Spinoza has led up to this proposition by P31 where he clearly defines will as within the category of Nature natured, rather than Nature naturing. Nature natured lacks free cause which is only within Nature naturing. Spinoza's demonstration follows this line of reasoning established on discussing the intellect. By defining the will as "like the intellect," Spinoza simply applies the reasoning applied earlier to the intellect. Here again Spinoza delivers significant effort to disabuse readers of the notion of "free"will. He grants the faculty of will, but shows that will operates within the natural framework under necessity. His necessity is characterized by certo modo which translates as "in a certain way." I don't think this translation conveys adequately the sense of specificity or singularity of the action. I think Spinoza is meaning that the cause produces the effect "with precision," removing both vagueness and randomness.
Voluntas non potest vocari causa libera sed tantum necessaria.
Translated as,
The will cannot be called a free cause but only a necessary [cause].
Demonstratio: Voluntas certus tantum cogitandi modus est sicuti intellectus adeoque (per propositionem 28) unaquaeque volitio non potest existere neque ad operandum determinari nisi ab alia causa determinetur et haec rursus ab alia et sic porro in infinitum. Quod si voluntas infinita supponatur, debet etiam ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo, non quatenus substantia absolute infinita est sed quatenus attributum habet quod infinitam et aeternam cogitationis essentiam exprimit (per propositionem 23). Quocunque igitur modo sive finita sive infinita concipiatur, causam requirit a qua ad existendum et operandum determinetur adeoque (per definitionem 7) non potest dici causa libera sed tantum necessaria
vel coacta. Q.E.D.
Translated as,
The will is only a certain mode of thinking just as is the intellect. To such an extent (by P28) each and every volition can neither exist nor be determined to operate unless it is determined by another cause, and this cause again by another, and so on, to infinity. Even if the will is held to be infinite, it must still be determined to exist and operate by God, not insofar as substance is an absolutely infinite substance, but insofar as [God] has an attribute that expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by P23). So in whatsoever way [will] is conceived, whether as finite or as infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and operate. To such an extent (by D7) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or compelled [cause].
Corollarium I: Hinc sequitur I Deum non operari ex libertate voluntatis.
Translated as,
From this it follows, first, that God does not operate by freedom of the will.
Corollarium II: Sequitur II voluntatem et intellectum ad Dei naturam ita sese habere ut mote et quies et absolute ut omnia naturalia quae (per propositionem 29) a Deo ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari debent. Nam voluntas, ut reliqua omnia, causa indiget a qua ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinetur. Et quamvis ex data voluntate sive intellectu infinita sequantur, non tamen propterea Deus magis dici potest ex libertate voluntatis agere quam propter ea quae ex motu et quiete sequuntur (infinita enim ex his etiam sequuntur) dici potest ex libertate motus et quietis agere. Quare voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet quam reliqua naturalia sed ad ipsam eodem modo sese habet ut motus et quies et omnia reliqua quae ostendimus ex necessitate divinae naturae sequi et ab eadem ad existendum et operandum certo modo determinari.
Translated as,
It follows, second, that will and intellect are to God's nature as motion and rest are absolutely all natural things, which (by P29) must be determined by God to exist and operate in a certain way. For the will, like all other things, requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and operate in a certain way. And although from a given will, or intellect infinitely many things may follow, God still cannot be said, on that account, to act from freedom of the will, any more than [God] can be said to act from freedom of motion and rest on account of those things that follow from motion and rest (for infinitely many things also follow from motion and rest). So will does not pertain to God's nature any more than do the other natural things, but is related to it in the same way as motion and rest, and all the other things which, as we have shown, follow from the necessity of the divine nature and are determined by it to exist and operate in a certain way.
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