Plerique qui de affectibus et hominum vivendi ratione scripserunt, videntur non de rebus naturalibus quæ communes naturæ leges sequuntur sed de rebus quæ extra naturam sunt, agere. Imo hominem in natura veluti imperium in imperio concipere videntur. Nam hominem naturæ ordinem magis perturbare quam sequi ipsumque in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam nec aliunde quam a se ipso determinari credunt. Humanæ deinde impotentiæ et inconstantiæ causam non communi naturæ potentiæ sed nescio cui naturæ humanæ vitio tribuunt quam propterea flent, rident, contemnunt vel quod plerumque fit, detestantur et qui humanæ mentis impotentiam eloquentius vel argutius carpere novit, veluti divinus habetur. Non defuerunt tamen viri præstantissimi (quorum labori et industriæ nos multum debere fatemur) qui de recta vivendi ratione præclara multa scripserint et plena prudentiæ consilia mortalibus dederint; verum affectuum naturam et vires et quid contra mens in iisdem moderandis possit, nemo quod sciam determinavit. Scio equidem celeberrimum Cartesium, licet etiam crediderit mentem in suas actiones absolutam habere potentiam, affectus tamen humanos per primas suas causas explicare simulque viam ostendere studuisse qua mens in affectus absolutum habere possit imperium sed mea quidem sententia nihil præter magni sui ingenii acumen ostendit, ut suo loco demonstrabo. Nam ad illos revertere volo qui hominum affectus et actiones detestari vel ridere malunt quam intelligere. His sine dubio mirum videbitur quod hominum vitia et ineptias more geometrico tractare aggrediar et certa ratione demonstrare velim ea quæ rationi repugnare quæque vana, absurda et horrenda esse clamitant. Sed mea hæc est ratio. Nihil in natura fit quod ipsius vitio possit tribui; est namque natura semper eadem et ubique una eademque ejus virtus et agendi potentia hoc est naturæ leges et regulæ secundum quas omnia fiunt et ex unis formis in alias mutantur, sunt ubique et semper eædem atque adeo una eademque etiam debet esse ratio rerum qualiumcunque naturam intelligendi nempe per leges et regulas naturæ universales. Affectus itaque odii, iræ, invidiæ etc. in se considerati ex eadem naturæ necessitate et virtute consequuntur ac reliqua singularia ac proinde certas causas agnoscunt per quas intelliguntur certasque proprietates habent cognitione nostra æque dignas ac proprietates cujuscunque alterius rei cujus sola contemplatione delectamur. De affectuum itaque natura et viribus ac mentis in eosdem potentia eadem methodo agam qua in præcedentibus de Deo et mente egi et humanas actiones atque appetitus considerabo perinde ac si quæstio de lineis, planis aut de corporibus esset.
Most who write about the affects and the reason of living of humans do not seem to discuss concerning the natural things which follow the common laws of nature but concerning those which are beyond nature. Indeed they seem to conceive of man in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe that humanity disrupts the order of nature more than follows (the order of nature) and to have absolute power itself in humanity's actions and not by another is humanity more determined than by itself. Finally the cause of human impotence and inconstancy is not the power of common nature but I do not know to what fault of human nature they attribute than they cry, laugh, condemn whatever most happens, they detest and who know to complain of power of the human mind more eloquently and more forcefully as if it has divinity. Nevertheless the most eminent of people have handed down (for whose labor and industry we confess we owe much) who have written many excellent things concerning the right way of living and have given many plans of wisdom to mortals; yet truly no one has outlined what I know on the nature and power of the affects and what against them the mind is able to do against moderating these. Indeed I know the most celebrated Descartes, of course even he might have believed that the mind has absolute power on its own actions, nevertheless to explain human feelings through its own first causes and at the same time to have studied to show the way in which the mind is able to have absolute power over the affect but my own sentiment is that he showed nothing other than his own ingenuity as I will demonstrate in its place. For I wish to return to those who prefer to hate or ridicule the actions and affects of humans rather than understand them. To these without a doubt it will seem amazing because I will move forward to explain the sins and errors of humans in a geometric method and I wish to show in a clear method things which repulse reason which they claim to be vain, absurd and horrible. But this is my rationale. Nothing happens in nature which one might attribute to some error of nature itself. For nature is always the same and where it is the same and one in its power and potential for action, that is, the laws of nature and the rules following which everything makes happen and changes from one form into others, are everywhere and always the same and to such a degree one and always the same and also ought to be the reason of things and for understanding nature of qualities, indeed through the laws and universal rules of nature. The affects, in this way, of hatred, envy etc. considered in themselves follow from the same necessity and virtue of nature as other singularities and next they are ignorant of certain causes by which they understand and certain properties have by our thought equally worthy and properties of whatsoever other thing whose by only our contemplation we are delighted. Thus, concerning the nature and strengths of feelings and the power of the mind over them I will lead in the same way which I led concerning God and the mind and I will consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a question of lines, planes and bodies.
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