Spinoza's Ethics: I.P11: God Exists

The necessity of the existence of God may be a small leap for Spinoza but is a big leap here, at least for those of us in the 21st century. Here he duplicates I.D6 exactly as a parenthetical reference to the main thought, but now adds that God (as Spinoza has defined it) necessarily exists. Three proofs follow this all important proposition:

In this first proof, Spinoza ties together some preceding pieces. I.A7 defines that which is not self-caused when A7 states "if a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence." With A7, he references the self-caused issues raised in I.D1 which states "self-caused is that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing."  In this same way as a circle cannot be imagined without roundness so here the essence of self-caused cannot be imagined without existence. Self-caused is the essence of substance as it exists in itself. So to imagine self-caused is not to imagine but to acknowledge existence. The fullness of this self-caused idea is I.D7 which says "free is that which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone." Here the definition references Spinoza's almost unfree notion of freedom involving necessity. I.P7 says that "it pertains to the nature of a substance to exist." By working through the idea of self-caused through substance, freedom and necessary existence, Spinoza "proves" God by saying God (as defined) cannot be denied without denying everything that has been established in the preceding axioms (and definitions). 

Spinoza's argument is interesting. Things either exist or don't exist, for a reason or cause. No true randomness exists for Spinoza. All randomness is apparent, not real. Thus, this reason or cause either exists within or outside the nature of the thing. So, with compelling causation, a thing either exists or doesn't exist necessarily. This necessity is either within the the nature of the thing or outside the thing, thus, within the whole of Nature. This line of reasoning implies a reality which is bursting at the seams, restrained in the breadth of its expression only by these reasons or causes. If not restrained, it exists. That seems explosive and related to what I often see in biology. I am unaccustomed to thinking that everything that exists, necessarily exists as it is and, in the same way, everything that does not exist, necessarily does not exist. His argument implies a reality that does not come easily to my mind, especially when moving to the realm of the "unseen." Applying his method, if I conceive of an idea which is a logical construct, say alien life forms, denying their existence requires that I identify a reason or cause which would prevent their existence. In the case of aliens, it seems that unless I could generally contrive a reason that would prevent their existence, then they must exist.

This third proof, like the second, builds on the approach of that which does not exist is constrained from existing by some reason or cause or else it would exist. This approach helps me understand the sense of the verb exprimit or "express"which he uses in I.P11. This sense of substance expressing itself unless restrained or modified provides a substance that is dynamic. As I meditate on this approach, I find it difficult to counter. As substance expresses its way into attributes and modifications, there are restraining reasons or causes and these are either internal or external. By simply starting, as he does here in the third proof, with what we know to be real (ourselves), he provides a method for rationally working his way to God's necessary existence.

In this note, Spinoza anticipated difficulty here and described the difficulty as rooted in thoughts "accustomed to only studying things which arise from external causes." The opposite of that is to focus on "self-caused" - an internal causation. Cause and effect is generally regarded as a process of attending to external causes, as in a series of billiard balls hitting one another. Spinoza is taking a completely different approach here. "Internal causes" is my phrase for what he terms "nature." He is describing a process of an effect which is built into the nature of the cause. As stated in prior posts, an example is when a circle causes roundness because it is in its "nature" or is definitional. This is an unusual way of discussing causality. He contrasts things of few parts to those of many parts to clarify that they both involve "external causes" and do not pertain to discussions of substance which involve "self-caused."

Exprimit or "expresses" is clearly an important term and deserving of close study. God's verb is not the famous "create" of the Hebrew Bible. Rather, God's verb is "express" and understanding the difference is a key to understanding immanence in the unfolding universe within Spinoza's framework. This framework allows no transcendence as implied in the word "create" of the Hebrew Bible. Another important word is introduced in this set of proofs - potentia or "power." Latin has many words for power but potentia and potestas are two of the most prevalent. Spinoza chooses potentia which carries the sense of the English cognate "potential." Potentia is pregnant with exprimit and is dynamic. Potestas is a term that combines potentia or "power" and the verb sto or "stand." This standing power is similar to control and law and would normally be associated with concepts of God, but not within the framework of Spinoza.

Deus sive substantia constans infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit, necessario existit.

Translated as,

God exists necessarily as a substance composed of infinite attributes, each and every one of which expresses an infinite and eternal essence.

Demonstratio: Si negas, concipe, si fieri potest, Deus non existere. Ergo (per axioma 7) ejus essentia non involvit existentiam. Atqui hoc (per propositionem 7) est absurdum: ergo Deus necessario existit.
Q.E.D.

