Spinoza's Ethics: I.P33: Everything is Determined

In this lengthy Proposition, Demonstration and Notes, Spinoza is confirming the deterministic pattern of God in which things unfold and express under necessity as well as perfection. Due to our imperfect understanding, we sometimes perceive that things do not unfold under necessity and perfection and term these "contingent." However, this term is not fundementally accurate, but represents a condition of our limited knowledge. Insofar as the term is used to indicate our limitations rather than those of God, the term is not inaccurate. The second note takes on a controversial issue: the will of God. While God is free cause, God is not "free will" because God cannot be not God and all that being not God would entail. 

Res in nullo alio modo neque alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt quam productae sunt. 

Translated as,

Things have been able to be produced by God in no other way and in no other order than they have been produced.

Demonstratio: Res enim omnes ex data Dei natura necessario sequutae sunt (per propositionem 16) et ex necessitate naturae Dei determinatae sunt ad certo modo existendum et operandum (per propositionem 29). Si itaque res alterius naturae potuissent esse vel alio modo ad operandum determinari ut naturae ordo alius esset, ergo Deus etiam natura alia posset esse quam jam est ac proinde (per propositionem 11) illa etiam deberet existere et consequenter duo vel plures possent dari Dii, quod (per corollarium I propositionis 14) est absurdum. Quapropter res nullo alio modo neque alio ordine, etc. Q.E.D. 

Translated as,

For all things have followed necessarily from God's given nature (by P16) and have been determined from the necessity of God's nature to exist and to operate in a certain way (by P29). So, if things of another nature could have existed or been determined to operate in another way so that the order of Nature was different, then God could also have been of a different nature than it is now and further (by P11) that other nature must also exist and consequently, there could have been two or more Gods, which is absurd (by P14C1). So things have been able to be produced in no other way and no other order, and so on.

Scholium I: Quonium his luce mediana clarius ostendi nihil absolute in rebus dari propter quod contingentes dicantur, explicare jam paucis volo quid nobis per contingens erit intellegendum sed prius quid per necessarium et impossible. Res aliqua necessaria dicitur vel ratione suae essentiae vel ratione causae. Rei enim alicujus existentia vel ex ipsius essentia et definitione vel ex data causa efficiente necessario sequitur. Deinde his etiam de causis res aliqua impossibilis dicitur; nimirum quia vel ipsius essentia seu definitio contradictionem involvit vel quia nulla causa externa datur ad talem rem producendam determinata. At res aliqua nulla alia de causa contingens dicitur nisi respectu defectus nostrae cognitionis. Res enim cujus essentiam contradictionem involvere ignoramus vel de qua probe scimus eandem nullam contradictionem involvere et tamen de ipsius existentia nihil certo affirmare possumus propterea quod ordo causarum nos latet, ea nunquam nec ut necessaria nec ut impossibilis videri nobis potest ideoque eandem vel contingentem vel possibilem vocamus.

Translated as,

Since by these [words] I have shown more clearly than the noonday light that absolutely nothing is given to things on account of which they may be called contingent, I wish to explain now in a few [words] what we should understand by contingent thing but first, what [we must understand] by necessary and impossible thing. Any thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause. For the existence of some thing follows necessarily either from essence and definition of itself or from a given efficient cause. Next also from these causes some thing is called impossible namely, either because essence or definition itself involves a contradiction or because no external cause has been given which has been determined to produce such a thing. But some thing is called contingent by no other cause unless with respect to a defect of our knowledge. For we are ignorant of a thing whose essence involves a contradiction or we know very well that the same [essence] involves no contradiction and nevertheless we are able to affirm nothing certainly about its existence because the order of causes is hidden from us, it can never seem to us either necessary or
impossible and to such a degree we call this same thing contingent or possible.

