Spinoza's Ethics: II.P3: Idea of God

In this proposition, Spinoza moves from the idea of God's essence in the same strict conceptual form as outlined in the first section to the mistaken ideas of God's power that humans hold. He weaves back and forth between the two in a way that is not as logically formal as prior sections. Spinoza is trying to bring the reader out of the some bad habits of mind while introducing new concepts about the mind of God. A difficult task at all times. It is also interesting to read about the different words for power that Spinoza uses here. Potestas is a ruling power, while potentia is an emergent power and my translations here do not (yet) specify a difference.

In Deo datur necessario idea tam ejus essentiæ quam omnium quæ ex ipsius essentia necessario sequuntur.

Translated as,

In God there necessarily exists the idea of its essence as much as of everything which necessarily follows from its essence.

Demonstratio: Deus enim (per propositionem 1 hujus) infinita infinitis modis cogitare sive (quod idem est per propositionem 16 partis I) ideam suæ essentiæ et omnium quæ necessario ex ea sequuntur, formare potest. Atqui omne id quod in Dei potestate est, necessario est (per propositionem 35 partis I); ergo datur necessario talis idea et (per propositionem 15 partis I) non nisi in Deo. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For God (by IIP1) is able to think infinite things by infinite modes or (what is the same by IP16) to form the idea of its essence and everything which necessarily follows from it. And everything which is in the power of God is so by necessity (by IP35). Therefore such idea necessarily exists and (by IP15) not unless [it exists] in God.

Scholium: Vulgus per Dei potentiam intelligit Dei liberam voluntatem et jus in omnia quæ sunt quæque propterea communiter ut contingentia considerantur. Deum enim potestatem omnia destruendi habere dicunt et in nihilum redigendi. Dei porro potentiam cum potentia regum sæpissime comparant. Sed hoc in corollario I et II propositionis 32 partis I refutavimus et propositione 16 partis I ostendimus Deum eadem necessitate agere qua seipsum intelligit hoc est sicuti ex necessitate divinæ naturæ sequitur (sicut omnes uno ore statuunt) ut Deus seipsum intelligat, eadem etiam necessitate sequitur ut Deus infinita infinitis modis agat. Deinde propositione 34 partis I ostendimus Dei potentiam nihil esse præterquam Dei actuosam essentiam adeoque tam nobis impossibile est concipere Deum non agere quam Deum non esse. Porro si hæc ulterius persequi liberet, possem hic etiam ostendere potentiam illam quam vulgus Deo affingit, non tantum humanam esse (quod ostendit Deum hominem vel instar hominis a vulgo concipi) sed etiam impotentiam involvere. Sed nolo de eadem re toties sermonem instituere. Lectorem solummodo iterum atque iterum rogo ut quæ in prima parte ex propositione 16 usque ad finem de hac re dicta sunt, semel atque iterum perpendat. Nam nemo ea quæ volo percipere recte poterit nisi magnopere caveat ne Dei potentiam cum humana regum potentia vel jure confundat.

Translated as,

The general public understands by [the term] power of God to be free will and law in all things which are, which things, as a result, are commonly considered as contingent things. For they say that God has the power to destroy all things and to reduce into nothingness. Again they most often compare the power of God with the power of kings. But we refute this in IP32C1 and 2 and we show in IP16 that God understands with the same necessity by which God does things, that is just as it also follows from the necessity of divine nature (as all declare with one mouth) that God understands Godself, so it also follows from the same necessity that God does infinite things in infinite modes. Then we show in IP34 that the power of God is nothing other than the active essence of God to such an extent that it is just as impossible for us to conceive that God is not doing [something] as it is [for us to conceive] that God is not existing. Next if it is permitted to follow these things further, I might also be able to show here that that power which the general public ascribes to God, to be not only human [power] (which shows God to be conceived as human or in human likeness by the general public) but also involves impotence. But I do not wish to make a lecture so many times concerning the same thing. I only ask again and again that the reader weigh over and over what has been said in the first part from IP16 to the end concerning these things. For no one might be able to correctly perceive thing which I wish unless taking great care lest the power of God is confused with human power or law of kings.