Spinoza's Ethics: II.P9: Actual Things

Here Spinoza further explores the relationship of the term affectus or "affect" to idea which was introduced in II.A3. In some ways, this confirms the notion that Spinoza's sense of idea typically relates to our everyday notion of "feeling." In discussing the mind, Spinoza does not delineate between thought and feelings, but instead argues that thought and feelings are both parts on a continuum within the mind which are all characterized by the word idea. Spinoza's delineation is between the mind and the brain - roughly describing the subjective and objective.

Yet when the discussion is involving the mind of God as opposed to the mind of a human being affectus or "affect" is still within the subjectivity of the thinking thing, but it simply refers to a variation. Affectus in this sense does not carry the everyday notion of "feeling" but more of a notion of "change." 

In Spinoza's demonstration, there is additional emphasis on the connectivity of ideas as indicated by affect. Spinoza makes a wording difference here from the wording in II.P7. He states that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of "causes," rather than using the word "things." This indicates that the things of II.P7 are the underlying modes and not a reference to the bodies that are the modal expressions of God as extending thing. This is important because readers often stumble at the concept of tying together the modal expressions of extending and thinking in a strict parallelism. Instead, the tying together is with the actual modes of substance and the modes expressed within its respective attribute.

In the corollary, Spinoza continues to distinguish the actual or real in God. The importance of this is because the nature of idea, especially as its application expands to feelings, is its imprecision. As the idea is in God, it is real or actual. This corollary is building that framework. Spinoza rarely adds a demonstration of a corollary. He does so here to secure the importance and definition of "in God" as through another singular thing. This, again, is significant and is understandable by reflecting on how we assert that we cannot argue about someone's feelings, because the experience of those feelings are true for the subject. However, we do argue that the object of those feelings are easily distorted by the limitations of perception. Thus, the respect that we give to someone's feelings (as opposed to their perceptions) is grounded in the sense that such thoughts are "in God."

Idea rei singularis actu existentis Deum pro causa habet non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus alia rei singularis actu existentis idea affectus consideratur cujus etiam Deus est causa quatenus alia tertia affectus est et sic in infinitum.

Translated as,

The idea of a singular thing in actuality of existing has God as cause not insofar as it is infinite but insofar as another idea of a singular thing in actuality of existing is considered an affect of which also God is the cause insofar as another third [idea] [is considered] an affect and so on into infinity.

Demonstratio: Idea rei singularis actu existentis modus singularis cogitandi est et a reliquis distinctus (per corollarium et scholium propositionis 8 hujus) adeoque (per propositionem 6 hujus) Deum quatenus est tantum res cogitans, pro causa habet. At non (per propositionem 28 partis I) quatenus est res absolute cogitans sed quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus consideratur et hujus etiam Deus est causa quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus est et sic in infinitum. Atqui ordo et connexio idearum (per propositionem 7 hujus) idem est ac ordo et connexio causarum; ergo unius singularis ideæ alia idea sive Deus quatenus alia idea affectus consideratur, est causa et hujus etiam quatenus alia affectus est et sic in infinitum. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

The idea of a singular thing in actuality of existing is a mode of singular thinking and distinct from remaining things (by IIP8C and IIP8S) to the extent (IIP6) that it has God as cause insofar as it is only a thinking thing. But not (by IP28) insofar as it is absolutely a thinking thing but insofar as it is considered an affect by another mode of thinking and of which also God is the cause insofar as it is the affect by another mode of thinking and so on into infinity. And the order and connection of ideas (by IIP7) is the same as the order and connection of causes. Thus, another idea of a unique singular idea or God insofar as [it is] another idea is considered an affect is the cause and of which also insofar as another [idea] is the affect and so on into infinity.

Corollarium: Quicquid in singulari cujuscunque ideæ objecto contingit, ejus datur in Deo cognitio quatenus tantum ejusdem objecti ideam habet.

Translated as,

Whatever touches on the singular object of whatsoever idea, the thought of it is given in God insofar as it has only the idea of the same object.

