Spinoza's Ethics: I.P15: Nothing But God

As they might say in Texas, "them's fighting words." Here Spinoza is explicitly stating the basics for what became known as pantheism (a term coined by a mathematician describing Spinoza's system posthumously). Prior to Spinoza, many pantheistic ideas had been expressed poetically, but here for the first time, these ideas are presented in a methodical proof. The implications of this explicit proof had significant impact on subsequent philosophical, religious, scientific and political thought. Given its radical implications, Spinoza follows his proof with a lengthy note presented here. 

Spinoza's note addresses those who believe that God exists outside rather than within creation. He begins humorously saying that he dismisses those who see God in terms of imagery. He follows the arguments of those who view God as transcendent and separate from creation. His argument is that corporeal substance must be made of substance and since substance can't produce substance, then corporeal substance must be God. But given the significance of this proposition, he proceeds through more reasonings. 

Spinoza's final note is highly useful. The exploration of the example of the line made up of points is a useful way of thinking about substance and modifications. If we take a line between two points, we understand that the line is made up of an infinity of points. In an imperfect analogy, substance is like the line with modifications like the points. The line is unchanging despite the varieties and singularities of the individual points. Further the line remains unbroken. But as an analogue to Spinoza's substance, the line would be infinitely infinite. This analogy illustrates immanence beautifully as well. Further, I believe that his comment claram rationem infallibelem or "clear reason is infallible" references the underlying metaphysical intuition of his framework; in my mind it is how the framework is bolted to reality and the non-tautological basis of its appeal and comfort.

Quicquid est, in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest.

Translated as,

Whatever is, is in God, and without God, nothing can exist or be conceived.

Demonstratio: Praeter Deum nulla datur neque concipi potest substantia (per 14 propositionem) hoc est (per definitionem 3) res quae in se est et per se concipitur. Modi autem (per definitionem 5) sine substantia nec esse nec concipi possunt; quare hi in sola divina natura esse et per ipsam solam concipi possunt. Atqui praeter substantias et modos nil datur (per axioma 1). Ergo nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

Except for God, no substance is provided nor able to be conceived (by P14), that is (by D3), a thing which is in itself and is conceived through itself. Moreover, modes (by D5) are neither able to be nor be conceived without substance. Thus only in divine nature are they (modes) able to be and be conceived. But outside of substances and modes, nothing exists (by A1). Thus, without God, nothing can exist or be conceived.

Scholium: Sunt qui Deum instar hominis corpore et mente constantem atque passionibus obnoxium fingunt sed quam longe hi a vera Dei cognitione aberrent, satis ex jam demonstratis constat. Sed hos mitto : nam omnes qui naturam divinam aliquo modo contemplati sunt, Deum esse corporeum negant. Quod etiam optime probant ex eo quod per corpus intelligimus quamcunque quantitatem longam, latam et profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatam, quo nihil absurdius de Deo, ente scilicet absolute infinito, dici potest. Attamen interim aliis rationibus quibus hoc idem demonstrare conantur, clare ostendunt se substantiam ipsam corpoream sive extensam a natura divina omnino removere atque ipsam a Deo creatam statuunt. Ex qua autem divina potentia creari potuerit, prorsus ignorant; quod clare ostendit illos id quod ipsimet dicunt, non intelligere. Ego saltem satis clare meo quidem judicio demonstravi (vide corollarium propositionis 6 et scholium II propositionis 8) nullam substantiam ab alio produci vel creari. Porro propositione 14 ostendimus præter Deum nullam dari neque concipi posse substantiam atque hinc conclusimus substantiam extensam unum ex infinitis Dei attributis esse.

Translated as,

There are those who shape God as an image composed of the body and mind of a man and liable to passions. But how far these stray from the true recognition of God, enough demonstration is already evident. These I dismiss. For everyone who has in some way reflected on divine nature does deny that God is endowed with a body. It can be said what they best prove by this - that by body we understand whatsoever quantity of length, breadth, and depth that is limited by some kind of figure than which nothing is more absurd concerning God, namely, of a being absolutely infinite. But yet in the meantime, by other reasons by which they try to prove this same thing they clearly show that they altogether remove substance itself, whether corporeal or extended, from divine nature and they maintain that substance itself has been created by God. However from what divine power it could have been created they absolutely are ignorant of - which clearly shows that they do not understand what they themselves say. At any rate, I have demonstrated clearly enough, certainly in my judgment, that no substance can be produced or created by another thing (see P6C and P8S2). Later, by P14 we show that except for God, no substance can either exist or be conceived, and from this we have concluded that extended substance is one of God's infinite attributes.

