III.P59

Inter omnes affectus qui ad mentem quatenus agit referuntur, nulli alii sunt quam qui ad lætitiam vel cupiditatem referuntur.

Among all affects which refer to the mind insofar as it acts, there are none other than which refer to joy or desire.

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes affectus ad cupiditatem, lætitiam vel tristitiam referuntur ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones ostendunt. Per tristitiam autem intelligimus quod mentis cogitandi potentia minuitur vel coercetur (per propositionem 11 hujus et ejus scholium) adeoque mens quatenus contristatur eatenus ejus intelligendi hoc est ejus agendi potentia (per propositionem 1 hujus) minuitur vel coercetur adeoque nulli tristitiæ affectus ad mentem referri possunt quatenus agit sed tantum affectus lætitiæ et cupiditatis qui (per propositionem præcedentem) eatenus etiam ad mentem referuntur. Q.E.D.

All affects refer to desire, joy or sadness as whose definitions which we have given do show. By sadness, moreover, we understand that which lessens or restrains the potential power of the mind's thinking (by IIIP11 and IIIP11S) to such a degree that the mind insofar as it is saddened just as much as its understanding, that is, its potential power of acting (by IIIP1) is lessened or restrained to such an extent that no affect of sadness can refer to the mind insofar as it acts but only affects of joy and desire which (by IIIP58) to such also refer to the mind.

SCHOLIUM: Omnes actiones quæ sequuntur ex affectibus qui ad mentem referuntur quatenus intelligit, ad fortitudinem refero quam in animositatem et generositatem distinguo. Nam per animositatem intelligo cupiditatem qua unusquisque conatur suum esse ex solo rationis dictamine conservare. Per generositatem autem cupiditatem intelligo qua unusquisque ex solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines juvare et sibi amicitia jungere. Eas itaque actiones quæ solum agentis utile intendunt, ad animositatem et quæ alterius etiam utile intendunt ad generositatem refero. Temperantia igitur, sobrietas et animi in periculis præsentia etc. animositatis sunt species; modestia autem, clementia etc. species generositatis sunt. Atque his puto me præcipuos affectus animique fluctuationes quæ ex compositione trium primitivorum affectuum nempe cupiditatis, lætitiæ et tristitiæ oriuntur, explicuisse perque primas suas causas ostendisse. Ex quibus apparet nos a causis externis multis modis agitari nosque perinde ut maris undæ a contrariis ventis agitatæ fluctuari nostri eventus atque fati inscios. 

All actions which follow from the affects which refer to the mind insofar as it understands, I refer to bravery which I distinguish between animosity and generosity. For by animosity, I understand desire by which each and everyone tries to persevere to be oneself solely from the dictate of reason. By generosity, morever, I understand desire by which each and everyone tries to help other people and to join to oneself by friendship solely from the dictate of reason. Thus, these actions which I refer to animosity which intend solely for the use of the agent and to generosity which also intend for the use of others. Thus, temperance, sobriety and presence of mind in danger are species of animosity; further those of modesty, mercy etc are species of generosity. And with these I think that I have shown the primary affects and fluctuations of mood which arise from the composition of the three primitive affects, namely, desire, joy and sadness, to have explained through the three primary causes. From which it is apparent that we are agitated by many external modal causes and that we are tossed about by events and by inscrutable fates in the same way as waves of the sea are agitated by contrary winds.

