III.D4: Wonder

Admiratio est rei alicujus imaginatio in qua mens defixa propterea manet quia hæc singularis imaginatio nullam cum reliquis habet connexionem. Vide propositionem 52 cum ejusdem scholio.

Wonder is an imagination of something in which the mind is fixated because it is locked since this imagination of a singular thing has no connection with other things.

EXPLICATIO: In scholio propositionis 18 partis II ostendimus quænam sit causa cur mens ex contemplatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat videlicet quia earum rerum imagines invicem concatenatæ et ita ordinatæ sunt ut alia aliam sequatur, quod quidem concipi nequit quando rei imago nova est sed mens in ejusdem rei contemplatione detinebitur donec ab aliis causis ad alia cogitandum determinetur. Rei itaque novæ imaginatio in se considerata ejusdem naturæ est ac reliquæ et hac de causa ego admirationem inter affectus non numero nec causam video cur id facerem quandoquidem hæc mentis distractio ex nulla causa positiva quæ mentem ab aliis distrahat, oritur sed tantum ex eo quod causa cur mens ex unius rei contemplatione ad alia cogitandum determinatur, deficit. Tres igitur (ut in scholio propositionis 11 hujus monui) tantum affectus primitivos seu primarios agnosco nempe lætitiæ, tristitiæ et cupiditatis nec alia de causa verba de admiratione feci quam quia usu factum est ut quidam affectus qui ex tribus primitivis derivantur, aliis nominibus indicari soleant quando ad objecta quæ admiramur, referuntur; quæ quidem ratio me ex æquo movet ut etiam contemptus definitionem his adjungam. 

In IIP18S we have shown what might be the cause why the mind from the contemplation of one thing immediately begins the contemplation of another thing, that is to say, since the images of these things are connected in turn and thus they are ordered so that one might follow another, which indeed cannot be conceived when the image of the thing is new but the mind will be detained by the contemplation of the same thing until from other causes it is determined to thinking about others. Thus the imagination of a new thing considered in itself is of the same nature as the others and from this cause I do not count wonder among the affects and I do not see the reason why I might make it since the distraction of the mind arises not from any positive cause which leads the mind from others, but only lacks from which cause why the mind is determined from the contemplation of one thing to thinking about others. Thus three (as I have warned in IIIP11S) I recognize only the primitive or primary affects, namely joy, sadness and desire and I have not made other reasons about wonder which since by use it is a deed so that indeed the affects which are derived from the three primitives, by other names they are accustomed to be indicated when to objects which we wonder, they are referred; which reason indeed moves me from equanimity so that I might also join contempt to the definition of these.

III.D3 - Sadness Defined

Tristitia est hominis transitio a majore ad minorem perfectionem.

Sadness is the movement of a person from a greater to a lesser perfection.

EXPLICATIO: Dico transitionem. Nam lætitia non est ipsa perfectio. Si enim homo cum perfectione ad quam transit nasceretur, ejusdem absque lætitiæ affectu compos esset; quod clarius apparet ex tristitiæ affectu qui huic est contrarius. Nam quod tristitia in transitione ad minorem perfectionem consistit, non autem in ipsa minore perfectione, nemo negare potest quandoquidem homo eatenus contristari nequit quatenus alicujus perfectionis est particeps. Nec dicere possumus quod tristitia in privatione majoris perfectionis consistat nam privatio nihil est; tristitiæ autem affectus actus est qui propterea nullus alius esse potest quam actus transeundi ad minorem perfectionem hoc est actus quo hominis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur (vide scholium propositionis 11 hujus). Cæterum definitiones hilaritatis, titillationis, melancholiæ et doloris omitto quia ad corpus potissimum referuntur et non nisi lætitiæ aut tristitiæ sunt species.

I say movement. For joy is not perfection itself. For if a person were born with perfection to which one moved, one would be in control of the the same thing without the mood of joy; which is more apparent from the mood of sadness which is contrary to this. For no one is able to deny that sadness consists of the movement to a lesser perfection, not moreover in the lesser perfection itself, since a person is not said to be sad insofar as as one participates in some perfection. And we are not able to say that sadness consists of the loss of a greater perfection for loss is nothing; moreover, the affect of sadness is an action which for that reason is to be able to be nothing other than an action of moving to a lesser perfection, that is an action by which the potential power of a person's acting is diminished or restrained (see IIIP11S). The remaining definitions of hilarity, titillation, melancholy and pain are omitted since they refer to the body above all and are only kinds of joy or sadness.

