In the Proposition, he states that if things have nothing in common with
one another (invicem or "interactively" is not included here), then
they must not be in at least one another. These descriptions like a set
theory where two sets do not overlap or even overlap sets which overlap.
If causality is immanent, as in "a circle causes roundness," then
causality would require commonness. For Spinoza, to say Thing Two is
caused by Thing One is the same as saying Thing Two is in Thing One. The
effect is in the cause. This is radically unlike the transitive
causality we tend to imagine, where we imagine the reverse - that Thing
One is in Thing Two.
In the Demonstration, Spinoza appears to
move from being - "have nothing in common" and knowing - "they cannot be
understood through one another" as a way of developing relationships of
both objects and ideas. This is his novel way to explore connections,
as he begins to develop the framework that being and knowing are
basically two sides of the same coin.
Quae res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una alterius causa esse non potest.
Translated as,
Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.
Also translated as,
If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other.
Demonstratio: Si nihil commune cum se invicem habent, ergo (per axioma 5) nec per se invicem possunt intelligi adeoque (per axioma 4) una alterius causa esse non potest. Q.E.D.
Translated as,
If they have nothing in common, it follows that one cannot be apprehended by means of the other (A5), and, therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (A4). Q.E.D.
Also translated as,
If they have nothing in common with one another, then (by A5) they cannot be understood through one another, and so (by A4) one cannot be the cause of the other, q.e.d.
No comments:
Post a Comment