III.P56

Lætitiæ, tristitiæ et cupiditatis et consequenter uniuscujusque affectus qui ex his componitur ut animi fluctuationis vel qui ab his derivatur nempe amoris, odii, spei, metus etc. tot species dantur quot sunt species objectorum a quibus afficimur.

There are as many kinds of joy, sadness and desire, and consequently of each and every affect which is made up of these [three] as a fluctuation of mood or which are derived from these [three], namely, of love, hatred, hope, fear etc as there are many kinds of objects by which we are affected.

DEMONSTRATIO: Lætitia et tristitia et consequenter affectus qui ex his componuntur vel ex his derivantur, passiones sunt (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus); nos autem (per propositionem 1 hujus) necessario patimur quatenus ideas habemus inadæquatas et quatenus easdem habemus (per propositionem 3 hujus) eatenus tantum patimur hoc est (vide scholium I propositionis 40 partis II) eatenus tantum necessario patimur quatenus imaginamur sive (vide propositionem 17 partis II cum ejus scholio) quatenus afficimur affectu qui naturam nostri corporis et naturam corporis externi involvit. Natura igitur uniuscujusque passionis ita necessario debet explicari ut objecti a quo afficimur, natura exprimatur. Nempe lætitia quæ ex objecto exempli gratia A oritur, naturam ipsius objecti A et lætitia quæ ex objecto B oritur, ipsius objecti B naturam involvit atque adeo hi duo lætitiæ affectus natura sunt diversi quia ex causis diversæ naturæ oriuntur. Sic etiam tristitiæ affectus qui ex uno objecto oritur, diversus natura est a tristitia quæ ab alia causa oritur, quod etiam de amore, odio, spe, metu, animi fluctuatione etc. intelligendum est ac proinde lætitiæ, tristitiæ, amoris, odii etc. tot species necessario dantur quot sunt species objectorum a quibus afficimur. At cupiditas est ipsa uniuscujusque essentia seu natura quatenus ex data quacunque ejus constitutione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum (vide scholium propositionis 9 hujus); ergo prout unusquisque a causis externis hac aut illa lætitiæ, tristitiæ, amoris, odii etc. specie afficitur hoc est prout ejus natura hoc aut alio modo constituitur, ita ejus cupiditas alia atque alia esse et natura unius a natura alterius cupiditatis tantum differre necesse est quantum affectus a quibus unaquæque oritur, inter se differunt. Dantur itaque tot species cupiditatis quot sunt species lætitiæ, tristitiæ, amoris etc. et consequenter (per jam ostensa) quot sunt objectorum species a quibus afficimur. Q.E.D.

Joy and sadness and consequently affects which are made up from these or derived from them are passions (by IIIP11S); moreover we (by IIIP1) suffer necessarily insofar as we have inadequate ideas and insofar as we have the same [inadequate ideas] (by IIIP3) do we suffer to such an extent, that is (see IIP40S1) to such an extent do we necessarily suffer insofar as we imagine or (see IIP17 and IIP17S) insofar as we are affected by an affect which involves to the nature of our body and the nature of an external body. Thus the nature of each and every passion ought necessarily be explained as the nature of the object (by which we are affected) is being expressed. Namely, a joy which arises from an object, for example, A, involves the nature of object A itself and the joy which arises from object B, involves the nature of object B itself and to such a degree these two affects of joy are different by nature due to natures of the causes arise diversely. Thus, also the affect of sadness which arises from one object is diverse by nature by the sadness which arises from another cause, which also ought to be understood from love, hatred, hope, fear, a change in mood etc and so there exist necessarily just as many kinds of joy, sadness, love, hatred etc as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected. But desire is the essence itself of each and every one or its nature insofar as it it conceived to be determined by whatever constitution of it is given for doing something (see IIIP9S); 