The final sentence of this explanation emphasizes that the focus of The Ethics is on those desires, joys and sadnesses which have a mental component. There are forms of desire, joy and sadness which are only physical, but The Ethics is not a medical textbook. While this disconnection between the mind and body seems to split Spinoza's strict parallelism, that parallelism only applies fully to Deus Sive Natura. In the case of people, Spinoza demonstrates that the consciousness of the mind narrowly selects from the complex workings operating at any point. So, strictly speaking, Spinoza is addressing affects related to consciousness. 

III.D2 - Joy Defined

Lætitia est hominis transitio a minore ad majorem perfectionem.

Joy is the movement of a person from a lesser to a greater perfection. 

III.D1 - Desire Defined

DEFINITIONES I. Cupiditas est ipsa hominis essentia quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum.

Desire is the essence itself of a person insofar as from whatsoever one's given affection is determined to be conceived for doing something.

EXPLICATIO: Diximus supra in scholio propositionis 9 hujus partis cupiditatem esse appetitum cum ejusdem conscientia; appetitum autem esse ipsam hominis essentiam quatenus determinata est ad ea agendum quæ ipsius conservationi inserviunt. Sed in eodem scholio etiam monui me revera inter humanum appetitum et cupiditatem nullam agnoscere differentiam. Nam sive homo sui appetitus sit conscius sive non sit, manet tamen appetitus unus idemque atque adeo ne tautologiam committere viderer, cupiditatem per appetitum explicare nolui sed eandem ita definire studui ut omnes humanæ naturæ conatus quos nomine appetitus, voluntatis, cupiditatis vel impetus significamus, una comprehenderem. Potueram enim dicere cupiditatem esse ipsam hominis essentiam quatenus determinata concipitur ad aliquid agendum sed ex hac definitione (per propositionem 23 partis II) non sequeretur quod mens possit suæ cupiditatis sive appetitus esse conscia. Igitur ut hujus conscientiæ causam involverem, necesse fuit (per eandem propositionem) addere "quatenus ex data quacunque ejus affectione determinata etc.". Nam per affectionem humanæ essentiæ quamcunque ejusdem essentiæ constitutionem intelligimus, sive ea sit innata sive quod ipsa per solum cogitationis sive per solum extensionis attributum concipiatur sive denique quod ad utrumque simul referatur. Hic igitur cupiditatis nomine intelligo hominis quoscunque conatus, impetus, appetitus et volitiones, qui pro varia ejusdem hominis constitutione varii et non raro adeo sibi invicem oppositi sunt ut homo diversimode trahatur et quo se vertat, nesciat.

We said above in IIIP9 that desire is appetite with consciousness of the same; further appetite is the essence of a person itself insofar as it is determined for doing things which promote the conservation of oneself. But in the same note, I also warned that I actually knew no difference between human appetite and desire. For whether a person might be aware of one's appetite or not, nevertheless the appetite remains one and the same and to such an extent lest I seem to commit a tautology, I do not wish to explain desire by appetite but in this regard have been eager to define the same thing so that every effort of human nature which we might signify by the name of appetite, will, desire or impulse, I might understand by one name. For I had been able to say that desire is the essence itself of a person insofar as it is determined to be conceived for doing something but from this definition (by IIP23) it might not follow because the mind is able to be aware of its own desire or appetite. So since I involved the cause of this awareness, it was necessary (by the same proposition) to add "insofar as it is determined by whatsoever is one's affection etc." For by affection of a person's essence, we understand whatsoever constitution of one's essence, whether it be innate or conceived as whatever through cognition alone or through the attribute of extension alone or finally it might refer to both at the same time. So here I understand by the name of desire of a person whatever efforts, impulses, appetites and wills, which vary by the various constitution of each person and not rarely to the extent that they are opposed in turn for each person so that a person is dragged by divergences and by what one is turned, one does not know.

III.P59 - Joy and Desire Have Action Power

Inter omnes affectus qui ad mentem quatenus agit referuntur, nulli alii sunt quam qui ad lætitiam vel cupiditatem referuntur.

