This appendix is a startling shift from the impersonal, physics, geometry and math-like characteristics of Book I. The role of the appendix appears to answer those who respond negatively to the austerity of the articulations of Book I. Essentially, the appendix is an argument that our responses are based in our cognitive illusions driven by the fact that we are all the center of our own universe. He articulates that it is a tendency for all people to think in this way. Book I, then, is a celebration that the universe is not a subjective fact or an arbitrary universe ruled by irrationality, but is real and perfect on its own terms. If this is true, then the commonality of the universe creates an opportunity for individuals of reason to collaborate and more fully succeed in their endeavors to live a better life through a process of mutual assistance based in reasoning. Spinoza even attempts to address the failure individuals to reason as only apparent but not an intrinsic flaw. The appendix is invaluable as it lists a few common cognitive pitfalls, such as imputing human intent from lack of power to a universe which lacks no power. An extension of this is to attribute as intrinsic characteristics of parts of the universe based on their personal or human usefulness. Spinoza is not denying the usefulness of these terms for human endeavor, but clarifying that these terms are not inherent properties. Here Spinoza highlights the inherent perfection and power of all those things we term good and bad, fragrant and stinky, beautiful and ugly. A response might be, "well, if it's not all about me, then what about me?" For that he, sets out the final three books. However, to answer these questions fully, Spinoza begins by removing the greatest obstacles in a process of "uncover, discover and discard" here in Book I. After all, to live a better life is the purpose of this work as well as Spinoza's other works.
Postquam homines sibi persuaserunt omnia quæ fiunt propter ipsos fieri, id in unaquaque re præcipuum judicare debuerunt quod ipsis utilissimum et illa omnia præstantissima æstimare a quibus optime afficiebantur. Unde has formare debuerunt notiones quibus rerum naturas explicarent scilicet bonum, malum, ordinem, confusionem, calidum, frigidum, pulchritudinem et deformitatem et quia se liberos existimant, inde hæ notiones ortæ sunt scilicet laus et vituperium, peccatum et meritum sed has infra postquam de natura humana egero, illas autem hic breviter explicabo. Nempe id omne quod ad valetudinem et Dei cultum conducit, bonum, quod autem iis contrarium est, malum vocaverunt. Et quia ii qui rerum naturam non intelligunt sed res tantummodo imaginantur, nihil de rebus affirmant et imaginationem pro intellectu capiunt, ideo ordinem in rebus esse firmiter credunt rerum suæque naturæ ignari. Nam cum ita sint dispositæ ut cum nobis per sensus repræsentantur, eas facile imaginari et consequenter earum facile recordari possimus, easdem bene ordinatas, si vero contra, ipsas male ordinatas sive confusas esse dicimus.
Translated as,
After men have persuaded themselves that everything which has happened has been on their account, then in each and every thing they had to judge special what was the most useful to themselves and to estimate all those things as most excellent by they are most favorably affected. From here they formed these notions by which they might explain the nature of things as good, bad, ordered, confused, hot, cold, beautiful and ugly and since they think themselves free, from there these notions have arisen such as praise and blame, sin and merit. [More] about these below after I will have discussed human nature, nonetheless here I will explain those things briefly. Indeed every thing which points to the power and worship of God they call good and, moreover, whatever is contrary to these, they call bad. And because they do not understand what is the nature of things but imagine things in such a way, they affirm nothing about things and take the imagination to be intellect to such a degree that they firmly believe order to be in things of whose nature they are ignorant. For things disposed in such a way that they are represented to us through senses, these are easily imagined and consequently we are able to remember them easily, so we say that these same things are well-ordered, if truly not so, such things are poorly ordered and confused.
Et quoniam ea nobis præ cæteris grata sunt quæ facile imaginari possumus, ideo homines ordinem confusioni præferunt quasi ordo aliquid in natura præter respectum ad nostram imaginationem esset; dicuntque Deum omnia ordine creasse et hoc modo ipsi nescientes Deo imaginationem tribuunt nisi velint forte Deum humanæ imaginationi providentem res omnes eo disposuisse modo quo ipsas facillime imaginari possent; nec moram forsan iis injiciet quod infinita reperiantur quæ nostram imaginationem longe superant et plurima quæ ipsam propter ejus imbecillitatem confundunt. Sed de hac re satis. Cæteræ deinde notiones etiam præter imaginandi modos quibus imaginatio diversimode afficitur, nihil sunt et tamen ab ignaris tanquam præcipua rerum attributa considerantur quia ut jam diximus, res omnes propter ipsos factas esse credunt et rei alicujus naturam bonam vel malam, sanam vel putridam et corruptam dicunt prout ab eadem afficiuntur. Exempli gratia si motus quem nervi ab objectis per oculos repræsentatis accipiunt, valetudini conducat, objecta a quibus causatur pulchra dicuntur, quæ autem contrarium motum cient, deformia.
Translated as,
And since things which we are able to imagine easily are welcome to us before the others, to this degree do men prefer order to confusion as if order might be something in nature with higher regard for our imagination. They say that God created all things by order and in this way they themselves ignorantly attribute to God an imagination unless perhaps they are wishing that God has disposed all things as an aid to the human imagination so that they are able to imagine all those things easily. And it does not put an impediment to [thinking] those things just because infinite things are found which far surpass our imagination and even more things which confound the imagination on account of [the imagination's] feebleness. But enough on this matter. Finally other notions are nothing but take priority as modes for imagining by which the imagination is diversely affected, and further from not knowing things, these [notions] are considered principal characteristics of things since as we have already said, they believe all things on account of being made for them and for such a reason they call nature good or bad, healthy or putrid and corrupt so as they are affected by the same thing. For example, a sensation which they receive by a nerve about objects seen by the eyes, is conducive to health, such objects by which [health] is caused are called beautiful, moreover whatever [objects] put into motion a contrary sensation, they call deformity.
