III.D13: Fear Defined

Metus est inconstans tristitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus. Vide de his scholium II propositionis 18 hujus.

Fear is an uncertain sadness born of the idea of a future or past thing about whose outcome we are to some extent hesitant. See IIIP18S2 concerning these.

EXPLICATIO: Ex his definitionibus sequitur non dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe. Qui enim spe pendet et de rei eventu dubitat, is aliquid imaginari supponitur quod rei futuræ existentiam secludit atque adeo eatenus contristari (per propositionem 19 hujus) et consequenter dum spe pendet, metuere ut res eveniat. Qui autem contra in metu est hoc est de rei quam odit eventu dubitat, aliquid etiam imaginatur quod ejusdem rei existentiam secludit atque adeo (per propositionem 20 hujus) lætatur et consequenter eatenus spem habet ne eveniat.

From these definitions, it follows that hope does not exist without fear nor fear without hope. For whoever ponders with hope and doubts the outcome of a matter, is supposed to imagine something which excludes the existence of a future thing and to such an extent is saddened (by IIIP19) and consequently as long as one ponders with hop, fears that the thing may occur. In contrast, whoever is in fear, that is, one is hesitant about the outcome concerning a thing which one hates, also imagines something which excludes the existence of the same thing and to such an extent (by IIIP20) is overjoyed and consequently has hope to an extent that it not occur. 

III.D12: Hope Defined

Spes est inconstans lætitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus.

Hope is an uncertain joy born of the idea of a future thing or a past one about whose outcome we are somewhat hesitant.  

III.D11: Mockery Defined

Irrisio est lætitia orta ex eo quod aliquid quod contemnimus in re quam odimus inesse imaginamur.

Mockery is a joy arising from where we imagine something which we scorn to be in something which we hate.

EXPLICATIO: Quatenus rem quam odimus contemnimus eatenus de eadem existentiam negamus (vide scholium propositionis 52 hujus) et eatenus (per propositionem 20 hujus) lætamur. Sed quoniam supponimus hominem id quod irridet odio tamen habere, sequitur hanc lætitiam solidam non esse. Vide scholium propositionis 47 hujus.

Insofar as we scorn that which we hate to such a degree do we deny the existence of a thing (see IIIP52S) and to such a degree (by IIIP20) do we rejoice. But since we suppose a person has hatred for that which one mocks, it follows that this joy is not solid. See IIIP47S. 

Spinoza is highlighting the complexity of moods around memories. In order to attain blessedness, clarity or processing of past events is important. For that reason, he revisits the issues raised by the things hated in the past.

 

III.D10: Devotion Defined

Devotio est amor erga eum quem admiramur.

Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.

EXPLICATIO: Admirationem oriri ex rei novitate ostendimus propositione 52 hujus. Si igitur contingat ut id quod admiramur sæpe imaginemur, idem admirari desinemus atque adeo videmus devotionis affectum facile in simplicem amorem degenerare. 

We demonstrated in IIIP52 that admiration arises from some novelty. Thus, if it happens that we often imagine whatever we admire, we will cease to admire the same and to such an extent we see that the feeling of devotion devolves easily into simple love.

Spinoza continues his careful reading of emotions related to awe, wonder, veneration and devotion as simply aberrations based on strangeness or newness. So, these aberrations are not desirable or lofty, but are temporary experiences on the way to understanding. Religion, in contrast, holds the highest regard for such feelings. Spinoza's careful approach to this category of emotions gives weight to the argument that the power of "the intellectual love of God" is fundamentally anti-religious and rational in its nature, rather than an overpowering "spiritual experience" in support of a rational decision. The priority of such anti-religious and rational basis is its durability, because novelty fades and, as he points out here, with it the overpowering nature of the religious emotions.

III.D9: Aversion Defined

Aversio est tristitia concomitante idea alicujus rei quæ per accidens causa est tristitiæ. De his vide scholium propositionis 15 hujus.

Aversion is a sadness accompanied by the idea of some thing which is a sadness by accidental cause. On these see IIIP15S. 

Consistent with the discussion on tendency, Spinoza is arguing another behavior is rooted in the primitives - this time sadness. For centuries, people have debated the idea of boys loving, and girls hating spiders and snakes. Spinoza is arguing that this "accidental" perception is rooted in an unwillingness to acknowledge the cultivation of the emotions driving, in this case, aversion. 

III.D8: Tendency Defined

Propensio est lætitia concomitante idea alicujus rei quæ per accidens causa est lætitiæ. 

Tendency is a joy accompanied by the idea of whatever thing which is a joy by accidental cause.

Spinoza is holding consistent that a tendency is not itself a primitive, but is rooted in the primitive of joy. This is important. Many might attribute a person's lack of power to avoid self-destructive behaviors to some tendency that seems structurally embedded. Instead, Spinoza argues that it is derived from joy but assigned an accidental cause in order to minimize identity with the tendency.

 

III.D7: Hatred Defined

Odium est tristitia concomitante idea causæ externæ.

Hatred is sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause

EXPLICATIO: Quæ hic notanda sunt, ex dictis in præcedentis definitionis explicatione facile percipiuntur. Vide præterea scholium propositionis 13 hujus. 

These things which ought to be noted here, are easily perceived from statements in the explanation of the preceding definition. See besides IIIP13S.