SCHOLIUM: Inter affectuum species quæ (per propositionem præcedentem) perplurimæ esse debent, insignes sunt luxuria, ebrietas, libido, avaritia et ambitio, quæ non nisi amoris vel cupiditatis sunt notiones quæ hujus utriusque affectus naturam explicant per objecta ad quæ referuntur. Nam per luxuriam, ebrietatem, libidinem, avaritiam et ambitionem nihil aliud intelligimus quam convivandi, potandi, coeundi, divitiarum et gloriæ immoderatum amorem vel cupiditatem. Præterea hi affectus quatenus eos per solum objectum ad quod referuntur ab aliis distinguimus, contrarios non habent. Nam temperantia quam luxuriæ et sobrietas quam ebrietati et denique castitas quam libidini opponere solemus, affectus seu passiones non sunt sed animi indicant potentiam quæ hos affectus moderatur. Cæterum reliquas affectuum species hic explicare nec possum (quia tot sunt quot objectorum species) nec si possem, necesse est. Nam ad id quod intendimus nempe ad affectuum vires et mentis in eosdem potentiam determinandum, nobis sufficit uniuscujusque affectus generalem habere definitionem. Sufficit inquam nobis affectuum et mentis communes proprietates intelligere ut determinare possimus qualis et quanta sit mentis potentia in moderandis et coercendis affectibus. Quamvis itaque magna sit differentia inter hunc et illum amoris, odii vel cupiditatis affectum exempli gratia inter amorem erga liberos et inter amorem erga uxorem, nobis tamen has differentias cognoscere et affectuum naturam et originem ulterius indagare, non est opus.

III.P55 - Comparing Ourselves To Others

Cum mens suam impotentiam imaginatur, eo ipso contristatur.

When the mind imagines its own impotence, it is depressed by it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis essentia id tantum quod mens est et potest, affirmat sive de natura mentis est ea tantummodo imaginari quæ ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt (per propositionem præcedentem). Cum itaque dicimus quod mens dum se ipsam contemplatur, suam imaginatur impotentiam, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod dum mens aliquid imaginari conatur quod ipsius agendi potentiam ponit, hic ejus conatus coercetur sive (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) quod ipsa contristatur. Q.E.D.

The essence of the mind affirms only that which the mind is and is able or from the nature of the mind is to imagine things in such a way which support the potential of its acting (by IIIP54). Since thus we say that the mind as long as it contemplates itself, imagines its own impotence, we say nothing other than that as long as the mind attempts to imagine something which supports its potential of acting, this efforting of it is compelled or (by IIIP11S) is depressed by itself.

COROLLARIUM: Hæc tristitia magis ac magis fovetur si se ab aliis vituperari imaginatur; quod eodem modo demonstratur ac corollarium propositionis 53 hujus.

This sadness is more and more nurtured if one imagines oneself faulted by others; which in the same way is demonstrated from IIIP53C.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc tristitia concomitante idea nostræ imbecillitatis humilitas appellatur; lætitia autem quæ ex contemplatione nostri oritur, philautia vel acquiescentia in se ipso vocatur. Et quoniam hæc toties repetitur quoties homo suas virtutes sive suam agendi potentiam contemplatur, hinc ergo etiam fit ut unusquisque facta sua narrare suique tam corporis quam animi vires ostentare gestiat et ut homines hac de causa sibi invicem molesti sint. Ex quibus iterum sequitur homines natura esse invidos (vide scholium propositionis 24 et scholium propositionis 32 hujus) sive ob suorum æqualium imbecillitatem gaudere et contra propter eorundem virtutem contristari. Nam quoties unusquisque suas actiones imaginatur toties lætitia (per propositionem 53 hujus) afficitur et eo majore quo actiones plus perfectionis exprimere et easdem distinctius imaginatur hoc est (per illa quæ in scholio I propositionis 40 partis II dicta sunt) quo magis easdem ab aliis distinguere et ut res singulares contemplari potest. Quare unusquisque ex contemplatione sui tunc maxime gaudebit quando aliquid in se contemplatur quod de reliquis negat. Sed si id quod de se affirmat, ad universalem hominis vel animalis ideam refert, non tantopere gaudebit et contra contristabitur si suas ad aliorum actiones comparatas imbecilliores esse imaginetur, quam quidem tristitiam (per propositionem 28 hujus) amovere conabitur idque suorum æqualium actiones perperam interpretando vel suas quantum potest adornando. Apparet igitur homines natura proclives esse ad odium et invidiam ad quam accedit ipsa educatio. Nam parentes solo honoris et invidiæ stimulo liberos ad virtutem concitare solent. Sed scrupulus forsan remanet quod non raro hominum virtutes admiremur eosque veneremur. Hunc ergo ut amoveam sequens addam corollarium.

