The demonstration is interesting as it moves to the mechanics of the
dynamics for the persistence of an idea. Ideas persist pathologically in
the cases of PTSD and OCD. Here Spinoza is arguing that the fluid parts
are affected (nerves? other mechanisms?) in such a way that reflections
are set up, almost as a frequency or similar to an echo in the realm of
sound. Critical to losing this persistence is to affect these
reflections. Recent research on deep brain stimulation (DBS) confirms
mechanisms similar to those described here as a means of healing OCD.
Further, the mind is the idea of the body. So when these brain
reflections are altered, the new patterns allow for a different mindset.
This is an apt description of the brain-mind results being discovered
in DBS treatment of OCD.
Si humanum corpus affectum est modo qui naturam corporis alicujus externi involvit, mens humana idem corpus externum ut actu existens vel ut sibi præsens contemplabitur donec corpus afficiatur affectu qui ejusdem corporis existentiam vel præsentiam secludat.
Translated as,
If the human body is affected in a way which involves the nature of some external body, the human mind will contemplate the external body as actually existing or as present to itself until the body is affected by an affect which shuts off the existence or presence of the same body.
DEMONSTRATIO: Patet. Nam quamdiu corpus humanum sic affectum est tamdiu mens humana (per propositionem 12 hujus) hanc corporis affectionem contemplabitur hoc est (per propositionem præcedentem) ideam habebit modi actu existentis quæ naturam corporis externi involvit hoc est ideam quæ existentiam vel præsentiam naturæ corporis externi non secludit sed ponit adeoque mens (per corollarium I præcedentis) corpus externum ut actu existens vel ut præsens contemplabitur donec afficiatur etc. Q.E.D.
Translated as,
It is clear. For just as long as the human body is thus affected for just as long will the human mind (by IIP12) contemplate this modification of the body, that is (by IIP16) will have an idea of the mode actually existing which [idea] involves the nature of the external body, that is, an idea which does not shut off the existence or presence of the nature of the external body but places [it] to such a degree that the mind (by IIP16C) will contemplate the external body as actually existing or as present until [the mind] is affected, etc.
COROLLARIUM: Mens corpora externa a quibus corpus humanum semel affectum fuit, quamvis non existant nec præsentia sint, contemplari tamen poterit velut præsentia essent.
Translated as,
The mind will nevertheless be able to contemplate external bodies as if they are present, [bodies] by which the human body has been once affected, although the [bodies] might not exist or be present.
DEMONSTRATIO: Dum corpora externa corporis humani partes fluidas ita determinant ut in molliores sæpe impingant, earum plana (per postulatum 5) mutant, unde fit (vide axioma 2 post corollarium lemmatis 3) ut inde alio modo reflectantur quam antea solebant et ut etiam postea iisdem novis planis spontaneo suo motu occurrendo eodem modo reflectantur ac cum a corporibus externis versus illa plana impulsæ sunt et consequenter ut corpus humanum dum sic reflexæ moveri pergunt, eodem modo afficiant, de quo mens (per propositionem 12 hujus) iterum cogitabit hoc est (per propositionem 17 hujus) mens iterum corpus externum ut præsens contemplabitur et hoc toties quoties corporis humani partes fluidæ spontaneo suo motu iisdem planis occurrent. Quare quamvis corpora externa a quibus corpus humanum affectum semel fuit, non existant, mens tamen eadem toties ut præsentia contemplabitur quoties hæc corporis actio repetetur. Q.E.D.
Translated as,
As long as external bodies determine the fluid parts of a human body in such a way so that the [external bodies] impinge often into the softer parts, whose surfaces (by postulate 5) change, from this it happens (see axiom 2 after the corollary of lemma 3) so that they [fluid parts] are reflected from there in another direction than they were accustomed to before and so that even after these same [planes] they are reflected in the same way by new surfaces occurring by their own spontaneous motion and when they are driven from external bodies against those surfaces and consequently they afflict the human body in the same way as long as they travel, reflecting to be moved, concerning which the mind (by IIP12) thinks again, that is (by IIP17) the mind will contemplate the human body again as present and this as often how much the fluid parts of the human body run into the same surfaces spontaneously by its own motion. For this reason, although external bodies by which the human body has been affected once do not exist, the mind nevertheless will contemplate them in the same way often as present as much as it has been repeated by this action of the body.
SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque qui fieri potest ut ea quæ non sunt veluti præsentia contemplemur, ut sæpe fit. Et fieri potest ut hoc aliis de causis contingat sed mihi hic sufficit ostendisse unam per quam rem sic possim explicare ac si ipsam per veram causam ostendissem nec tamen credo me a vera longe aberrare quandoquidem omnia illa quæ sumpsi postulata, vix quicquam continent quod non constet experientia de qua nobis non licet dubitare postquam ostendimus corpus humanum prout ipsum sentimus, existere (vide corollarium post propositionem 13 hujus). Præterea (ex corollario præcedentis et corollario II propositionis 16 hujus) clare intelligimus quænam sit differentia inter ideam exempli gratia Petri quæ essentiam mentis ipsius Petri constituit et inter ideam ipsius Petri quæ in alio homine, puta in Paulo, est. Illa enim essentiam corporis ipsius Petri directe explicat nec existentiam involvit nisi quamdiu Petrus existit; hæc autem magis constitutionem corporis Pauli quam Petri naturam indicat et ideo durante illa corporis Pauli constitutione mens Pauli quamvis Petrus non existat, ipsum tamen ut sibi præsentem contemplabitur. Porro ut verba usitata retineamus, corporis humani affectiones quarum ideæ corpora externa velut nobis præsentia repræsentant, rerum imagines vocabimus tametsi rerum figuras non referunt. Et cum mens hac ratione contemplatur corpora, eandem imaginari dicemus. Atque hic ut quid sit error indicare incipiam, notetis velim mentis imaginationes in se spectatas nihil erroris continere sive mentem ex eo quod imaginatur, non errare sed tantum quatenus consideratur carere idea quæ existentiam illarum rerum quas sibi præsentes imaginatur, secludat. Nam si mens dum res non existentes ut sibi præsentes imaginatur, simul sciret res illas revera non existere, hanc sane imaginandi potentiam virtuti suæ naturæ, non vitio tribueret præsertim si hæc imaginandi facultas a sola sua natura penderet hoc est (per definitionem 7 partis I) si hæc mentis imaginandi facultas libera esset.
Translated as,
So we see how it can happen, as it often does, that we contemplate things which are not present as if they are. And it may be that this comes from other causes but here it suffices for me to have shown one thing through which I am able to explain the matter even if I might have shown itself by its true cause. Nevertheless I do not believe that I stray far from the truth since [of] all those postulates which I have taken, scarcely any contain something that experience does not confirm about which [experience] we cannot doubt after showing that the human body exists just as we sense it (see IIP13C). Meanwhile (from IIP17C and IIP16C2) we understand clearly what might be different within an idea, for example, [the idea] of Peter which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind itself and within the idea of Peter himself that is in another human, like think of Paul. For the former idea directly explains the essence of Peter's body itself and does not involve existence except when Peter exists; the latter idea however indicates more the constitution of the body of Paul than the nature of Peter and so by that lasting constitution of the body of Paul, the mind of Paul will nevertheless contemplate [Peter] himself although he does not exist. Again since we use common words, the modifications of the human body, the ideas of which represent external bodies as if present to us, we will call as images of things even if they do not reproduce the figures of things. And since the mind by this method contemplates bodies, we may say that the same thing is imagined. And here as I begin to show what is the error, you might note I state imaginations of the mind contain nothing of error in their own views or the mind, from which what is imagined, does not err but so much insofar as it is considered to lack the idea which excludes the existence of those things which it imagines as present to itself. For if the mind as long as things not existing as it imagines as present to itself, at the same time as it knows those things do not exist in return, this power of clear imagination by the virtue of its nature is not attributed to fault especially if this faculty of imagination ponders by its own nature alone, that is (by ID7) if this faculty of the mind for imagining is free.
No comments:
Post a Comment