APPENDIX: His Dei naturam ejusque proprietates explicui ut quod necessario existit; quod sit unicus; quod ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate sit et agat; quod sit omnium rerum causa libera et quomodo; quod omnia in Deo sint et ab ipso ita pendeant ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint; et denique quod omnia a Deo fuerint prædeterminata, non quidem ex libertate voluntatis sive absoluto beneplacito sed ex absoluta Dei natura sive infinita potentia. Porro ubicunque data fuit occasio, præjudicia quæ impedire poterant quominus meæ demonstrationes perciperentur, amovere curavi sed quia non pauca adhuc restant præjudicia quæ etiam imo maxime impedire poterant et possunt quominus homines rerum concatenationem eo quo ipsam explicui modo, amplecti possint, eadem hic ad examen rationis vocare operæ pretium duxi. Et quoniam omnia quæ hic indicare suscipio præjudicia pendent ab hoc uno quod scilicet communiter supponant homines omnes res naturales ut ipsos propter finem agere, imo ipsum Deum omnia ad certum aliquem finem dirigere pro certo statuant : dicunt enim Deum omnia propter hominem fecisse, hominem autem ut ipsum coleret. Hoc igitur unum prius considerabo quærendo scilicet primo causam cur plerique hoc in præjudicio acquiescant et omnes natura adeo propensi sint ad idem amplectendum.
Translated as,
In these [propositions], I have explained the nature of God and its properties as that which exists necessarily, as that which is the one and only, as that which is and acts from the sole necessity of its own nature, as that which is the free cause of all things and in what way [it is the free cause], that all things in God depend on [Godself] in such a way that they are unable to be or be conceived without [Godself] and finally that all things are predetermined by God, not indeed from free will or absolute well-being but from the absolute nature and infinite power of God. Further, whenever an occasion might be given, prejudices which might have impeded my demonstrations from being perceived, I have carefully worked to eliminate. But because not just a few prejudices still remain which also might even more greatly (and do) impede men from being able to grasp the sequence of things in the way in which I have explained it, I have led the scrutiny of reason to determine the worth of the work. And because all of the prejudices which I have undertaken to show here depend on this one thing - namely that men have commonly supposed all natural things to be made as they are on account of an end, even more they have established that God itself has fashioned all things for a some specific end for a certain [purpose]: for they say that God has made all things on behalf of man, moreover so that [God] may nurture man. Thus, I consider this one thing before all by seeking the cause why so many acquiesce in this prejudice and all men are by nature inclined to such a degree to think the same way.
Deinde ejusdem falsitatem ostendam et tandem quomodo ex hoc orta sint præjudicia de bono et malo, merito et peccato, laude et vituperio, ordine et confusione, pulchritudine et deformitate et de aliis hujus generis. Verum hæc ab humanæ mentis natura deducere non est hujus loci : satis hic erit si pro fundamento id capiam quod apud omnes debet esse in confesso nempe hoc quod omnes homines rerum causarum ignari nascuntur et quod omnes appetitum habent suum utile quærendi, cujus rei sunt conscii. Ex his enim sequitur primo quod homines se liberos esse opinentur quandoquidem suarum volitionum suique appetitus sunt conscii et de causis a quibus disponuntur ad appetendum et volendum, quia earum sunt ignari nec per somnium cogitant. Sequitur secundo homines omnia propter finem agere videlicet propter utile quod appetunt; unde fit ut semper rerum peractarum causas finales tantum scire expetant et ubi ipsas audiverint, quiescant; nimirum quia nullam habent causam ulterius dubitandi. Sin autem easdem ex alio audire nequeant, nihil iis restat nisi ut ad semet se convertant et ad fines a quibus ipsi ad similia determinari solent, reflectant et sic ex suo ingenio ingenium alterius necessario judicant.
Translated as,
Next I will show the falsity of the same and finally the way in which prejudices arise from this concerning good and bad, merit and sin, praise and blame, order and chaos, beauty and ugliness and others of the same kind. Truly, this is not the place to deduce the nature of the human mind: it will be enough here if, on behalf of [building] a foundation, I will take that which among all men ought without doubt to be in common opinion - that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things and that all men have a desire to seek their own utility, the [desire] for which they are conscious. For from these [assertions] it follows first that men think that they are free since they are conscious of their own desires and appetites and about the causes by which they are moved to desiring and wishing, even though they are ignorant of these [causes] and do not think as though sleeping. Next it follows that men do everything on account of an end just as for the utility which they seek. From this it happens that they always seek to know the final causes of things happening so that when they hear about those things themselves, they are content. Evidently because they have no cause for further doubt. But if, however, they are unable to hear the same [final] causes from another, nothing stands firm for them unless they turn themselves into themselves and for ends by which they themselves are accustomed to determine similar things, they reflect and thus evaluate the innate tendency of another by their own innate tendency.