Scholium II: Ex præcedentibus clare sequitur res summa perfectione a Deo fuisse productas quandoquidem ex data perfectissima natura necessario secutæ sunt. Neque hoc Deum ullius arguit imperfectionis; ipsius enim perfectio hoc nos affirmare coegit. Imo ex hujus contrario clare sequeretur (ut modo ostendi) Deum non esse summe perfectum; nimirum quia si res alio modo fuissent productæ, Deo alia natura esset tribuenda, diversa ab ea quam ex consideratione Entis perfectissimi coacti sumus ei tribuere. Verum non dubito quin multi hanc sententiam ut absurdam explodant nec animum ad eandem perpendendam instituere velint idque nulla alia de causa quam quia Deo aliam libertatem assueti sunt tribuere, longe diversam ab illa quæ a nobis (definitione 7) tradita est videlicet absolutam voluntatem. Verum neque etiam dubito si rem meditari vellent nostrarumque demonstrationum seriem recte secum perpendere, quin tandem talem libertatem qualem jam Deo tribuunt, non tantum ut nugatoriam sed ut magnum scientiæ obstaculum plane rejiciant. Nec opus est ut ea quæ in scholio propositionis 17 dicta sunt, hic repetam. Attamen in eorum gratiam adhuc ostendam quod quamvis concedatur voluntatem ad Dei essentiam pertinere, ex ejus perfectione nihilominus sequatur res nullo alio potuisse modo neque ordine a Deo creari; quod facile erit ostendere si prius consideremus id quod ipsimet concedunt videlicet ex solo Dei decreto et voluntate pendere ut unaquæque res id quod est sit. Nam alias Deus omnium rerum causa non esset. Deinde quod omnia decreta ab æterno ab ipso Deo sancita fuerunt. Nam alias imperfectionis et inconstantiæ argueretur. At cum in æterno non detur quando, ante nec post, hinc ex sola scilicet Dei perfectione sequitur Deum aliud decernere nunquam posse nec unquam potuisse sive Deum ante sua decreta non fuisse nec sine ipsis esse posse.

Translated as,

From the preceding [statements], it clearly follows that things produced by God have the height of perfection since [these things] necessarily follow from a nature given to be most perfect. And no one accuses God of imperfection for its own perfection forces us to affirm this. Indeed, it might follow clearly from the contrary of this (that which I have just shown) that God is not the height of perfection. Because, without a doubt, things that might have been produced in another way, another different nature would be attributed to God from that which we are forced to attribute to [God] from the consideration of a most perfect Being. Truly I do not doubt but that many will eject this opinion as absurd and not set [their] mind to considering this same [opinion] by no other reason than because they are accustomed to attribute another freedom to God widely different than that which has been handed to us (D7), namely an absolute will. Indeed I also do not doubt that if they are willing to reflect on [this] matter and weigh within themselves properly the series of our demonstrations that they might reject such freedom which they now attribute to God, not only as trifling, but plainly as a great obstacle to science. Nor is it a need that I repeat here things which have been said in P17S. Nevertheless I will show here for their pleasure that even if it is conceded that will pertains to the essence of God, nothing less follows from its [God's] perfection than things are able to be created in no other way or in another order which is easy to show if we were to consider what they themselves conceded earlier that they think that from the decree and will of God everything is as it is. For otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things. Next, because everything decreed for eternity by God has been inviolate, for otherwise it might be accused of imperfection and inconstancy. But since in eternity there is no such thing as when, before, or after, it follows solely from the perfection of God, that God never can decree, or never could have decreed anything but what is, that God did not exist before its decrees, and would not exist without them. 

At dicent quod quamvis supponeretur quod Deus aliam rerum naturam fecisset vel quod ab æterno aliud de natura ejusque ordine decrevisset, nulla inde in Deo sequeretur imperfectio. Verum si hoc dicant, concedent simul Deum posse sua mutare decreta. Nam si Deus de natura ejusque ordine aliud quam decrevit decrevisset hoc est ut aliud de natura voluisset et concepisset, alium necessario quam jam habet  intellectum et aliam quam jam habet voluntatem habuisset. Et si Deo alium intellectum aliamque voluntatem tribuere licet absque ulla ejus essentiæ ejusque perfectionis mutatione, quid causæ est cur jam non possit sua de rebus creatis decreta mutare et nihilominus æque perfectus manere? Ejus enim intellectus et voluntas circa res creatas et earum ordinem in respectu suæ essentiæ et perfectionis perinde est, quomodocunque concipiatur. Deinde omnes quos vidi philosophi concedunt nullum in Deo dari intellectum potentia sed tantum actu; cum autem et ejus intellectus et ejus voluntas ab ejusdem essentia non distinguantur ut etiam omnes concedunt, sequitur ergo hinc etiam quod si Deus alium intellectum actu habuisset et aliam voluntatem, ejus etiam essentia alia necessario esset ac proinde (ut a principio conclusi) si aliter res quam jam sunt, a Deo productæ essent, Dei intellectus ejusque voluntas hoc est (ut conceditur) ejus essentia alia esse deberet, quod est absurdum.

