Spinoza's Ethics: II.P6: Modes within Attribute

Spinoza is removing the structure which supports the anthropomorphic notion that God makes plans and then executes them. God expresses through maximal power and in the expression of this power modal changes occur. These modal changes occur within a causal chain limited by the power of the attribute. Since modal change is causal simultaneously (although expression may manifest non simultaneously) within different attributes, we may have an impression of an idea through an object, but that impression is not the power of expression of extending, but the power of expression of thinking. The power of expression must occur only within the attribute. 

Cujuscunque attributi modi Deum quatenus tantum sub illo attributo cujus modi sunt et non quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, pro causa habent.

Translated as,

The modes of whatsoever attribute have God as cause insofar as it [God] is considered only under that attribute of which they are modes and not insofar as under any other [attribute].

Demonstratio: Unumquodque enim attributum per se absque alio concipitur (per propositionem 10 partis I). Quare uniuscujusque attributi modi conceptum sui attributi, non autem alterius involvunt adeoque (per axioma 4 partis I) Deum quatenus tantum sub illo attributo cujus modi sunt et non quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, pro causa habent. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For each and every attribute is conceived through itself and away from another (by IP10). For that reason the modes of each and every attribute have the concept of their own attribute as cause, moreover they [the modes] do not involve [the attribute] of another to the extent (by IPA4) that they have God as cause insofar as it [God] is considered only under that attribute of which they are modes and not insofar as under any other attribute.

Corollarium: Hinc sequitur quod esse formale rerum quæ modi non sunt cogitandi, non sequitur ideo ex divina natura quia res prius cognovit sed eodem modo eademque necessitate res ideatæ ex suis attributis consequuntur et concluduntur ac ideas ex attributo cogitationis consequi ostendimus.

Translated as,

Here it follows that the formal essence of things which are not thinking modes, does not follow so much from divine nature because it [divine nature] has known the things before but in the same mode and by the same necessity that the things ideated follow and are concluded from their own attributes as we show that the ideas follow from the attribute of thinking.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P5: Formal Essence of Ideas

This proposition is difficult. Aristotle outlined four causes: material, efficient, formal and final. Part of Spinoza's genius is to clearly identify final cause as a human-based mental tool that is useful but illusion-generating. Final cause is not a true cause.

The other three causes remain components of Spinoza's heavily cause-effect understanding. As it relates to ideas, the material cause is the specific content of an idea, the efficient cause is God as substance and the formal cause of ideas, or formal essence of ideas here, is God expressing that efficient causality within the attribute of thinking. The formal essence of ideas is only within the attribute of thinking. 

The distinction is subtle but important. Ideas sometimes represent objects and sometimes ideas do not represent objects. This is addressed in II.A3. Thus, the ideas are materially different. However, all of them are formally ideas. The shared sense in which an idea is an idea is the formal essence or formal cause of the idea and this itself is also considered a mode of thinking (a small third category of ideas - the "idea of an idea").

The difficulty here is that the formal cause within Aristotle is typically tied to what we consider the idea of the object. While Spinoza has a one-to-one connection between an idea and its modal cause, the one-to-one connection is not about the object. As a result, the formal cause or essence of an idea is different than that found in Aristotle.

Language note: Most translators render God as subject of consideratur or "is considered." As mentioned in the Language note in II.A1, the subject of is considered is the nominative singular res cogitans or "thinking aspect."  The correct rendering allows a natural translation of explicatur or "be explained" to have esse formale or "formal essence" as the subject.

Esse formale idearum Deum quatenus tantum ut res cogitans consideratur, pro causa agnoscit et non quatenus alio attributo explicatur. Hoc est tam Dei attributorum quam rerum singularium ideæ non ipsa ideata sive res perceptas pro causa efficiente agnoscunt sed ipsum Deum quatenus est res cogitans.

Translated as,

The formal essence of ideas acknowledges God as cause insofar as only the thinking aspect [of God] is considered, and not insofar as it [the formal essence] is explained by some other attribute. That is, ideas just as much of the attributes of God as of singular things acknowledge as their efficient cause not the ideations themselves or things perceived but God itself insofar as it is the thinking aspect [of God].

Demonstratio: Patet quidem ex propositione 3 hujus. Ibi enim concludebamus Deum ideam suæ essentiæ et omnium quæ ex ea necessario sequuntur, formare posse ex hoc solo nempe quod Deus est res cogitans et non ex eo quod sit suæ ideæ objectum. Quare esse formale idearum Deum quatenus est res cogitans, pro causa agnoscit. Sed aliter hoc modo demonstratur. Esse formale idearum modus est cogitandi (ut per se notum) hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 25 partis I) modus qui Dei naturam quatenus est res cogitans, certo modo exprimit adeoque (per propositionem 10 partis I) nullius alterius attributi Dei conceptum involvit et consequenter (per axioma 4 partis I) nullius alterius attributi nisi cogitationis est effectus adeoque esse formale idearum Deum quatenus tantum ut res cogitans consideratur etc. Q.E.D. 

