The first thing to understand about this proposition is that Latin is notoriously challenged by a lack of a definite or indefinite article. As a result, this proposition is often translated generically, but given Latin's vagueness and Spinoza's focus on singularity, I think it appropriate to be specific. The essence of God does not pertain to a specific human, rather than to humankind as most translators render it.
In the demonstration, Spinoza builds on the understanding that the essence of substance is existence. Here he refers to necessary existence. In this, he argues that a human clearly does not qualify. Of course, a human can and does exist. Yet Spinoza argues that such existence is not necessary. This necessity is different than our common understanding because Spinoza is not referring to a necessity that is compelled from the outside. In this, a human existence may actually be understood as necessary. Rather, Spinoza is discussing necessary as that without which nothing else functions. The necessity of substance is that nothing else functions without it; here a human is easily understood as unnecessary.
In the scholium, Spinoza moves from the essence of a human to the form of a human. By doing so, Spinoza equates the form of a human to the essence of a human. The essence of a human, then, is unrelated to its existence but is a formal singularity.
In the corollary, Spinoza connects the essence of a human or the formal singularity to a specific modification of substance. In the connected demonstration, he describes this specific modification as in God and unable to be without God. For understanding (although there are some limits here), I think of how waves function within the ocean. Waves are in and of the ocean and are certainly singular, but yet they do not form the essence or necessary existence of the ocean.
Finally, Spinoza embarks on a difficult scholium. In this scholium he takes aim at two arguments which are inconsistent among themselves. The first argument is that the essence of a human pertains to the essence of God. In this Spinoza is simply focused on the logic that God can and does exist without a human but the converse is not true. The second argument is the essence of a human can exist without God. For Spinoza this is clearly flawed. But the argument does get more laborious. In his argumentation, Spinoza does clearly establish a couple of things. One, a human is nothing more than what a friend of mine says "a pimple on God's butt." Second, modifications of substance are what substance or God does. It appears that while modifications themselves are transitory that modifying substance is the core of God's expressiveness and thus, modifying is fundamental to existence. Modifications come from modifying but modifying doesn't come from somewhere. Instead, modifying is the essence of substance.Ad essentiam hominis non pertinet esse substantiæ sive substantia formam hominis non constituit.
Translated as,
It does not pertain to the essence of a human to be of [the essence of] substance or substance does not constitute the form of a human.
DEMONSTRATIO: Esse enim substantiæ involvit necessariam existentiam (per propositionem 7 partis I). Si igitur ad hominis essentiam pertineret esse substantiæ, data ergo substantia, daretur necessario homo (per definitionem 2 hujus) et consequenter homo necessario existeret, quod (per axioma 1 hujus) est absurdum. Ergo etc. Q.E.D.
Translated as,
For to be of [the essence of] substance involves necessary existence (by IP7). So if it were to pertain to the essence of a human to be of [the essence of] substance, then when substance is given, a human would necessarily be given (by IID2) and consequently a human would necessarily exist, which (by IIA1) is absurd. Therefore, etc.
SCHOLIUM: Demonstratur etiam hæc propositio ex propositione 5 partis I nempe quod duæ ejusdem naturæ substantiæ non dentur. Cum autem plures homines existere possint, ergo id quod hominis formam constituit, non est esse substantiæ. Patet præterea hæc propositio ex reliquis substantiæ proprietatibus videlicet quod substantia sit sua natura infinita, immutabilis, indivisibilis etc. ut facile unusquisque videre potest.
Translated as,
So this proposition is shown from IP5 of course since two substances of the same nature may not be given. Since moreover more humans are able to exist, thus that which constitutes the form of a human is not able to be of [the essence of] substance. It is clear on account of this proposition from the other properties of substance just as because substance is by its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible etc. so that one is able to easily see it as unique.
COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur essentiam hominis constitui a certis Dei attributorum modificationibus.