Porro cum in se et extra se non pauca reperiant media quæ ad suum utile assequendum non parum conducant ut exempli gratia oculos ad videndum, dentes ad masticandum, herbas et animantia ad alimentum, solem ad illuminandum, mare ad alendum pisces, hinc factum ut omnia naturalia tanquam ad suum utile media considerent et quia illa media ab ipsis inventa, non autem parata esse sciunt, hinc causam credendi habuerunt aliquem alium esse qui illa media in eorum usum paraverit. Nam postquam res ut media consideraverunt, credere non potuerunt easdem se ipsas fecisse sed ex mediis quæ sibi ipsi parare solent, concludere debuerunt dari aliquem vel aliquos naturæ rectores humana præditos libertate qui ipsis omnia curaverint et in eorum usum omnia fecerint. Atque horum etiam ingenium quandoquidem de eo nunquam quid audiverant, ex suo judicare debuerunt atque hinc statuerunt Deos omnia in hominum usum dirigere ut homines sibi devinciant et in summo ab iisdem honore habeantur; unde factum ut unusquisque diversos Deum colendi modos ex suo ingenio excogitaverit ut Deus eos supra reliquos diligeret et totam naturam in usum cæcæ illorum cupiditatis et insatiabilis avaritiæ dirigeret.
Translated as,
Next, since they find both in themselves and outside themselves not just a few means which they assemble not just a little for achieving their own usage, for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, plants and animals for food, the sun for illuminating, the sea for nourishing fish, from here it is a fact that they consider all natural things as if [they are] means for their own usage and because they know that those means had been discovered by themselves, and yet had not been prepared [by themselves], from this they had cause for believing that there was someone else who prepared these means for their use. For after they had considered things as means, they were not able to believe that these same things had made themselves but out of means which they themselves are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they must have concluded that someone, or other governors of nature, exists endowed with human independence which may take care of all things for themselves and make everything for their own use. And indeed the character of these [governors], since they never heard from it from anywhere, they must have judged from their own [example] and from this established that Gods configure everything for human use so that they might obligate men to themselves and be held in the highest honor by the same men. From this it is a fact that each and every [man] understands diverse ways for cultivating God from his own character so that God might choose them above all others and might fashion all of nature for the use of their blind desire and insatiable greed.
Atque ita hoc præjudicium in superstitionem versum et altas in mentibus egit radices; quod in causa fuit ut unusquisque maximo conatu omnium rerum causas finales intelligere easque explicare studeret. Sed dum quæsiverunt ostendere naturam nihil frustra (hoc est quod in usum hominum non sit) agere, nihil aliud videntur ostendisse quam naturam Deosque æque ac homines delirare. Vide quæso quo res tandem evasit! Inter tot naturæ commoda non pauca reperire debuerunt incommoda, tempestates scilicet, terræ motus, morbos etc. atque hæc statuerunt propterea evenire quod Dii irati essent ob injurias sibi ab hominibus factas sive ob peccata in suo cultu commissa et quamvis experientia indies reclamaret ac infinitis exemplis ostenderet commoda atque incommoda piis æque ac impiis promiscue evenire, non ideo ab inveterato præjudicio destiterunt : facilius enim iis fuit hoc inter alia incognita quorum usum ignorabant, ponere et sic præsentem suum et innatum statum ignorantiæ retinere quam totam illam fabricam destruere et novam excogitare. Unde pro certo statuerunt Deorum judicia humanum captum longissime superare : quæ sane unica fuisset causa ut veritas humanum genus in æternum lateret nisi mathesis, quæ non circa fines sed tantum circa figurarum essentias et proprietates versatur, aliam veritatis normam hominibus ostendisset et præter mathesin aliæ etiam adsignari possunt causæ (quas hic enumerare supervacaneum est) a quibus fieri potuit ut homines communia hæc præjudicia animadverterent et in veram rerum cognitionem ducerentur.
Translated as,
And in this way prejudice turns into superstition and puts the deepest roots into their minds. Because it was in [this] cause that each and every man was eager with the greatest effort to understand the final causes of all things and to explain them. But as long as they sought to show that nature does nothing in vain (that is because it might not be for the use of men), nothing else seemed to have shown than that nature and the Gods are as crazy as men. Look, I seek in what way the matter has finally turned out! Among so many conveniences of nature they must have discovered not a few inconveniences, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases etc and meanwhile they determined these happened because the Gods were angry on account of injuries to themselves caused by men or on account of sins committed in their own worship and, although experience protested against this daily and with infinite examples showed that conveniences and inconveniences happen indiscriminately to the pious and the impious alike, they did not for that reason abandon their inveterate prejudice. For it was easier for them to place this among other unknowns whose use they did not understand and thus retain their present and innate status of ignorance than to destroy the entire structure and think of something new.
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