At dixi me præcipuos tantum, non omnes qui dari possunt animi conflictus ostendisse. Nam eadem via qua supra procedendo facile possumus ostendere amorem esse junctum p™nitentiæ, dedignationi, pudori etc. Imo unicuique ex jam dictis clare constare credo affectus tot modis alios cum aliis posse componi indeque tot variationes oriri ut nullo numero definiri queant. Sed ad meum institutum præcipuos tantum enumeravisse sufficit nam reliqui quos omisi plus curiositatis quam utilitatis haberent. Attamen de amore hoc notandum restat quod scilicet sæpissime contingit dum re quam appetebamus fruimur, ut corpus ex ea fruitione novam acquirat constitutionem a qua aliter determinatur et aliæ rerum imagines in eo excitantur et simul mens alia imaginari aliaque cupere incipit. Exempli gratia cum aliquid quod nos sapore delectare solet, imaginamur, eodem frui nempe comedere cupimus. At quamdiu eodem sic fruimur, stomachus adimpletur corpusque aliter constituitur. Si igitur corpore jam aliter disposito ejusdem cibi imago quia ipse præsens adest, fomentetur et consequenter conatus etiam sive cupiditas eundem comedendi, huic cupiditati seu conatui nova illa constitutio repugnabit et consequenter cibi quem appetebamus, præsentia odiosa erit et hoc est quod fastidium et tædium vocamus. Cæterum corporis affectiones externas quæ in affectibus observantur, ut sunt tremor, livor, singultus, risus etc. neglexi quia ad solum corpus absque ulla ad mentem relatione referuntur. Denique de affectuum definitionibus quædam notanda sunt, quas propterea hic ordine repetam et quid in unaquaque observandum est, iisdem interponam.

But I have said that I have shown the principal ones only, not all which are able to exist by conflicts of the mind. For by the same way in which the above proceeded easily we were able to show that love is joined to repentence, contempt, shame etc. No indeed, I believe that it stands clearly to each and everyone from what has been said that other affects by so many modes are able to be composed with others that so many variations arise from everywhere so that they may not be defined by any number. But for my plan it is sufficient to have enumerated only the principle ones for the remaining one have been omitted which have more of curiosity than of utility. Nevertheless,  it remains for noting concerning love which of course happens most often as long as we delight in what we seek, so that the body acquires a new constitution from its pleasure by which it is determined otherwise and the other images of things are excited in that and at the same time the mind begins to desire other things and imagine other things. For example, when something is accustomed to delight us by flavor, we might imagine, we desire to enjoy the same, indeed consume it.  

III.P58 - True Us Generates Affects of Joy

Præter lætitiam et cupiditatem quæ passiones sunt, alii lætitiæ et cupiditatis affectus dantur qui ad nos quatenus agimus, referuntur.

Beyond joy and desire which are passions, other affects of joy and desire exist which refer to us insofar as we act.

DEMONSTRATIO: Cum mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam concipit, lætatur (per propositionem 53 hujus) : mens autem se ipsam necessario contemplatur quando veram sive adæquatam ideam concipit (per propositionem 43 partis II). At mens quasdam ideas adæquatas concipit (per scholium II propositionis 40 partis II) : ergo eatenus etiam lætatur quatenus ideas adæquatas concipit hoc est (per propositionem 1 hujus) quatenus agit. Deinde mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, in suo esse perseverare conatur (per propositionem 9 hujus) : at per conatum cupiditatem intelligimus (per ejusdem scholium); ergo cupiditas ad nos refertur etiam quatenus intelligimus sive (per propositionem 1 hujus) quatenus agimus. Q.E.D.

When the mind conceives itself and its potential power for acting, it rejoices (by IIIP53): yet, the mind contemplates itself by necessity when it conceives a true or adequate idea (by IIP43). But the mind conceives certain adequate ideas (by IIP40S2): therefore insofar as it rejoices in as much as it conceives adequate ideas, that is (by IIIP1) in as much as it acts. Finally, the mind has insofar as they are clear and distinct rather than confused, seeks to persevere to be in itself (by IIIP9): but we understand by conatus desire (by IIIP9S); therefore desire refers to us insofar we understand or (by IIIP1) insofar as we act. 

III.P57 - To each thing Their own thing

Quilibet uniuscujusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt.