Among all affects which refer to the mind insofar as it acts, there are none other than which refer to joy or desire.

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes affectus ad cupiditatem, lætitiam vel tristitiam referuntur ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones ostendunt. Per tristitiam autem intelligimus quod mentis cogitandi potentia minuitur vel coercetur (per propositionem 11 hujus et ejus scholium) adeoque mens quatenus contristatur eatenus ejus intelligendi hoc est ejus agendi potentia (per propositionem 1 hujus) minuitur vel coercetur adeoque nulli tristitiæ affectus ad mentem referri possunt quatenus agit sed tantum affectus lætitiæ et cupiditatis qui (per propositionem præcedentem) eatenus etiam ad mentem referuntur. Q.E.D.

All affects refer to desire, joy or sadness as whose definitions which we have given do show. By sadness, moreover, we understand that which lessens or restrains the potential power of the mind's thinking (by IIIP11 and IIIP11S) to such a degree that the mind insofar as it is saddened just as much as its understanding, that is, its potential power of acting (by IIIP1) is lessened or restrained to such an extent that no affect of sadness can refer to the mind insofar as it acts but only affects of joy and desire which (by IIIP58) to such also refer to the mind.

SCHOLIUM: Omnes actiones quæ sequuntur ex affectibus qui ad mentem referuntur quatenus intelligit, ad fortitudinem refero quam in animositatem et generositatem distinguo. Nam per animositatem intelligo cupiditatem qua unusquisque conatur suum esse ex solo rationis dictamine conservare. Per generositatem autem cupiditatem intelligo qua unusquisque ex solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines juvare et sibi amicitia jungere. Eas itaque actiones quæ solum agentis utile intendunt, ad animositatem et quæ alterius etiam utile intendunt ad generositatem refero. Temperantia igitur, sobrietas et animi in periculis præsentia etc. animositatis sunt species; modestia autem, clementia etc. species generositatis sunt. Atque his puto me præcipuos affectus animique fluctuationes quæ ex compositione trium primitivorum affectuum nempe cupiditatis, lætitiæ et tristitiæ oriuntur, explicuisse perque primas suas causas ostendisse. Ex quibus apparet nos a causis externis multis modis agitari nosque perinde ut maris undæ a contrariis ventis agitatæ fluctuari nostri eventus atque fati inscios. 

All actions which follow from the affects which refer to the mind insofar as it understands, I refer to bravery which I distinguish between animosity and generosity. For by animosity, I understand desire by which each and everyone tries to persevere to be oneself solely from the dictate of reason. By generosity, morever, I understand desire by which each and everyone tries to help other people and to join to oneself by friendship solely from the dictate of reason. Thus, these actions which I refer to animosity which intend solely for the use of the agent and to generosity which also intend for the use of others. Thus, temperance, sobriety and presence of mind in danger are species of animosity; further those of modesty, mercy etc are species of generosity. And with these I think that I have shown the primary affects and fluctuations of mood which arise from the composition of the three primitive affects, namely, desire, joy and sadness, to have explained through the three primary causes. From which it is apparent that we are agitated by many external modal causes and that we are tossed about by events and by inscrutable fates in the same way as waves of the sea are agitated by contrary winds.

At dixi me præcipuos tantum, non omnes qui dari possunt animi conflictus ostendisse. Nam eadem via qua supra procedendo facile possumus ostendere amorem esse junctum p™nitentiæ, dedignationi, pudori etc. Imo unicuique ex jam dictis clare constare credo affectus tot modis alios cum aliis posse componi indeque tot variationes oriri ut nullo numero definiri queant. Sed ad meum institutum præcipuos tantum enumeravisse sufficit nam reliqui quos omisi plus curiositatis quam utilitatis haberent. Attamen de amore hoc notandum restat quod scilicet sæpissime contingit dum re quam appetebamus fruimur, ut corpus ex ea fruitione novam acquirat constitutionem a qua aliter determinatur et aliæ rerum imagines in eo excitantur et simul mens alia imaginari aliaque cupere incipit. Exempli gratia cum aliquid quod nos sapore delectare solet, imaginamur, eodem frui nempe comedere cupimus. At quamdiu eodem sic fruimur, stomachus adimpletur corpusque aliter constituitur. Si igitur corpore jam aliter disposito ejusdem cibi imago quia ipse præsens adest, fomentetur et consequenter conatus etiam sive cupiditas eundem comedendi, huic cupiditati seu conatui nova illa constitutio repugnabit et consequenter cibi quem appetebamus, præsentia odiosa erit et hoc est quod fastidium et tædium vocamus. Cæterum corporis affectiones externas quæ in affectibus observantur, ut sunt tremor, livor, singultus, risus etc. neglexi quia ad solum corpus absque ulla ad mentem relatione referuntur. Denique de affectuum definitionibus quædam notanda sunt, quas propterea hic ordine repetam et quid in unaquaque observandum est, iisdem interponam.

