In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas sed mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a causa quæ etiam ab alia determinata est et hæc iterum ab alia et sic in infinitum.
In the mind no will is absolute or free but the mind is determined to willing this or that by a cause which also has been determined by something else and again this from another and thus into infinity.
DEMONSTRATIO: Mens certus et determinatus modus cogitandi est (per propositionem 11 hujus) adeoque (per corollarium II propositionis 17 partis I) suarum actionum non potest esse causa libera sive absolutam facultatem volendi et nolendi habere non potest sed ad hoc vel illud volendum (per propositionem 28 partis I) determinari debet a causa quæ etiam ab alia determinata est et hæc iterum ab alia etc. Q.E.D.
The mind is a certain and determined mode for knowing (by IIP11) to such a degree (by IP17IIC) is not able to be a free cause of its own actions or is not able to have an absolute faculty for willing or not willing but for willing this or that (by IP28) it ought to be determined from a cause which has also been determined from another and this again from another etc.
SCHOLIUM: Eodem hoc modo demonstratur in mente nullam dari facultatem absolutam intelligendi, cupiendi, amandi etc. Unde sequitur has et similes facultates vel prorsus fictitias vel nihil esse præter entia metaphysica vel universalia quæ ex particularibus formare solemus. Adeo ut intellectus et voluntas ad hanc et illam ideam vel ad hanc et illam volitionem eodem modo sese habeant ac lapideitas ad hunc et illum lapidem vel ut homo ad Petrum et Paulum. Causam autem cur homines se liberos esse putent explicuimus in appendice partis primæ. Verum antequam ulterius pergam, venit hic notandum me per voluntatem affirmandi et negandi facultatem, non autem cupiditatem intelligere; facultatem inquam intelligo qua mens quid verum quidve falsum sit, affirmat vel negat et non cupiditatem qua mens res appetit vel aversatur. At postquam demonstravimus has facultates notiones esse universales quæ a singularibus ex quibus easdem formamus, non distinguuntur, inquirendum jam est an ipsæ volitiones aliquid sint præter ipsas rerum ideas. Inquirendum inquam est an in mente alia affirmatio et negatio detur præter illam quam idea quatenus idea est, involvit, qua de re vide sequentem propositionem ut et demonstrationem 3 hujus ne cogitatio in picturas incidat. Non enim per ideas imagines quales in fundo oculi et si placet, in medio cerebro formantur sed cogitationis conceptus intelligo.
In this same way it is demonstrated in the mind there is no absolute faculty for understanding, desiring, loving etc. From which it follows that these and similar faculties are actually fictions are either nothing but metaphysical or universal entities which we are are accustomed to form from particulars. To such a degree the intellect and will hold themselves in the same way to this and that idea or to this and that volition and as stoneness is to this and that stone or as humanness is to Peter and Paul. Moreover we have explained the cause why humans think themselves to be free in the appendix of the first part. Indeed before I travel further, let it be noted here that by will I understand the faculty of affirming and denying, not desiring moreover; I say that I understand the faculty by which the mind has that is true or what is false, affirms or denies and not the desire by what thing the mind desires or is repelled. But after we have shown these faculties are universal notions which are not distinct from the singular things from which we form them, we now are inquiring whether the volitions themselves are something beyond the ideas of the things themselves. I say inquiring is either in the mind by some affirmation and negation given except that which is an idea involves insofar as an idea - see following proposition and D3 lest the thinking of this fall into pictures. For I do not understand by ideas such images which in base of the eyes if it pleases, it is formed in the middle of the brain but the concepts of understanding.
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