This sadness accompanied by the idea of our weakness is called humility; moreover joy which arises from contemplation of ourselves is called self-love or acquiescence in oneself. And since this just as often as it is repeated so often does a person contemplate ones own virtues or power of acting, thus from this also it happens that each and every person is eager to tell ones doings and to show strength of the body as well as of the mind and, so, people are annoying to each other on this account. From which again it follows that people are naturally jealous (see IIIP24 and IIIP32S) or to rejoice at weakness equal to themselves and, in contrast, to be saddened on account of the strength of others. For whenever each and every one imagines ones one action so then is affected with joy (by IIIP53) and the greater the actions one imagines them to express more of perfection and the more distinctly the same, that is (by that said in IIP40SI) the more one is able to distinguish the same things from other and to be contemplated as singular things. Therefore each and every one will rejoice maximally then by the contemplation of oneself when something is contemplated in oneself which is denied to the others. But if it affirms something about oneself, it refers to the universal idea of a person or an animal, one will not rejoice so greatly and in contrast one is saddened if one imagines that ones own actions are compared to the stupidities of others, then indeed one will try to remove the sadness (by IIIP28) and by interpreting wrongly it as actions of ones own equals or by adorning ones own as much as one is able. Thus, it appears that people are by nature inclined to hatred and envy to which education itself approaches. For parents are accustomed to motivate children towards virtue by only the stimulus of honor or envy. But perhaps a scruple remains because we admire the virtues of people not infrequently and respect them. Thus I will add a following corollary so that I may remove this.

COROLLARIUM: Nemo virtutem alicui nisi æquali invidet.

No one envies the virtue of another unless one is an equal.

DEMONSTRATIO: Invidia est ipsum odium (vide scholium propositionis 24 hujus) sive (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) tristitia hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) affectio qua hominis agendi potentia seu conatus coercetur. At homo (per scholium propositionis 9 hujus) nihil agere conatur neque cupit nisi quod ex data sua natura sequi potest; ergo homo nullam de se agendi potentiam seu (quod idem est) virtutem prædicari cupiet quæ naturæ alterius est propria et suæ aliena adeoque ejus cupiditas coerceri hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) ipse contristari nequit ex eo quod aliquam virtutem in aliquo ipsi dissimili contemplatur et consequenter neque ei invidere poterit. At quidem suo æquali qui cum ipso ejusdem naturæ supponitur. Q.E.D.

Envy is hatred itself (see IIIP24S) or (by IIIP13S) sadness, that is (by IIIP11S) an affect by which the potential of a person's acting or efforting is restrained. By a person (by IIIP9S) tries to do nother and desires nothing unless one is able to follow by one's given nature; thus a person desires no potential of doing or (what is the same thing) virtue to be proclaimed which is proper of another nature and different than oneself to such a degree that one's greed is restrained, that is (by IIIP11S) says that one is saddened from which one contemplates some virtue is someone dissimilar to oneself and consequently might not be able to envy that person. But indeed it is supposed to be one's equal who with the same nature.

SCHOLIUM: Cum igitur supra in scholio propositionis 52 hujus partis dixerimus nos hominem venerari ex eo quod ipsius prudentiam, fortitudinem etc. admiramur, id fit (ut ex ipsa propositione patet) quia has virtutes ei singulariter inesse et non ut nostræ naturæ communes imaginamur adeoque easdem ipsi non magis invidebimus quam arboribus altitudinem et leonibus fortitudinem etc.