Any affect of each and every individual differs from the affect of another individual just as much as the essence of one differs from the essence of the other.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio patet ex axiomate 1, quod vide post lemma 3 scholiumque propositionis 13 partis II. At nihilominus eandem ex trium primitivorum affectuum definitionibus demonstrabimus. Omnes affectus ad cupiditatem, lætitiam vel tristitiam referuntur ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones, ostendunt. At cupiditas est ipsa uniuscujusque natura seu essentia (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 9 hujus); ergo uniuscujusque individui cupiditas a cupiditate alterius tantum discrepat quantum natura seu essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt. Lætitia deinde et tristitia passiones sunt quibus uniuscujusque potentia seu conatus in suo esse perseverandi augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur (per propositionem 11 hujus et ejus scholium). At per conatum in suo esse perseverandi quatenus ad mentem et corpus simul refertur, appetitum et cupiditatem intelligimus (vide scholium propositionis 9 hujus); ergo lætitia et tristitia est ipsa cupiditas sive appetitus quatenus a causis externis augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur hoc est (per idem scholium) est ipsa cujusque natura atque adeo uniuscujusque lætitia vel tristitia a lætitia vel tristitia alterius tantum etiam discrepat quantum natura seu essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt et consequenter quilibet uniuscujusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat etc. Q.E.D.

This proposition is clear from axiom 1, which see post lemma 3 and IIP13S. But nonetheless, we will show the same thing from the definitions of the three primary affects. Evey affect refers to desire, joy or sadness so as they reveal whose definitions we have given. But desire is the nature or essence of each and every one (see its definition in IIIP9S); thus, the desire of each and every individual is discordant with the desire of another so much as the nature or essence of one differs from the essence of another. Then joy and sadness are passions by which the potential power or conatus of each and every one is increased or lessens for persevering in oneself, is aided or restrained (by IIIP11 and IIIP11S). But by conatus to be persevering in oneself insofar as it refers to the mind and body at the same time, we understand appetite and desire (see IIIP9S); thus joy and sadness and desire itself or appetite insofar as it is increased or lessened, aided or restrained, that is (by the same IIIP9S) is the nature of anyone itself and to such a degree the joy or sadness of each and every one is discordant from the joy or sadness of another to such an extent that the nature or essence of one differs from the essence of another and consequently any affect of each and every individual is discordant with the affect of another so much etc.  

SCHOLIUM: Hinc sequitur affectus animalium quæ irrationalia dicuntur (bruta enim sentire nequaquam dubitare possumus postquam mentis novimus originem) ab affectibus hominum tantum differre quantum eorum natura a natura humana differt. Fertur quidem equus et homo libidine procreandi; at ille libidine equina hic autem humana. Sic etiam libidines et appetitus insectorum, piscium et avium alii atque alii esse debent. Quamvis itaque unumquodque individuum sua qua constat natura, contentum vivat eaque gaudeat, vita tamen illa qua unumquodque est contentum et gaudium nihil aliud est quam idea seu anima ejusdem individui atque adeo gaudium unius a gaudio alterius tantum natura discrepat quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt. Denique ex præcedenti propositione sequitur non parum etiam interesse inter gaudium quo ebrius exempli gratia ducitur et inter gaudium quo potitur philosophus, quod hic in transitu monere volui. Atque hæc de affectibus qui ad hominem referuntur quatenus patitur. Superest ut pauca addam de iis qui ad eundem referuntur quatenus agit. 

From here it follows that the affects of animals which are called irrational (for we are in no way able to doubt that brutes feel after we know the origin of the mind) to differ from the affects of people so much as the nature of them differ from human nature. Indeed the horse and the person are driven by lust to procreation; but the former by equine lust, the latter, however, by human lust. Thus the lust and appetites of insects, fish, birds ought to be some in one way, others in another. Thus, although each and every individual lives contented by what stands as one's nature and rejoices in that, nevertheless that life by which each and every is contented and is no joy other than the idea or soul of the same individual and to such an extent the joy of one differs from the joy of another by nature by the amount that the essence of one differs from the essence of another. Finally, from the preceding proposition it follows that there is also not too little between the joy for which the drunk, for example, is led and the joy to which the philosopher acquires, which I have desired to remind here in passing. And these concerning the affects which refer to a person insofar as one bears. It remains that I add a few things about which who refer to the same one insofar as one acts. 

III.P56 - Different Objects Generate Different Moods

Lætitiæ, tristitiæ et cupiditatis et consequenter uniuscujusque affectus qui ex his componitur ut animi fluctuationis vel qui ab his derivatur nempe amoris, odii, spei, metus etc. tot species dantur quot sunt species objectorum a quibus afficimur.

