Tuesday, October 6, 2020

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P26: Determined By God

Here Spinoza continues to relentlessly demonstrate that its "all God all the time." No room for a separate causal power exists. Our perceptions of independence of power are simply cognitive illusions.

Res quae ad aliquid operandum determinata est, a Deo necessario sic fuit determinata et quae a Deo non est determinata, non potest se ipsam ad operandum determinare. 

Translated as,

A thing which has been determined to produce an outcome has necessarily been determined in this way by God and one which has not been determined by God, is not able to determine itself to produce an outcome.

Demonstratio: Id per quod res determinatae ad aliquid operandum dicuntur, necessario quid positivum est (ut per se notum). Adeoque tam ejus essentiae quam existentiae Deus ex necessitate suae naturae est causa efficiens (per propositiones 25 et 16) quod erat primum. Ex quo etiam quod secundo proponitur clarissime sequitur. Nam si res quae a Deo determinata non est, se ipsam determinare posset, prima pars falsa esset, quod est absurdum, ut ostendimus.

Translated as,

That by which things are said to be determined to produce an outcome, necessarily such a thing is substantive (as it is known through itself). To such an extent, God, from the necessity of its own nature, is the efficient cause just as much of a thing's essence as of a thing's existence (by P25 and 16). This was the first thing. And from which it follows most clearly what was proposed next. For if a thing which has not been determined by God were able to determine itself, the first part of this [proposition] would be false, which is absurd, as we have shown.

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