Spinoza's Ethics: Composite Bodies

This discussion on composite bodies would seem more appropriate to Book I with respect to modes. Yet, Spinoza delves into this issue as he is addressing the concept that the mind is the idea of the body. His prior proposition articulates that the body is the object of the mind. So he explores the basic operation of simple and composite bodies so that the ideation of the mind is more clear. The patterns described here are the fundamentals that give rise to thought. The mind's operation is based on an understanding of the operating principles of the composite bodies which form the body that is the object of the mind. This "understanding" includes such things as sensation and emotion.  

DEFINITIO: Cum corpora aliquot ejusdem aut diversæ magnitudinis a reliquis ita coercentur ut invicem incumbant vel si eodem aut diversis celeritatis gradibus moventur ut motus suos invicem certa quadam ratione communicent, illa corpora invicem unita dicemus et omnia simul unum corpus sive individuum componere quod a reliquis per hanc corporum unionem distinguitur.

Translated as,

When some bodies of the same or of diverse magnitudes are forced by the other [bodies] so that they lay on one another or if they are moved by the same or by varying degrees of speed so that they communicate their own motions to each other by some fixed means, we say that those bodies are united with each other and that everything at the same time makes up one body or individual which is distinguished from others by this union of bodies.

AXIOMA III: Quo partes individui vel corporis compositi secundum majores vel minores superficies sibi invicem incumbunt, eo difficilius vel facilius cogi possunt ut situm suum mutent et consequenter eo difficilius vel facilius effici potest ut ipsum individuum aliam figuram induat. Atque hinc corpora quorum partes secundum magnas superficies invicem incumbunt, dura, quorum autem partes secundum parvas, mollia et quorum denique partes inter se moventur, fluida vocabo.

Translated as,

As parts of an individual or composite body lay in line with larger or smaller surfaces among each other, so they are able to be compelled with difficulty or ease so as to change their place and consequently are able to be effected with difficulty or ease that the individual itself is led to another shape. And from here bodies whose parts lay on large surfaces among each other, are hard, moreover those whose parts in line with small [surfaces], are soft and whose parts are moved from all sides among themselves, I will call fluid.

LEMMA IV: Si corporis sive individui quod ex pluribus corporibus componitur, quædam corpora segregentur et simul totidem alia ejusdem naturæ eorum loco succedant, retinebit individuum suam naturam uti antea absque ulla ejus formæ mutatione.

Translated as,

If something of a body or an individual is composed from more bodies, certain bodies are separated and at the same time as many others of the same nature follow in place of them, it [the body] will retain its individual nature as before without any change of its form.

DEMONSTRATIO: Corpora enim (per lemma 1) ratione substantiæ non distinguuntur; id autem quod formam individui constituit, in corporum unione (per definitionem præcedentem) consistit; atqui hæc (per hypothesin) tametsi corporum continua fiat mutatio, retinetur : retinebit ergo individuum tam ratione substantiæ quam modi suam naturam uti ante. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For bodies (by IIL1) are not distinguished by reason of substance; moreover that which constitutes the form of the individual, consists in a union of bodies (by preceding definition); and so this [union] (by hypothesis) is retained as if a continuous change of bodies occurred. Therefore it will retain the individuality not only by reason of substance but also due to its own nature of the mode as before.

LEMMA V : Si partes individuum componentes majores minoresve evadant, ea tamen proportione ut omnes eandem ut antea ad invicem motus et quietis rationem servent, retinebit itidem individuum suam naturam ut antea absque ulla formæ mutatione.

Translated as,

If the parts composing an individual become either more or less, nevertheless by that proportion so that all might save the same ratio as before for movement and rest, it [body] will retain likewise its same individual nature as before without any change of form.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hujus eadem est ac præcedentis lemmatis.

Translated as,

The demonstration of this is the same as of the preceding lemma.

LEMMA VI: Si corpora quædam individuum componentia motum quem versus unam partem habent, aliam versus flectere cogantur at ita ut motus suos continuare possint atque invicem eadem qua antea ratione communicare, retinebit itidem individuum suam naturam absque ulla formæ mutatione.

Translated as,

If certain bodies composing an individual have motion which turns one part, [and] they [certain bodies] are compelled to bend against another and so are able to continue their movements and communicate among each other as before, then it [the individual] will retain likewise its own individual nature without any change of form.

DEMONSTRATIO: Per se patet. Id enim omne retinere supponitur quod in ejusdem definitione formam ipsius constituere diximus.