There are as many kinds of joy, sadness and desire, and consequently of each and every affect which is made up of these [three] as a fluctuation of mood or which are derived from these [three], namely, of love, hatred, hope, fear etc as there are many kinds of objects by which we are affected.

DEMONSTRATIO: Lætitia et tristitia et consequenter affectus qui ex his componuntur vel ex his derivantur, passiones sunt (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus); nos autem (per propositionem 1 hujus) necessario patimur quatenus ideas habemus inadæquatas et quatenus easdem habemus (per propositionem 3 hujus) eatenus tantum patimur hoc est (vide scholium I propositionis 40 partis II) eatenus tantum necessario patimur quatenus imaginamur sive (vide propositionem 17 partis II cum ejus scholio) quatenus afficimur affectu qui naturam nostri corporis et naturam corporis externi involvit. Natura igitur uniuscujusque passionis ita necessario debet explicari ut objecti a quo afficimur, natura exprimatur. Nempe lætitia quæ ex objecto exempli gratia A oritur, naturam ipsius objecti A et lætitia quæ ex objecto B oritur, ipsius objecti B naturam involvit atque adeo hi duo lætitiæ affectus natura sunt diversi quia ex causis diversæ naturæ oriuntur. Sic etiam tristitiæ affectus qui ex uno objecto oritur, diversus natura est a tristitia quæ ab alia causa oritur, quod etiam de amore, odio, spe, metu, animi fluctuatione etc. intelligendum est ac proinde lætitiæ, tristitiæ, amoris, odii etc. tot species necessario dantur quot sunt species objectorum a quibus afficimur. At cupiditas est ipsa uniuscujusque essentia seu natura quatenus ex data quacunque ejus constitutione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum (vide scholium propositionis 9 hujus); ergo prout unusquisque a causis externis hac aut illa lætitiæ, tristitiæ, amoris, odii etc. specie afficitur hoc est prout ejus natura hoc aut alio modo constituitur, ita ejus cupiditas alia atque alia esse et natura unius a natura alterius cupiditatis tantum differre necesse est quantum affectus a quibus unaquæque oritur, inter se differunt. Dantur itaque tot species cupiditatis quot sunt species lætitiæ, tristitiæ, amoris etc. et consequenter (per jam ostensa) quot sunt objectorum species a quibus afficimur. Q.E.D.

Joy and sadness and consequently affects which are made up from these or derived from them are passions (by IIIP11S); moreover we (by IIIP1) suffer necessarily insofar as we have inadequate ideas and insofar as we have the same [inadequate ideas] (by IIIP3) do we suffer to such an extent, that is (see IIP40S1) to such an extent do we necessarily suffer insofar as we imagine or (see IIP17 and IIP17S) insofar as we are affected by an affect which involves to the nature of our body and the nature of an external body. Thus the nature of each and every passion ought necessarily be explained as the nature of the object (by which we are affected) is being expressed. Namely, a joy which arises from an object, for example, A, involves the nature of object A itself and the joy which arises from object B, involves the nature of object B itself and to such a degree these two affects of joy are different by nature due to natures of the causes arise diversely. Thus, also the affect of sadness which arises from one object is diverse by nature by the sadness which arises from another cause, which also ought to be understood from love, hatred, hope, fear, a change in mood etc and so there exist necessarily just as many kinds of joy, sadness, love, hatred etc as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected. But desire is the essence itself of each and every one or its nature insofar as it it conceived to be determined by whatever constitution of it is given for doing something (see IIIP9S); thus, just as each and every one is affected by external causes with this or that kind of joy, sadness, love, hatred etc, that is as one's nature is determined by this or another mode, thus one's desire is one way and then another and the nature of one desire must differ from another desire just as much as affects differ among themselves by which each and every one arises. Thus as many kinds of desire exist as there are kinds of joy, sadness, love etc and consequently (as I have already shown) as many kinds of objects by which we are affected.