But I have said that I have shown the principal ones only, not all which are able to exist by conflicts of the mind. For by the same way in which the above proceeded easily we were able to show that love is joined to repentence, contempt, shame etc. No indeed, I believe that it stands clearly to each and everyone from what has been said that other affects by so many modes are able to be composed with others that so many variations arise from everywhere so that they may not be defined by any number. But for my plan it is sufficient to have enumerated only the principle ones for the remaining one have been omitted which have more of curiosity than of utility. Nevertheless,  it remains for noting concerning love which of course happens most often as long as we delight in what we seek, so that the body acquires a new constitution from its pleasure by which it is determined otherwise and the other images of things are excited in that and at the same time the mind begins to desire other things and imagine other things. For example, when something is accustomed to delight us by flavor, we might imagine, we desire to enjoy the same, indeed consume it. But as long as we are thus delighted, the stomach is filled and the body is constitutionally altered. If therefore by the body's disposition being altered, the image of the same food, since it presented itself, it is nurtured and consequently also conatus and the desire for eating the same thing, then the new constitution will be repulsed by this desire or conatus and consequently the food to which we were drawn, will present itself as odious and that is what we call disgust or boredom. The external affections of the rest of the body which were observed in the affects, such as trembling, bruising, hiccups, laughter etc, I have not mentioned because these refer to the body along and away from any relation to the mind. Finally, certain ought to be noted concerning the definitions of the affects, which besides I repeat in this order and which are observed in each and everyone, I will place in the same

III.P58 - True Us Generates Affects of Joy

Præter lætitiam et cupiditatem quæ passiones sunt, alii lætitiæ et cupiditatis affectus dantur qui ad nos quatenus agimus, referuntur.

Beyond joy and desire which are passions, other affects of joy and desire exist which refer to us insofar as we act.

DEMONSTRATIO: Cum mens se ipsam suamque agendi potentiam concipit, lætatur (per propositionem 53 hujus) : mens autem se ipsam necessario contemplatur quando veram sive adæquatam ideam concipit (per propositionem 43 partis II). At mens quasdam ideas adæquatas concipit (per scholium II propositionis 40 partis II) : ergo eatenus etiam lætatur quatenus ideas adæquatas concipit hoc est (per propositionem 1 hujus) quatenus agit. Deinde mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, in suo esse perseverare conatur (per propositionem 9 hujus) : at per conatum cupiditatem intelligimus (per ejusdem scholium); ergo cupiditas ad nos refertur etiam quatenus intelligimus sive (per propositionem 1 hujus) quatenus agimus. Q.E.D.

When the mind conceives itself and its potential power for acting, it rejoices (by IIIP53): yet, the mind contemplates itself by necessity when it conceives a true or adequate idea (by IIP43). But the mind conceives certain adequate ideas (by IIP40S2): therefore insofar as it rejoices in as much as it conceives adequate ideas, that is (by IIIP1) in as much as it acts. Finally, the mind has insofar as they are clear and distinct rather than confused, seeks to persevere to be in itself (by IIIP9): but we understand by conatus desire (by IIIP9S); therefore desire refers to us insofar we understand or (by IIIP1) insofar as we act. 

III.P57 - To each thing Their own thing

Quilibet uniuscujusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt.