Proof (One): If you deny this, conceive, if it is possible, that God does not exist. Then his essence does not involve existence (by A7). But this is absurd (by P7). So God exists necessarily.

Aliter: Cujuscunque rei assignari debet causa seu ratio tam cur existit quam cur non existit. Exempli gratia si triangulus existit, ratio seu causa dari debet cur existit; si autem non existit, ratio etiam seu causa dari debet quae impedit quominus existat sive quae ejus existentiam tollat. Haec vero ratio seu causa vel in natura rei contineri debet vel extra ipsam. Exempli gratia rationem cur circulus quadratus non existat, ipsa ejus natura indicat; nimirum quia contradictionem involvit. Cur autem contra substantia existat, ex sola etiam ejus natura sequitur quia scilicet existentiam involvit (vide propositionem 7). At ratio cur circulus vel triangulus existit vel cur non existit, ex eorum natura non sequitur sed ex ordine universae naturae corporae; ex eo enim sequi debet vel jam triangulum necessario existere vel impossibile esse ut jam existat. Atque haec per se manifesta sunt. Ex quibus sequitur id necessario existere cujus nulla ratio nec causa datur quae impedit quominus existat. Si itaque nulla ratio nec causa dari possit quae impedit quominus Deus existat vel quae ejus existentiam tollat, omnino concludendum est eundem necessario existere. At si talis ratio seu causa daretur, ea vel in ipsa Dei natura vel extra ipsam dari deberet hoc est in alia substantia alterius naturae. Nam si ejusdem naturae esset, eo ipso concederetur dari Deum. At substantia quae alterius esset naturae, nihil cum Deo commune habere (per 2 propositionem) adeoque neque ejus existentiam ponere neque tollere posset. Cum igitur ratio seu causa quae divinam existentiam tollat, extra divinam naturam dari non possit, debebit necessario dari, siquidem non existit, in ipsa ejus natura, quae propterea contradictionem involveret. Atqui hoc de Ente absolute infinito et summe perfecto affirmare absurdum est; ergo nec in Deo nec extra Deum ulla causa seu ratio datur quae ejus existentiam tollat ac proinde Deus necessario existit. Q.E.D.

Proof (Two): Of whatsoever thing, there should be a cause or reason assigned as to why it exists and as to why it does not exist. For example, if a triangle exists, there should be a reason or cause why it exists; however, if it does not exist, there should also be a reason or cause which prevents it from existing or which may remove its existence. Indeed this reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing or be outside of itself. For example, the nature of the thing itself shows the reason why a square circle may not exist, because it undoubtedly involves a contradiction. Moreover, in contrast, why a substance may exist also follows from only its nature, namely because it involves existence (see P7). But the reason why a circle or triangle exists, or why it does not exist, does not follow from the nature of these things, but from the order of the natural corporeal universe. For from this order, it ought to follow that either the triangle necessarily exists now or that it is impossible for it to exist now. So these things are made clear through themselves. From these, it follows that what exists necessarily has no reason or cause which prevents it from existing. So if no reason or cause able to be given which prevents God from existing or which removes this existence, it must be deduced altogether that the same exists necessarily. But if there such a reason or cause were given, it would either be given within the God's nature itself of God or outside of its own nature, that is in another substance of a different nature. For if it were of the same nature, by this sameness itself it would be conceded that God is a given. But substance which is of a different nature, would have nothing in common with God (by P2) and to such an extent would not be able to establish or remove its (God's) existence. Therefore, because a reason or cause that removes divine existence cannot be given outside of divine nature, accordingly its non-existence would be in its own nature, which would, for this reason, involve a contradiction. So it is absurd to affirm this (contradiction) of a Being absolutely infinite and the height of perfection. So neither in God nor outside God is any cause or reason given which removes his existence and so God exists necessarily.

Aliter: Posse non existere impotentia est et contra posse existere potentia est (ut per se notum). Si itaque id quod jam necessario existit, non nisi entia finita sunt, sunt ergo entia finita potentiora Ente absolute infinito atque hoc (ut per se notum) absurdum est; ergo vel nihil existit vel Ens absolute infinitum necessario etiam existit. Atqui nos vel in nobis vel in alio quod necessario existit, existimus (vide axioma 1 et propositionem 7). Ergo Ens absolute infinitum hoc est (per definitionem 6) Deus necessario existit. Q.E.D.

