Spinoza's Ethics: I.P10: Attributes Conceived

I think the language is significant here. As discussed in a prior post, there is a difference in percipit "perceived" and concipi "conceived." In essence, perceiving is an activity of the intellect as in a "view from somewhere" as opposed to conceiving which is a "view from nowhere." The degree of specificity of a "view from somewhere" starts this proposition with "each and every" but ends with a "view from nowhere" as in "conceived." His demonstration reveals the transition from the specific to the universal in the pivotal word tanquam "as if." All the translations ignore the sense of this word and I think that is mistaken because it reveals the powerful role of the attribute in his system.

Unumquodque unius substantiae attributum per se concipi debet.

Translated as,

Each and every attribute of an individual substance must be conceived through itself.

Demonstratio: Attributum enim est id quod de substantia intellectus percipit tanquam ejus essentiam constituens (per definitionem 4); adeoque (per defintionem 3) per se concipi debet. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For an attribute is that which the intellect perceives of a substance as if constituting the essence of a substance (through D4). To such an extent, it (the attribute) ought to be conceived through itself (through D3).

Scholium: Ex his apparet quod quamvis dua attributa realiter distincta concipiantur hoc est unum sine ope alterius, non possumus tamen inde concludere ipse dua entia sive duas diversas substantias constituere; id enim est de natura substantiae ut unumquodque ejus attributorum per se concipiatur quandoquidem omnia quae habet attributa, simul in ipsa semper fuerunt nec unum ab alio produci potuit sed unumquodque realitatem sive esse substantiae exprimit. Longe ergo abest ut absurdum sit uni substantiae plura attributa tribuere; quin nihil in natura clarius quam quod unumquodque ens sub alio attributo debeat concipi et quo plus realitatis aut esse habeat eo plura attributa quae et necessitatem sive aeternitatem et infinitatem exprimunt, habeat et consequenter nihil etiam clarius quam quod ens absolute infinitum necessario sit definiendum (ut definitionem 6 tradidimus) ens quod constat infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam certam essentiam exprimit. Si quis autem jam quaerit ex quo ergo signo diversitatem substantiarum poterimus dignoscere, legat sequentes propositiones, quae ostendunt in rerum natura non nisi unicam substantiam existere eamque absolute infinitam esse, quapropter id signum frustra quaereretur.

Translated as,

From these preceding statements, it is apparent that as much as two attributes might be conceived as really distinct, that is, the one not resourcing the other, nevertheless we cannot conclude from this itself that they confirm two entities or two different substances. It is of the nature of a substance that each and every one of its attributes might be conceived through themselves since all of the attributes which belong to a substance have always been in the substance itself and one attribute could not produce another attribute, but each and every one attribute expressing the reality or being of a substance. So it is a long way from absurd to grant more attributes than one to an individual substance. In fact, nothing in nature is clearer than that each and every being ought to be conceived under some attribute, and where (the entity) might have more reality or being, there it would have more attributes which are expressing necessity as eternity and infinity. And it follows that there is also nothing clearer than that a being absolutely infinite be defined necessarily (as we passed on in D6) as a being composed of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain essence both eternal and infinite. Moreover, if someone then asks by what sign that we then might be able to differentiate among the diversity of substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that in the nature of things there exists no substance unless singular and that it is absolutely infinite. So that sign would be sought in vain.