Translated as,

This is clear by itself. For it is supposed to retain everything which in its same definition that we said constitutes its form.

LEMMA VII: Retinet præterea individuum sic compositum suam naturam sive id secundum totum moveatur sive quiescat sive versus hanc sive versus illam partem moveatur dummodo unaquæque pars motum suum retineat eumque uti antea reliquis communicet.

Translated as,

Besides an individual thus composed retains its own nature whether it is moved all together or it is resting or this or that part is moved as long as each and every part retains its own motion and communicates this [motion] to the remaining parts as before.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet ex ipsius definitione, quam vide ante lemma 4.

Translated as,

It is clear from the definition of itself, on which see IIL4 above.

SCHOLIUM: His itaque videmus qua ratione individuum compositum possit multis modis affici, ejus nihilominus natura servata. Atque hucusque individuum concepimus quod non nisi ex corporibus quæ solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate inter se distinguuntur hoc est quod ex corporibus simplicissimis componitur. Quod si jam aliud concipiamus ex pluribus diversæ naturæ individuis compositum, idem pluribus aliis modis posse affici reperiemus, ipsius nihilominus natura servata. Nam quandoquidem ejus unaquæque pars ex pluribus corporibus est composita, poterit ergo (per lemma præcedens) unaquæque pars absque ulla ipsius naturæ mutatione jam tardius jam celerius moveri et consequenter motus suos citius vel tardius reliquis communicare. Quod si præterea tertium individuorum genus ex his secundis compositum concipiamus, idem multis aliis modis affici posse reperiemus absque ulla ejus formæ mutatione. Et si sic porro in infinitum pergamus, facile concipiemus totam naturam unum esse Individuum cujus partes hoc est omnia corpora infinitis modis variant absque ulla totius Individui mutatione. Atque hæc, si animus fuisset de corpore ex professo agere, prolixius explicare et demonstrare debuissem. Sed jam dixi me aliud velle nec alia de causa hæc adferre quam quia ex ipsis ea quæ demonstrare constitui, facile possum deducere.

Translated as,

With these, we see thus by what means a composite individual is able to be affected in many ways, whose nature is, nevertheless, preserved. And so to this point we have conceived the individual which exists not unless from bodies which are distinguished by motion or rest alone, by speed or slowness among themselves, that is, which is composed out of the simplest bodies. What if now we might conceive of another [body] made up of more individuals of diverse nature, we might find the same [body] is able to be affected in even more other ways, whose nature, nevertheless, is preserved. For since each and every part of it is composed of more bodies, each and every part will be able therefore (by IIL7) without any change of its own nature, be moved now slowly now quickly and consequently communicate its motions to the remaining parts more quickly or slowly. Which if moreover we might conceive of a third kind of individuals composed from these second [type], we might find that the same is able to be affected by many other modes without any change of its form. And if thus we proceed again into infinity, we may easily conceive all nature to be one Individual whose parts, that is, all bodies change by infinite modes without any change of the whole Individual. And these things, if it had been my mind to discuss the body especially, I ought to explain more fully and demonstrate. But already I have said that I wish something else and not to raise other things concerning this cause which because I am easily able to deduce [them] from these, I have decided to demonstrate them.

Spinoza's Ethics: Simple Bodies

AXIOMA I: Omnia corpora vel moventur vel quiescunt.

Translated as,

All bodies either are moved or are at rest.

AXIOMA II: Unumquodque corpus jam tardius jam celerius movetur.

Translated as,

Each and every body is either moved slowly or quickly.

LEMMA I: Corpora ratione motus et quietis, celeritatis et tarditatis et non ratione substantiæ ab invicem distinguuntur.

Translated as,

Bodies are distinguished by reason of motion and rest, of fast and slow and not by reason of substance from one another.

DEMONSTRATIO: Primam partem hujus per se notam suppono. At quod ratione substantiæ non distinguantur corpora, patet tam ex propositione 5 quam 8 partis I sed clarius ex iis quæ in scholio propositionis 15 partis I dicta sunt.

Translated as,

I place the first part of this as known through itself. But for what bodies may not be distinguished by reason of substance, it is clear from IP5 as well as IP8 but more clearly from things which are said in IP15S.

LEMMA II: Omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt.

Translated as,

All bodies occur in certain ways.

DEMONSTRATIO: In his enim omnia corpora conveniunt quod unius ejusdemque attributi conceptum involvunt (per definitionem 1 hujus), deinde quod jam tardius jam celerius et absolute jam moveri jam quiescere possunt.