Verum ad pleniorem explicationem adversariorum argumenta refutabo quæ omnia huc redeunt primo quod substantia corporea quatenus substantia constat ut putant partibus et ideo eandem infinitam posse esse et consequenter ad Deum pertinere posse negant. Atque hoc multis exemplis explicant ex quibus unum aut alterum afferam. Si substantia corporea aiunt est infinita, concipiatur in duas partes dividi; erit unaquæque pars vel finita vel infinita. Si illud, componitur ergo infinitum ex duabus partibus finitis, quod est absurdum. Si hoc, datur ergo infinitum duplo majus alio infinito, quod etiam est absurdum. Porro si quantitas infinita mensuratur partibus pedes æquantibus, infinitis talibus partibus constare debebit ut et si partibus mensuretur digitos æquantibus ac propterea unus numerus infinitus erit duodecies major alio infinito. Denique si ex uno puncto infinitæ cujusdam quantitatis concipiatur duas lineas ut AB, AC, certa ac determinata in initio distantia in infinitum protendi, certum est distantiam inter B et C continuo augeri et tandem ex determinata indeterminabilem fore. Cum igitur hæc absurda sequantur ut putant ex eo quod quantitas infinita supponitur, inde concludunt substantiam corpoream debere esse finitam et consequenter ad Dei essentiam non pertinere.

Translated as,

Indeed, for a fuller explanation I will refute my adversaries' arguments - which all come back to this point: first because (as they think) corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, is composed of parts. For this reason they deny that the same substance is able to be infinite and consequently that it can pertain to God. And they even explain this with many examples from which I will bring forth one or two. If they say corporeal substance is infinite, let it be conceived to be divided into two parts. Each one of the parts will either be finite or infinite. If the former, an infinite thing is from placing together two finite parts - which is absurd. If the latter, an infinite thing doubly large is created by adding another infinite thing - which is also absurd. If an infinite quantity is measured by splitting into parts equal to feet, it will be composed of infinite such parts. And if it is measured by splitting into parts equal to inches, it will be an infinite number twelve times greater than the other infinity. Finally if it is conceived that two lines of some infinite quantity as AB and AC are lengthened from one point that is certain and determined at the beginning into infinity at a distance, it is certain that the distance between B and C continues to increase so that finally it becomes indeterminate from determinate. Therefore, since these absurdities follow (as they think) from this because an infinite quantity is supposed, from this they conclude that corporeal substance must be finite and consequently not pertain to the essence of God.

Secundum argumentum petitur etiam a summa Dei perfectione. Deus enim inquiunt cum sit ens summe perfectum, pati non potest : atqui substantia corporea quandoquidem divisibilis est, pati potest; sequitur ergo ipsam ad Dei essentiam non pertinere. Hæc sunt quæ apud scriptores invenio argumenta quibus ostendere conantur substantiam corpoream divina natura indignam esse nec ad eandem posse pertinere. Verumenimvero si quis recte attendat, me ad hæc jam respondisse comperiet quandoquidem hæc argumenta in eo tantum fundantur quod substantiam corpoream ex partibus componi supponunt, quod jam (per propositionem 12 cum corollario propositionis 13) absurdum esse ostendi. Deinde si quis rem recte perpendere velit, videbit omnia illa absurda (siquidem omnia absurda sunt, de quo non jam disputo) ex quibus concludere volunt substantiam extensam finitam esse, minime ex eo sequi quod quantitas infinita supponatur sed quod quantitatem infinitam mensurabilem et ex partibus finitis conflari supponunt; quare ex absurdis quæ inde sequuntur, nihil aliud concludere possunt quam quod quantitas infinita non sit mensurabilis et quod ex partibus finitis conflari non possit. Atque hoc idem est quod nos supra (propositione 12 etc.) jam demonstravimus.

Translated as,

The second argument is also sought from the height of God's perfection. God, they say, since he is a being of the height of perfection is unable to be acted on. But since corporeal substance is divisible, it is able to be acted on. So, it follows that (corporeal substance) itself does not pertain to the essence of God. These are the arguments which I find among writers by which they try to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of divine nature and is unable to pertain to the same (divine) nature. But, in fact, if anyone is paying close attention, he will find that I have already responded to these arguments since they are based only on this - that they suppose that corporeal substance is composed of parts which has already been shown to be absurd (P12 and P13S). So anyone who wants to weight the matter correctly will see that all those absurdities (if indeed they are all absurd, about which I do not now dispute), from which they wish to conclude that extended substance is finite, do not follow in the least because an infinite quantity is supposed, but because they suppose an infinite quantity to be measurable and forged from finite parts. So from the absurdities which follow from they can conclude only that infinite quantity is not measurable and that it is not forged from finite parts. This is the same thing we have already demonstrated above (P12, etc).