SCHOLIUM: Inter affectuum species quæ (per propositionem præcedentem) perplurimæ esse debent, insignes sunt luxuria, ebrietas, libido, avaritia et ambitio, quæ non nisi amoris vel cupiditatis sunt notiones quæ hujus utriusque affectus naturam explicant per objecta ad quæ referuntur. Nam per luxuriam, ebrietatem, libidinem, avaritiam et ambitionem nihil aliud intelligimus quam convivandi, potandi, coeundi, divitiarum et gloriæ immoderatum amorem vel cupiditatem. Præterea hi affectus quatenus eos per solum objectum ad quod referuntur ab aliis distinguimus, contrarios non habent. Nam temperantia quam luxuriæ et sobrietas quam ebrietati et denique castitas quam libidini opponere solemus, affectus seu passiones non sunt sed animi indicant potentiam quæ hos affectus moderatur. Cæterum reliquas affectuum species hic explicare nec possum (quia tot sunt quot objectorum species) nec si possem, necesse est. Nam ad id quod intendimus nempe ad affectuum vires et mentis in eosdem potentiam determinandum, nobis sufficit uniuscujusque affectus generalem habere definitionem. Sufficit inquam nobis affectuum et mentis communes proprietates intelligere ut determinare possimus qualis et quanta sit mentis potentia in moderandis et coercendis affectibus. Quamvis itaque magna sit differentia inter hunc et illum amoris, odii vel cupiditatis affectum exempli gratia inter amorem erga liberos et inter amorem erga uxorem, nobis tamen has differentias cognoscere et affectuum naturam et originem ulterius indagare, non est opus.

Among the kinds of affects which (by preceding proposition) ought to be very many, notable are extravagance, drunkenness, lust, greed and ambition, which not unless they are notions of love or desire which explain the nature of this or that affect by the object to which they refer. For by extravagance, drunkenness, lust, greed and ambition we understand nothing other than an immoderate love or desire for feasting, drinking, copulating, riches and glory. Meanwhile these affects insofar as they do not have contraries, we distinguish from others by only the object to which they refer. For we are accustomed to place temperance opposite to extravagance, sobriety to drunkenness, and finally chastity to lust, they are not affects or passion but minds indicating the potential power which moderates these affects. The rest of the remaining kinds of affects I am unable to explicate here (since so many are as many are there are kinds of objects) and, if I were able, it is unnecessary. For to that which we intend certainly for the purpose of determining the strength of the affects and the potential power of the mind in the same things, it suffices that each and every affect has a general definition. I say that it suffices for us to understand the affect and the common properties of the mind so that we are able to determine the quality and quantity of potential power there might be in the mind to moderate and restrain the affects. Thus, although there may be greater differences between this and that affect of love, hatred or desire, for example, between love relating to children and loved between a married, nevertheless for us to know these differences and to track down the nature of the affects and, further, their origin, is not this work.

III.P55 - Comparing Ourselves To Others

Cum mens suam impotentiam imaginatur, eo ipso contristatur.

When the mind imagines its own impotence, it is depressed by it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis essentia id tantum quod mens est et potest, affirmat sive de natura mentis est ea tantummodo imaginari quæ ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt (per propositionem præcedentem). Cum itaque dicimus quod mens dum se ipsam contemplatur, suam imaginatur impotentiam, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod dum mens aliquid imaginari conatur quod ipsius agendi potentiam ponit, hic ejus conatus coercetur sive (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) quod ipsa contristatur. Q.E.D.

The essence of the mind affirms only that which the mind is and is able or from the nature of the mind is to imagine things in such a way which support the potential of its acting (by IIIP54). Since thus we say that the mind as long as it contemplates itself, imagines its own impotence, we say nothing other than that as long as the mind attempts to imagine something which supports its potential of acting, this efforting of it is compelled or (by IIIP11S) is depressed by itself.

COROLLARIUM: Hæc tristitia magis ac magis fovetur si se ab aliis vituperari imaginatur; quod eodem modo demonstratur ac corollarium propositionis 53 hujus.