Translated as,

For in these ways all bodies occur which involve the concept of each and the same attribute (by IID1), next which absolutely are able to now be moved or now be at rest and now slowly and now quickly.

LEMMA III: Corpus motum vel quiescens ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio et illud iterum ab alio et sic in infinitum.

Translated as,

A body motion or rest ought to have been determined for motion or rest from another body which also has been determined for motion or rest from another and that again from another and so into infinity.

DEMONSTRATIO: Corpora (per definitionem 1 hujus) res singulares sunt quæ (per lemma 1) ratione motus et quietis ab invicem distinguuntur adeoque (per propositionem 28 partis I) unumquodque ad motum vel quietem necessario determinari debuit ab alia re singulari nempe (per propositionem 6 hujus) ab alio corpore quod (per axioma 1) etiam vel movetur vel quiescit. At hoc etiam (per eandem rationem) moveri vel quiescere non potuit nisi ab alio ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuisset et hoc iterum (per eandem rationem) ab alio et sic in infinitum. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

Bodies (by IID1) are singular things which (by IIL1) are distinguished from one another by reason of motion and of rest to such an extent (by IP28) that each and every one ought to have been necessarily determined for motion or rest by another singular thing, indeed (by IIP6) by another body which (by IIA1) also is moved or rests. But this also (by the same reason) was not able to be moved or rest unless it has been determined to motion or rest and this again (by the same reason) from another and thus to infinity.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur corpus motum tamdiu moveri donec ab alio corpore ad quiescendum determinetur et corpus quiescens tamdiu etiam quiescere donec ab alio ad motum determinetur. Quod etiam per se notum est. Nam cum suppono corpus exempli gratia A quiescere nec ad alia corpora mota attendo, nihil de corpore A dicere potero nisi quod quiescat. Quod si postea contingat ut corpus A moveatur, id sane evenire non potuit ex eo quod quiescebat; ex eo enim nil aliud sequi poterat quam ut corpus A quiesceret. Si contra supponatur A moveri, quotiescunque ad A tantum attendimus, nihil de eodem affirmare poterimus nisi quod moveatur. Quod si postea contingat ut A quiescat, id sane evenire etiam non potuit ex motu quem habebat; ex motu enim nihil aliud sequi poterat quam ut A moveretur : contingit itaque a re quæ non erat in A nempe a causa externa a qua ad quiescendum determinatum fuit.

Translated as,

From this it follows that a body is moved to so long a motion until it is determined by another body to rest and a body at rest also is at rest so long until it is determined by another to motion. Which is also known through itself. For since I supply a body an example A to rest and I do not attend to other moving bodies, I will be able to say nothing concerning body A unless because it rests. Which if later it happens that body A is moved, that was not able to happen reasonably; from this for nothing is able to follow unless it might be body A rests. If on the other hand it is supposed that A is moved, as much as we attend only to how much A, we will be able to affirm nothing concerning the same unless that it was moved. Which if it happens after that A rests, it also will be not happen reasonably from the motion which it had; from motion for nothing else is able to follow than that A was moved; thus it happens from a thing which was not in A indeed from an external cause by which it has been determined to rest.

AXIOMA I: Omnes modi quibus corpus aliquod ab alio afficitur corpore, ex natura corporis affecti et simul ex natura corporis afficientis sequuntur ita ut unum idemque corpus diversimode moveatur pro diversitate naturæ corporum moventium et contra ut diversa corpora ab uno eodemque corpore diversimode moveantur.

Translated as,

All modes - by which some body is affected by another body - follow simultaneously from the nature of the affected body and from the nature of the affecting body, in such a way that the same exact body may be moved differently according to the diversity of the natures of the bodies moving [the same exact body] and conversely that diverse bodies may be moved differently by the same exact body.

AXIOMA II: Cum corpus motum alteri quiescenti quod dimovere nequit, impingit, reflectitur ut moveri pergat et angulus lineæ motus reflectionis cum plano corporis quiescentis cui impegit, æqualis erit angulo quem linea motus incidentiæ cum eodem plano efficit. Atque hæc de corporibus simplicissimis quæ scilicet solo motu et quiete, celeritate et tarditate ab invicem distinguuntur : jam ad composita ascendamus.

Translated as,

When a moving body strikes another resting [body] which is unable to move away, [the moving body] is reflected back so that it proceeds to be moved and the angle of the line of the motion of reflection with the plane of the resting body which it struck, will be equal to the angle which the moving line of incidence makes with the same plane. And this concerning the simplest bodies which of course are distinguished from one another only by motion and by rest, by speed and slowness: now we ascend to composite bodies. 