Quare telum quod in nos intendunt, in se ipsos revera conjiciunt. Si igitur ipsi ex suo hoc absurdo concludere tamen volunt substantiam extensam debere esse finitam, nihil aliud hercle faciunt quam si quis ex eo quod finxit circulum quadrati proprietates habere, concludit circulum non habere centrum ex quo omnes ad circumferentiam ductæ lineæ sunt æquales. Nam substantiam corpoream quæ non nisi infinita, non nisi unica et non nisi indivisibilis potest concipi (vide propositiones 8, 5 et 12) eam ipsi ad concludendum eandem esse finitam, ex partibus finitis conflari et multiplicem esse et divisibilem concipiunt. Sic etiam alii postquam fingunt lineam ex punctis componi, multa sciunt invenire argumenta quibus ostendant lineam non posse in infinitum dividi. Et profecto non minus absurdum est ponere quod substantia corporea ex corporibus sive partibus componatur quam quod corpus ex superficiebus, superficies ex lineis, lineæ denique ex punctis componantur. Atque hoc omnes qui claram rationem infallibilem esse sciunt, fateri debent et imprimis ii qui negant dari vacuum. Nam si substantia corporea ita posset dividi ut ejus partes realiter distinctæ essent, cur ergo una pars non posset annihilari manentibus reliquis ut ante inter se connexis? et cur omnes ita aptari debent ne detur vacuum? Sane rerum quæ realiter ab invicem distinctæ sunt, una sine alia esse et in suo statu manere potest. Cum igitur vacuum in natura non detur (de quo alias) sed omnes partes ita concurrere debent ne detur vacuum, sequitur hinc etiam easdem non posse realiter distingui hoc est substantiam corpoream quatenus substantia est, non posse dividi.

Translated as,

So the weapon they intend for us, they actually throw back on themselves. If, therefore, they want to conclude from this absurdity of theirs that extended substance must be finite, they are in reality doing nothing more than if someone created a circle has the properties of a square, and concluded that the circle has no center from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For corporeal substance, which cannot be conceived except as infinite, one and only, and indivisible (see P8, 5, and 12), in order to conclude that it is finite, they conceive as forged from finite parts, to be numerous and divisible. So also others, after they create that a line is composed of points, know how to invent many arguments, by which they show that a line cannot be divided into infinity. And really it is no less absurd to assert that corporeal substance is composed of bodies or parts than that a body is composed of surfaces, the surfaces of lines, and the lines, finally, of points. All those who know that clear reason is infallible must admit this - above all those who deny that there is a vacuum. For if corporeal substance were able to be divided so that its parts were really distinct, then why could one part not be annihilated with the rest remaining conncected with one another as before? And why must they all be so fitted together that there is no vacuum? Reasonably, with things which are really distinct from one another, each one (of them) can be and remain in its condition without the other. Since, therefore, there is no vacuum in nature (about which elsewhere), but all its parts must so meet together that there is no vacuum, it also follows from this that the same (parts) cannot be really distinguished, that is that corporeal substance, insofar as it is a substance, cannot be divided.

Si quis tamen jam quærat cur nos ex natura ita propensi simus ad dividendam quantitatem? ei respondeo quod quantitas duobus modis a nobis concipitur, abstracte scilicet sive superficialiter prout nempe ipsam imaginamur vel ut substantia, quod a solo intellectu fit. Si itaque ad quantitatem attendimus prout in imaginatione est, quod sæpe et facilius a nobis fit, reperietur finita, divisibilis et partibus conflata; si autem ad ipsam prout in intellectu est, attendimus et eam quatenus substantia est, concipimus, quod difficillime fit, tum ut jam satis demonstravimus, infinita, unica et indivisibilis reperietur. Quod omnibus qui inter imaginationem et intellectum distinguere sciverint, satis manifestum erit, præcipue si ad hoc etiam attendatur quod materia ubique eadem est nec partes in eadem distinguuntur nisi quatenus materiam diversimode affectam esse concipimus, unde ejus partes modaliter tantum distinguuntur, non autem realiter. Exempli gratia aquam quatenus aqua est, dividi concipimus ejusque partes ab invicem separari; at non quatenus substantia est corporea; eatenus enim neque separatur neque dividitur. Porro aqua quatenus aqua generatur et corrumpitur; at quatenus substantia nec generatur nec corrumpitur. Atque his me ad secundum argumentum etiam respondisse puto quandoquidem id in eo etiam fundatur quod materia quatenus substantia divisibilis sit et partibus confletur. Et quamvis hoc non esset, nescio cur divina natura indigna esset quandoquidem (per propositionem 14) extra Deum nulla substantia dari potest a qua ipsa pateretur. Omnia inquam in Deo sunt et omnia quæ fiunt per solas leges infinitæ Dei naturæ fiunt et ex necessitate ejus essentiæ (ut mox ostendam) sequuntur; quare nulla ratione dici potest Deum ab alio pati aut substantiam extensam divina natura indignam esse tametsi divisibilis supponatur dummodo æterna et infinita concedatur. Sed de his impræsentiarum satis.

Translated as,

Nevertheless, if someone asks now why we, by nature, may be inclined to divide quantity, I shall respond to him that quantity is conceived by us in two ways: abstractly or, that is to say, superficially as of course we  imagine it or as substance, which is done by the intellect alone. So if we attend to quantity as it is in the imagination, which is done by us often and more easily, it will be found to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; however if we attend to it just as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar as it is a substance, which happens with the most difficulty, then (as we have already demonstrated enought) it will be found to be infinite, one and only, and indivisible. This will be clear enough to all who know how to distinguish between the intellect and the imagination, particularly if it is also attended to that matter is everywhere the same and that parts are not distinguished unless insofar as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways, from whose parts are distinguished only modally, but not really. For example, we conceive that water is divided and its parts separated from one another insofar as it is water, but not insofar as it is corporeal substance. For as long as it is substance, it is neither separated nor divided. Further, water, insofar as it is water, is generated and corrupted, but insofar as it is substance, it is neither generated nor corrupted. But still with these I think I have even replied to the second argument too, since it is founded on this - that matter, insofar as it is substance, may be divisible and composed of parts. Even if this (argument) were not (adequate), I do not know why (matter) would be unworthy of divine nature. Since (by P14) outside of God there can be no substance by which it might be acted on. Everything, I say, is in God, and all things that happen, happen only through the laws of God's infinite nature and follow (as I shall show) from the necessity of his essence. So by no reason can it be said that God is acted on by another, or that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature, even if it is supposed to be divisible, so long as it is granted to be eternal and infinite. But enough of this for the present.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P14: Nothing But God

