Quicquid corporis nostri agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, juvat vel coercet, ejusdem rei idea mentis nostræ cogitandi potentiam auget vel minuit, juvat vel coercet.
Whatever increases or diminishes the power of our body to act, helps or restrains, the idea of the same thing increases or diminishes the power of our mind to think, helps or restrains.
DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio patet ex propositione 7 partis II vel etiam ex propositione 14 partis II.
This proposition is evident from IIP7 or even also from IIP14.
SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque mentem magnas posse pati mutationes et jam ad majorem jam autem ad minorem perfectionem transire, quæ quidem passiones nobis explicant affectus lætitiæ et tristitiæ. Per lætitiam itaque in sequentibus intelligam passionem qua mens ad majorem perfectionem transit. Per tristitiam autem passionem qua ipsa ad minorem transit perfectionem. Porro affectum lætitiæ ad mentem et corpus simul relatum titillationem vel hilaritatem voco, tristitiæ autem dolorem vel melancholiam. Sed notandum titillationem et dolorem ad hominem referri quando una ejus pars præ reliquis est affecta; hilaritatem autem et melancholiam quando omnes pariter sunt affectæ. Quid deinde cupiditas sit in scholio propositionis 9 hujus partis explicui et præter hos tres nullum alium agnosco affectum primarium nam reliquos ex his tribus oriri in sequentibus ostendam. Sed antequam ulterius pergam, lubet hic fusius propositionem 10 hujus partis explicare ut clarius intelligatur qua ratione idea ideæ sit contraria. In scholio propositionis 17 partis II ostendimus ideam quæ mentis essentiam constituit, corporis existentiam tamdiu involvere quamdiu ipsum corpus existit. Deinde ex iis quæ in corollario propositionis 8 partis II et in ejusdem scholio ostendimus, sequitur præsentem nostræ mentis existentiam ab hoc solo pendere quod scilicet mens actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Denique mentis potentiam qua ipsa res imaginatur earumque recordatur, ab hoc etiam pendere ostendimus (vide propositiones 17 et 18 partis II cum ejus scholio) quod ipsa actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Ex quibus sequitur mentis præsentem existentiam ejusque imaginandi potentiam tolli simulatque mens præsentem corporis existentiam affirmare desinit. At causa cur mens hanc corporis existentiam affirmare desinit, non potest esse ipsa mens (per propositionem 4 hujus) nec etiam quod corpus esse desinit. Nam (per propositionem 6 partis II) causa cur mens corporis existentiam affirmat, non est quia corpus existere incepit : quare per eandem rationem nec ipsius corporis existentiam affirmare desinit quia corpus esse desinit sed (per propositionem 8 partis II) hoc ab alia idea oritur quæ nostri corporis et consequenter nostræ mentis præsentem existentiam secludit quæque adeo ideæ quæ nostræ mentis essentiam constituit, est contraria.
Thus we see that the mind is able to endure great changes and to move at one time to a greater and another time to a lesser perfection which certain passions explain to us feelings of happiness and sadness. So by happy passion I understand in the following by which the mind moves to a greater perfection. Moreover by sad passion by which the mind itself moves to a lesser perfection. Next I call the feeling of happiness that relates simultaneously to the mind and the body as titillation or hilarity, moreover that of sadness as grief or depression. But noting titillation or grief is referring when one of its parts is affected more than the others; hilarity or depression when all parts are affected equally. Next what desire I have explained in IIIP9S and beyond these three I do not know any of other primary affects for I show the remaining from these three in the following. But before I move farther, it is pleasing here to explicate more widely IIIP10 so that it might be understood by what reason an idea might be contrary to an idea. In IIP17S we show the idea that constitutes the essence of the mind, involves the existence of the body insofar as the body itself exists. Next from these which we show in IIP8C and IIP8S, it follows that the present existence of our mind derives from this alone because of course the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Finally we show the power of the mind by which the thing itself is imagined and of which it is recorded, from here also to derive (see IIP17 and IIP18 and IIP18S) which involves the actual existence of the body. From which it follows that the present existence of the mind and to raise its power of imagining and the mind imitates and leaves off to affirm the present existence of the body. But why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, the mind itself is not able to be (by IIIP4) and does not even cease because the body is. For (by IIP6) the reason the mind affirms the existence of the body is not because the body begins to exist: wherefore by the same rationale it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body itself because the body ceases to be but (by IIP8) this arises from another idea which hides the present existence of our body and thus our mind which idea to such an extent constitutes the essence of our mind and is contrary.
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