Monday, June 28, 2021

Thoughts on Mind - Body Parallelism of II.P7

In my recent review of the Ethics, I have focused more attentively on the challenges of Book II - On The Mind. One of the more troubling propositions is Proposition 7 with its parallelism. As Spinoza states, the order and connection of things is the same as the order and connection of the mind. Spinoza writes so succinctly that misinterpretation is likely.

On a deeper view, it is clear to me that Spinoza's framework is based on an understanding that there is such a thing as "reality" and that the way we experience it in the physical universe (extending attribute) and the mental universe (thinking attribute) tell us first and foremost about ourselves and then secondly, and with much greater difficulty, about the universe. I think he would support the idea that "we are each at the center of the universe." The Copernican revolution has to be done and redone for each of us.

Connected with this is the obvious idea that despite this so-called parallelism is a lack of parallels in some profound ways. Without the body, there can be no mind. On the other hand, without the mind there may continue to be a body. So Spinoza's parallelism is not strict. Instead he inverts Descartes who defines thought as having primacy and gives the body primacy. Rather than "I think therefore I am," Spinoza states the obvious that could be rendered as "I exist therefore I am."

Removing the cognitive delusion of the priority of the mind over the body is the first critical step to an increase of freedom. As long as this delusion persists, a wide variety of personal and communal frustrations will persist and fester. Our individual delusions carry into communal ones and impair our power.

Further the parallelism is limited to certain areas. For example, the mind has ideas that connect to other ideas through acts of the imagination. These clearly do not have a parallel order and connection of things. That does not mean that acts of the imagination of bad things, but instead have a different role than what he is addressing.

Spinoza is attempting to set up a physical body framework which is the "objective" aspect that we can measure. The "idea" of this physical body framework is "subjective" - a term that includes feeling ideas and thought ideas. As a result, there are truly multiple causal paths. Without the body, there is not mind. Thus, the body indirectly or loosely causes the mind. Also powerful ideas cause other powerful ideas so the mind causes the mind. A misreading of Spinoza leads to ideas that strict parallelism principles deny the impact of body on the mind. Instead, Spinoza's causality is focused on the tightest connections in which the cause and effect are embedded like a triangle causes triangleness. 

If these are the ways in which the parallelism is not parallel, what is the key takeaway for its inclusion? Here I think it lies in the understanding that the conscious mind is a very small subset of the mind itself. As the role of consciousness is decision-making, the basis of a decision is crucial. The best "thinking" is a mind is about what is knowable - that is, the mind's knowledge of its own formative body - just as the triangleness is based in the triangle. This idea is, to some extent, verbally inexpressible as there is uniqueness to each body. Feelings are ideas which rise to consciousness and are related to the body. Feelings become the basis for the best thinking, but only if they are recognized as having close to no information of the universe around yet are sensationally wonderful for a knowledge of the body.

Spinoza's parallelism sets up a way to make quality decisions by starting by honoring the accuracy and adequacy of the body feeling ideas and then carefully exploring their connection to the world around the body. By grounding and honoring the ideas within the body without allowing these feeling ideas to generate cognitive delusions, Spinoza believes that we maximize our expressive power. His parallelism helps articulate these "objective" and "subjective" expressive forces.

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Spinoza's Ethics: III.P47

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