Translated as,

But, they say, it might be supposed that God had made a different nature of things, or had ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning nature and its order, from here no imperfection in God might follow. Truly if they are to say this, they might concede at the same time that God is able to change its own decrees. For if God had decreed something of its nature and order other than which [God] has decreed, that is, as something other from nature [God] had wished and conceived, necessarily [God]  possessed an intellect other than the one now possessed and had a will other than then the will now held. And if it is permitted to attribute to God another intellect and will and by any other change of [God's] essence and perfection, what is the reason why [God] is not now able to change its decrees of created things and yet remain equally perfect? For its intellect and will concerning created things and the order of them is conceived in whatever way equally with respect to its essence and perfection. Next all of the philosophers whom I have seen concede that no intellect exists in God by potential but so much by actuality. Moreover since both [God's'] intellect and will may not be distinguished by the same essence - as they all still concede, it then follows from here also that if God had another intellect and another will by actuality, then [God's] essence would necessary be another and next (as I concluded from the beginning) if things had been produced by God different than they are, then the intellect and will of God, that is (as is conceded) the essence ought to be different, which is absurd. 

Cum itaque res nullo alio modo nec ordine a Deo produci potuerint et hoc verum esse ex summa Dei perfectione sequatur, nulla profecto sana ratio persuadere nobis potest ut credamus quod Deus noluerit omnia quæ in suo intellectu sunt, eadem illa perfectione qua ipsa intelligit, creare. At dicent in rebus nullam esse perfectionem neque imperfectionem sed id quod in ipsis est propter quod perfectæ sunt aut imperfectæ et bonæ aut malæ dicuntur, a Dei tantum voluntate pendere atque adeo si Deus voluisset, potuisset efficere ut id quod jam perfectio est, summa esset imperfectio et contra. Verum quid hoc aliud esset quam aperte affirmare quod Deus qui id quod vult necessario intelligit, sua voluntate efficere potest ut res alio modo quam intelligit, intelligat, quod (ut modo ostendi) magnum est absurdum. Quare argumentum in ipsos retorquere possum hoc modo. Omnia a Dei potestate pendent. Ut res itaque aliter se habere possint, Dei necessario voluntas aliter se habere etiam deberet; atqui Dei voluntas aliter se habere nequit (ut modo ex Dei perfectione evidentissime ostendimus). Ergo neque res aliter se habere possunt. Fateor hanc opinionem quæ omnia indifferenti cuidam Dei voluntati subjicit et ab ipsius beneplacito omnia pendere statuit, minus a vero aberrare quam illorum qui statuunt Deum omnia sub ratione boni agere. Nam hi aliquid extra Deum videntur ponere quod a Deo non dependet, ad quod Deus tanquam ad exemplar in operando attendit vel ad quod tanquam ad certum scopum collineat. Quod profecto nihil aliud est quam Deum fato subjicere, quo nihil de Deo absurdius statui potest, quem ostendimus tam omnium rerum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ primam et unicam liberam causam esse. Quare non est ut in hoc absurdo refutando tempus consumam.