Translated as,

Indeed it is clear from IIP3. For there we concluded that God is able to form the idea of its essence and all things which necessarily follow from [the idea of its essence] from this alone, namely, because God is a thinking thing and not from that which might be the object of its [God's] idea. Therefore the formal essence of ideas acknowledges God as cause insofar as it [God] is a thinking thing. But otherwise in this way it is demonstrated. The formal essence of ideas is a mode of thinking (as noted through itself) that is (by IP25C) a mode which expresses in a certain way the nature of God insofar as it is the thinking aspect, to such an extent (by IP10) that it [the mode of thinking] involves the concept of no other attribute of God and consequently (by IP4) is the effect of no other attribute unless of thinking to the degree that the formal essence of ideas [acknowledges] God [as cause] insofar as only the thinking aspect is considered, etc.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P4: Uniqueness

These propositions continue to work through the mind of God as opposed to the axioms which focus on the mind of humans. Here Spinoza seems to create arguments similar to those which established one God because only one substance exists. Spinoza argues that only one mind of God exists because only it comprehends all that exists.

It is relevant to consider within this uniqueness is God as Knowing as opposed to thinking thing. Thinking thing is a function of modes while God as Knowing is substance.

Idea Dei ex qua infinita infinitis modis sequuntur, unica tantum esse potest.

Translated as,

The idea of God from which infinite things follow by infinite modes is able to be to such a degree unique.

Demonstratio: Intellectus infinitus nihil præter Dei attributa ejusque affectiones comprehendit (per propositionem 30 partis I). Atqui Deus est unicus (per corollarium I propositionis 14 partis I). Ergo idea Dei ex qua infinita infinitis modis sequuntur, unica tantum esse potest. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

The infinite understanding comprehends nothing besides the attributes of God and its modifications (by IP30). And God is unique (by IP14C). Therefore the idea of God from which infinite things follow by infinite modes is able to be to such a degree unique.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P3: Idea of God

In this proposition, Spinoza moves from the idea of God's essence in the same strict conceptual form as outlined in the first section to the mistaken ideas of God's power that humans hold. He weaves back and forth between the two in a way that is not as logically formal as prior sections. Spinoza is trying to bring the reader out of the some bad habits of mind while introducing new concepts about the mind of God. A difficult task at all times. It is also interesting to read about the different words for power that Spinoza uses here. Potestas is a ruling power, while potentia is an emergent power and my translations here do not (yet) specify a difference.

In Deo datur necessario idea tam ejus essentiæ quam omnium quæ ex ipsius essentia necessario sequuntur.

Translated as,

In God there necessarily exists the idea of its essence as much as of everything which necessarily follows from its essence.

Demonstratio: Deus enim (per propositionem 1 hujus) infinita infinitis modis cogitare sive (quod idem est per propositionem 16 partis I) ideam suæ essentiæ et omnium quæ necessario ex ea sequuntur, formare potest. Atqui omne id quod in Dei potestate est, necessario est (per propositionem 35 partis I); ergo datur necessario talis idea et (per propositionem 15 partis I) non nisi in Deo. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For God (by IIP1) is able to think infinite things by infinite modes or (what is the same by IP16) to form the idea of its essence and everything which necessarily follows from it. And everything which is in the power of God is so by necessity (by IP35). Therefore such idea necessarily exists and (by IP15) not unless [it exists] in God.

Scholium: Vulgus per Dei potentiam intelligit Dei liberam voluntatem et jus in omnia quæ sunt quæque propterea communiter ut contingentia considerantur. Deum enim potestatem omnia destruendi habere dicunt et in nihilum redigendi. Dei porro potentiam cum potentia regum sæpissime comparant. Sed hoc in corollario I et II propositionis 32 partis I refutavimus et propositione 16 partis I ostendimus Deum eadem necessitate agere qua seipsum intelligit hoc est sicuti ex necessitate divinæ naturæ sequitur (sicut omnes uno ore statuunt) ut Deus seipsum intelligat, eadem etiam necessitate sequitur ut Deus infinita infinitis modis agat. Deinde propositione 34 partis I ostendimus Dei potentiam nihil esse præterquam Dei actuosam essentiam adeoque tam nobis impossibile est concipere Deum non agere quam Deum non esse. Porro si hæc ulterius persequi liberet, possem hic etiam ostendere potentiam illam quam vulgus Deo affingit, non tantum humanam esse (quod ostendit Deum hominem vel instar hominis a vulgo concipi) sed etiam impotentiam involvere. Sed nolo de eadem re toties sermonem instituere. Lectorem solummodo iterum atque iterum rogo ut quæ in prima parte ex propositione 16 usque ad finem de hac re dicta sunt, semel atque iterum perpendat. Nam nemo ea quæ volo percipere recte poterit nisi magnopere caveat ne Dei potentiam cum humana regum potentia vel jure confundat.