Here Spinoza raises the word affectiones which has been translated as "modifications" here, but is variously translated "accidents," "affections" and "states" by other translators. As I commented earlier, modifications seems most applicable. The concepts rem extensam, "extended thing" and rem cogitatem, "thinking thing" make their first appearance here. It is interesting that such profound distinctions are introduced in a Corollary 2 note.

Praeter Deum, nulla dari neque concipi potest substantia.

Translated as,

Except God, no substance can be nor be conceived.

Demonstratio: Cum Deus sit ens absolute infinitum de quo nullum attributum quod essentiam substantiae exprimit, negari potest (per definitionem 6) isque necessario existat (per propostionem 11) si aliqua substantia praeter Deum daretur, ea explicari deberet per aliquod attributum Dei sicque duae substantiae ejusdem attributi existerent, quod (per propositionem 5) est absurdum adeoque nulla substantia extra Deum dari potest et consequenter non etiam concipi. Nam si posset concipi, deberet necessario concipi ut existens; atqui hoc (per primam parem huius demonstrationis) est absurdum. Ergo extra Deum dari neque concipi potest substantia. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

Since God is an absolutely infinite being, about which no attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied existence (by D6). And God exists necessarily (by P11). If any substance except God were to exist, it would have to be explained through some attribute of God, and so two substances of the same attribute might exist, which (by P5) is absurd. And to such an extent, no substance beyond God can exist and consequently even be conceived. For if it could be conceived, it must necessarily be conceived as existing. But this conception (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. So, beyond God, substance can neither be nor be conceived.

Corollarium I: Hinc clarissime sequitur I Deum esse unicum hoc est (per definitionem 6) in rerum natura non nisi unam substantiam dari eamque absolute infinitam esse, ut in scolio propositionis 10 iam innuimus.

Translated as,

From this it follows most clearly, first, that God is one and only, that is (by D6), that in the nature of things there is only one substance and it is absolutely infinite, as we intimated in P10S.

Corollarium: Sequitur II rem extensam et rem cogitatem vel Dei attributa esse vel (per axioma 1) affectiones attributorum Dei.

Translated as,

It follows, second, that an extended thing and a thinking thing are either attributes of God, or (by A1) modifications of God's attributes.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P13: One Substance Indivisible

This proposition follows in a clear form from those the precede it. However, I do find it particularly interesting to note that he finds it relevant to note note a substantiam corpoream or "corporeal substance." If the essence of substance is existence, then isn't "corporeal substance" redundant? If it's not, then what is the manifestation of existence as substance? 

Substantia absolute infinita est indivisibilis.

Translated as,

An absolutely infinite substance is indivisible.

Demonstratio: Si enim divisibilis esset, partes in quas divideretur vel naturam substantiae absolute infinitae retinebunt vel non. Si primum, dabuntur ergo plures substantiae ejusdem naturae, quod (per propositionem 5) est absurdum. Si secundum ponatur, ergo (ut supra) poterit substantia absolute infinita desinere esse, quod (per propositionem 11) est etiam absurdum.

Proof: For if it were divisible, the parts into which it would be divided will either retain the nature of an absolutely infinite substance or they will not. If the first, then there will given more substances of the same nature, which (by P5) is absurd. But if the second is put forth, thus (as above in P12), an absolutely infinite substance would be able to cease existing, which (by P11) is also absurd.

Corollarium: Ex his sequitur nullam substantiam et consequenter nullam substantiam corpoream, quatenus substantia est, esse divisibilem.

Translated as,

From these propositions, it follows that no substance, and thus no corporeal substance, insofar as it is a substance, is divisible.

Scholium: Quod substantia sit indivisibilis, simplicius ex hoc intelligitur quod natura substantiae non potest concipi nisi infinita et quod per partem substantiae nihil aliud intelligi potest nisi quam substantia finita, quod (per propositionem 8) manifestam contradictionem implicat.

Translated as,

With respect to that substance is indivisible, is understood more simply from this, that the nature of substance cannot be conceived unless as infinite, and that by a part of substance nothing else can be understood except a finite substance, which (by P8) implies a clear contradiction.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P12: No Attribute Divisible

Spinoza's demonstration is thorough and slightly different than what might be anticipated. Spinoza's first argument relates to the division of substance as a problematic creation of a substance. However, his second demonstration relates to a parts and whole reasoning process, where the division would destroy a substance. Both of them make sense and reveal Spinoza's pattern of finding more than one way to demonstrate and confirm his propositions. It is also interesting that in this proposition he pairs the term attribute with conceived instead of perceived. It is likely that the reason for this is that the nature of this proposition is more a "view from nowhere" rather than a "view from somewhere."