Therefore although above in IIIP52S we said that we venerate a person  because we admire that person's prudence, fortitude, etc. it happens (as is evident from the proposition itself) since we imagine those virtues to be singular in that person and not as our common nature to such a degree that we do not envy these same more than the height of the trees or the bravery of the lions.

III.P54 - Mind Tends to Self-Glorify

Mens ea tantum imaginari conatur quæ ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt.

The mind tries to imagine only things which establish the power of its own acting.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis conatus sive potentia est ipsa ipsius mentis essentia (per propositionem 7 hujus); mentis autem essentia (ut per se notum) id tantum quod mens est et potest, affirmat; at non id quod non est neque potest adeoque id tantum imaginari conatur quod ipsius agendi potentiam affirmat sive ponit. Q.E.D.

The efforting or potential [power] of the mind is the essence of the mind itself (by IIIP7); moreover the essence of the mind (as known through itself) affirms only that which the mind is and is able; but not that which it is not and not able to the extent that it tries to imagine only that which affirms or supports its potential of acting.

III.P53 - Imagining Oneself as Unique or Rare

Cum mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur, lætatur et eo magis quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginatur.

When the mind contemplates itself and its power for acting, it rejoices and even more so the more it imagines itself and its power for acting distinctly.

DEMONSTRATIO: Homo se ipsum non cognoscit nisi per affectiones sui corporis earumque ideas (per propositiones 19 et 23 partis II). Cum ergo fit ut mens se ipsam possit contemplari, eo ipso ad majorem perfectionem transire hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) lætitia affici supponitur et eo majore quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginari potest. Q.E.D.

A person does not understand itself unless through the modifications of its body and ideas of the same [modifications] (by IIP19 and IIP23). Thus when it happens that the mind is able to contemplate itself, by this itself does it cross to a greater perfection, that is (by IIIP11S) it is supposed to be affected with joy and with more joy to the extent it is able to imagine itself and its power for acting distinctly.

COROLLARIUM: Hæc lætitia magis magisque fovetur quo magis homo se ab aliis laudari imaginatur. Nam quo magis se ab aliis laudari imaginatur eo majore lætitia alios ab ipso affici imaginatur idque concomitante idea sui (per scholium propositionis 29 hujus) atque adeo (per propositionem 27 hujus) ipse majore lætitia concomitante idea sui afficitur. Q.E.D.

This joy is encouraged more and more to the extent that the person imagines oneself to be praised by others. For the more one imagines oneself to be praised by others, the greater the joy one imagines that others are affected by oneself and the idea of oneself as accompanying (by IIIP29S) and to such an extent (by IIIP27) one is affected by a greater joy accompanying the idea of oneself. 

 

III.P52 - Power of Unique or Rare

Objectum quod simul cum aliis antea vidimus vel quod nihil habere imaginamur nisi quod commune est pluribus, non tamdiu contemplabimur ac illud quod aliquid singulare habere imaginamur.

An object which we have seen before at the same time with some other things or which we imagine has nothing other than what is common to more things, we will not contemplate on as long as that thing which we imagine to have something singular.

DEMONSTRATIO: Simulatque objectum quod cum aliis vidimus, imaginamur, statim et aliorum recordamur (per propositionem 18 partis II, cujus etiam scholium vide) et sic ex unius contemplatione statim in contemplationem alterius incidimus. Atque eadem est ratio objecti quod nihil habere imaginamur nisi quod commune est pluribus. Nam eo ipso supponimus nos nihil in eo contemplari quod antea cum aliis non viderimus. Verum cum supponimus nos in objecto aliquo aliquid singulare quod antea nunquam vidimus, imaginari, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod mens dum illud objectum contemplatur, nullum aliud in se habeat in cujus contemplationem ex contemplatione illius incidere potest atque adeo ad illud solum contemplandum determinata est. Ergo objectum etc. Q.E.D.