This sadness is more and more nurtured if one imagines oneself faulted by others; which in the same way is demonstrated from IIIP53C.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc tristitia concomitante idea nostræ imbecillitatis humilitas appellatur; lætitia autem quæ ex contemplatione nostri oritur, philautia vel acquiescentia in se ipso vocatur. Et quoniam hæc toties repetitur quoties homo suas virtutes sive suam agendi potentiam contemplatur, hinc ergo etiam fit ut unusquisque facta sua narrare suique tam corporis quam animi vires ostentare gestiat et ut homines hac de causa sibi invicem molesti sint. Ex quibus iterum sequitur homines natura esse invidos (vide scholium propositionis 24 et scholium propositionis 32 hujus) sive ob suorum æqualium imbecillitatem gaudere et contra propter eorundem virtutem contristari. Nam quoties unusquisque suas actiones imaginatur toties lætitia (per propositionem 53 hujus) afficitur et eo majore quo actiones plus perfectionis exprimere et easdem distinctius imaginatur hoc est (per illa quæ in scholio I propositionis 40 partis II dicta sunt) quo magis easdem ab aliis distinguere et ut res singulares contemplari potest. Quare unusquisque ex contemplatione sui tunc maxime gaudebit quando aliquid in se contemplatur quod de reliquis negat. Sed si id quod de se affirmat, ad universalem hominis vel animalis ideam refert, non tantopere gaudebit et contra contristabitur si suas ad aliorum actiones comparatas imbecilliores esse imaginetur, quam quidem tristitiam (per propositionem 28 hujus) amovere conabitur idque suorum æqualium actiones perperam interpretando vel suas quantum potest adornando. Apparet igitur homines natura proclives esse ad odium et invidiam ad quam accedit ipsa educatio. Nam parentes solo honoris et invidiæ stimulo liberos ad virtutem concitare solent. Sed scrupulus forsan remanet quod non raro hominum virtutes admiremur eosque veneremur. Hunc ergo ut amoveam sequens addam corollarium.

This sadness accompanied by the idea of our weakness is called humility; moreover joy which arises from contemplation of ourselves is called self-love or acquiescence in oneself. And since this just as often as it is repeated so often does a person contemplate ones own virtues or power of acting, thus from this also it happens that each and every person is eager to tell ones doings and to show strength of the body as well as of the mind and, so, people are annoying to each other on this account. From which again it follows that people are naturally jealous (see IIIP24 and IIIP32S) or to rejoice at weakness equal to themselves and, in contrast, to be saddened on account of the strength of others. For whenever each and every one imagines ones one action so then is affected with joy (by IIIP53) and the greater the actions one imagines them to express more of perfection and the more distinctly the same, that is (by that said in IIP40SI) the more one is able to distinguish the same things from other and to be contemplated as singular things. Therefore each and every one will rejoice maximally then by the contemplation of oneself when something is contemplated in oneself which is denied to the others. But if it affirms something about oneself, it refers to the universal idea of a person or an animal, one will not rejoice so greatly and in contrast one is saddened if one imagines that ones own actions are compared to the stupidities of others, then indeed one will try to remove the sadness (by IIIP28) and by interpreting wrongly it as actions of ones own equals or by adorning ones own as much as one is able. Thus, it appears that people are by nature inclined to hatred and envy to which education itself approaches. For parents are accustomed to motivate children towards virtue by only the stimulus of honor or envy. But perhaps a scruple remains because we admire the virtues of people not infrequently and respect them. Thus I will add a following corollary so that I may remove this.

COROLLARIUM: Nemo virtutem alicui nisi æquali invidet.

No one envies the virtue of another unless one is an equal.

DEMONSTRATIO: Invidia est ipsum odium (vide scholium propositionis 24 hujus) sive (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) tristitia hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) affectio qua hominis agendi potentia seu conatus coercetur. At homo (per scholium propositionis 9 hujus) nihil agere conatur neque cupit nisi quod ex data sua natura sequi potest; ergo homo nullam de se agendi potentiam seu (quod idem est) virtutem prædicari cupiet quæ naturæ alterius est propria et suæ aliena adeoque ejus cupiditas coerceri hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) ipse contristari nequit ex eo quod aliquam virtutem in aliquo ipsi dissimili contemplatur et consequenter neque ei invidere poterit. At quidem suo æquali qui cum ipso ejusdem naturæ supponitur. Q.E.D.