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P13: Object of The Mind

This proposition, at first study, seems to contradict the parallel structure of II.P7 because it appears to give priority to the body in a cause-effect framework. However, this proposition actually informs the parallel structure. Ideas, as discussed in earlier propositions, are either representative or non-representative. The physical or extending aspect and the subjective or thinking aspect are each causally connected within their respective attributes but are based within a mode or modification of substance. As the physical mode of an individual emerges, so too does the subjective mode emerge. Yet, the subjective mode does not emerge as a "tabula rasa" as some were to claim. Instead, the subjective mode emerges with the idea of the body. This "idea of the body" is difficult for us to understand because of our simple and abstraction notions related to idea. Instead, for Spinoza, an idea can be complex with as many components to an idea as there are components in a body. Thus, the "idea of the body" is made of representative and non-representative ideas. 

In his demonstration, Spinoza poses two situations that would exist if the body were not the object of the mind. The first describes a situation in which subjectivity would exist through other bodies but not our own. If that were the case, we would record the experience of other objects and not our own experience. He then describes a different situation is which we experience the subjectivity of something else as well as our own. He states that this clearly does not occur - although we experience empathy with others. It does point to God as thinking thing and how utterly unattainable the experience of multiple and disparate sensations might be experienced. Perhaps this could be conceptualized as a form of "pain."

As usual, his scholium raises interesting issues. He asserts that the union of the mind and the body are completely common and applicable to all enlivened creatures. Thus, Spinoza has no doubt about the existence of a mind of a plant or animal different than humans. The presence of a mind in terms of what we call inanimate would be subject to a definition of "enlivened." Perhaps the coordinations of the atmosphere provide an opportunity to expand "enlivened" to the planet. He does not differentiate or further define in the direction of "enlivened," but rather moves in the direction of "reality" or "excellence" which are defined in a variety of ways including functionality, multi-tasking and independence. Thus a comparison of stone, virus, bacterium, plant, animal and human would be on this spectrum - a spectrum which excludes nothing. In this physical scale, there is a parallel mental scale. The idea that as functionality increases, more "of reality" increases seems to rely on underlying notions of power. Also fascinating is that his mental distinctions are more based on interspecies distinctions here as opposed to concepts that we might term IQ. In this sense, Spinoza is quite egalitarian about treatment of the human mind. 

Objectum ideæ humanam mentem constituentis est corpus sive certus extensionis modus actu existens et nihil aliud.

Translated as,

The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body or a certain mode of extension actually existing and nothing else.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim corpus non esset humanæ mentis objectum, ideæ affectionum corporis non essent in Deo (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus) quatenus mentem nostram sed quatenus alterius rei mentem constitueret hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) ideæ affectionum corporis non essent in nostra mente; atqui (per axioma 4 hujus) ideas affectionum corporis habemus. Ergo objectum ideæ humanam mentem constituentis est corpus idque (per propositionem 11 hujus) actu existens. Deinde si præter corpus etiam aliud esset mentis objectum, cum nihil (per propositionem 36 partis I) existat ex quo aliquis effectus non sequatur, deberet (per propositionem 12 hujus) necessario alicujus ejus effectus idea in mente nostra dari; atqui (per axioma 5 hujus) nulla ejus idea datur. Ergo objectum nostræ mentis est corpus existens et nihil aliud. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For if the body is not the object of the human mind, the ideas of impacts of the body are not in God (by IIP9C) insofar as our our mind but it [God] constitutes the mind of another thing, that is, (by IIP11C) the ideas of the impacts of the body are not in our mind, and yet (by IIA4) we have ideas of the impacts of the body. Therefore the object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body and it (by IIP11) is actually existing. Next, if besides the body there is still another object of the mind, since nothing (by IP36) exists from which another effect does not follow, the effect of something else ought (by IIP12) to be given necessarily in our mind by an idea and yet (by IIA5) no idea of it is given. Thus, the object of our mind is the existing body and nothing else.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur hominem mente et corpore constare et corpus humanum prout ipsum sentimus existere.

Translated as,

From this, it follows that a human is composed of the mind and body and that the body of humans exists just as we feel itself.