Translated as,

The general public understands by [the term] power of God to be free will and law in all things which are, which things, as a result, are commonly considered as contingent things. For they say that God has the power to destroy all things and to reduce into nothingness. Again they most often compare the power of God with the power of kings. But we refute this in IP32C1 and 2 and we show in IP16 that God understands with the same necessity by which God does things, that is just as it also follows from the necessity of divine nature (as all declare with one mouth) that God understands Godself, so it also follows from the same necessity that God does infinite things in infinite modes. Then we show in IP34 that the power of God is nothing other than the active essence of God to such an extent that it is just as impossible for us to conceive that God is not doing [something] as it is [for us to conceive] that God is not existing. Next if it is permitted to follow these things further, I might also be able to show here that that power which the general public ascribes to God, to be not only human [power] (which shows God to be conceived as human or in human likeness by the general public) but also involves impotence. But I do not wish to make a lecture so many times concerning the same thing. I only ask again and again that the reader weigh over and over what has been said in the first part from IP16 to the end concerning these things. For no one might be able to correctly perceive thing which I wish unless taking great care lest the power of God is confused with human power or law of kings.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P2: God as Extending Thing

In reading this proposition from the Latin only, I realize that most translators have designated God's attributes as the attribute of thought and the attribute of extension. However, in Latin the sense is more active and expressive. The attributes seem better translated as the attribute of thinking and the attribute of extending. In the Latin and I believe a better understanding of Spinoza, there is no moment of non-activity in God.

Extensio attributum Dei est sive Deus est res extensa.

Translated as,

Extending is an attribute of God or God is an extending thing.

Demonstratio: Hujus eodem modo procedit ac demonstratio præcedentis propositionis.

Translated as,

Demonstration: The demonstration of this proceeds in the same way as the demonstration of the preceding proposition.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P1: God as Thinking Thing

Here Spinoza has shifted back out of the human focus in the definitions and axioms to God as a starting point in the propositions. His demonstration starts with singular thoughts which clearly exist. He relies on prior proofs to establish the nature of a singular thought as an expression of God. From here he moves to the attribute of God which is a conceptual grouping of perceived things that are expressions of God. His scholia are typically helpful, but this one is unusual. Spinoza basically relies on what is logical, but borders on an imagination - one of an infinite thinking being. 

A useful way to understand thinking thing is to use a term like consciousness or awareness which does not reference intentionality. God has feelings that have no reactivity because these "feelings" are devoid of the reactivity of inadequate ideas. God as thinking thing would be easier understood as God as feeling thing, but we tend to describe feelings around their affects. When the affect is removed, but the idea remains, that is the neutral state of feeling or thinking (which are the same) here.

Cogitatio attributum Dei est sive Deus est res cogitans.

Translated as,

Thinking is an attribute of God or God is a thinking thing.

Demonstratio: Singulares cogitationes sive hæc et illa cogitatio modi sunt qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo exprimunt (per corollarium propositionis 25 partis I). Competit ergo Deo (per definitionem 5 partis I) attributum cujus conceptum singulares omnes cogitationes involvunt, per quod etiam concipiuntur. Est igitur cogitatio unum ex infinitis Dei attributis quod Dei æternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit (vide definitionem 6 partis I) sive Deus est res cogitans. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

Singular thoughts, whether this or that thought, are modes which express the nature of God in a certain and determinate mode (by IP25C). Thus, the attribute [of thinking] agrees with God (by ID5) whose concept involves all singular thoughts, through which [attribute] they are also conceived. Therefore thinking is one [attribute] from infinite attributes of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of God (see ID6) or God is a thinking thing.

Scholium: Patet etiam hæc propositio ex hoc quod nos possumus ens cogitans infinitum concipere. Nam quo plura ens cogitans potest cogitare, eo plus realitatis sive perfectionis idem continere concipimus; ergo ens quod infinita infinitis modis cogitare potest, est necessario virtute cogitandi infinitum. Cum itaque ad solam cogitationem attendendo Ens infinitum concipiamus, est necessario (per definitiones 4 et 6 partis I) cogitatio unum ex infinitis Dei attributis, ut volebamus.