Therefore since all things have been able to be produced by God in no other way and in no other order and this truly follows to be from the highest perfection of God, no sound argument has been made that is able to persuade us that we might believe that God was not willing to create all things which are in [God's] intellect, by the same perfection by which [God] understands. But they might say in [these] matters that there is no perfection or imperfection but that which is themselves on account of which they are called perfect or imperfect or good or bad are held to be such by the will of God and, to such an extent, if God so willed it, it would happen that which is now perfect might be the height of imperfection and vice versa. Truly what is this other than to affirm openly that because God necessarily understands whatever God wishes, then by [God's] will, [God] is able to effect whatever it might understand in a way different than it understands, which is (as I have shown in a way) a great absurdity. For this reason, I am able to turn back the argument on themselves in this way. Everything depends on the power of God. For things to be able to hold themselves differently, necessarily the will of God ought to hold itself differently; but the will of God is unable to hold itself differently (as we have shown in a way most evidently from the perfection of God). Therefore things are not able to hold themselves differently. I confess that this opinion which subjects everything to the same indifferent God and determines that everything depends on the goodwill of [Godself] is less deviant from the truth than the [opinion] of those who determine that God brings about everything under a reason of goodness. For these [people] seem to assert something outside God which does not depend on God, for which God so to speak attends as an example in operating or lines up with as a specific reference point. This is doing nothing other than subjecting God to fate, in which nothing can be determined to be more absurd concerning God, which we have shown as not only the essence of all things but also the as the first and only free cause of the existence of all things. For this reason, I will spend no time in refuting this absurdity.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P32: God's Will

Spinoza has led up to this proposition by P31 where he clearly defines will as within the category of Nature natured, rather than Nature naturing. Nature natured lacks free cause which is only within Nature naturing. Spinoza's demonstration follows this line of reasoning established on discussing the intellect. By defining the will as "like the intellect," Spinoza simply applies the reasoning applied earlier to the intellect. Here again Spinoza delivers significant effort to disabuse readers of the notion of "free"will. He grants the faculty of will, but shows that will operates within the natural framework under necessity. His necessity is characterized by certo modo which translates as "in a certain way." I don't think this translation conveys adequately the sense of specificity or singularity of the action. I think Spinoza is meaning that the cause produces the effect "with precision," removing both vagueness and randomness.

Voluntas non potest vocari causa libera sed tantum necessaria.

Translated as,

The will cannot be called a free cause but only a necessary [cause].

Demonstratio: Voluntas certus tantum cogitandi modus est sicuti intellectus adeoque (per propositionem 28) unaquaeque volitio non potest existere neque ad operandum determinari nisi ab alia causa determinetur et haec rursus ab alia et sic porro in infinitum. Quod si voluntas infinita supponatur, debet etiam ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo, non quatenus substantia absolute infinita est sed quatenus attributum habet quod infinitam et aeternam cogitationis essentiam exprimit (per propositionem 23). Quocunque igitur modo sive finita sive infinita concipiatur, causam requirit a qua ad existendum et operandum determinetur adeoque (per definitionem 7) non potest dici causa libera sed tantum necessaria
vel coacta. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

The will is only a certain mode of thinking just as is the intellect. To such an extent (by P28) each and every volition can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined by another cause, and this cause again by another, and so on, to infinity. Even if the will is held to be infinite, it must still be determined to exist and operate by God, not insofar as substance is an absolutely infinite substance, but insofar as [God] has an attribute that expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by P23). So in whatsoever way [will] is conceived, whether as finite or as infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and operate. To such an extent (by D7) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or compelled [cause].

Corollarium I: Hinc sequitur I Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis. 

Translated as,

From this it follows, first, that God does not operate by freedom of the will.

Corollarium II: Sequitur II voluntatem et intellectum ad Dei naturam ita sese habere ut mote et quies et absolute ut omnia naturalia quae (per propositionem 29) a Deo ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari debent. Nam voluntas, ut reliqua omnia, causa indiget a qua ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinetur. Et quamvis ex data voluntate sive intellectu infinita sequantur, non tamen propterea Deus magis dici potest ex libertate voluntatis agere quam propter ea quae ex motu et quiete sequuntur (infinita enim ex his etiam sequuntur) dici potest ex libertate motus et quietis agere. Quare voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet quam reliqua naturalia sed ad ipsam eodem modo sese habet ut motus et quies et omnia reliqua quae ostendimus ex necessitate divinae naturae sequi et ab eadem ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari.