Nullum substantiae attributum potest vere concipi ex quo sequatur substantiam posse dividi.

Also translated as,

No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which it could follow that a substance can be divided.

Demonstratio: Partes enim in quas substantia sic concepta divideretur, vel naturam substantiae retinebunt vel non. Si primum, tum (per propositionem 8) unaquaeque pars debebit esse infinita et (per propositionem 6) causa sui et (per propositionem 5) constare debebit ex diverso attributo adeoque ex una substantia plures constitui poterunt, quod (per propositionem 6) est absurdum. Adde quod partes (per propositionem 2) nihil commune cum suo toto haberent et totum (per definitionem 4 et per propositionem 10) absque suis partibus et esse et concipi posset, quod absurdum esse nemo dubitare poterit. Si autem secundum ponatur quod scilicet partes naturam substantiae non retinebunt, ergo cum tota substantia in aequales partes esset divisa, naturam substantiae amitteret et esse desineret, quod (per propositionem 7) est absurdum.

Translated as,

For the parts into which substance is conceptually divided either retain the nature of a substance or not. If the first, then (by P8) each and every part will have to be infinite, and (by P6) its own cause and (by P5) each part will have to be structured from different attribute so that many (substances) can be formed from one substance, which is absurd (by P6). Add that the parts would have nothing in common with their whole (by P2), and the whole (by D4 and P10) could be and be conceived without its parts which no one will be able to doubt is absurd. Moreover, if the latter were supposed, namely that the parts do not retain the nature of substance, then when dividing the whole substance into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance and cease to exist which (by P7) is absurd.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P11: God Exists

The necessity of the existence of God may be a small leap for Spinoza but is a big leap here, at least for those of us in the 21st century. Here he duplicates I.D6 exactly as a parenthetical reference to the main thought, but now adds that God (as Spinoza has defined it) necessarily exists. Three proofs follow this all important proposition:

In this first proof, Spinoza ties together some preceding pieces. I.A7 defines that which is not self-caused when A7 states "if a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence." With A7, he references the self-caused issues raised in I.D1 which states "self-caused is that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing."  In this same way as a circle cannot be imagined without roundness so here the essence of self-caused cannot be imagined without existence. Self-caused is the essence of substance as it exists in itself. So to imagine self-caused is not to imagine but to acknowledge existence. The fullness of this self-caused idea is I.D7 which says "free is that which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone." Here the definition references Spinoza's almost unfree notion of freedom involving necessity. I.P7 says that "it pertains to the nature of a substance to exist." By working through the idea of self-caused through substance, freedom and necessary existence, Spinoza "proves" God by saying God (as defined) cannot be denied without denying everything that has been established in the preceding axioms (and definitions). 

Spinoza's argument is interesting. Things either exist or don't exist, for a reason or cause. No true randomness exists for Spinoza. All randomness is apparent, not real. Thus, this reason or cause either exists within or outside the nature of the thing. So, with compelling causation, a thing either exists or doesn't exist necessarily. This necessity is either within the the nature of the thing or outside the thing, thus, within the whole of Nature. This line of reasoning implies a reality which is bursting at the seams, restrained in the breadth of its expression only by these reasons or causes. If not restrained, it exists. That seems explosive and related to what I often see in biology. I am unaccustomed to thinking that everything that exists, necessarily exists as it is and, in the same way, everything that does not exist, necessarily does not exist. His argument implies a reality that does not come easily to my mind, especially when moving to the realm of the "unseen." Applying his method, if I conceive of an idea which is a logical construct, say alien life forms, denying their existence requires that I identify a reason or cause which would prevent their existence. In the case of aliens, it seems that unless I could generally contrive a reason that would prevent their existence, then they must exist.

This third proof, like the second, builds on the approach of that which does not exist is constrained from existing by some reason or cause or else it would exist. This approach helps me understand the sense of the verb exprimit or "express"which he uses in I.P11. This sense of substance expressing itself unless restrained or modified provides a substance that is dynamic. As I meditate on this approach, I find it difficult to counter. As substance expresses its way into attributes and modifications, there are restraining reasons or causes and these are either internal or external. By simply starting, as he does here in the third proof, with what we know to be real (ourselves), he provides a method for rationally working his way to God's necessary existence.

In this note, Spinoza anticipated difficulty here and described the difficulty as rooted in thoughts "accustomed to only studying things which arise from external causes." The opposite of that is to focus on "self-caused" - an internal causation. Cause and effect is generally regarded as a process of attending to external causes, as in a series of billiard balls hitting one another. Spinoza is taking a completely different approach here. "Internal causes" is my phrase for what he terms "nature." He is describing a process of an effect which is built into the nature of the cause. As stated in prior posts, an example is when a circle causes roundness because it is in its "nature" or is definitional. This is an unusual way of discussing causality. He contrasts things of few parts to those of many parts to clarify that they both involve "external causes" and do not pertain to discussions of substance which involve "self-caused."

