Mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, conatur in suo esse perseverare indefinita quadam duratione et hujus sui conatus est conscia.
A mind has ideas just insofar as clear and distinct as confused, tries to persevere to be in itself by a certain indefinite duration and by awareness of this is its trying.
DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis essentia ex ideis adæquatis et inadæquatis constituitur (ut in propositione 3 hujus ostendimus) adeoque (per propositionem 7 hujus) tam quatenus has quam quatenus illas habet, in suo esse perseverare conatur idque (per propositionem 8 hujus) indefinita quadam duratione. Cum autem mens (per propositionem 23 partis II) per ideas affectionum corporis necessario sui sit conscia, est ergo (per propositionem 7 hujus) mens sui conatus conscia. Q.E.D.
The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas (as we have shown in IIIP3) to the extent (by IIIP7) it has insofar as much these as those, it tries to persevere to be in itself and this (by IIIP8) with certain indefinite duration. Moreover, since the mind (by IIP23) by ideas is aware of affections of its body necessarily, thus the mind is (by IIIP7) aware of its trying.
Spinoza is focused on the mind's awareness of efforting. Clearly, since the mind is the idea of the body, it is the body which attempts to persevere, that is, the survival effort is lodged in the body. The normal thought is that the mind is attempting to persist and forces the body to engage in this effort. Instead, Spinoza states that the mind, whether from confused or adequate ideas, is aware of this fundamental trying.
SCHOLIUM: Hic conatus cum ad mentem solam refertur, voluntas appellatur sed cum ad mentem et corpus simul refertur, vocatur appetitus, qui proinde nihil aliud est quam ipsa hominis essentia ex cujus natura ea quæ ipsius conservationi inserviunt, necessario sequuntur atque adeo homo ad eadem agendum determinatus est. Deinde inter appetitum et cupiditatem nulla est differentia nisi quod cupiditas ad homines plerumque referatur quatenus sui appetitus sunt conscii et propterea sic definiri potest nempe cupiditas est appetitus cum ejusdem conscientia. Constat itaque ex his omnibus nihil nos conari, velle, appetere neque cupere quia id bonum esse judicamus sed contra nos propterea aliquid bonum esse judicare quia id conamur, volumus, appetimus atque cupimus.
Here when trying refers to the mind alone, it is called will but when it refers to the mind and the body at the same time, it is called appetite, which thus is nothing other than the essence of humanity itself from whose nature are those which serve its own preservation, follow necessarily and to that degree a human is determined to the same acting. Next among appetite and desire there is no difference unless because desire refers to generally to humans insofar as they are aware of their appetite and besides desire is thus of course able to be defined as appetite with awareness of its same. Thus it stands from all these there is nothing we try, wish, seek and desire because we judge it to be good but in contrast, besides, something is judged to be good because we try, will, seek, and desire it.
Here Spinoza extends the notion that the essence of the human is its conatus, which is marked by its potentia. This conatus is not limited to humans, but is Spinoza's focus here. There is a pattern of the body seeking to maintain itself or expand itself. Of course, there is an issue here that resembles water running uphill. This does not seem correct. Somehow there is a persistence of order as a superior energy flow to a movement to disorder. Seemingly contrary to the principles of entropy, this persistence of order appears to be a structural anomaly - akin to the act of siphoning.
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