Spinoza's Ethics: II.P7: Order and Connection

This proposition is important to thoroughly understand. As discussed in earlier posts on Book II, Spinoza is presenting reality through two aspects. It is tempting to simply connect a series of events that occur within the physical world to establish a series of events within the mental world, but that demeans the unique nature of each attribute. For example, lightening and thunder are related to the same event. However, lightening occurs with a different timing than thunder because the speed of light waves are different than those of sound waves. To say that the lightening caused the thunder is to misattribute cause. They are both caused by the same underlying phenomenon. Similarly, the order and connection of ideas and things are prone to differences given the defining characteristics of each attribute. For example, within the attribute of thinking are modes of thought such as affects that do not have a representational object, but yet have a related causal event within the attribute of extending.

That warning aside, Spinoza sets out a proposition that ensures a movement towards an "active" intellect by focusing causality on the subjective experiences rather than the objective events. His framework for understanding reality drives a different process for addressing mental states. When confronted with a feeling or mental state, most individuals highlight a particular person or event as the cause. Spinoza is stating that the person or event is not the cause, instead the cause is the idea of the person or the event. This idea is frequently incorrect, or in his terms, inadequate. Given the inadequacy of the idea, the likelihood is high that the feeling or mental state experienced is in error - despite our best observation. In the same way that we perceive that lightening creates subsequent thunder, so too are we inclined to incorrectly attribute cause and blame.

Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum.

Translated as,

The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Demonstratio: Patet ex axiomate 4 partis I. Nam cujuscunque causati idea a cognitione causæ cujus est effectus, dependet.

Translated as,

It is evident from IA4. For the idea of whatsoever is caused is governed by the knowledge of which cause it is the effect.

Corollarium: Hinc sequitur quod Dei cogitandi potentia æqualis est ipsius actuali agendi potentiæ. Hoc est quicquid ex infinita Dei natura sequitur formaliter, id omne ex Dei idea eodem ordine eademque connexione sequitur in Deo objective.

Translated as,

From this it follows that the power of God's thinking is the equivalent of the power of [God's] actual doing. That is, whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God, every ["whatever"] follows from the idea of God in the same order and the same connection as an object in God.

Scholium: Hic antequam ulterius pergamus, revocandum nobis in memoriam est id quod supra ostendimus nempe quod quicquid ab infinito intellectu percipi potest tanquam substantiæ essentiam constituens, id omne ad unicam tantum substantiam pertinet et consequenter quod substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia quæ jam sub hoc jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur. Sic etiam modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res sed duobus modis expressa, quod quidam Hebræorum quasi per nebulam vidisse videntur, qui scilicet statuunt Deum, Dei intellectum resque ab ipso intellectas unum et idem esse. Exempli gratia circulus in natura existens et idea circuli existentis quæ etiam in Deo est, una eademque est res quæ per diversa attributa explicatur et ideo sive naturam sub attributo extensionis sive sub attributo cogitationis sive sub alio quocunque concipiamus, unum eundemque ordinem sive unam eandemque causarum connexionem hoc est easdem res invicem sequi reperiemus. Nec ulla alia de causa dixi quod Deus sit causa ideæ exempli gratia circuli quatenus tantum est res cogitans et circuli quatenus tantum est res extensa nisi quia esse formale ideæ circuli non nisi per alium cogitandi modum tanquam causam proximam et ille iterum per alium et sic in infinitum, potest percipi ita ut quamdiu res ut cogitandi modi considerantur, ordinem totius naturæ sive causarum connexionem per solum cogitationis attributum explicare debemus et quatenus ut modi extensionis considerantur, ordo etiam totius naturæ per solum extensionis attributum explicari debet et idem de aliis attributis intelligo. Quare rerum ut in se sunt, Deus revera est causa quatenus infinitis constat attributis nec impræsentiarum hæc clarius possum explicare.

Translated as,

Before we might move further, we ought to recall to memory that which we have shown above, namely that whatever may be perceived from infinite intellect as if constituting the essence of substance, every such ["whatever"] pertains to the one and only substance to such a degree that, as a consequence, thinking substance and extending substance are one and the same substance which is comprehended either now under this or now under that attribute. Thus, the mode of extension and the idea of that mode are indeed one and the same thing but expressed under two modes, which certain of the Hebrews seemed to have seen as if through a cloud, who evidently determined that God, the intellect of God and things from the [intellect of God] itself are one and the same thing. For example, a circle existing in nature and the idea of a circle existing which is truly in God are one and the same thing which is explained through different attributes and to the extent we conceive nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of thought or under some other [attribute], we discover one and the same order or one and the same connection of causes that is, the same things follow in order. And I have not said any other things about cause where God might be the cause of an idea, for example, [the cause] of the circle insofar as [God] is only a thinking thing and [the cause] of the circle insofar as [God] is only an extending thing (unless since it is the formal essence of the idea of a circle) is not able to be perceived unless by thinking of another mode as its proximate cause and that again through another to infinity, so that for as long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we ought to explain the order of all of nature or the connection of causes by only the attribute of thought and insofar as the modes of extension are considered, also the order of all of nature ought to be explained by only the attribute of extension and I understand the same of other attributes. Therefore of things as they are in themselves, God in truth is the cause insofar as [God] consists of infinite attributes and I am not able to explain these more clearly for the present.