Exprimit or "expresses" is clearly an important term and deserving of close study. God's verb is not the famous "create" of the Hebrew Bible. Rather, God's verb is "express" and understanding the difference is a key to understanding immanence in the unfolding universe within Spinoza's framework. This framework allows no transcendence as implied in the word "create" of the Hebrew Bible. Another important word is introduced in this set of proofs - potentia or "power." Latin has many words for power but potentia and potestas are two of the most prevalent. Spinoza chooses potentia which carries the sense of the English cognate "potential." Potentia is pregnant with exprimit and is dynamic. Potestas is a term that combines potentia or "power" and the verb sto or "stand." This standing power is similar to control and law and would normally be associated with concepts of God, but not within the framework of Spinoza.

Deus sive substantia constans infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit, necessario existit.

Translated as,

God exists necessarily as a substance composed of infinite attributes, each and every one of which expresses an infinite and eternal essence.

Demonstratio: Si negas, concipe, si fieri potest, Deus non existere. Ergo (per axioma 7) ejus essentia non involvit existentiam. Atqui hoc (per propositionem 7) est absurdum: ergo Deus necessario existit.
Q.E.D.

Proof (One): If you deny this, conceive, if it is possible, that God does not exist. Then his essence does not involve existence (by A7). But this is absurd (by P7). So God exists necessarily.

Aliter: Cujuscunque rei assignari debet causa seu ratio tam cur existit quam cur non existit. Exempli gratia si triangulus existit, ratio seu causa dari debet cur existit; si autem non existit, ratio etiam seu causa dari debet quae impedit quominus existat sive quae ejus existentiam tollat. Haec vero ratio seu causa vel in natura rei contineri debet vel extra ipsam. Exempli gratia rationem cur circulus quadratus non existat, ipsa ejus natura indicat; nimirum quia contradictionem involvit. Cur autem contra substantia existat, ex sola etiam ejus natura sequitur quia scilicet existentiam involvit (vide propositionem 7). At ratio cur circulus vel triangulus existit vel cur non existit, ex eorum natura non sequitur sed ex ordine universae naturae corporae; ex eo enim sequi debet vel jam triangulum necessario existere vel impossibile esse ut jam existat. Atque haec per se manifesta sunt. Ex quibus sequitur id necessario existere cujus nulla ratio nec causa datur quae impedit quominus existat. Si itaque nulla ratio nec causa dari possit quae impedit quominus Deus existat vel quae ejus existentiam tollat, omnino concludendum est eundem necessario existere. At si talis ratio seu causa daretur, ea vel in ipsa Dei natura vel extra ipsam dari deberet hoc est in alia substantia alterius naturae. Nam si ejusdem naturae esset, eo ipso concederetur dari Deum. At substantia quae alterius esset naturae, nihil cum Deo commune habere (per 2 propositionem) adeoque neque ejus existentiam ponere neque tollere posset. Cum igitur ratio seu causa quae divinam existentiam tollat, extra divinam naturam dari non possit, debebit necessario dari, siquidem non existit, in ipsa ejus natura, quae propterea contradictionem involveret. Atqui hoc de Ente absolute infinito et summe perfecto affirmare absurdum est; ergo nec in Deo nec extra Deum ulla causa seu ratio datur quae ejus existentiam tollat ac proinde Deus necessario existit. Q.E.D.

Proof (Two): Of whatsoever thing, there should be a cause or reason assigned as to why it exists and as to why it does not exist. For example, if a triangle exists, there should be a reason or cause why it exists; however, if it does not exist, there should also be a reason or cause which prevents it from existing or which may remove its existence. Indeed this reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing or be outside of itself. For example, the nature of the thing itself shows the reason why a square circle may not exist, because it undoubtedly involves a contradiction. Moreover, in contrast, why a substance may exist also follows from only its nature, namely because it involves existence (see P7). But the reason why a circle or triangle exists, or why it does not exist, does not follow from the nature of these things, but from the order of the natural corporeal universe. For from this order, it ought to follow that either the triangle necessarily exists now or that it is impossible for it to exist now. So these things are made clear through themselves. From these, it follows that what exists necessarily has no reason or cause which prevents it from existing. So if no reason or cause able to be given which prevents God from existing or which removes this existence, it must be deduced altogether that the same exists necessarily. But if there such a reason or cause were given, it would either be given within the God's nature itself of God or outside of its own nature, that is in another substance of a different nature. For if it were of the same nature, by this sameness itself it would be conceded that God is a given. But substance which is of a different nature, would have nothing in common with God (by P2) and to such an extent would not be able to establish or remove its (God's) existence. Therefore, because a reason or cause that removes divine existence cannot be given outside of divine nature, accordingly its non-existence would be in its own nature, which would, for this reason, involve a contradiction. So it is absurd to affirm this (contradiction) of a Being absolutely infinite and the height of perfection. So neither in God nor outside God is any cause or reason given which removes his existence and so God exists necessarily.

