III.D11: Mockery Defined

Irrisio est lætitia orta ex eo quod aliquid quod contemnimus in re quam odimus inesse imaginamur.

Mockery is a joy arising from where we imagine something which we scorn to be in something which we hate.

EXPLICATIO: Quatenus rem quam odimus contemnimus eatenus de eadem existentiam negamus (vide scholium propositionis 52 hujus) et eatenus (per propositionem 20 hujus) lætamur. Sed quoniam supponimus hominem id quod irridet odio tamen habere, sequitur hanc lætitiam solidam non esse. Vide scholium propositionis 47 hujus.

Insofar as we scorn that which we hate to such a degree do we deny the existence of a thing (see IIIP52S) and to such a degree (by IIIP20) do we rejoice. But since we suppose a person has hatred for that which one mocks, it follows that this joy is not solid. See IIIP47S. 

Spinoza is highlighting the complexity of moods around memories. In order to attain blessedness, clarity or processing of past events is important. For that reason, he revisits the issues raised by the things hated in the past.

 

III.D10: Devotion Defined

Devotio est amor erga eum quem admiramur.

Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.

EXPLICATIO: Admirationem oriri ex rei novitate ostendimus propositione 52 hujus. Si igitur contingat ut id quod admiramur sæpe imaginemur, idem admirari desinemus atque adeo videmus devotionis affectum facile in simplicem amorem degenerare. 

We demonstrated in IIIP52 that admiration arises from some novelty. Thus, if it happens that we often imagine whatever we admire, we will cease to admire the same and to such an extent we see that the feeling of devotion devolves easily into simple love.

Spinoza continues his careful reading of emotions related to awe, wonder, veneration and devotion as simply aberrations based on strangeness or newness. So, these aberrations are not desirable or lofty, but are temporary experiences on the way to understanding. Religion, in contrast, holds the highest regard for such feelings. Spinoza's careful approach to this category of emotions gives weight to the argument that the power of "the intellectual love of God" is fundamentally anti-religious and rational in its nature, rather than an overpowering "spiritual experience" in support of a rational decision. The priority of such anti-religious and rational basis is its durability, because novelty fades and, as he points out here, with it the overpowering nature of the religious emotions.

III.D9: Aversion Defined

Aversio est tristitia concomitante idea alicujus rei quæ per accidens causa est tristitiæ. De his vide scholium propositionis 15 hujus.

Aversion is a sadness accompanied by the idea of some thing which is a sadness by accidental cause. On these see IIIP15S. 

Consistent with the discussion on tendency, Spinoza is arguing another behavior is rooted in the primitives - this time sadness. For centuries, people have debated the idea of boys loving, and girls hating spiders and snakes. Spinoza is arguing that this "accidental" perception is rooted in an unwillingness to acknowledge the cultivation of the emotions driving, in this case, aversion. 

III.D8: Tendency Defined

Propensio est lætitia concomitante idea alicujus rei quæ per accidens causa est lætitiæ. 

Tendency is a joy accompanied by the idea of whatever thing which is a joy by accidental cause.

Spinoza is holding consistent that a tendency is not itself a primitive, but is rooted in the primitive of joy. This is important. Many might attribute a person's lack of power to avoid self-destructive behaviors to some tendency that seems structurally embedded. Instead, Spinoza argues that it is derived from joy but assigned an accidental cause in order to minimize identity with the tendency.

 

III.D7: Hatred Defined

Odium est tristitia concomitante idea causæ externæ.

Hatred is sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause

EXPLICATIO: Quæ hic notanda sunt, ex dictis in præcedentis definitionis explicatione facile percipiuntur. Vide præterea scholium propositionis 13 hujus. 

These things which ought to be noted here, are easily perceived from statements in the explanation of the preceding definition. See besides IIIP13S. 

III.D6: Love Defined

Amor est lætitia concomitante idea causæ externæ.

Love is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

EXPLICATIO: Hæc definitio satis clare amoris essentiam explicat; illa vero auctorum qui definiunt amorem esse voluntatem amantis se jungendi rei amatæ, non amoris essentiam sed ejus proprietatem exprimit et quia amoris essentia non satis ab auctoribus perspecta fuit, ideo neque ejus proprietatis ullum clarum conceptum habere potuerunt et hinc factum ut eorum definitionem admodum obscuram esse omnes judicaverint. Verum notandum cum dico proprietatem esse in amante se voluntate jungere rei amatæ, me per voluntatem non intelligere consensum vel animi deliberationem seu liberum decretum (nam hoc fictitium esse demonstravimus propositione 48 partis II) nec etiam cupiditatem sese jungendi rei amatæ quando abest vel perseverandi in ipsius præsentia quando adest; potest namque amor absque hac aut illa cupiditate concipi sed per voluntatem me acquiescentiam intelligere quæ est in amante ob rei amatæ præsentiam a qua lætitia amantis corroboratur aut saltem fovetur.

This definition explains the essence of love clearly enough; truly those writers who define love as the will of love to join oneself to the beloved thing, have not expressed the essence of love but its property and since the essence of love was not viewed enough by the authors, to such an extent they are not able to have any clear concept of its property and from this the fact that all judge that their definition is very obscure. Truly it ought to be noted since I say that the property is in love that one by will joins to the beloved, that I by will do not understand agreement or deliberation of the heart or free decree (for this is a fiction we have demonstrated in IIP48) and also not desire to join oneself to the beloved when away or persevering in presence of it when near; for love is able to be conceived from this or that desire but by will I understand that satisfaction which is in love on account of the presence of the beloved from which joy is corroborated by love or at least encouraged.

III.D5: Contempt Defined

Contemptus est rei alicujus imaginatio quæ mentem adeo parum tangit ut ipsa mens ex rei præsentia magis moveatur ad ea imaginandum quæ in ipsa re non sunt quam quæ in ipsa sunt. Vide scholium propositionis 52 hujus. Definitiones venerationis et dedignationis missas hic facio quia nulli quod sciam affectus ex his nomen trahunt. 

Contempt is an imagination of some thing which touches the mind to such a small extent that the mind itself is moved more by the presence of the thing to imagining those things which are not in the thing itself than those things which are. See IIIP52. Outlining the definitions of veneration and disdain I do here since there are no affects which derive their name from these. 

Here Spinoza discusses contempt as something which is not related to an affect, but more like some redirected state. He includes veneration and disdain as constructed in a similar way. These are all endowed with more of a sideways force than a direct force. It is pertinent that Spinoza begins his post-primitives discussion with stating those states of mind which are not powered by the primitives, but are likely to be confused as such. The delineation of veneration as not affect-driven - like that of wonder - lends credence to the idea that any form of a religious mindset is unattractive to Spinoza.