In this appendix, Spinoza tries to clarify the cognitive error of final causes. Final causes are useful to humans in the errands of their daily lives, but Spinoza views final causes as errors when ascribed to God. Essentially, a final cause in the case of a human is an idea by which to improve her or his situation. In this way, a final cause indicates some lack or some imperfection in the current situation. For Spinoza, God does not exhibit a lack at any point. Change itself, then, is not the result of the "will of God" in the sense of final cause. Rather change is a manifestation of expressive power as in the sense that "nature abhors a vacuum" - perfection is a push out from rather than a push towards.
His satis explicui id quod primo loco promisi. Ut jam autem ostendam naturam finem nullum sibi præfixum habere et omnes causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta, non opus est multis. Credo enim id jam satis constare tam ex fundamentis et causis unde hoc præjudicium originem suam traxisse ostendi quam ex propositione 16 et corollariis propositionis 32 et præterea ex iis omnibus quibus ostendi omnia naturæ æterna quadam necessitate summaque perfectione procedere. Hoc tamen adhuc addam nempe hanc de fine doctrinam naturam omnino evertere. Nam id quod revera causa est, ut effectum considerat et contra. Deinde id quod natura prius est, facit posterius. Et denique id quod supremum et perfectissimum est, reddit imperfectissimum. Nam (duobus prioribus omissis quia per se manifesta sunt) ut ex propositionibus 21, 22 et 23 constat, ille effectus perfectissimus est qui a Deo immediate producitur et quo aliquid pluribus causis intermediis indiget ut producatur, eo imperfectius est. At si res quæ immediate a Deo productæ sunt, ea de causa factæ essent ut Deus finem assequeretur suum, tum necessario ultimæ quarum de causa priores factæ sunt, omnium præstantissimæ essent. Deinde hæc doctrina Dei perfectionem tollit nam si Deus propter finem agit, aliquid necessario appetit quo caret. Et quamvis theologi et metaphysici distinguant inter finem indigentiæ et finem assimilationis, fatentur tamen Deum omnia propter se, non vero propter res creandas egisse quia nihil ante creationem præter Deum assignare possunt propter quod Deus ageret adeoque necessario fateri coguntur Deum iis propter quæ media parare voluit, caruisse eaque cupivisse, ut per se clarum.
Translated as,
With these [demonstrations], I have explained what I promised in the first place. Moreover, as I may already have shown that nature has no end fixed for itself and all final causes are nothing except human fictions, there is no burden for more [demonstrations]. For I believe that it is already enough that I have shown not only out of what foundations and causes from where this prejudice originated, but I have also shown in P16 and P32C and in other [propositions] that all of nature proceeds by certain eternal necessity and the highest perfection. Nevertheless, I will still add that this teaching concerning final [cause] has certainly turned nature completely upside down. For that which is actually the cause is considered the effect and vice versa. Next that which is prior in nature, [this teaching] makes as posterior. And finally that which is supreme and most perfect, [this teaching] returns as most imperfect. For (omitting the first two [assertions] because they are self-evident) as is known from P22, P23 and P24, that effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God and wherever something requires more intermediate causes for it to be produced, there it is more imperfect. But if things which are immediately produced by God are such things as may be made for the reason so that God achieves [God's] own end, then necessarily the last things, the reason for whose priors were made, would be the most excellent of all. Further this teaching removes the perfection of God for if God were compelled on account of an end, necessarily [God] strives for what [God] lacks. And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between an end of need and an end of assimilation, they nevertheless confess that God did everything on behalf of them, that [God] did not act on account of things to be created because they are able to assign nothing before creation except God for which God might act and so they are necessarily forced to confess that God needs these things on behalf of which he wants to set up means and desires them, as is self-evident.
Nec hic prætereundum est quod hujus doctrinæ sectatores qui in assignandis rerum finibus suum ingenium ostentare voluerunt, ad hanc suam doctrinam probandam novum attulerunt modum argumentandi reducendo scilicet non ad impossibile sed ad ignorantiam, quod ostendit nullum aliud fuisse huic doctrinæ argumentandi medium. Nam si exempli gratia ex culmine aliquo lapis in alicujus caput ceciderit eumque interfecerit, hoc modo demonstrabunt lapidem ad hominem interficiendum cecidisse. Ni enim eum in finem Deo id volente ceciderit, quomodo tot circumstantiæ (sæpe enim multæ simul concurrunt) casu concurrere potuerunt? Respondebis fortasse id ex eo quod ventus flavit et quod homo illac iter habebat, evenisse. At instabunt, cur ventus illo tempore flavit? Cur homo illo eodemque tempore illac iter habebat? Si iterum respondeas ventum tum ortum quia mare præcedenti die tempore adhuc tranquillo agitari inceperat et quod homo ab amico invitatus fuerat, instabunt iterum quia nullus rogandi finis, cur autem mare agitabatur? cur homo in illud tempus invitatus fuit? et sic porro causarum causas rogare non cessabunt donec ad Dei voluntatem hoc est ignorantiæ asylum confugeris. Sic etiam ubi corporis humani fabricam vident, stupescunt et ex eo quod tantæ artis causas ignorant, concludunt eandem non mechanica sed divina vel supernaturali arte fabricari talique modo constitui ut una pars alteram non lædat. Atque hinc fit ut qui miraculorum causas veras quærit quique res naturales ut doctus intelligere, non autem ut stultus admirari studet, passim pro hæretico et impio habeatur et proclametur ab iis quos vulgus tanquam naturæ Deorumque interpretes adorat. Nam sciunt quod sublata ignorantia stupor hoc est unicum argumentandi tuendæque suæ auctoritatis medium quod habent, tollitur. Sed hæc relinquo et ad id quod tertio loco hic agere constitui, pergo.
Translated as,
And this ought to not be disregarded because the followers of this teaching who want to show their own ingenuity in assigning final [causes] of things, they have presented a proof for this teaching of theirs a new method of argument for reduction just as not to the impossible but to ignorance, because it shows that there has been no other means for arguing this teaching. For example, if a stone falls from some height on someone's head and kills him, they demonstrate in this way that the stone has fallen in order to kill the man. For if it did not kill him by the will of God as a final cause, in which way did so many circumstance occur by chance (for oftern many things occure simultaneously)? Perhaps you will reply that it came about from some wind blew and a man travelled there. But they will say, why did the wind blow at that time? Why did that man travel to that place at the same time? If you might respond again that the wind arose then because the sea on the prior day began to stir up from a tranquil time and the man had been invited by a friend, they say again, because there is no end for questions, why then did the sea get agitated? Why was the invitation for the man at that time? And thus in turn they do not quit asking about the causes of causes until you have fled to the will of God, that is the refuge of ignorance. In this way also when they see the fabric of the human body, they are stupified and ignorant out of which causes of such art, they conclude that this same fabric is not of mechanical but divine or fabricated by supernatural arts and by such method I have established that one part does not betray the other. And here it happens that who seeks the true causes of miracles and who seeks to study natural things as a doctor, not moreover eager to admire as a moron, immediately he is held as a heretic and impious one and proclaimed from others whom the crowd adores as if interpreters of nature and Gods. For they know because wonder, that is the unique means for defending their argument and their authority, is dispelled if ignorance is removed. But I leave this and for that which I mean to put here in the third section and I move on.
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