Translated as,
From this it follows that the essence of a human is constituted by certain modifications of attributes of God.
DEMONSTRATIO: Nam esse substantiæ (per propositionem præcedentem) ad essentiam hominis non pertinet. Est ergo (per propositionem 15 partis I) aliquid quod in Deo est et quod sine Deo nec esse nec concipi potest sive (per corollarium propositionis 25 partis I) affectio sive modus qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo exprimit.
Translated as,
For to be of [the essence] of substance (by IIP10) does not pertain to the essence of a human. Thus it is (by IP15) whatever which is in God and which can neither be nor be conceived without God (by IP25C) is a modification or mode which expresses the nature of God in a certain and determinate way.
SCHOLIUM: Omnes sane concedere debent nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi posse. Nam apud omnes in confesso est quod Deus omnium rerum tam earum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ unica est causa hoc est Deus non tantum est causa rerum secundum fieri ut aiunt sed etiam secundum esse. At interim plerique id ad essentiam alicujus rei pertinere dicunt sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest adeoque vel naturam Dei ad essentiam rerum creatarum pertinere vel res creatas sine Deo vel esse vel concipi posse credunt vel quod certius est, sibi non satis constant. Cujus rei causam fuisse credo quod ordinem philosophandi non tenuerint. Nam naturam divinam quam ante omnia contemplari debebant quia tam cognitione quam natura prior est, ordine cognitionis ultimam et res quæ sensuum objecta vocantur, omnibus priores esse crediderunt; unde factum est ut dum res naturales contemplati sunt, de nulla re minus cogitaverint quam de divina natura et cum postea animum ad divinam naturam contemplandum appulerint, de nulla re minus cogitare potuerint quam de primis suis figmentis quibus rerum naturalium cognitionem superstruxerant; utpote quæ ad cognitionem divinæ naturæ nihil juvare poterant adeoque nihil mirum si sibi passim contradixerint. Sed hoc mitto. Nam meum intentum hic tantum fuit causam reddere cur non dixerim id ad essentiam alicujus rei pertinere sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest; nimirum quia res singulares non possunt sine Deo esse nec concipi et tamen Deus ad earum essentiam non pertinet sed id necessario essentiam alicujus rei constituere dixi quo dato, res ponitur et quo sublato, res tollitur vel id sine quo res et vice versa id quod sine re nec esse nec concipi potest.
Translated as,
Everyone ought to sanely concede that nothing is able to be or be conceived without God. For all are in agreement that God is the unique cause of all things just as much of their essence as of their existence, that is, God is not only the cause of things according to their happening as they say but also according to their existing. But meanwhile most say that it pertains to the essence of something without which a thing is able to neither be nor be conceived to such a degree that they believe that either the nature of God pertains to the essence of created things or that created things are able to be or be conceived without God or what is more certain, they are not consistent enough for themselves. I believe that the cause of which thing has been that they have not held the order for philosophizing. For the divine nature, which is before all things, they ought to have contemplated [first] because it is prior as much by cognition as by nature, [this divine nature] they have believed that it is final by order of cognition and that things are prior (to everything else) which are called objects of feelings. From where it is a fact that as long as natural things are contemplated, about nothing have they thought less than about divine nature and since after they named the spirit for contemplating divine nature, about nothing less have they been able to think than about their own first fictions by which they have build out an understanding of natural things. In as much as which things are able to help nothing for the understanding of divine nature to such an extent that nothing is a wonder if they contradict themselves throughout. But I dismiss this. For my only intention here was to give the cause why I did not speak about what pertains to the essence of whatever thing without which a thing is able to neither be nor be conceived; no doubt because singular things are not able to be nor be conceived without God and nevertheless God does not pertain to the essence of things but I have said that it necessarily constitutes the essence of each thing by which given, the thing is placed and by which removed, the thing is removed or that without which the thing is and vice versa that which without which thing the thing is neither able to be nor be conceived.
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