III.D15: Desperation Defined

Desperatio est tristitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.

Desperation is a sadness born of the idea of a future or past matter which has been raised as a cause for concern.

EXPLICATIO: Oritur itaque ex spe securitas et ex metu desperatio quando de rei eventu dubitandi causa tollitur, quod fit quia homo rem præteritam vel futuram adesse imaginatur et ut præsentem contemplatur vel quia alia imaginatur quæ existentiam earum rerum secludunt quæ ipsi dubium injiciebant. Nam tametsi de rerum singularium eventu (per corollarium propositionis 31 partis II) nunquam possumus esse certi, fieri tamen potest ut de earum eventu non dubitemus. Aliud enim esse ostendimus (vide scholium propositionis 49 partis II) de re non dubitare, aliud rei certitudinem habere atque adeo fieri potest ut ex imagine rei præteritæ aut futuræ eodem lætitiæ vel tristitiæ affectu afficiamur ac ex rei præsentis imagine, ut in propositione 18 hujus demonstravimus, quam cum ejusdem scholiis vide. 

Thus security arises from hope desperation from fear when the cause for doubting the eventual outcome is raised, because it happens since a person imagines a past or future thing as present and as one contemplates the present thing or other things one imagines which exclude the existence of these things which throw themselves into doubt. For even if concerning the outcome of singular things (by IIP31C) we are unable to be certain, nonetheless it can happen that we do not doubt the outcome of them. For we have shown that it is one thing (see IIP49S) to not doubt something, something else to have certainty about a matter and to such an extent it is able to happen that from the image of a past or future thing we are affected by an affect of joy or sadness and from the image of the thing present, as we have shown in IIIP18, then see with scholia of the same. 

The explanation here is important for an insight into Spinoza's view on thinking. We might commonly hold that not doubting something is the same as being certain of something, but still most of us actually hold that not doubting someone is the same as "believing" someone. Certainty has a much higher standard and most of us have faced that dreaded question, "Are you certain?" only to find some hesitation. Spinoza is setting out a tool for managing the reactivity of hopes and fears by allowing these affects to be muted by a simple question "Are you certain?"

 

III.D14: Security Defined

Securitas est lætitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.

Security is a joy born of the idea of a past or future matter about which there has been raised as a cause for concern. 

III.D13: Fear Defined

Metus est inconstans tristitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus. Vide de his scholium II propositionis 18 hujus.

Fear is an uncertain sadness born of the idea of a future or past thing about whose outcome we are to some extent hesitant. See IIIP18S2 concerning these.

EXPLICATIO: Ex his definitionibus sequitur non dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe. Qui enim spe pendet et de rei eventu dubitat, is aliquid imaginari supponitur quod rei futuræ existentiam secludit atque adeo eatenus contristari (per propositionem 19 hujus) et consequenter dum spe pendet, metuere ut res eveniat. Qui autem contra in metu est hoc est de rei quam odit eventu dubitat, aliquid etiam imaginatur quod ejusdem rei existentiam secludit atque adeo (per propositionem 20 hujus) lætatur et consequenter eatenus spem habet ne eveniat.

From these definitions, it follows that hope does not exist without fear nor fear without hope. For whoever ponders with hope and doubts the outcome of a matter, is supposed to imagine something which excludes the existence of a future thing and to such an extent is saddened (by IIIP19) and consequently as long as one ponders with hop, fears that the thing may occur. In contrast, whoever is in fear, that is, one is hesitant about the outcome concerning a thing which one hates, also imagines something which excludes the existence of the same thing and to such an extent (by IIIP20) is overjoyed and consequently has hope to an extent that it not occur. 

III.D12: Hope Defined

Spes est inconstans lætitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus.

Hope is an uncertain joy born of the idea of a future thing or a past one about whose outcome we are somewhat hesitant.  

III.D11: Mockery Defined

Irrisio est lætitia orta ex eo quod aliquid quod contemnimus in re quam odimus inesse imaginamur.

Mockery is a joy arising from where we imagine something which we scorn to be in something which we hate.

EXPLICATIO: Quatenus rem quam odimus contemnimus eatenus de eadem existentiam negamus (vide scholium propositionis 52 hujus) et eatenus (per propositionem 20 hujus) lætamur. Sed quoniam supponimus hominem id quod irridet odio tamen habere, sequitur hanc lætitiam solidam non esse. Vide scholium propositionis 47 hujus.

Insofar as we scorn that which we hate to such a degree do we deny the existence of a thing (see IIIP52S) and to such a degree (by IIIP20) do we rejoice. But since we suppose a person has hatred for that which one mocks, it follows that this joy is not solid. See IIIP47S. 

Spinoza is highlighting the complexity of moods around memories. In order to attain blessedness, clarity or processing of past events is important. For that reason, he revisits the issues raised by the things hated in the past.

 

III.D10: Devotion Defined

Devotio est amor erga eum quem admiramur.

Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.

EXPLICATIO: Admirationem oriri ex rei novitate ostendimus propositione 52 hujus. Si igitur contingat ut id quod admiramur sæpe imaginemur, idem admirari desinemus atque adeo videmus devotionis affectum facile in simplicem amorem degenerare. 

We demonstrated in IIIP52 that admiration arises from some novelty. Thus, if it happens that we often imagine whatever we admire, we will cease to admire the same and to such an extent we see that the feeling of devotion devolves easily into simple love.

Spinoza continues his careful reading of emotions related to awe, wonder, veneration and devotion as simply aberrations based on strangeness or newness. So, these aberrations are not desirable or lofty, but are temporary experiences on the way to understanding. Religion, in contrast, holds the highest regard for such feelings. Spinoza's careful approach to this category of emotions gives weight to the argument that the power of "the intellectual love of God" is fundamentally anti-religious and rational in its nature, rather than an overpowering "spiritual experience" in support of a rational decision. The priority of such anti-religious and rational basis is its durability, because novelty fades and, as he points out here, with it the overpowering nature of the religious emotions.

III.D9: Aversion Defined

Aversio est tristitia concomitante idea alicujus rei quæ per accidens causa est tristitiæ. De his vide scholium propositionis 15 hujus.

Aversion is a sadness accompanied by the idea of some thing which is a sadness by accidental cause. On these see IIIP15S. 

Consistent with the discussion on tendency, Spinoza is arguing another behavior is rooted in the primitives - this time sadness. For centuries, people have debated the idea of boys loving, and girls hating spiders and snakes. Spinoza is arguing that this "accidental" perception is rooted in an unwillingness to acknowledge the cultivation of the emotions driving, in this case, aversion.