

Desperatio est tristitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.

Desperation is a sadness born of the idea of a future or past matter which has been raised as a cause for concern.

EXPLICATIO: Oritur itaque ex spe securitas et ex metu desperatio quando de rei eventu dubitandi causa tollitur, quod fit quia homo rem præteritam vel futuram adesse imaginatur et ut præsentem contemplatur vel quia alia imaginatur quæ existentiam earum rerum secludunt quæ ipsi dubium injiciebant. Nam tametsi de rerum singularium eventu (per corollarium propositionis 31 partis II) nunquam possumus esse certi, fieri tamen potest ut de earum eventu non dubitemus. Aliud enim esse ostendimus (vide scholium propositionis 49 partis II) de re non dubitare, aliud rei certitudinem habere atque adeo fieri potest ut ex imagine rei præteritæ aut futuræ eodem lætitiæ vel tristitiæ affectu afficiamur ac ex rei præsentis imagine, ut in propositione 18 hujus demonstravimus, quam cum ejusdem scholiis vide. 

Thus security arises from hope desperation from fear when the cause for doubting the eventual outcome is raised, because it happens since a person imagines a past or future thing as present and as one contemplates the present thing or other things one imagines which exclude the existence of these things which throw themselves into doubt. For even if concerning the outcome of singular things (by IIP31C) we are unable to be certain, nonetheless it can happen that we do not doubt the outcome of them. For we have shown that it is one thing (see IIP49S) to not doubt something, something else to have certainty about a matter and to such an extent it is able to happen that from the image of a past or future thing we are affected by an affect of joy or sadness and from the image of the thing present, as we have shown in IIIP18, then see with scholia of the same. 

The explanation here is important for an insight into Spinoza's view on thinking. We might commonly hold that not doubting something is the same as being certain of something, but still most of us actually hold that not doubting someone is the same as "believing" someone. Certainty has a much higher standard and most of us have faced that dreaded question, "Are you certain?" only to find some hesitation. Spinoza is setting out a tool for managing the reactivity of hopes and fears by allowing these affects to be muted by a simple question "Are you certain?"

 

III.D14: Security Defined

Securitas est lætitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.

Security is a joy born of the idea of a past or future matter about which there has been raised as a cause for concern.