SCHOLIUM: Ex his non tantum intelligimus mentem humanam unitam esse corpori sed etiam quid per mentis et corporis unionem intelligendum sit. Verum ipsam adæquate sive distincte intelligere nemo poterit nisi prius nostri corporis naturam adæquate cognoscat. Nam ea quæ hucusque ostendimus, admodum communia sunt nec magis ad homines quam ad reliqua individua pertinent, quæ omnia quamvis diversis gradibus animata tamen sunt. Nam cujuscunque rei datur necessario in Deo idea cujus Deus est causa eodem modo ac humani corporis ideæ atque adeo quicquid de idea humani corporis diximus, id de cujuscunque rei idea necessario dicendum est. Attamen nec etiam negare possumus ideas inter se ut ipsa objecta differre unamque alia præstantiorem esse plusque realitatis continere prout objectum unius objecto alterius præstantius est plusque realitatis continet ac propterea ad determinandum quid mens humana reliquis intersit quidque reliquis præstet, necesse nobis est ejus objecti ut diximus hoc est corporis humani naturam cognoscere. Eam autem hic explicare nec possum nec id ad ea quæ demonstrare volo, necesse est. Hoc tamen in genere dico quo corpus aliquod reliquis aptius est ad plura simul agendum vel patiendum, eo ejus mens reliquis aptior est ad plura simul percipiendum et quo unius corporis actiones magis ab ipso solo pendent et quo minus alia corpora cum eodem in agendo concurrunt, eo ejus mens aptior est ad distincte intelligendum. Atque ex his præstantiam unius mentis præ aliis cognoscere possumus, deinde causam etiam videre cur nostri corporis non nisi admodum confusam habeamus cognitionem et alia plura quæ in sequentibus ex his deducam. Qua de causa operæ pretium esse duxi hæc ipsa accuratius explicare et demonstrare, ad quod necesse est pauca de natura corporum præmittere.

Translated as,

From these [propositions] we not only know that the human mind is joined to the body, but also what ought to be known by the union of the mind and the body. Truly no one will be able to know the [mind] itself adequately and distinctly unless first that person adequately recognizes the nature of our body. For those things which we have shown up to this point, are completely common things and do not pertain more to humans than to any other individual [beings], which nevertheless are all enlivened by as many degrees as you like. For the idea of whatsoever thing is given necessarily in God of which God is the cause in the same way as the ideas of the human body to such a degree that whatever we have said about the idea of the human body, it must necessarily be said about the idea of whatsoever thing. And yet we are not even able to deny that ideas differ among themselves as objects themselves differ and that one be more excellent than others and contain more of reality just as the object of one is more excellent than the object of another and contains more of reality and for that reason to determine [in] what [way] the human mind differs from the others and [in] what [way] it excels over the others, it is necessary for us to get to know of its object, as we have said, that is the nature of the human body. Moreover I am unable to explain this [nature] here and it is not necessary for those things which I wish to show. Nevertheless in this kind I say in what way some body is more suitable than others for doing or working more things at the same time, where its mind is more suitable than others for perceiving more things at the same time and where the actions of one mind depend more on itself alone and where other bodies join less with the same in doing, where its mind is more suitable for knowing distinctly. And from these we are able to recognize the excellence of one mind before the others, next to even see why the cause of our body, not unless we might have a completely confused understanding, and more other things which I deduce in order from these things. Concerning which cause to be the price of works I have arranged these things to accurately explain and show them, for which it is necessary to show a few things concerning the nature of bodies.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P12: Perception

Spinoza is outlining how things occur objectively and are viewed subjectively. This challenge exists in psychology and psychiatry today within the so called mind-body problem. For example, the framework for dynamics between cognitive therapy and drug therapy elude scientists. Here Spinoza provides an outline of how the mind perceives. The first part is to articulate the nature of the idea that constitutes the mind. Here he provides an example with the body. He uses the term by necessity, which as I pointed out earlier, refers to a causal state that requires something. Clearly, for a mind to exist, the related body must exist. Thus, in Spinoza's terms, the mind is connected to the body by necessity. Further, when such a relationship exists, he shows that a change or affectus must be considered. I have discussed the critical role that this non-representational mode of thinking plays within Spinoza's framework.

Another example here is the role that accounting plays with its object as the actual business. Accounting attempts to capture business reality, but often misinterprets. Sometimes these misinterpretations impact the business reality - as in capital formation. At times, it appears that Spinoza's strict attributal distinction do not allow for causality of the mind on the body and vice versa. However, that is clearly only the case at the level of God, where completely adequate ideas accompany extending things. On a human level, a interactive dynamic like this accounting example does set up.