Translated as,

This proposition is also evident from the fact that we are able to conceive an infinite thinking being. For the more things a thinking being is able to think, the more reality or perfection we conceive the same [being] to contain. Thus, a being which is able to think infinite things in infinite modes is necessarily infinite by the power of thinking. Thus to the degree that we might conceive an infinite Being by attending only to thought, thought is necessarily one [attribute] (by IP4 and IP6) from infinite attributes of God, as we meant.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.A5: Human Limits

Here Spinoza outlines the limits of human faculties. These axioms continue to address a human mind (as opposed to the mind of God). Further, Spinoza continues with sentimus or "feeling" and percipimus or "perceiving" as cogitandi modos or "modes of thinking." When it comes to "feeling," an object or a body must be involved. This "feeling" may be removed but the idea remains - a state that leads to "perceiving."

The add-on about checking later postulates seems irregular as Spinoza typically builds in a geometric fashion. I suspect that either this was a note to be adjusted later or it was added at a later dated for clarification.

Nullas res singulares præter corpora et cogitandi modos sentimus nec percipimus. Postulata vide post 13 propositionem.

Translated as,

We neither feel nor perceive any singular things except bodies and modes of thinking. See postulates after IIP13.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.A4: Body

Spinoza sets as axiomatic that the body is experienced as a unity, as a certain one thing. The body is a mode of extending (II.D1) and is a composite of many parts but identified as a singular thing (II.D7).

The mode of the body as a thinking thing is expressed here as feeling. Feelings are a part of the mind not of the brain. Typically we are accustomed to view the feelings are part of our physical selves and our thoughts as part of our mental selves. Not so for Spinoza. Feelings are thoughts which are part of the attribute of thinking. This is a crucial distinction. 

Our physical body is a mode which is made up of and affected by many modes within the attribute of extending. Similarly the mind experiences the body within the attribute of thinking as made up of and affected by many modes. These sometimes diverse and contrarian parts are felt through the unifying experience of the body. As a result, it is clear that problems of confusion arise. For example, Catullus famously writes odi et amo to describe an experience of such confusion.

Nos corpus quoddam multis modis affici sentimus.

Translated as,

We feel the body as a certain thing which is affected by many modes.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.A3: Affects

Spinoza precedes A3 with A2 - that humans think. Here in A3, he begins discussing modes of thinking with what we call "feelings." Spinoza posits that affectus or what I am translating as "change" is a thinking mode. The "changes" described here occur due to representational modes of thinking or "ideas." In this framework, "John loves Mary" means that "John has a mode of thinking which is a change or affectus due to a mode of thinking which is a representation thought or idea of Mary." Both terms - affectus or "changes"  and ideae or "ideas" indicate modes of thinking but one is of variation and the other is of representation. Further, variation cannot exist without representation.

Language note: Affectus is the same term for different noun cases and numbers. It can be nominative or genitive singular as well as nominative or accusative plural. This adds to the general translation challenges presented by Latin's lack of definite and indefinite articles. Here Spinoza is using the genitive singular to indicate a genitive of description in "name of change."

Our popular usage splits "feelings" from "thoughts." We view "feelings" as emotional reactions of our hearts, while we view "thoughts" as activities of our minds. Spinoza considers both of these concepts of feelings and thoughts as modes of thinking. He does indicate that a "change" modes of thinking must be accompanied by an "idea" mode of thinking. This introduces a tool of the mind: by removing the idea of a thing, one is able to remove the related change. This "out of sight, out of mind" approach is helpful as some changes can be troubling to an individual.

Conversely, an individual may have an "idea" mode of thinking but not have an accompanying change mode of thinking. This indicates that the idea itself may be present without triggering a change. Using the example above, it is possible for John to have a mode of thinking which is a representational thought or idea of Mary without a related mode of thinking that is a change or affectus." If the idea of Mary is troubling to John but he is not able to use an "out of sight, out of mind" approach, then he may seek to find way to have the idea of Mary without such idea causing a change.

Modi cogitandi ut amor, cupiditas vel quicunque nomine affectus animi insigniuntur, non dantur nisi in eodem individuo detur idea rei amatæ, desideratæ etc. At idea dari potest quamvis nullus alius detur cogitandi modus. 

Translated as,

Modes of thinking are designated by the name of a change of mind such as love, desire or whatsoever, are not given unless the idea of the thing loved, desired etc is given in the same individual. But the idea [of the thing loved, desired etc.] may exist although no other mode of thinking exists.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.A2: Human Thought

Again, it is remarkable that this qualifies as an axiom. By building on Book I, Spinoza could have created a proposition that extended God through the attribute of thought to humans as modally expressing thought. But he did not. Spinoza is building the shortest road to "blessedness" and for this reason I believe that he wants to focus on what interests us the most: us.

Homo cogitat.

Translated as,

A human thinks.