Demonstratio: Quicquid in objecto cujuscunque ideæ contingit, ejus datur in Deo idea (per propositionem 3 hujus) non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus consideratur (per præcedentem propositionem) sed (per propositionem 7 hujus) ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum; erit ergo cognitio ejus quod in singulari aliquo objecto contingit, in Deo quatenus tantum ejusdem objecti habet ideam. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

Whatever touches on the object of whatever idea, the idea of it [whatever touches] is given in God (by IIP3) not insofar as it is infinite but insofar as another idea of a singular thing is considered an affect (by IIP8) but (IIP7) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things; it will be therefore the thought of it which touches on any object of a singular thing, in God insofar as it only has the idea of the same object.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P8: Ideas That Do Not Exist

This proposition addresses the intuition that there must be ideas of singular things which actually don't exist. If II.P7 is correct and the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things, then what is the meaning of ideas that do not exist? Here Spinoza says that ideas of singular things which do not exist are in God's infinite idea as formal essences. 

Ideæ rerum singularium sive modorum non existentium ita debent comprehendi in Dei infinita idea ac rerum singularium sive modorum essentiæ formales in Dei attributis continentur.

Translated as,

The ideas of singular things or modes that do not exist ought to be comprehended in the infinite idea of God as the formal essences of singular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.

Demonstratio: Hæc propositio patet ex præcedenti sed intelligitur clarius ex præcedenti scholio.

Translated as,

This proposition is clear from the preceding [proposition] but is more clearly understood from the preceding scholium.

Corollarium: Hinc sequitur quod quamdiu res singulares non existunt nisi quatenus in Dei attributis comprehenduntur, earum esse objectivum sive ideæ non existunt nisi quatenus infinita Dei idea existit et ubi res singulares dicuntur existere non tantum quatenus in Dei attributis comprehenduntur sed quatenus etiam durare dicuntur, earum ideæ etiam existentiam per quam durare dicuntur, involvent.

Translated as,

From this it follows because as long as singular things do not exist unless insofar as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, the objective essence or ideas of [these singular things] do not exist unless insofar as the infinite idea of God exists and when singular things are said to exist not only insofar as they are comprehended in the attributes of God but insofar are they are said to last, the ideas of [these singular things] involve even existence through which they are said to last.

Scholium: Si quis ad uberiorem hujus rei explicationem exemplum desideret, nullum sane dare potero quod rem de qua hic loquor, utpote unicam adæquate explicet; conabor tamen rem ut fieri potest, illustrare. Nempe circulus talis est naturæ ut omnium linearum rectarum in eodem sese invicem secantium rectangula sub segmentis sint inter se æqualia; quare in circulo infinita inter se æqualia rectangula continentur : attamen nullum eorum potest dici existere nisi quatenus circulus existit nec etiam alicujus horum rectangulorum idea potest dici existere nisi quatenus in circuli idea comprehenditur. Concipiantur jam ex infinitis illis duo tantum nempe E et D existere. Sane eorum etiam ideæ jam non tantum existunt quatenus solummodo in circuli idea comprehenduntur sed etiam quatenus illorum rectangulorum existentiam involvunt, quo fit ut a reliquis reliquorum rectangulorum ideis distinguantur. 

Translated as,

If anyone might desire an example for a more fruitful explanation of this matter, I will be able to give no clear one on the matter about which I speak here, in as much as [the matter] shows up adequately unique. Nevertheless I will try to illustrate the matter so that it might become [clear]. Of course such a circle is of nature so that of all of the straight lines are in the same circle itself in turns cutting up rectangles that are under segments equal among themselves. Thus, in a circle there are infinite equal rectangles contained within itself. Nevertheless not one of them is able to be said to exist unless insofar as it is comprehended in the idea of the circle. Already they are conceived from those infinite [segments] only two - namely E and D - exist. Clearly the ideas of them also do not only exist insofar as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle, but also insofar as they involve the existence of those rectangles, by which it happens that they might be distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P7: Order and Connection

This proposition is important to thoroughly understand. As discussed in earlier posts on Book II, Spinoza is presenting reality through two aspects. It is tempting to simply connect a series of events that occur within the physical world to establish a series of events within the mental world, but that demeans the unique nature of each attribute. For example, lightening and thunder are related to the same event. However, lightening occurs with a different timing than thunder because the speed of light waves are different than those of sound waves. To say that the lightening caused the thunder is to misattribute cause. They are both caused by the same underlying phenomenon. Similarly, the order and connection of ideas and things are prone to differences given the defining characteristics of each attribute. For example, within the attribute of thinking are modes of thought such as affects that do not have a representational object, but yet have a related causal event within the attribute of extending.