Quicquid in objecto ideæ humanam mentem constituentis contingit, id ab humana mente debet percipi sive ejus rei dabitur in mente necessario idea hoc est si objectum ideæ humanam mentem constituentis sit corpus, nihil in eo corpore poterit contingere quod a mente non percipiatur.

Translated as,

Whatever happens in the object of an idea constituting a human mind, that [occurrence] ought to be perceived by a human mind or the idea of that matter [occurrence] is given in the mind by necessity, that is, if the object of the idea constituting a human mind is a body, nothing is able to happen in this body which is not perceived by the mind.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid enim in objecto cujuscunque ideæ contingit, ejus rei datur necessario in Deo cognitio (per corollarium propositionis 9 hujus) quatenus ejusdem objecti idea affectus consideratur hoc est (per propositionem 11 hujus) quatenus mentem alicujus rei constituit. Quicquid igitur in objecto ideæ humanam mentem constituentis contingit, ejus datur necessario in Deo cognitio quatenus naturam humanæ mentis constituit hoc est (per corollarium propositionis 11 hujus) ejus rei cognitio erit necessario in mente sive mens id percipit. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For whatever happens in the object of whatsoever idea, an understanding of that matter [occurrence] is given in God by necessity (by IIP9C) insofar as through the idea of the same object, a change is considered, that is (by IIP11) insofar as it [idea] constitutes the mind of something. Thus, whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting a human mind, an understanding of that matter [occurrence] is given in God by necessity, that is (by IIP11C), the understanding of that thing will exist in the mind by necessity or the mind perceives it.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc propositio patet etiam et clarius intelligitur ex scholio propositionis 7 hujus, quod vide. 

Translated as,

This proposition is especially understood clearly from IIP7S, which you should view.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P11: Essence of a Human Mind

Spinoza's scholium reveals his awareness that this section is difficult to understand. In the prior proposition, he addresses the essence of a human as modal and not substantial. Given his earlier propositions, this modal essence manifests equally within attributes of existing and thinking. The modal manifestations are clear: a human body and a human mind. Insofar as these modes don't exist, they are simply formal or virtual (in my words). But existence changes all of that. The essence of an existing human body is (yet to be discussed but will ultimately be given) conatus. The essence of an existing human mind is a singular idea of an existing singular thing that is both prior by nature and adequate. Both existing modes are connected together within their respective attributes by the power of God's expressiveness. Conatus is a human body's modal expressiveness, while adequacy is a human mind's modal expressiveness. The power of the human mind's expressiveness can be weakened by inadequate ideas. This is briefly highlighted at the end of this corollary.  

Primum quod actuale mentis humanæ esse constituit, nihil aliud est quam idea rei alicujus singularis actu existentis.

Translated as,

The first thing which constitutes the actual essence of a human mind is nothing other than the idea of a singular thing in actual existence.

DEMONSTRATIO: Essentia hominis (per corollarium præcedentis propositionis) a certis Dei attributorum modis constituitur nempe (per axioma 2 hujus) a modis cogitandi quorum omnium (per axioma 3 hujus) idea natura prior est et ea data reliqui modi (quibus scilicet idea natura prior est) in eodem debent esse individuo (per axioma 3 hujus). Atque adeo idea primum est quod humanæ mentis esse constituit. At non idea rei non existentis. Nam tum (per corollarium propositionis 8 hujus) ipsa idea non potest dici existere; erit ergo idea rei actu existentis. At non rei infinitæ. Res namque infinita (per propositiones 21 et 22 partis I) debet semper necessario existere; atqui hoc (per axioma 1 hujus) est absurdum; ergo primum quod esse humanæ mentis actuale constituit, est idea rei singularis actu existentis. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

The essence of a human (by IIP10C) is constituted by certain modes of attributes of God, indeed (by IIA2) by modes of thinking whose idea of everything (by IIA3) is prior by nature and, [the idea] having been given, the remaining modes (by which of course the idea is prior by nature) must be in the same individual (by IIA3). And to such a degree the idea at first is what constitutes the essence of a human mind. But not the idea of a thing not existing. For then (by IIP8C) the idea itself is not able to be said to exist; it will therefore be the idea of a thing existing in actuality. But not of an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (by IP21 and IP22) ought to exist by necessity. And this (by IIA1) is absurd. Therefore at first which constitutes the actual essence of a human mind is the idea of a singular thing in actual existence.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur mentem humanam partem esse infiniti intellectus Dei ac proinde cum dicimus mentem humanam hoc vel illud percipere, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod Deus non quatenus infinitus est sed quatenus per naturam humanæ mentis explicatur sive quatenus humanæ mentis essentiam constituit, hanc vel illam habet ideam et cum dicimus Deum hanc vel illam ideam habere non tantum quatenus naturam humanæ mentis constituit sed quatenus simul cum mente humana alterius rei etiam habet ideam, tum dicimus mentem humanam rem ex parte sive inadæquate percipere.

