III.D22: Disrespect Defined

Despectus est de aliquo præ odio minus justo sentire.

Disrespect is to feel less than just about someone due to hatred.

EXPLICATIO: Est itaque existimatio amoris et despectus odii effectus sive proprietas atque adeo potest existimatio etiam definiri quod sit amor quatenus hominem ita afficit ut de re amata plus justo sentiat et contra despectus quod sit odium quatenus hominem ita afficit ut de eo quem odio habet, minus justo sentiat. Vide de his scholium propositionis 26 hujus.

Thus reverence is an effect or property of love and disrespect of hatred and to such an extent reverence is also able to be defined what is love insofar as it affects a person so that one feels more than just about the beloved thing and in contrast disrespect as what affects a person so that one feels less than just about what one has hatred for. See concerning these IIIP26S.

The explanation seems redundant here and, in many ways, it is. Yet Spinoza is concerned about the shades of love and hate and the explanation allows him to introduce "insofar as" as the qualifier for the particular level or shade of love or hatred discussed here. 

III.D21: Esteem Defined

Existimatio est de aliquo præ amore plus justo sentire.

Reverence is to feel more than appropriate about someone due to love.

Spinoza is leery of religion and religious leaders. This definition seems to resonate with that meaning. To feel strongly about someone due to love is certainly a normal condition. The challenge is that such feelings can cloud appropriate judgment and it is this clouding that Spinoza is highlighting. 

 

  

III.D20: Indignation Defined

Indignatio est odium erga aliquem qui alteri malefecit.

Indignation is hatred towards someone who hurt another.

EXPLICATIO: Hæc nomina ex communi usu aliud significare scio. Sed meum institutum non est verborum significationem sed rerum naturam explicare easque iis vocabulis indicare quorum significatio quam ex usu habent, a significatione qua eadem usurpare volo, non omnino abhorret, quod semel monuisse sufficiat. Cæterum horum affectuum causam vide in corollario I propositionis 27 et scholio propositionis 22 hujus partis.

I know that these names signify something else from common usage. But my intention is not the significance of words but to explain the nature of a thing and to point out with these words whose significance which have from usage, from a significance from which same word I wish to usurp, which is not altogether opposed, let it suffice one time to have been warned. For the cause of these other affects, see IIIP27C1 and IIIP22S.

Translation is always difficult, but Spinoza warns that any philological reading may be incorrect if the reader does not search for the underlying "nature of a thing." The words are in a general sense correct, but do not have a specificity of meaning. This warning is especially relevant as we get to the end of the Ethics where many words are used to indicate the highly desirable affect accompanying our highest state.

III.D19: Favor Defined

Favor est amor erga aliquem qui alteri benefecit.

Favor is love towards someone who has benefited another. 

III.D18: Commiseration Defined

Commiseratio est tristitia concomitante idea mali quod alteri quem nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit. Vide scholium propositionis 22 et scholium propositionis 27 hujus.

Commiseration is a sadness accompanied by the idea of a bad thing which occurs to another whom we imagine is similar to ourselves. See IIIP22S and IIIP27S. 

EXPLICATIO: Inter commiserationem et misericordiam nulla videtur esse differentia nisi forte quod commiseratio singularem affectum respiciat, misericordia autem ejus habitum.

Between commiseration and compassion there seems to be no difference unless perhaps because commiseration might reflect a singular affect, while compassion reflects one's demeanor. 

Again Spinoza situates the affect in a bodily positioning. One can almost feel the difference here with commiseration feeling like a core experience (due to personal identification), while compassion is felt more at a peripheral level - like the skin. 

III.D17: Biting of Conscience Defined

Conscientiæ morsus est tristitia concomitante idea rei præteritæ quæ præter spem evenit.

Biting of conscience (or remorse) is a sadness accompanied by the idea of a past thing which turned out beyond hope. 

Here we have a hope unmet and Spinoza uses a phrase that exactly describes the physical sensation - consistent with the concept that the mind is the idea of the body and, thus, bodily-centered. 

III.D16: Thrilling Defined

Gaudium est lætitia concomitante idea rei præteritæ quæ præter spem evenit. 

Thrilling is joy accompanied by the idea of a past thing which occurred beyond hope. 

Spinoza is describing a pattern in which not only are expectations unmet, met or exceeded, but also hopes are similarly unmet, met or exceeded. Here is where hope is exceeded.