Proof (Three): To be able not to exist is impotence and, in contrast, to be able to exist is power (as is known through itself). So, if what now exists necessarily does not exist unless as one of finite beings, then finite beings are more powerful than an absolutely infinite Being. But this is absurd (as is known through itself). Thus, either nothing exists or an absolutely infinite Being actually exists necessarily. Yet we exist, either in ourselves, or in something else, which necessarily exists (see A1 and P7). Therefore, an absolutely infinite Being, that is (by D6) God, exists necessarily.

Scholium: In hac ultima demonstratione Dei existentiam a posteriori ostendere volui ut demonstratio facilius perciperetur; non autem propterea quod ex hoc eodem fundamento Dei existentia a priori non sequatur. Nam cum posse existere potentia sit, sequitur quo plus realitatis alicujus rei naturae competit eo plus virium a se habere ut existat adeoque Ens absolute infinitum sive Deum infinitam absolute potentiam existendi a se habere, qui propterea absolute existit. Multi tamen forsan non facile huius demonstrationis evidentiam videre poterunt quia assueti sunt eas solummodo res comtemplari quae a causis externis fiunt et ex his quae cito fiunt hoc est quae facile existunt, eas etiam facile perire vident et contras eas res factu difficiliores judicant hoc est ad existendum non adeo faciles ad quas plura pertinere concipiunt. Verum ut ab his praejudiciis liberentur, non opus habeo hic ostendere qua ratione hoc enunciatum "quod cito fit cito perit" verum sit nec etiam an respectu totius naturae omnia aeque facilia sint an secus. Sed hoc tantum notare sufficit me hic non loqui de rebus quae a causis externis fiunt sed de solis substantiis, quae (per propositionem 6) a nulla causa externa produce possunt. Res enim quae a causis externis fiunt, sive eae multis partibus constent sive paucis, quicquid perfectionis sive realitatis habent, id omne virtuti causae externae debetur adeoque earum existentia ex sola perfectione causae externae, non autem suae oritur. Contra quicquid substantia perfectionis habet, nulli causae externae deberet; quare ejus etiam existentia ex sola ejus natura sequi debet, quae proinde nihil aliud est quam ejus essentia. Perfectio igitur rei existentiam non tollit sed contra ponit; imperfection autem contra eandem tollit adeoque de nullius rei existentia certiores esse possumus quam de existentia Entis absolute infiniti seu perfecti hoc est Dei. Nam quandoquidem ejus essentia omnem imperfectionem secludit absolutamque perfectionem involvit, eo ipso omnem causam dubitandi de ipsius existentia tollit summamque de eadem certitudinem dat, quod mediocriter attendenti perspicuum fore credo.

Translated as,

In this last proof, I wanted to show God's existence a posteriori, so that the proof would be perceived more easily, not because God's existence does not follow a priori from the same foundation. For since being able to exist is power, it follows that the more of some reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more strength it has to exist by itself. To such an extent, an absolutely infinite Being or God has by itself an absolutely infinite power of existing. For that reason, God exists absolutely.

Nevertheless, perhaps many are not easily able to see the obviousness of this proof because they have been accustomed to only studying things which arise from external causes. From these (causes), they see that which arises quickly, that is, which exists easily, also perishes easily. In contrast, they view as more difficult to do, that is, not so easy for bringing into existence, those things which they conceive to be made of more parts. But to free them from these prejudices, I do not have to show here by what rationale the saying "easy come, easy go" is true, nor whether or not all things are equally easy with respect to all of nature. But it is sufficient to note only this - that I am not here speaking about things that arise from external causes but only of substances which (by P6) can be produced by no external cause.

For things which arise from external causes, whether these things are made of many or few parts, whatever of perfection or reality these things have owe it all to the excellence of an external cause to the degree that their perfection comes solely from the perfection of the extenal cause rathter than arising from itself. In contrast, whatever of perfection a substance has is not owed to any external cause. The reason for this is that its existence must follow from its own nature which is nothing other than its own essence. Therefore, perfection does not remove existence from a thing but, on the contrary, places in within it. Moreover, it (existence) removes imperfection from the same thing to the extent that we cannot be more certain of anything than the existence of a thing than the existence of an absolutely infinite and perfect Being, that is God. For seeing that its (God's) essence shuts off any imperfection and involves absolute perfection, existence. By this alone, it removes all cause for doubting its existence and provides the height of certainty about the same thing. I believe that this is going to be clear to any who give it a modicum of thought.