This proposition, at first study, seems to contradict the parallel structure of II.P7 because it appears to give priority to the body in a cause-effect framework. However, this proposition actually informs the parallel structure. Ideas, as discussed in earlier propositions, are either representative or non-representative. The physical or extending aspect and the subjective or thinking aspect are each causally connected within their respective attributes but are based within a mode or modification of substance. As the physical mode of an individual emerges, so too does the subjective mode emerge. Yet, the subjective mode does not emerge as a "tabula rasa" as some were to claim. Instead, the subjective mode emerges with the idea of the body. This "idea of the body" is difficult for us to understand because of our simple and abstraction notions related to idea. Instead, for Spinoza, an idea can be complex with as many components to an idea as there are components in a body. Thus, the "idea of the body" is made of representative and non-representative ideas.
In his demonstration, Spinoza poses two situations that would exist if the body were not the object of the mind. The first describes a situation in which subjectivity would exist through other bodies but not our own. If that were the case, we would record the experience of other objects and not our own experience. He then describes a different situation is which we experience the subjectivity of something else as well as our own. He states that this clearly does not occur - although we experience empathy with others. It does point to God as thinking thing and how utterly unattainable the experience of multiple and disparate sensations might be experienced. Perhaps this could be conceptualized as a form of "pain."
As usual, his scholium raises interesting issues. He asserts that the union of the mind and the body are completely common and applicable to all enlivened creatures. Thus, Spinoza has no doubt about the existence of a mind of a plant or animal different than humans. The presence of a mind in terms of what we call inanimate would be subject to a definition of "enlivened." Perhaps the coordinations of the atmosphere provide an opportunity to expand "enlivened" to the planet. He does not differentiate or further define in the direction of "enlivened," but rather moves in the direction of "reality" or "excellence" which are defined in a variety of ways including functionality, multi-tasking and independence. Thus a comparison of stone, virus, bacterium, plant, animal and human would be on this spectrum - a spectrum which excludes nothing. In this physical scale, there is a parallel mental scale. The idea that as functionality increases, more "of reality" increases seems to rely on underlying notions of power. Also fascinating is that his mental distinctions are more based on interspecies distinctions here as opposed to concepts that we might term IQ. In this sense, Spinoza is quite egalitarian about treatment of the human mind.Objectum ideæ humanam mentem constituentis est corpus sive certus extensionis modus actu existens et nihil aliud.
Translated as,
The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body or a certain mode of extension actually existing and nothing else.
DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim corpus non esset humanæ mentis objectum, ideæ affectionum corporis non essent in Deo (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus) quatenus mentem nostram sed quatenus alterius rei mentem constitueret hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) ideæ affectionum corporis non essent in nostra mente; atqui (per axioma 4 hujus) ideas affectionum corporis habemus. Ergo objectum ideæ humanam mentem constituentis est corpus idque (per propositionem 11 hujus) actu existens. Deinde si præter corpus etiam aliud esset mentis objectum, cum nihil (per propositionem 36 partis I) existat ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur, deberet (per propositionem 12 hujus) necessario alicujus ejus effectus idea in mente nostra dari; atqui (per axioma 5 hujus) nulla ejus idea datur. Ergo objectum nostræ mentis est corpus existens et nihil aliud. Q.E.D.
Translated as,
For if the body is not the object of the human mind, the ideas of impacts of the body are not in God (by IIP9C) insofar as our our mind but it [God] constitutes the mind of another thing, that is, (by IIP11C) the ideas of the impacts of the body are not in our mind, and yet (by IIA4) we have ideas of the impacts of the body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body and it (by IIP11) is actually existing. Next, if besides the body there is still another object of the mind, since nothing (by IP36) exists from which another effect does not follow, the effect of something else ought (by IIP12) to be given necessarily in our mind by an idea and yet (by IIA5) no idea of it is given. Thus, the object of our mind is the existing body and nothing else.
COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur hominem mente et corpore constare et corpus humanum prout ipsum sentimus existere.
Translated as,
From this, it follows that a human is composed of the mind and body and that the body of humans exists just as we feel itself.
SCHOLIUM: Ex his non tantum intelligimus mentem humanam unitam esse corpori sed etiam quid per mentis et corporis unionem intelligendum sit. Verum ipsam adæquate sive distincte intelligere nemo poterit nisi prius nostri corporis naturam adæquate cognoscat. Nam ea quæ hucusque ostendimus, admodum communia sunt nec magis ad homines quam ad reliqua individua pertinent, quæ omnia quamvis diversis gradibus animata tamen sunt. Nam cujuscunque rei datur necessario in Deo idea cujus Deus est causa eodem modo ac humani corporis ideæ atque adeo quicquid de idea humani corporis diximus, id de cujuscunque rei idea necessario dicendum est. Attamen nec etiam negare possumus ideas inter se ut ipsa objecta differre unamque alia præstantiorem esse plusque realitatis continere prout objectum unius objecto alterius præstantius est plusque realitatis continet ac propterea ad determinandum quid mens humana reliquis intersit quidque reliquis præstet, necesse nobis est ejus objecti ut diximus hoc est corporis humani naturam cognoscere. Eam autem hic explicare nec possum nec id ad ea quæ demonstrare volo, necesse est. Hoc tamen in genere dico quo corpus aliquod reliquis aptius est ad plura simul agendum vel patiendum, eo ejus mens reliquis aptior est ad plura simul percipiendum et quo unius corporis actiones magis ab ipso solo pendent et quo minus alia corpora cum eodem in agendo concurrunt, eo ejus mens aptior est ad distincte intelligendum. Atque ex his præstantiam unius mentis præ aliis cognoscere possumus, deinde causam etiam videre cur nostri corporis non nisi admodum confusam habeamus cognitionem et alia plura quæ in sequentibus ex his deducam. Qua de causa operæ pretium esse duxi hæc ipsa accuratius explicare et demonstrare, ad quod necesse est pauca de natura corporum præmittere.
Translated as,
From these [propositions] we not only know that the human mind is joined to the body, but also what ought to be known by the union of the mind and the body. Truly no one will be able to know the [mind] itself adequately and distinctly unless first that person adequately recognizes the nature of our body. For those things which we have shown up to this point, are completely common things and do not pertain more to humans than to any other individual [beings], which nevertheless are all enlivened by as many degrees as you like. For the idea of whatsoever thing is given necessarily in God of which God is the cause in the same way as the ideas of the human body to such a degree that whatever we have said about the idea of the human body, it must necessarily be said about the idea of whatsoever thing. And yet we are not even able to deny that ideas differ among themselves as objects themselves differ and that one be more excellent than others and contain more of reality just as the object of one is more excellent than the object of another and contains more of reality and for that reason to determine [in] what [way] the human mind differs from the others and [in] what [way] it excels over the others, it is necessary for us to get to know of its object, as we have said, that is the nature of the human body. Moreover I am unable to explain this [nature] here and it is not necessary for those things which I wish to show. Nevertheless in this kind I say in what way some body is more suitable than others for doing or working more things at the same time, where its mind is more suitable than others for perceiving more things at the same time and where the actions of one mind depend more on itself alone and where other bodies join less with the same in doing, where its mind is more suitable for knowing distinctly. And from these we are able to recognize the excellence of one mind before the others, next to even see why the cause of our body, not unless we might have a completely confused understanding, and more other things which I deduce in order from these things. Concerning which cause to be the price of works I have arranged these things to accurately explain and show them, for which it is necessary to show a few things concerning the nature of bodies.
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