Aliter: Posse non existere impotentia est et contra posse existere potentia est (ut per se notum). Si itaque id quod jam necessario existit, non nisi entia finita sunt, sunt ergo entia finita potentiora Ente absolute infinito atque hoc (ut per se notum) absurdum est; ergo vel nihil existit vel Ens absolute infinitum necessario etiam existit. Atqui nos vel in nobis vel in alio quod necessario existit, existimus (vide axioma 1 et propositionem 7). Ergo Ens absolute infinitum hoc est (per definitionem 6) Deus necessario existit. Q.E.D.

Proof (Three): To be able not to exist is impotence and, in contrast, to be able to exist is power (as is known through itself). So, if what now exists necessarily does not exist unless as one of finite beings, then finite beings are more powerful than an absolutely infinite Being. But this is absurd (as is known through itself). Thus, either nothing exists or an absolutely infinite Being actually exists necessarily. Yet we exist, either in ourselves, or in something else, which necessarily exists (see A1 and P7). Therefore, an absolutely infinite Being, that is (by D6) God, exists necessarily.

Scholium: In hac ultima demonstratione Dei existentiam a posteriori ostendere volui ut demonstratio facilius perciperetur; non autem propterea quod ex hoc eodem fundamento Dei existentia a priori non sequatur. Nam cum posse existere potentia sit, sequitur quo plus realitatis alicujus rei naturae competit eo plus virium a se habere ut existat adeoque Ens absolute infinitum sive Deum infinitam absolute potentiam existendi a se habere, qui propterea absolute existit. Multi tamen forsan non facile huius demonstrationis evidentiam videre poterunt quia assueti sunt eas solummodo res comtemplari quae a causis externis fiunt et ex his quae cito fiunt hoc est quae facile existunt, eas etiam facile perire vident et contras eas res factu difficiliores judicant hoc est ad existendum non adeo faciles ad quas plura pertinere concipiunt. Verum ut ab his praejudiciis liberentur, non opus habeo hic ostendere qua ratione hoc enunciatum "quod cito fit cito perit" verum sit nec etiam an respectu totius naturae omnia aeque facilia sint an secus. Sed hoc tantum notare sufficit me hic non loqui de rebus quae a causis externis fiunt sed de solis substantiis, quae (per propositionem 6) a nulla causa externa produce possunt. Res enim quae a causis externis fiunt, sive eae multis partibus constent sive paucis, quicquid perfectionis sive realitatis habent, id omne virtuti causae externae debetur adeoque earum existentia ex sola perfectione causae externae, non autem suae oritur. Contra quicquid substantia perfectionis habet, nulli causae externae deberet; quare ejus etiam existentia ex sola ejus natura sequi debet, quae proinde nihil aliud est quam ejus essentia. Perfectio igitur rei existentiam non tollit sed contra ponit; imperfection autem contra eandem tollit adeoque de nullius rei existentia certiores esse possumus quam de existentia Entis absolute infiniti seu perfecti hoc est Dei. Nam quandoquidem ejus essentia omnem imperfectionem secludit absolutamque perfectionem involvit, eo ipso omnem causam dubitandi de ipsius existentia tollit summamque de eadem certitudinem dat, quod mediocriter attendenti perspicuum fore credo.

Translated as,

In this last proof, I wanted to show God's existence a posteriori, so that the proof would be perceived more easily, not because God's existence does not follow a priori from the same foundation. For since being able to exist is power, it follows that the more of some reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more strength it has to exist by itself. To such an extent, an absolutely infinite Being or God has by itself an absolutely infinite power of existing. For that reason, God exists absolutely.

Nevertheless, perhaps many are not easily able to see the obviousness of this proof because they have been accustomed to only studying things which arise from external causes. From these (causes), they see that which arises quickly, that is, which exists easily, also perishes easily. In contrast, they view as more difficult to do, that is, not so easy for bringing into existence, those things which they conceive to be made of more parts. But to free them from these prejudices, I do not have to show here by what rationale the saying "easy come, easy go" is true, nor whether or not all things are equally easy with respect to all of nature. But it is sufficient to note only this - that I am not here speaking about things that arise from external causes but only of substances which (by P6) can be produced by no external cause.

For things which arise from external causes, whether these things are made of many or few parts, whatever of perfection or reality these things have owe it all to the excellence of an external cause to the degree that their perfection comes solely from the perfection of the extenal cause rathter than arising from itself. In contrast, whatever of perfection a substance has is not owed to any external cause. The reason for this is that its existence must follow from its own nature which is nothing other than its own essence. Therefore, perfection does not remove existence from a thing but, on the contrary, places in within it. Moreover, it (existence) removes imperfection from the same thing to the extent that we cannot be more certain of anything than the existence of a thing than the existence of an absolutely infinite and perfect Being, that is God. For seeing that its (God's) essence shuts off any imperfection and involves absolute perfection, existence. By this alone, it removes all cause for doubting its existence and provides the height of certainty about the same thing. I believe that this is going to be clear to any who give it a modicum of thought.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P10: Attributes Conceived

I think the language is significant here. As discussed in a prior post, there is a difference in percipit "perceived" and concipi "conceived." In essence, perceiving is an activity of the intellect as in a "view from somewhere" as opposed to conceiving which is a "view from nowhere." The degree of specificity of a "view from somewhere" starts this proposition with "each and every" but ends with a "view from nowhere" as in "conceived." His demonstration reveals the transition from the specific to the universal in the pivotal word tanquam "as if." All the translations ignore the sense of this word and I think that is mistaken because it reveals the powerful role of the attribute in his system.