That warning aside, Spinoza sets out a proposition that ensures a movement towards an "active" intellect by focusing causality on the subjective experiences rather than the objective events. His framework for understanding reality drives a different process for addressing mental states. When confronted with a feeling or mental state, most individuals highlight a particular person or event as the cause. Spinoza is stating that the person or event is not the cause, instead the cause is the idea of the person or the event. This idea is frequently incorrect, or in his terms, inadequate. Given the inadequacy of the idea, the likelihood is high that the feeling or mental state experienced is in error - despite our best observation. In the same way that we perceive that lightening creates subsequent thunder, so too are we inclined to incorrectly attribute cause and blame.

Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum.

Translated as,

The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Demonstratio: Patet ex axiomate 4 partis I. Nam cujuscunque causati idea a cognitione causæ cujus est effectus, dependet.

Translated as,

It is evident from IA4. For the idea of whatsoever is caused is governed by the knowledge of which cause it is the effect.

Corollarium: Hinc sequitur quod Dei cogitandi potentia æqualis est ipsius actuali agendi potentiæ. Hoc est quicquid ex infinita Dei natura sequitur formaliter, id omne ex Dei idea eodem ordine eademque connexione sequitur in Deo objective.

Translated as,

From this it follows that the power of God's thinking is the equivalent of the power of [God's] actual doing. That is, whatever follows formally from the infinite nature of God, every ["whatever"] follows from the idea of God in the same order and the same connection as an object in God.

Scholium: Hic antequam ulterius pergamus, revocandum nobis in memoriam est id quod supra ostendimus nempe quod quicquid ab infinito intellectu percipi potest tanquam substantiæ essentiam constituens, id omne ad unicam tantum substantiam pertinet et consequenter quod substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia quæ jam sub hoc jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur. Sic etiam modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res sed duobus modis expressa, quod quidam Hebræorum quasi per nebulam vidisse videntur, qui scilicet statuunt Deum, Dei intellectum resque ab ipso intellectas unum et idem esse. Exempli gratia circulus in natura existens et idea circuli existentis quæ etiam in Deo est, una eademque est res quæ per diversa attributa explicatur et ideo sive naturam sub attributo extensionis sive sub attributo cogitationis sive sub alio quocunque concipiamus, unum eundemque ordinem sive unam eandemque causarum connexionem hoc est easdem res invicem sequi reperiemus. Nec ulla alia de causa dixi quod Deus sit causa ideæ exempli gratia circuli quatenus tantum est res cogitans et circuli quatenus tantum est res extensa nisi quia esse formale ideæ circuli non nisi per alium cogitandi modum tanquam causam proximam et ille iterum per alium et sic in infinitum, potest percipi ita ut quamdiu res ut cogitandi modi considerantur, ordinem totius naturæ sive causarum connexionem per solum cogitationis attributum explicare debemus et quatenus ut modi extensionis considerantur, ordo etiam totius naturæ per solum extensionis attributum explicari debet et idem de aliis attributis intelligo. Quare rerum ut in se sunt, Deus revera est causa quatenus infinitis constat attributis nec impræsentiarum hæc clarius possum explicare.

Translated as,

Before we might move further, we ought to recall to memory that which we have shown above, namely that whatever may be perceived from infinite intellect as if constituting the essence of substance, every such ["whatever"] pertains to the one and only substance to such a degree that, as a consequence, thinking substance and extending substance are one and the same substance which is comprehended either now under this or now under that attribute. Thus, the mode of extension and the idea of that mode are indeed one and the same thing but expressed under two modes, which certain of the Hebrews seemed to have seen as if through a cloud, who evidently determined that God, the intellect of God and things from the [intellect of God] itself are one and the same thing. For example, a circle existing in nature and the idea of a circle existing which is truly in God are one and the same thing which is explained through different attributes and to the extent we conceive nature under the attribute of extension or under the attribute of thought or under some other [attribute], we discover one and the same order or one and the same connection of causes that is, the same things follow in order. And I have not said any other things about cause where God might be the cause of an idea, for example, [the cause] of the circle insofar as [God] is only a thinking thing and [the cause] of the circle insofar as [God] is only an extending thing (unless since it is the formal essence of the idea of a circle) is not able to be perceived unless by thinking of another mode as its proximate cause and that again through another to infinity, so that for as long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we ought to explain the order of all of nature or the connection of causes by only the attribute of thought and insofar as the modes of extension are considered, also the order of all of nature ought to be explained by only the attribute of extension and I understand the same of other attributes. Therefore of things as they are in themselves, God in truth is the cause insofar as [God] consists of infinite attributes and I am not able to explain these more clearly for the present.