Translated as,

It follows, second, that will and intellect are to God's nature as motion and rest are absolutely all natural things, which (by P29) must be determined by God to exist and operate in a certain way. For the will, like all other things, requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and operate in a certain way. And although from a given will, or intellect infinitely many things may follow, God still cannot be said, on that account, to act from freedom of the will, any more than [God] can be said to act from freedom of motion and rest on account of those things that follow from motion and rest (for infinitely many things also follow from motion and rest). So will does not pertain to God's nature any more than do the other natural things, but is related to it in the same way as motion and rest, and all the other things which, as we have shown, follow from the necessity of the divine nature and are determined by it to exist and operate in a certain way.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P31: Intellect in Action

Spinoza distinguishes clearly here between our intellect, which is a mode of the attribute of thought, and the attribute of thought. Our intellect is just one of an array of modes of thought. The attribute of thought which he calls absolute thought is of a completely different order. He then addresses the issue of the intellect insofar as it relates to the activity of understanding. He is careful to not address the potential for thinking, because he is demonstrating how the intellect functions within a framework of modal causality.

Intellectus actu sive is finitus sit sive infinitus, ut et voluntas, cupiditas, amor etc. ad Naturam naturatam, non vero ad naturantem referri debent. 

Translated as,

The intellect, whether finite or infinite in action, like will, desire, love, etc. ought to be referred to as Nature natured, not as Nature naturing.

Demonstratio: Per intellectum enim (ut per se notum) non intelligimus absolutam cogitationem sed certum tantum modum cogitandi, qui modis ab aliis scilicet cupiditate, amore, etc. differt adeoque (per definitionem 5) per absolutam cogitationem concipi debet nempe (per propositionem 15 et definitionem 6) per aliquod Dei attributum quod aeternam et infinitam cogitationis essentiam exprimit, ita concipi debet ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possit ac propterea (per scholium propositionis 29) ad Naturam naturatam, non vero naturantem referri debet ut etiam reliqui modi cogitandi. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

By intellect (as is known through itself) we understand not absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, which mode differs from the others, such as desire, love, etc., and to such a degree (by D5) truly ought to be conceived by absolute thought, that is (by P15 and D6), it must be conceived in this way by some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought so that without that attribute it can neither be nor be conceived and so (by P29S) like the other modes of thinking, it must be referred to as Nature natured not as Natura naturing.

Scholium: Ratio cur hic loquar de intellectu actu non est quia concedo ullum dari intellectum potentia sed quia omnem confusionem vitare cupio, nolui loqui nisi de re nobis quam clarissime percepta, de ipsa scilicet intellectione qua nihil nobis clarius percipitur. Nihil enim intelligere possumus ad perfectiorem intellectionis cogitationem non conducat.

Translated as,

The reason why I speak here of the intellect in action is not because I concede that there is an intellect in potential, but, because I wish to avoid all confusion, I do not wish to speak of things unless we perceive [them] as clearly as possible.  Certainly concerning intellectual activity itself, nothing is more clear to our perception. For we are able to understand nothing that does not lead to more perfect thinking of intellectual activity.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P30: View From Somewhere

Here Spinoza outlines the structure of perceiving or comprehending - activity of the intellect which, as I posted earlier, operates from somewhere. This is in contrast to conceiving which is capable of knowing substance as substance as a view from nowhere. The delineation sets up for conceive/perceive/imagine as a spectrum of activities of the mind.

Intellectus actu finitus aut actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud.

Translated as,

An intellect, whether finite in action or infinite in action, must comprehend God's attributes and God's modifications and nothing else.

Demonstratio: Idea vera debet convenire cum suo ideato (per axioma 6) hoc est (ut per se notum) id quod in intellectu objective continentur, debet necessario in natura dari. Atqui in natura (per corollarium I propositionis 14) non nisi una substantia datur nempe Deus nec ullae aliae affectiones (per propositionem 15) quam quae in Deo sunt et quae (per eandem propositionem) sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt; ergo intellectus actu finitus aut actu infinitus Dei attributa Deique affectiones comprehendere debet et nihil aliud. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

A true idea must agree with its object (by A6), that is (as is known through itself), what is contained objectively in the intellect must necessarily be given in nature. But in nature (by P14C1) there is only one substance, namely, God, and there are no modifications other than those which are in God (by P15) and which can neither be nor be conceived without God (by the same proposition). Therefore, an intellect, whether finite in action or infinite in action, must comprehend God's attributes and God's affections, and nothing else.