Spinoza's Ethics: II.P31: Duration of Singular Things

Here Spinoza extends the reasoning that denies our knowledge of the extent of our lives to other things. Despite our best efforts of understanding, we are simply limited by our inability to have full knowledge of all of the causal chains operating.

Nos de duratione rerum singularium quæ extra nos sunt, nullam nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus.

We are able to have nothing except a completely inadequate understanding of the duration of singular things which are outside us.

DEMONSTRATIO: Unaquæque enim res singularis sicuti humanum corpus ab alia re singulari determinari debet ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione et hæc iterum ab alia et sic in infinitum (per propositionem 28 partis I). Cum autem ex hac communi rerum singularium proprietate in præcedenti propositione demonstraverimus nos de duratione nostri corporis non nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere, ergo hoc idem de rerum singularium duratione erit concludendum quod scilicet ejus non nisi admodum inadæquatam cognitionem habere possumus. Q.E.D.

For whatsoever singular thing so as the human body ought to be determined from another singular thing to exist and operate by a certain and determined reason and this again from another and thus into infinity (by IP28). Moreover since we have demonstrated from this common property of singular things in the preceding proposition that we do not have anything concerning the duration of our body except a completely inadequate understanding, therefore this same ought to be concluded concerning the duration of singular things because just as this we are not able to have anything except an inadequate understanding.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur omnes res particulares contingentes et corruptibiles esse. Nam de earum duratione nullam adæquatam cognitionem habere possumus (per propositionem præcedentem) et hoc est id quod per rerum contingentiam et corruptionis possibilitatem nobis est intelligendum (vide scholium I propositionis 33 partis I). Nam (per propositionem 29 partis I) præter hoc nullum datur contingens.

From this it follows that all particular things are contingent and corruptible. For we are able to have no adequate understanding of the duration of these (by IIP30) and that is we ought to know that by the contingency and possibility of corruption of things (see IP33S1). For (by IP29), except this nothing is contingent.