Here Spinoza is continuing to build out a discussion of cause and effect which took initial form with I.A3. Spinoza is stating that cause and effect cannot be connected unless they share a common finite and determined existence. The implication is that although the chain of causation for a singular thing is infinite, the cause itself can only be finite. God, as substance, then, is the immanent cause of particular things, but God, as modifications, is the particular cause.
The demonstration of the proposition emphasizes the concept of immanence - so far from a notion of transcendent God does Spinoza take us that even the concept of an immanent God insofar as God is eternal and infinite is not "causing" our situations. Rather, God insofar as God is a modification which is finite and of limited duration is our "cause." In this way, Spinoza tightens the logic on those who might seek to distort the concept of immanence to fit their historical uses of transcendence.
This note makes a rough distinction between two types of causes: proximate and remote. All of I.P28 is focused on the causality of singular things with an infinite chain of causality. The demonstration emphasizes God as cause, not insofar as God is eternal and infinite, but insofar as God is a modification which is finite and has duration. So too the note makes a similar distinction: God is always the cause, but sometimes as proximate and sometimes as remote.
Quodcunque singulare sive quaevis res finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, non potest existere nec ad operandum determinari nisi ad existendum et operandum determinetur ab alia causa quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam et rursus haec causa non potest etiam existere neque ad operandum determinari nisi ab alia quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, determinetur ad existendum et operandum et sic in infinitum.
Translated as,
Whatsoever singular or whatever thing is finite and has a determinate existence is not able to exist nor be determined to an outcome unless it be determined to exist and produce an outcome from another cause which is finite and has a determinate existence and again this cause is also not able to exist nor be determined to produce an outcome unless it too is determined to exist and produce an outcome by another which is finite and has a determinate existence and so on to infinity.
Demonstratio: Quicquid determinatum est ad existendum et operandum, a Deo sic determinatum est (per propositionem 26 et per corollarium propositionis 24). At id quod finitum est et determinatam habet existentiam, ab absoluta natura alicujus Dei attributi produci non potuit; quicquid enim ex absoluta natura alicujus Dei attribut sequitur, id infinitum et aeternum est (per propositionem 21). Debuit ergo ex Deo vel aliquo ejus attributo sequi quatenus aliquo modo affectum consideratur; praeter enim substantiam et modos nil datur (per axioma 1 et definitionibus 3 et 5) et modi (per corollarium ropositionis 25) nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones. At ex Deo vel aliquo ejus attributo quatenus affectum est modificatione quae aeterna et infinita est, sequi etiam non potuit (per propositionem 22). Debuit ergo sequi vel ad existendum et operandum determinari a Deo vel aliquo ejus attributo quatenus modificatum est modificatione quae finita est et determinatam habet existentiam. Quod erat primum. Deinde haec rursus causa sive hic modus (per eandem rationem qua primam partem huius jam jam demonstravimus) debuit etiam determinari ab alia quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam et rursus haec ultima (per eandem rationem) ab alia et sic semper (per eandem rationem) in infinitum. Q.E.D.
Translated as,
Whatever has been determined to exist and produce an outcome, has been determined in this way by God (by P26 and P24C). But what is finite and has a determinate existence has not been able to be produced by the absolute nature of some attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, is an infinite and eternal thing (by P21). It must, therefore, follow either from God or from some attribute of God insofar as it is considered to be affected by some mode. For there is nothing except substance and its modes (by A1, D3 and D5) and modes (by P25C) are nothing but modifications of God's attributes. But it also has not been able to follow from God, or from some attribute of God, insofar as it is affected by a measuring which is eternal and infinite (by P22). It must, therefore, follow from, or be determined to exist and produce an outcome by God or some attribute of God insofar as it is measured by a measuring which is finite and has a determinate existence. This was the first thing to be proven. Next in turn, this cause or this mode (by the same reasoning by which we have already demonstrated the first part of this proposition) must also be determined by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, this last (by the same reasoning) by another, and so always (by the same reasoning) to infinity.
Scholium: Cum quaedam a Deo immediate produci debuerunt videlicet ea quae ex absoluta ejus natura necessario sequuntur et alia mediantibus his primis quae tamen sine Deo nec esse nec concipi possunt, hinc sequitur I: quod Deus sit rerum immediate ab ipso productarum causa absolute proxima, non vero in suo genere aiunt. Nam Dei effectus sine sua causa nec esse nec concipi possunt (per propositionem 15 et corollarium propositionis 24). Sequitur II: quod Deus non potest proprie dici causa esse remota rerum singularium nisi forte ea de causa ut scilicet has ab iis quas immediate produxit vel potius quae ex absoluta ejus natura sequuntur, distinguamus. Nam per causam remotam talem intelligimus quae cum effectu nullo modo conjuncta est. At omnia quae sunt in Deo sunt et a Deo ita dependent ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint.
Translated as,
Since certain things must have been produced by God immediately, that is those which follow necessarily from its absolute nature and others by mediation of these first things - which nevertheless can neither be nor be conceived without God had to be produced by the mediation of these first things, it follows: I. because God is absolutely the proximate cause of things produced immediately by itself and not indeed "in its own kind" as they say. For God's effects can neither be nor be conceived without their cause (by P15 and P24C). II. because God cannot properly be called the remote cause of singular things, unless perhaps from that cause so that we may distinguish them from those which [God] has produced immediately or rather which follow from its absolute nature. For by a remote cause we understand one which is not conjoined in any way with its effect. But all things that are, are in God, and so depend on God that they can neither be nor be conceived without it.
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