Translated as,

From here it follows that a human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God and next when we say that a human mind perceives this or that, we say nothing other than that God, not insofar as it is infinite, but insofar as it is explained by the nature of the human mind or insofar as it constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea and when we say that God has this or that idea not so much insofar as it constitutes the nature of the human mind but insofar as at the same time it even has the idea of another thing with a human mind, then we say that a human mind perceives a thing partially or inadequately.

SCHOLIUM: Hic sine dubio lectores hærebunt multaque comminiscentur quæ moram injiciant et hac de causa ipsos rogo ut lento gradu mecum pergant nec de his judicium ferant donec omnia perlegerint.

Translated as,

Here without a doubt readers will be stuck and confuse many things which inject a delay and for this reason I ask these same [readers] that they proceed with me by a slow step and not make a judgment concerning these things as long as they are reading everything to the end.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P10: Essence of A Human

The first thing to understand about this proposition is that Latin is notoriously challenged by a lack of a definite or indefinite article. As a result, this proposition is often translated generically, but given Latin's vagueness and Spinoza's focus on singularity, I think it appropriate to be specific. The essence of God does not pertain to a specific human, rather than to humankind as most translators render it.

In the demonstration, Spinoza builds on the understanding that the essence of substance is existence. Here he refers to necessary existence. In this, he argues that a human clearly does not qualify. Of course, a human can and does exist. Yet Spinoza argues that such existence is not necessary. This necessity is different than our common understanding because Spinoza is not referring to a necessity that is compelled from the outside. In this, a human existence may actually be understood as necessary. Rather, Spinoza is discussing necessary as that without which nothing else functions. The necessity of substance is that nothing else functions without it; here a human is easily understood as unnecessary.

In the scholium, Spinoza moves from the essence of a human to the form of a human. By doing so, Spinoza equates the form of a human to the essence of a human. The essence of a human, then, is unrelated to its existence but is a formal singularity.

In the corollary, Spinoza connects the essence of a human or the formal singularity to a specific modification of substance. In the connected demonstration, he describes this specific modification as in God and unable to be without God. For understanding (although there are some limits here), I think of how waves function within the ocean. Waves are in and of the ocean and are certainly singular, but yet they do not form the essence or necessary existence of the ocean.

Finally, Spinoza embarks on a difficult scholium. In this scholium he takes aim at two arguments which are inconsistent among themselves. The first argument is that the essence of a human pertains to the essence of God. In this Spinoza is simply focused on the logic that God can and does exist without a human but the converse is not true. The second argument is the essence of a human can exist without God. For Spinoza this is clearly flawed. But the argument does get more laborious. In his argumentation, Spinoza does clearly establish a couple of things. One, a human is nothing more than what a friend of mine says "a pimple on God's butt." Second, modifications of substance are what substance or God does. It appears that while modifications themselves are transitory that modifying substance is the core of God's expressiveness and thus, modifying is fundamental to existence. Modifications come from modifying but modifying doesn't come from somewhere. Instead, modifying is the essence of substance.

Ad essentiam hominis non pertinet esse substantiæ sive substantia formam hominis non constituit.

Translated as,

It does not pertain to the essence of a human to be of [the essence of] substance or substance does not constitute the form of a human.

DEMONSTRATIO: Esse enim substantiæ involvit necessariam existentiam (per propositionem 7 partis I). Si igitur ad hominis essentiam pertineret esse substantiæ, data ergo substantia, daretur necessario homo (per definitionem 2 hujus) et consequenter homo necessario existeret, quod (per axioma 1 hujus) est absurdum. Ergo etc. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For to be of [the essence of] substance involves necessary existence (by IP7). So if it were to pertain to the essence of a human to be of [the essence of] substance, then when substance is given, a human would necessarily be given (by IID2) and consequently a human would necessarily exist, which (by IIA1) is absurd. Therefore, etc. 

SCHOLIUM: Demonstratur etiam hæc propositio ex propositione 5 partis I nempe quod duæ ejusdem naturæ substantiæ non dentur. Cum autem plures homines existere possint, ergo id quod hominis formam constituit, non est esse substantiæ. Patet præterea hæc propositio ex reliquis substantiæ proprietatibus videlicet quod substantia sit sua natura infinita, immutabilis, indivisibilis etc. ut facile unusquisque videre potest.