As soon as we imagine an object which we have seen with some other things, immediately we recall the others (by IIP18, see also IIP18S) and thus from only this recollection immediately do we fall into the recollection of the other. And the same is the reason for an object which we imagine has nothing other than which is common to more things. For from this itself we imagine that we contemplate nothing in it which we have not see before with other things. Truly when we suppose that we imagine in some object something singular which we have never seen before, we say nothing other than because as long as the mind contemplates some obect, there is not something it has in itself in whose contemplation it is able to fall into from contemplation of that so it is determined to contemplate that only. 

SCHOLIUM: Hæc mentis affectio sive rei singularis imaginatio quatenus sola in mente versatur, vocatur admiratio, quæ si ab objecto quod timemus moveatur, consternatio dicitur quia mali admiratio hominem suspensum in sola sui contemplatione ita tenet ut de aliis cogitare non valeat quibus illud malum vitare posset. Sed si id quod admiramur sit hominis alicujus prudentia, industria vel aliquid hujusmodi, quia eo ipso hominem nobis longe antecellere contemplamur, tum admiratio vocatur veneratio; alias horror si hominis iram, invidiam etc. admiramur. Deinde si hominis quem amamus prudentiam, industriam etc. admiramur, amor eo ipso (per propositionem 12 hujus) major erit et hunc amorem admirationi sive venerationi junctum devotionem vocamus. 

This affection of the mind or the imagination of a singular thing insofar as it is spun about only in the mind, it is called wonder, which if it is moved by an object which we fear, it is said to be consternation because the wonder at the evil holds a person suspended in the contemplation of only the thing itself to such a degree that one is not able to think about other things by which one might be able to avoid that evil. But if we wonder at that which is the wisdom, industry or another pattern of some person, since we contemplate by this itself this person is far superior to us, then this wonder is called veneration; elsewhere horro if we wonder at the person's anger, jealousy etc. Then if we wonder at the wisdom, industry etc of a person whom we love, the love will be greater by this itself (by IIIP12) and we call this love joined to admiration or veneration devotion.

Et ad hunc modum concipere etiam possumus odium, spem, securitatem et alios affectus admirationi junctos atque adeo plures affectus deducere poterimus quam qui receptis vocabulis indicari solent. Unde apparet affectuum nomina inventa esse magis ex eorum vulgari usu quam ex eorundem accurata cognitione. Admirationi opponitur contemptus cujus tamen causa hæc plerumque est quod scilicet ex eo quod aliquem rem aliquam admirari, amare, metuere etc. videmus vel ex eo quod res aliqua primo aspectu apparet similis rebus quas admiramur, amamus, metuimus etc. (per propositionem 15 cum ejus corollario et propositionem 27 hujus) determinamur ad eandem rem admirandum, amandum, metuendum etc. Sed si ex ipsius rei præsentia vel accuratiore contemplatione, id omne de eadem negare cogamur quod causa admirationis, amoris, metus etc. esse potest, tum mens ex ipsa rei præsentia magis ad ea cogitandum quæ in objecto non sunt quam quæ in ipso sunt, determinata manet cum tamen contra ex objecti præsentia id præcipue cogitare soleat quod in objecto est. Porro sicut devotio ex rei quam amamus admiratione sic irrisio ex rei quam odimus vel metuimus contemptu oritur et dedignatio ex stultitiæ contemptu sicuti veneratio ex admiratione prudentiæ. Possumus denique amorem, spem, gloriam et alios affectus junctos contemptui concipere atque inde alios præterea affectus deducere quos etiam nullo singulari vocabulo ab aliis distinguere solemus. 

And to this mode we are also able to conceive hatred, hope, security and other affects joined to admiration and to such an extent more affects we are able to deduce than which are usually indicated by received words. From where it is apparent that the names of affects were invented more from the vulgar usage of them than by the accurate understanding of the same. To admiration contempt is opposed nevertheless whose cause is this for the most part because of course from which another thing for admire, for love, for fear etc we see whither from which another thing at first look appears like things which we admire, love, fear etc (by IIIP15 and 15C and IIIP27) we are determined to admiring, loving, fearing the same thing. But if from the present or accurate contemplation of the thing itself, everything about the same thing we think to deny which is able to be the cause of admiration, love, fear, etc., then the mind from the presence itself of the thing more to thinking it which are not in the object which are in itself, remains determined when nevertheless against from the presence of the object it is especially accustomed to think which is in the object. Further, just as devotion from the thing which we love with admiration thus mockery from the thing we hate or fear arises from contempt and disdaining from contempt of stupidity just as veneration is from the admiration of prudence. Finally we are able to desire lover, hope, glory and other affects joined to contempt and from there other affects besides we are accustomed to deduce which also to distinguish by no singular word from others.

