In this proposition, Spinoza outlines the constraints for adequate understanding. Given our tendency to cognitive illusion, Spinoza outlines that these ideas are not true in the sense that they do not completely reflect the object. However, despite these "external" constraints, Spinoza indicates that a pathway to understanding exists through an "internal" process.
Idea ideæ cujuscunque affectionis corporis humani adæquatam humanæ mentis cognitionem non involvit.
Translated as,
The idea of the idea of whatsoever modification of the human body does not involve an adequate understanding of the human mind.
DEMONSTRATIO: Idea enim affectionis corporis humani (per propositionem 27 hujus) adæquatam ipsius corporis cognitionem non involvit sive ejus naturam adæquate non exprimit hoc est (per propositionem 13 hujus) cum natura mentis non convenit adæquate adeoque (per axioma 6 partis I) hujus ideæ idea adæquate humanæ mentis naturam non exprimit sive adæquatam ejus cognitionem non involvit. Q.E.D.
Translated as,
For the idea of a modification of the human body (by IIP27) does not involve the adequate understanding of the body itself or does not express its nature adequately, that is (by IIP13) since the nature of the mind does not correlate adequately to such a degree (by IA6) that the idea of this idea does not express the nature of the human mind adequately or does not involve an adequate understanding of it.
COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur mentem humanam quoties ex communi naturæ ordine res percipit, nec sui ipsius nec sui corporis nec corporum externorum adæquatam sed confusam tantum et mutilatam habere cognitionem. Nam mens se ipsam non cognoscit nisi quatenus ideas affectionum corporis percipit (per propositionem 23 hujus). Corpus autem suum (per propositionem 19 hujus) non percipit nisi per ipsas affectionum ideas per quas etiam tantum (per propositionem 26 hujus) corpora externa percipit atque adeo quatenus eas habet, nec sui ipsius (per propositionem 29 hujus) nec sui corporis (per propositionem 27 hujus) nec corporum externorum (per propositionem 25 hujus) habet adæquatam cognitionem sed tantum (per propositionem 28 hujus cum ejus scholio) mutilatam et confusam. Q.E.D.
Translated as,
Here it follows that as much as the human mind perceives things from the common order of nature, that it does not have an adequate understanding of itself and of its body and of external bodies but one so confused and mutilated. For the mind does not understand itself unless insofar as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body (by IIP23). Moreover, it does not perceive its own body (by IIP19) unless through ideas themselves of modifications by which it also to this extent perceives (by IIP26) external bodies and to such a degree insofar it has them and not of itself (by IIP29) and not of its body (by IIP27) and not of external bodies (by IIP25) does it have an adequate understanding but one so (by IIP28S) mutilated and confused.
SCHOLIUM: Dico expresse quod mens nec sui ipsius nec sui corporis nec corporum externorum adæquatam sed confusam tantum et mutilatam cognitionem habeat quoties ex communi naturæ ordine res percipit hoc est quoties externe, ex rerum nempe fortuito occursu, determinatur ad hoc vel illud contemplandum et non quoties interne, ex eo scilicet quod res plures simul contemplatur, determinatur ad earundem convenientias, differentias et oppugnantias intelligendum; quoties enim hoc vel alio modo interne disponitur, tum res clare et distincte contemplatur, ut infra ostendam.
Translated as,
I say expressly because the mind may have neither of itself nor of its body nor of external bodies an adequate understanding but one so confused and mutilated as often as it perceives things from the common order of nature, that is as often as it is determined externally, from the happenstance occasion of things of course, to this or that idea and not as often internally, from which of course because it contemplates more things at the same time, it is determined to understanding correlations, differences and oppositions of the same things; for as often in this or that way it is disposed internally, then a thing is beheld clearly and distinctly, as I show below.
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