Any affect of each and every individual differs from the affect of another individual just as much as the essence of one differs from the essence of the other.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio patet ex axiomate 1, quod vide post lemma 3 scholiumque propositionis 13 partis II. At nihilominus eandem ex trium primitivorum affectuum definitionibus demonstrabimus. Omnes affectus ad cupiditatem, lætitiam vel tristitiam referuntur ut eorum quas dedimus definitiones, ostendunt. At cupiditas est ipsa uniuscujusque natura seu essentia (vide ejus definitionem in scholio propositionis 9 hujus); ergo uniuscujusque individui cupiditas a cupiditate alterius tantum discrepat quantum natura seu essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt. Lætitia deinde et tristitia passiones sunt quibus uniuscujusque potentia seu conatus in suo esse perseverandi augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur (per propositionem 11 hujus et ejus scholium). At per conatum in suo esse perseverandi quatenus ad mentem et corpus simul refertur, appetitum et cupiditatem intelligimus (vide scholium propositionis 9 hujus); ergo lætitia et tristitia est ipsa cupiditas sive appetitus quatenus a causis externis augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur hoc est (per idem scholium) est ipsa cujusque natura atque adeo uniuscujusque lætitia vel tristitia a lætitia vel tristitia alterius tantum etiam discrepat quantum natura seu essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt et consequenter quilibet uniuscujusque individui affectus ab affectu alterius tantum discrepat etc. Q.E.D.

This proposition is clear from axiom 1, which see post lemma 3 and IIP13S. But nonetheless, we will show the same thing from the definitions of the three primary affects. Evey affect refers to desire, joy or sadness so as they reveal whose definitions we have given. But desire is the nature or essence of each and every one (see its definition in IIIP9S); thus, the desire of each and every individual is discordant with the desire of another so much as the nature or essence of one differs from the essence of another. Then joy and sadness are passions by which the potential power or conatus of each and every one is increased or lessens for persevering in oneself, is aided or restrained (by IIIP11 and IIIP11S). But by conatus to be persevering in oneself insofar as it refers to the mind and body at the same time, we understand appetite and desire (see IIIP9S); thus joy and sadness and desire itself or appetite insofar as it is increased or lessened, aided or restrained, that is (by the same IIIP9S) is the nature of anyone itself and to such a degree the joy or sadness of each and every one is discordant from the joy or sadness of another to such an extent that the nature or essence of one differs from the essence of another and consequently any affect of each and every individual is discordant with the affect of another so much etc.  

SCHOLIUM: Hinc sequitur affectus animalium quæ irrationalia dicuntur (bruta enim sentire nequaquam dubitare possumus postquam mentis novimus originem) ab affectibus hominum tantum differre quantum eorum natura a natura humana differt. Fertur quidem equus et homo libidine procreandi; at ille libidine equina hic autem humana. Sic etiam libidines et appetitus insectorum, piscium et avium alii atque alii esse debent. Quamvis itaque unumquodque individuum sua qua constat natura, contentum vivat eaque gaudeat, vita tamen illa qua unumquodque est contentum et gaudium nihil aliud est quam idea seu anima ejusdem individui atque adeo gaudium unius a gaudio alterius tantum natura discrepat quantum essentia unius ab essentia alterius differt. Denique ex præcedenti propositione sequitur non parum etiam interesse inter gaudium quo ebrius exempli gratia ducitur et inter gaudium quo potitur philosophus, quod hic in transitu monere volui. Atque hæc de affectibus qui ad hominem referuntur quatenus patitur. Superest ut pauca addam de iis qui ad eundem referuntur quatenus agit. 

From here it follows that the affects of animals which are called irrational (for we are in no way able to doubt that brutes feel after we know the origin of the mind) to differ from the affects of people so much as the nature of them differ from human nature. Indeed the horse and the person are driven by lust to procreation; but the former by equine lust, the latter, however, by human lust. Thus the lust and appetites of insects, fish, birds ought to be some in one way, others in another. Thus, although each and every individual lives contented by what stands as one's nature and rejoices in that, nevertheless that life by which each and every is contented and is no joy other than the idea or soul of the same individual and to such an extent the joy of one differs from the joy of another by nature by the amount that the essence of one differs from the essence of another. Finally, from the preceding proposition it follows that there is also not too little between the joy for which the drunk, for example, is led and the joy to which the philosopher acquires, which I have desired to remind here in passing. And these concerning the affects which refer to a person insofar as one bears. It remains that I add a few things about which who refer to the same one insofar as one acts.