Quæ deinde per nares sensum movent, odorifera vel fætida vocant, quæ per linguam, dulcia aut amara, sapida aut insipida etc. Quæ autem per tactum, dura aut mollia, aspera aut lævia etc. Et quæ denique aures movent, strepitum, sonum vel harmoniam edere dicuntur quorum postremum homines adeo dementavit ut Deum etiam harmonia delectari crederent. Nec desunt philosophi qui sibi persuaserint motus cælestes harmoniam componere. Quæ omnia satis ostendunt unumquemque pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicasse vel potius imaginationis affectiones pro rebus accepisse. Quare non mirum est (ut hoc etiam obiter notemus) quod inter homines tot quot experimur, controversiæ ortæ sint ex quibus tandem scepticismus. Nam quamvis humana corpora in multis conveniant, in plurimis tamen discrepant et ideo id quod uni bonum, alteri malum videtur; quod uni ordinatum, alteri confusum; quod uni gratum, alteri ingratum est et sic de cæteris quibus hic supersedeo cum quia hujus loci non est de his ex professo agere, tum quia hoc omnes satis experti sunt. Omnibus enim in ore est "quot capita tot sensus", "suo quemque sensu abundare", "non minora cerebrorum quam palatorum esse discrimina" : quæ sententiæ satis ostendunt homines pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicare resque potius imaginari quam intelligere. Res enim si intellexissent, illæ omnes teste mathesi, si non allicerent, ad minimum convincerent.
Translated as,
Whatever things move a sensation through the nostrils, they call odiferous or fetid, through the tongue, they call sweet or bitter, savory or insipid etc. Moreover, though touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth etc. And finally whatever things move their ears, are termed to form a crash, a sound or harmony some of whose men, crazed to such a degree, believe that God is even delighted by harmony. And there is not a lack of philosophers who persuade themselves that celestial motion creates harmony. What all of these things reveal enough is that each and every one has judged about matters on behalf of the disposition of the brain or rather accepted the modifications of the imagination on behalf of things. For which reason it is not suprising (as we noted here already in passing) because we experience among as many men as many controversies arise out of which finally there is skepticism. For although human bodies agree in many ways, neverthless in more ways they disagree and to this degree that which is good for one seems bad to another, that which is orderly for one is confused for another, that which is pleasing for one is displeasing for another and in this way concerning the other things which I have covered here since there is no place about these things to do from a profession, so because of this everyone is expert enough. For in all things there is a saying "so many heads, so many opinions," "each is filled with his own opinon," "there are not fewer brains than there are differences of palates." These mottos show clearly enough that man judge matters in terms of the disposition of their brain and imagine things rather than understand them. For if they had understood matters, they might at least convince, if not win over, everyone by the standard of math.
Videmus itaque omnes notiones quibus vulgus solet naturam explicare, modos esse tantummodo imaginandi nec ullius rei naturam sed tantum imaginationis constitutionem indicare et quia nomina habent, quasi essent entium extra imaginationem existentium, eadem entia non rationis sed imaginationis voco atque adeo omnia argumenta quæ contra nos ex similibus notionibus petuntur, facile propulsari possunt. Solent enim multi sic argumentari. Si omnia ex necessitate perfectissimæ Dei naturæ sunt consecuta, unde ergo tot imperfectiones in natura ortæ? Videlicet rerum corruptio ad fætorem usque, rerum deformitas quæ nauseam moveat, confusio, malum, peccatum etc. Sed ut modo dixi, facile confutantur. Nam rerum perfectio ex sola earum natura et potentia est æstimanda nec ideo res magis aut minus perfectæ sunt propterea quod hominum sensum delectant vel offendunt, quod humanæ naturæ conducunt vel quod eidem repugnant. Iis autem qui quærunt cur Deus omnes homines non ita creavit ut solo rationis ductu gubernarentur? nihil aliud respondeo quam quia ei non defuit materia ad omnia ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum creanda vel magis proprie loquendo quia ipsius naturæ leges adeo amplæ fuerunt ut sufficerent ad omnia quæ ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt producenda, ut propositione 16 demonstravi.
Hæc sunt quæ hic notare suscepi præjudicia. Si quædam hujus farinæ adhuc restant, poterunt eadem ab unoquoque mediocri meditatione emendari.
Finis partis primæ.
Thus we see all notions by which the mass is accustomed to explain nature are modes simply for the means of imagination and indicate the nature of nothing but the constitution of the imagination and because they have names, as if they are beings which exist outside the imagination, I claim that the same beings are not of reason but of the imagination and to such an extent all the arguments which divide us out of similar notions, may easily be dismissed. For many are accustomed to argue. If everuthing has followed from the necessity of the highest perfection of the nature of God, then where do all of the imperfections in nature arise? Just as the corruption of things moves toward stench, the deformity of things moves to nausea, confusion to bad, sin, etc. But as I have said in this way they are easily confused. For the perfection of things ought to be calculated as only from the nature and power of these things and not to the degree that a thing is more or less perfect on account of which delight or offend the sense of men, which is conducive to human nature or which is repugnant to it. Moreover to those who seek why God did not create all men so that they are governed only by the guidance of reason? I answer that nothing other than because matter is not lacking for [God] for creating everything from the highest no doubt to the lowest degree of perfection or to speak more properly because the laws of nature are full to such an extent that they suffice for all things produced which are able to be conceived from some infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated in P16.
These are the prejudices which I have undertaken to note here. If any of this residue remains, the same [prejudices] are able to be changed for each with even a mediocre amount of reflection.
The end of part one.
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