Spinoza's Ethics: II.P9: Actual Things

Here Spinoza further explores the relationship of the term affectus or "affect" to idea which was introduced in II.A3. In some ways, this confirms the notion that Spinoza's sense of idea typically relates to our everyday notion of "feeling." In discussing the mind, Spinoza does not delineate between thought and feelings, but instead argues that thought and feelings are both parts on a continuum within the mind which are all characterized by the word idea. Spinoza's delineation is between the mind and the brain - roughly describing the subjective and objective.

Yet when the discussion is involving the mind of God as opposed to the mind of a human being affectus or "affect" is still within the subjectivity of the thinking thing, but it simply refers to a variation. Affectus in this sense does not carry the everyday notion of "feeling" but more of a notion of "change." 

In Spinoza's demonstration, there is additional emphasis on the connectivity of ideas as indicated by affect. Spinoza makes a wording difference here from the wording in II.P7. He states that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of "causes," rather than using the word "things." This indicates that the things of II.P7 are the underlying modes and not a reference to the bodies that are the modal expressions of God as extending thing. This is important because readers often stumble at the concept of tying together the modal expressions of extending and thinking in a strict parallelism. Instead, the tying together is with the actual modes of substance and the modes expressed within its respective attribute.

In the corollary, Spinoza continues to distinguish the actual or real in God. The importance of this is because the nature of idea, especially as its application expands to feelings, is its imprecision. As the idea is in God, it is real or actual. This corollary is building that framework. Spinoza rarely adds a demonstration of a corollary. He does so here to secure the importance and definition of "in God" as through another singular thing. This, again, is significant and is understandable by reflecting on how we assert that we cannot argue about someone's feelings, because the experience of those feelings are true for the subject. However, we do argue that the object of those feelings are easily distorted by the limitations of perception. Thus, the respect that we give to someone's feelings (as opposed to their perceptions) is grounded in the sense that such thoughts are "in God."

Idea rei singularis actu existentis Deum pro causa habet non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus alia rei singularis actu existentis idea affectus consideratur cujus etiam Deus est causa quatenus alia tertia affectus est et sic in infinitum.

Translated as,

The idea of a singular thing in actuality of existing has God as cause not insofar as it is infinite but insofar as another idea of a singular thing in actuality of existing is considered an affect of which also God is the cause insofar as another third [idea] [is considered] an affect and so on into infinity.

Demonstratio: Idea rei singularis actu existentis modus singularis cogitandi est et a reliquis distinctus (per corollarium et scholium propositionis 8 hujus) adeoque (per propositionem 6 hujus) Deum quatenus est tantum res cogitans, pro causa habet. At non (per propositionem 28 partis I) quatenus est res absolute cogitans sed quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus consideratur et hujus etiam Deus est causa quatenus alio cogitandi modo affectus est et sic in infinitum. Atqui ordo et connexio idearum (per propositionem 7 hujus) idem est ac ordo et connexio causarum; ergo unius singularis ideæ alia idea sive Deus quatenus alia idea affectus consideratur, est causa et hujus etiam quatenus alia affectus est et sic in infinitum. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

The idea of a singular thing in actuality of existing is a mode of singular thinking and distinct from remaining things (by IIP8C and IIP8S) to the extent (IIP6) that it has God as cause insofar as it is only a thinking thing. But not (by IP28) insofar as it is absolutely a thinking thing but insofar as it is considered an affect by another mode of thinking and of which also God is the cause insofar as it is the affect by another mode of thinking and so on into infinity. And the order and connection of ideas (by IIP7) is the same as the order and connection of causes. Thus, another idea of a unique singular idea or God insofar as [it is] another idea is considered an affect is the cause and of which also insofar as another [idea] is the affect and so on into infinity.

Corollarium: Quicquid in singulari cujuscunque ideæ objecto contingit, ejus datur in Deo cognitio quatenus tantum ejusdem objecti ideam habet.

Translated as,

Whatever touches on the singular object of whatsoever idea, the thought of it is given in God insofar as it has only the idea of the same object.

Demonstratio: Quicquid in objecto cujuscunque ideæ contingit, ejus datur in Deo idea (per propositionem 3 hujus) non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus alia rei singularis idea affectus consideratur (per præcedentem propositionem) sed (per propositionem 7 hujus) ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum; erit ergo cognitio ejus quod in singulari aliquo objecto contingit, in Deo quatenus tantum ejusdem objecti habet ideam. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

Whatever touches on the object of whatever idea, the idea of it [whatever touches] is given in God (by IIP3) not insofar as it is infinite but insofar as another idea of a singular thing is considered an affect (by IIP8) but (IIP7) the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things; it will be therefore the thought of it which touches on any object of a singular thing, in God insofar as it only has the idea of the same object.