This proposition builds on I.D3, I.D4 and I.D5. As I discussed in I.D5, I am translating affectionum as "modifications" rather than "affections" to avoid confusion with contemporary usage of the term. As he says in I.P2, a difference in the attributes of the substances would be a difference essentially, that is, nothing would be in common between them, unlike differences in modifications (that are conceived through another, not just through themselves).
The demonstration raises the issue of why Spinoza included the phrase
extra intellectum or "outside the intellect". At first blush, this raise
the issue of appearing to being a domain within a domain and would
violate the simplicity of all is substance and modifications. However,
the intellect is simply a modification of substance with no violation.
So what is Spinoza doing here?
First, given his sparse wording,
this phrase is important, especially since he repeats it twice. I think
he provides an initial clue in I.D4. That discussion highlighted the
difference between concipitur or "conceive" and percipit or "perceive"
where my post distinguished them as "view from nowhere" and "view from
somewhere." Confirming this notion with verb forms, concipitur is
rendered with the passive voice in Latin while percipit is rendered with
the active voice. The subjective element or interior space comes into
view. This word implied a thinking subject or observer. Of course, both
the proposition and the demonstration emphasize the word "distinguish."
To
make this discussion more clear, it might be helpful to look at what
might be meant if he had used the phrase "inside the intellect." In
I.D3, he defines that a substance may be conceived through itself
without reference to anything else. On the other hand, in I.D5,
modifications must be conceived through another. As he posited in I.P1,
substances are primary, while modifications are secondary. Further, by
I.D1 and by I.A7, substances must exist while modifications may not
exist. This distinction is important because it means that I can
conceive a true idea about modifications even if its object does not
exist. But with substance, no substance can exist only "inside the
intellect." So his discussion here is not meant to address the issues
that these modifications "inside the intellect" raise.
Duae aut plures res distinctae vel inter se distinguuntur ex diversitate attributorum substantiarum vel ex diversitate earundum affectionum.
Translated as,
Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications.
Also translated as,
Two or more things are made distinct by distinguishing among themselves either by a difference in the attributes of their substances or by a difference in their modifications.
Demonstratio: Omnia quae sunt vel in se vel in alio sunt (per axioma 1) hoc est (per definitiones 3 et 5) extra intellectum nihil datur praeter substantias earumque affectiones. Nihil ergo extra intellectum datur per quod plures res distingui inter se possunt praeter substantias sive quod idem est (per definitionem 4) earum attributa earumque affectiones.
Translated as,
Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else (I.A1),—that is (by I.D3 and I.D5), nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except substance and its modifications. Nothing is, therefore, given besides the understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, in other words (I.D4) their attributes and modifications.
Also translated as,
All things which are either exist in itself or in something else (by A1), that is (by D3 and D5), outside the intellect nothing is given except substances and their modifications. So nothing, outside the intellect, is given through which multiple things can be distinguished from one another except substances (or their attributes - which is the same thing by I.D4) and their modifications.
No comments:
Post a Comment