Envy is hatred itself (see IIIP24S) or (by IIIP13S) sadness, that is (by IIIP11S) an affect by which the potential of a person's acting or efforting is restrained. By a person (by IIIP9S) tries to do nother and desires nothing unless one is able to follow by one's given nature; thus a person desires no potential of doing or (what is the same thing) virtue to be proclaimed which is proper of another nature and different than oneself to such a degree that one's greed is restrained, that is (by IIIP11S) says that one is saddened from which one contemplates some virtue is someone dissimilar to oneself and consequently might not be able to envy that person. But indeed it is supposed to be one's equal who with the same nature.

SCHOLIUM: Cum igitur supra in scholio propositionis 52 hujus partis dixerimus nos hominem venerari ex eo quod ipsius prudentiam, fortitudinem etc. admiramur, id fit (ut ex ipsa propositione patet) quia has virtutes ei singulariter inesse et non ut nostræ naturæ communes imaginamur adeoque easdem ipsi non magis invidebimus quam arboribus altitudinem et leonibus fortitudinem etc.

Therefore although above in IIIP52S we said that we venerate a person  because we admire that person's prudence, fortitude, etc. it happens (as is evident from the proposition itself) since we imagine those virtues to be singular in that person and not as our common nature to such a degree that we do not envy these same more than the height of the trees or the bravery of the lions.

III.P54 - Mind Tends to Self-Glorify

Mens ea tantum imaginari conatur quæ ipsius agendi potentiam ponunt.

The mind tries to imagine only things which establish the power of its own acting.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis conatus sive potentia est ipsa ipsius mentis essentia (per propositionem 7 hujus); mentis autem essentia (ut per se notum) id tantum quod mens est et potest, affirmat; at non id quod non est neque potest adeoque id tantum imaginari conatur quod ipsius agendi potentiam affirmat sive ponit. Q.E.D.

The efforting or potential [power] of the mind is the essence of the mind itself (by IIIP7); moreover the essence of the mind (as known through itself) affirms only that which the mind is and is able; but not that which it is not and not able to the extent that it tries to imagine only that which affirms or supports its potential of acting.

III.P53 - Imagining Oneself as Unique or Rare

Cum mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur, lætatur et eo magis quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginatur.

When the mind contemplates itself and its power for acting, it rejoices and even more so the more it imagines itself and its power for acting distinctly.

DEMONSTRATIO: Homo se ipsum non cognoscit nisi per affectiones sui corporis earumque ideas (per propositiones 19 et 23 partis II). Cum ergo fit ut mens se ipsam possit contemplari, eo ipso ad majorem perfectionem transire hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) lætitia affici supponitur et eo majore quo se suamque agendi potentiam distinctius imaginari potest. Q.E.D.

A person does not understand itself unless through the modifications of its body and ideas of the same [modifications] (by IIP19 and IIP23). Thus when it happens that the mind is able to contemplate itself, by this itself does it cross to a greater perfection, that is (by IIIP11S) it is supposed to be affected with joy and with more joy to the extent it is able to imagine itself and its power for acting distinctly.

COROLLARIUM: Hæc lætitia magis magisque fovetur quo magis homo se ab aliis laudari imaginatur. Nam quo magis se ab aliis laudari imaginatur eo majore lætitia alios ab ipso affici imaginatur idque concomitante idea sui (per scholium propositionis 29 hujus) atque adeo (per propositionem 27 hujus) ipse majore lætitia concomitante idea sui afficitur. Q.E.D.

This joy is encouraged more and more to the extent that the person imagines oneself to be praised by others. For the more one imagines oneself to be praised by others, the greater the joy one imagines that others are affected by oneself and the idea of oneself as accompanying (by IIIP29S) and to such an extent (by IIIP27) one is affected by a greater joy accompanying the idea of oneself.