Unumquodque unius substantiae attributum per se concipi debet.

Translated as,

Each and every attribute of an individual substance must be conceived through itself.

Demonstratio: Attributum enim est id quod de substantia intellectus percipit tanquam ejus essentiam constituens (per definitionem 4); adeoque (per defintionem 3) per se concipi debet. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For an attribute is that which the intellect perceives of a substance as if constituting the essence of a substance (through D4). To such an extent, it (the attribute) ought to be conceived through itself (through D3).

Scholium: Ex his apparet quod quamvis dua attributa realiter distincta concipiantur hoc est unum sine ope alterius, non possumus tamen inde concludere ipse dua entia sive duas diversas substantias constituere; id enim est de natura substantiae ut unumquodque ejus attributorum per se concipiatur quandoquidem omnia quae habet attributa, simul in ipsa semper fuerunt nec unum ab alio produci potuit sed unumquodque realitatem sive esse substantiae exprimit. Longe ergo abest ut absurdum sit uni substantiae plura attributa tribuere; quin nihil in natura clarius quam quod unumquodque ens sub alio attributo debeat concipi et quo plus realitatis aut esse habeat eo plura attributa quae et necessitatem sive aeternitatem et infinitatem exprimunt, habeat et consequenter nihil etiam clarius quam quod ens absolute infinitum necessario sit definiendum (ut definitionem 6 tradidimus) ens quod constat infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam certam essentiam exprimit. Si quis autem jam quaerit ex quo ergo signo diversitatem substantiarum poterimus dignoscere, legat sequentes propositiones, quae ostendunt in rerum natura non nisi unicam substantiam existere eamque absolute infinitam esse, quapropter id signum frustra quaereretur.

Translated as,

From these preceding statements, it is apparent that as much as two attributes might be conceived as really distinct, that is, the one not resourcing the other, nevertheless we cannot conclude from this itself that they confirm two entities or two different substances. It is of the nature of a substance that each and every one of its attributes might be conceived through themselves since all of the attributes which belong to a substance have always been in the substance itself and one attribute could not produce another attribute, but each and every one attribute expressing the reality or being of a substance. So it is a long way from absurd to grant more attributes than one to an individual substance. In fact, nothing in nature is clearer than that each and every being ought to be conceived under some attribute, and where (the entity) might have more reality or being, there it would have more attributes which are expressing necessity as eternity and infinity. And it follows that there is also nothing clearer than that a being absolutely infinite be defined necessarily (as we passed on in D6) as a being composed of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain essence both eternal and infinite. Moreover, if someone then asks by what sign that we then might be able to differentiate among the diversity of substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that in the nature of things there exists no substance unless singular and that it is absolutely infinite. So that sign would be sought in vain.

Spend a Deflation Dividend?

When the Soviet - U.S. conflict was reduced during the Gorbachev years, many spoke about a "peace dividend" for the economy due to a decline in required military expenditures. The current pandemic has a similar potential benefit of a "deflation dividend."

The Federal Reserve has a three part mandate: full employment, low stable inflation and control of long-term interest rates. While making monetary policy much more important, the pandemic has in some ways made the Fed's job easier. The typical foe of the Fed is inflation. In order to fight inflation, the Fed regularly introduces recessions through monetary tightening. But the pandemic actually allows the Fed to do just the opposite and take loosening actions.

The pandemic is unusual in that its impact is to increase utilization of high productivity tools, such as using internet-based communication rather than travel or internet-based shopping rather than real estate-based shopping. Normally an economic slowdown is accompanied by a slowdown in new technologies, whereas this slowdown is accelerating the adoption of them.

The combination of reduced demand and increased technology usage is a potent brew for deflation. While the 19th century U.S. economy flourished under deflation, our debt-based economy cannot withstand these dynamics. As a result, we potentially can spend a "deflation dividend." It seems like an excellent time to think about the best approaches. I can see the following ways:

1) increase social justice, with a program like reparations payments to slave descendants or Native Americans. This is my top idea because these payments would immediately increase demand and increase the general standard of living. Of course, the implementation is daunting.

2) increase globalization of with "utility"- like regulations for companies like Microsoft, Google and Apple in order to limit their role as platforms - while decreasing globalization in supply chains as well as news. The combined effect would be inflationary, but would encourage more economic diversity in local areas. Again, implementation would require a rethinking of anti-trust as well as import-export policies.

 3) make a massive investment in science and math-based education by closing all student loans and making them student grants in the science and math fields. At the same time eliminating all student loans for anything outside science and math-based education fields. While the overall impact would be inflationary by the creation of large educational debt, the restructuring of the U.S. workforce would reduce a desire for the "good old days" of manufacturing jobs that will never return.