Translated as,

So this proposition is shown from IP5 of course since two substances of the same nature may not be given. Since moreover more humans are able to exist, thus that which constitutes the form of a human is not able to be of [the essence of] substance. It is clear on account of this proposition from the other properties of substance just as because substance is by its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible etc. so that one is able to easily see it as unique.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur essentiam hominis constitui a certis Dei attributorum modificationibus.

Translated as,

From this it follows that the essence of a human is constituted by certain modifications of attributes of God.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam esse substantiæ (per propositionem præcedentem) ad essentiam hominis non pertinet. Est ergo (per propositionem 15 partis I) aliquid quod in Deo est et quod sine Deo nec esse nec concipi potest sive (per corollarium propositionis 25 partis I) affectio sive modus qui Dei naturam certo et determinato modo exprimit.

Translated as,

For to be of [the essence] of substance (by IIP10) does not pertain to the essence of a human. Thus it is (by IP15) whatever which is in God and which can neither be nor be conceived without God (by IP25C) is a modification or mode which expresses the nature of God in a certain and determinate way.

SCHOLIUM: Omnes sane concedere debent nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi posse. Nam apud omnes in confesso est quod Deus omnium rerum tam earum essentiæ quam earum existentiæ unica est causa hoc est Deus non tantum est causa rerum secundum fieri ut aiunt sed etiam secundum esse. At interim plerique id ad essentiam alicujus rei pertinere dicunt sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest adeoque vel naturam Dei ad essentiam rerum creatarum pertinere vel res creatas sine Deo vel esse vel concipi posse credunt vel quod certius est, sibi non satis constant. Cujus rei causam fuisse credo quod ordinem philosophandi non tenuerint. Nam naturam divinam quam ante omnia contemplari debebant quia tam cognitione quam natura prior est, ordine cognitionis ultimam et res quæ sensuum objecta vocantur, omnibus priores esse crediderunt; unde factum est ut dum res naturales contemplati sunt, de nulla re minus cogitaverint quam de divina natura et cum postea animum ad divinam naturam contemplandum appulerint, de nulla re minus cogitare potuerint quam de primis suis figmentis quibus rerum naturalium cognitionem superstruxerant; utpote quæ ad cognitionem divinæ naturæ nihil juvare poterant adeoque nihil mirum si sibi passim contradixerint. Sed hoc mitto. Nam meum intentum hic tantum fuit causam reddere cur non dixerim id ad essentiam alicujus rei pertinere sine quo res nec esse nec concipi potest; nimirum quia res singulares non possunt sine Deo esse nec concipi et tamen Deus ad earum essentiam non pertinet sed id necessario essentiam alicujus rei constituere dixi quo dato, res ponitur et quo sublato, res tollitur vel id sine quo res et vice versa id quod sine re nec esse nec concipi potest.

Translated as,

Everyone ought to sanely concede that nothing is able to be or be conceived without God. For all are in agreement that God is the unique cause of all things just as much of their essence as of their existence, that is, God is not only the cause of things according to their happening as they say but also according to their existing. But meanwhile most say that it pertains to the essence of something without which a thing is able to neither be nor be conceived to such a degree that they believe that either the nature of God pertains to the essence of created things or that created things are able to be or be conceived without God or what is more certain, they are not consistent enough for themselves. I believe that the cause of which thing has been that they have not held the order for philosophizing. For the divine nature, which is before all things, they ought to have contemplated [first] because it is prior as much by cognition as by nature, [this divine nature] they have believed that it is final by order of cognition and that things are prior (to everything else) which are called objects of feelings. From where it is a fact that as long as natural things are contemplated, about nothing have they thought less than about divine nature and since after they named the spirit for contemplating divine nature, about nothing less have they been able to think than about their own first fictions by which they have build out an understanding of natural things. In as much as which things are able to help nothing for the understanding of divine nature to such an extent that nothing is a wonder if they contradict themselves throughout. But I dismiss this. For my only intention here was to give the cause why I did not speak about what pertains to the essence of whatever thing without which a thing is able to neither be nor be conceived; no doubt because singular things are not able to be nor be conceived without God and nevertheless God does not pertain to the essence of things but I have said that it necessarily constitutes the essence of each thing by which given, the thing is placed and by which removed, the thing is removed or that without which the thing is and vice versa that which without which thing the thing is neither able to be nor be conceived.