III.P51: Differences Imply Freedom

Diversi homines ab uno eodemque objecto diversimode affici possunt et unus idemque homo ab uno eodemque objecto potest diversis temporibus diversimode affici.

Different people are able to be affected by one and the same object in different ways and one and the same person is able to be affected by the same object in different ways at different times.

DEMONSTRATIO: Corpus humanum (per postulatum 3 partis II) a corporibus externis plurimis modis afficitur. Possunt igitur eodem tempore duo homines diversimode esse affecti atque adeo (per axioma 1 quod est post lemma 3, quod vide post propositionem 13 partis II) ab uno eodemque objecto possunt diversimode affici. Deinde (per idem postulatum) corpus humanum potest jam hoc jam alio modo esse affectum et consequenter (per idem axioma) ab uno eodemque objecto diversis temporibus diversimode affici. Q.E.D.

The human body (by IIPost.3) is affected by external bodies in very many ways. Thus, two people are able to be affected at the same time in different ways and to such an extent (see after IIP13, by A1 which is after L3) from one and the same object are able to be affected in different ways. Then (by IIPost.3) the human body is able to be affected now in this (way) and then in another and consequently (by the same A1) to be affected by one and the same object at different times in different ways.

SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque fieri posse ut quod hic amat, alter odio habeat et quod hic metuit, alter non metuat et ut unus idemque homo jam amet quod antea oderit et ut jam audeat quod antea timuit etc. Deinde quia unusquisque ex suo affectu judicat quid bonum, quid malum, quid melius et quid pejus sit (vide scholium propositionis 39 hujus) sequitur homines tam judicio quam affectu variare posse et hinc fit ut cum alios aliis comparamus, ex sola affectuum differentia a nobis distinguantur et ut alios intrepidos, alios timidos, alios denique alio nomine appellemus. Exempli gratia illum ego intrepidum vocabo qui malum contemnit quod ego timere soleo et si præterea ad hoc attendam quod ejus cupiditas malum inferendi ei quem odit et benefaciendi ei quem amat, non coercetur timore mali a quo ego contineri soleo, ipsum audacem appellabo. Deinde ille mihi timidus videbitur qui malum timet quod ego contemnere soleo et si insuper ad hoc attendam quod ejus cupiditas coercetur timore mali quod me continere nequit, ipsum pusillanimem esse dicam et sic unusquisque judicabit. Denique ex hac hominis natura et judicii inconstantia ut et quod homo sæpe ex solo affectu de rebus judicat et quod res quas ad lætitiam vel tristitiam facere credit quasque propterea (per propositionem 28 hujus) ut fiant promovere vel amovere conatur, sæpe non nisi imaginariæ sint ut jam taceam alia quæ in II parte ostendimus de rerum incertitudine, facile concipimus hominem posse sæpe in causa esse tam ut contristetur quam ut lætetur sive ut tam tristitia quam lætitia afficiatur concomitante idea sui tanquam causa atque adeo facile intelligimus quid p™nitentia et quid acquiescentia in se ipso sit. Nempe p™nitentia est tristitia concomitante idea sui et acquiescentia in se ipso est lætitia concomitante idea sui tanquam causa et hi affectus vehementissimi sunt quia homines se liberos esse credunt (vide propositionem 49 hujus). 

