III.D18: Commiseration Defined

Commiseratio est tristitia concomitante idea mali quod alteri quem nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit. Vide scholium propositionis 22 et scholium propositionis 27 hujus.

Commiseration is a sadness accompanied by the idea of a bad thing which occurs to another whom we imagine is similar to ourselves. See IIIP22S and IIIP27S. 

EXPLICATIO: Inter commiserationem et misericordiam nulla videtur esse differentia nisi forte quod commiseratio singularem affectum respiciat, misericordia autem ejus habitum.

Between commiseration and compassion there seems to be no difference unless perhaps because commiseration might reflect a singular affect, while compassion reflects one's demeanor. 

Again Spinoza situates the affect in a bodily positioning. One can almost feel the difference here with commiseration feeling like a core experience (due to personal identification), while compassion is felt more at a peripheral level - like the skin. 

III.D17: Biting of Conscience Defined

Conscientiæ morsus est tristitia concomitante idea rei præteritæ quæ præter spem evenit.

Biting of conscience (or remorse) is a sadness accompanied by the idea of a past thing which turned out beyond hope. 

Here we have a hope unmet and Spinoza uses a phrase that exactly describes the physical sensation - consistent with the concept that the mind is the idea of the body and, thus, bodily-centered. 

III.D16: Thrilling Defined

Gaudium est lætitia concomitante idea rei præteritæ quæ præter spem evenit. 

Thrilling is joy accompanied by the idea of a past thing which occurred beyond hope. 

Spinoza is describing a pattern in which not only are expectations unmet, met or exceeded, but also hopes are similarly unmet, met or exceeded. Here is where hope is exceeded. 

III.D15: Desperation Defined

Desperatio est tristitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.

Desperation is a sadness born of the idea of a future or past matter which has been raised as a cause for concern.

EXPLICATIO: Oritur itaque ex spe securitas et ex metu desperatio quando de rei eventu dubitandi causa tollitur, quod fit quia homo rem præteritam vel futuram adesse imaginatur et ut præsentem contemplatur vel quia alia imaginatur quæ existentiam earum rerum secludunt quæ ipsi dubium injiciebant. Nam tametsi de rerum singularium eventu (per corollarium propositionis 31 partis II) nunquam possumus esse certi, fieri tamen potest ut de earum eventu non dubitemus. Aliud enim esse ostendimus (vide scholium propositionis 49 partis II) de re non dubitare, aliud rei certitudinem habere atque adeo fieri potest ut ex imagine rei præteritæ aut futuræ eodem lætitiæ vel tristitiæ affectu afficiamur ac ex rei præsentis imagine, ut in propositione 18 hujus demonstravimus, quam cum ejusdem scholiis vide. 

Thus security arises from hope desperation from fear when the cause for doubting the eventual outcome is raised, because it happens since a person imagines a past or future thing as present and as one contemplates the present thing or other things one imagines which exclude the existence of these things which throw themselves into doubt. For even if concerning the outcome of singular things (by IIP31C) we are unable to be certain, nonetheless it can happen that we do not doubt the outcome of them. For we have shown that it is one thing (see IIP49S) to not doubt something, something else to have certainty about a matter and to such an extent it is able to happen that from the image of a past or future thing we are affected by an affect of joy or sadness and from the image of the thing present, as we have shown in IIIP18, then see with scholia of the same. 

The explanation here is important for an insight into Spinoza's view on thinking. We might commonly hold that not doubting something is the same as being certain of something, but still most of us actually hold that not doubting someone is the same as "believing" someone. Certainty has a much higher standard and most of us have faced that dreaded question, "Are you certain?" only to find some hesitation. Spinoza is setting out a tool for managing the reactivity of hopes and fears by allowing these affects to be muted by a simple question "Are you certain?"

 

III.D14: Security Defined

Securitas est lætitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.

Security is a joy born of the idea of a past or future matter about which there has been raised as a cause for concern. 

III.D13: Fear Defined

Metus est inconstans tristitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus. Vide de his scholium II propositionis 18 hujus.

Fear is an uncertain sadness born of the idea of a future or past thing about whose outcome we are to some extent hesitant. See IIIP18S2 concerning these.

EXPLICATIO: Ex his definitionibus sequitur non dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe. Qui enim spe pendet et de rei eventu dubitat, is aliquid imaginari supponitur quod rei futuræ existentiam secludit atque adeo eatenus contristari (per propositionem 19 hujus) et consequenter dum spe pendet, metuere ut res eveniat. Qui autem contra in metu est hoc est de rei quam odit eventu dubitat, aliquid etiam imaginatur quod ejusdem rei existentiam secludit atque adeo (per propositionem 20 hujus) lætatur et consequenter eatenus spem habet ne eveniat.

From these definitions, it follows that hope does not exist without fear nor fear without hope. For whoever ponders with hope and doubts the outcome of a matter, is supposed to imagine something which excludes the existence of a future thing and to such an extent is saddened (by IIIP19) and consequently as long as one ponders with hop, fears that the thing may occur. In contrast, whoever is in fear, that is, one is hesitant about the outcome concerning a thing which one hates, also imagines something which excludes the existence of the same thing and to such an extent (by IIIP20) is overjoyed and consequently has hope to an extent that it not occur. 

III.D12: Hope Defined

Spes est inconstans lætitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus.

Hope is an uncertain joy born of the idea of a future thing or a past one about whose outcome we are somewhat hesitant.