We see, thus, it is able to happen the what this one loves, another hates and what this one fears, another does not fear and that one and the same person now loves what before one hated and that one dares what another fears, etc. Then because each and every one judges from one's own affect what is good, what is bad, what is better and what is worse (see IIIP39S) it follows that people can vary by not only judgment by also affect and from here it happens that when we compare one with another, they are distinguished from us only by a difference in their affects and so we call some fearless, others timid and then others by another name. For example, I will call one fearless who disdains a bad thing which I am used to fear and if besides I will attend to this which his desire to do harm to one whom he hates and to do well to one whom one loves, it will not be restrained by fear of evil by which I am used to contain, I will call audacious. Then, that one seems timid to me who fears an evil which I am used to disdain and if, further, I will attend to this which desire of his is restrained by a fear of evil which does speak to contain me, I will call that one cowardly and judge thus each and every one. Then from this nature of a person and the inconstancy of judgment so that because a person often judges things solely from the affect and because things which one believes easily to cause joy or sadness which besides (by IIIP28) as they happen he tries to promote or prevent, often not unless they are imaginary so I am even silent on some things which we have shown in part II concerning the uncertainty of things, we easily conceive that a person is often able to be the cause not only to be sad but to be happy or is affected by not only sadness but also joy with the accompanying idea of himself as the cause to such a degree do we understand what is repentance and self-acceptance. Certainly repentance is sadness accompanied by the idea of oneself and self-acceptance is joy accompanied by the idea of oneself as the cause and these affects are most vehement because people believe themselves to be free (see IIIP49).

III.P50: Wired to Correlate and to See As Causal

Res quæcunque potest esse per accidens spei aut metus causa.

Anything whatsoever is able to be, by accident, the cause of either hope or fear.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio eadem via demonstratur qua propositio 15 hujus, quam vide una cum scholio II propositionis 18 hujus.

This same proposition is demonstrated by IIIIP15; see along with IIIP18S2.

SCHOLIUM: Res quæ per accidens spei aut metus sunt causæ, bona aut mala omina vocantur. Deinde quatenus hæc eadem omina sunt spei aut metus causa eatenus (per definitionem spei et metus, quam vide in scholio II propositionis 18 hujus) lætitiæ aut tristitiæ sunt causa et consequenter (per corollarium propositionis 15 hujus) eatenus eadem amamus vel odio habemus et (per propositionem 28 hujus) tanquam media ad ea quæ speramus, adhibere vel tanquam obstacula aut metus causas amovere conamur. Præterea ex propositione 25 hujus sequitur nos natura ita esse constitutos ut ea quæ speramus, facile, quæ autem timemus, difficile credamus et ut de iis plus minusve justo sentiamus. Atque ex his ortæ sunt superstitiones quibus homines ubique conflictantur. Cæterum non puto operæ esse pretium animi hic ostendere fluctuationes quæ ex spe et metu oriuntur quandoquidem ex sola horum affectuum definitione sequitur non dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe (ut fusius suo loco explicabimus) et præterea quandoquidem quatenus aliquid speramus aut metuimus eatenus idem amamus vel odio habemus atque adeo quicquid de amore et odio diximus, facile unusquisque spei et metui applicare poterit.

Anythings which, by accident, are the causes of hope or fear, are called everything good or bad. Then insofar as these same things are the cause of hope or fear - just so far (by the definition of hope and fear, on which see IIIP18S2) are the cause of joy or sadness and consequently (by IIIP15C) just so much by the same do we love or hate and (by IIIP28) we try to invoke as if the means to things for which we hope, or to remove as if their obstacles or causes of fear. Besides from IIIP25 it follows that we are, by nature so, constituted so that we believe easily the things which we hope for, moreover with difficulty, (the things) which we fear and as a result, from these, we feel more or less than is just. And superstitions arising from these by which humans everywhere are conflicted. I do not think that for the rest of the work it worth the reward to show the fluctuations of the soul here which arise from the hope or fear since it follows from the definition alone of these affects that hope without fear and fear without hope do not exist (as we will explain more fully in another place) and besides since insofar as we hope for or fear something just so much do we love or hate the same and to such an extent as we have talked something about love and hate, it might easily have been applied to each and every hope and fear.