Thoughts on Mind - Body Parallelism of II.P7

In my recent review of the Ethics, I have focused more attentively on the challenges of Book II - On The Mind. One of the more troubling propositions is Proposition 7 with its parallelism. As Spinoza states, the order and connection of things is the same as the order and connection of the mind. Spinoza writes so succinctly that misinterpretation is likely.

On a deeper view, it is clear to me that Spinoza's framework is based on an understanding that there is such a thing as "reality" and that the way we experience it in the physical universe (extending attribute) and the mental universe (thinking attribute) tell us first and foremost about ourselves and then secondly, and with much greater difficulty, about the universe. I think he would support the idea that "we are each at the center of the universe." The Copernican revolution has to be done and redone for each of us.

Connected with this is the obvious idea that despite this so-called parallelism is a lack of parallels in some profound ways. Without the body, there can be no mind. On the other hand, without the mind there may continue to be a body. So Spinoza's parallelism is not strict. Instead he inverts Descartes who defines thought as having primacy and gives the body primacy. Rather than "I think therefore I am," Spinoza states the obvious that could be rendered as "I exist therefore I am."

Removing the cognitive delusion of the priority of the mind over the body is the first critical step to an increase of freedom. As long as this delusion persists, a wide variety of personal and communal frustrations will persist and fester. Our individual delusions carry into communal ones and impair our power.

Further the parallelism is limited to certain areas. For example, the mind has ideas that connect to other ideas through acts of the imagination. These clearly do not have a parallel order and connection of things. That does not mean that acts of the imagination of bad things, but instead have a different role than what he is addressing.

Spinoza is attempting to set up a physical body framework which is the "objective" aspect that we can measure. The "idea" of this physical body framework is "subjective" - a term that includes feeling ideas and thought ideas. As a result, there are truly multiple causal paths. Without the body, there is not mind. Thus, the body indirectly or loosely causes the mind. Also powerful ideas cause other powerful ideas so the mind causes the mind. A misreading of Spinoza leads to ideas that strict parallelism principles deny the impact of body on the mind. Instead, Spinoza's causality is focused on the tightest connections in which the cause and effect are embedded like a triangle causes triangleness. 

If these are the ways in which the parallelism is not parallel, what is the key takeaway for its inclusion? Here I think it lies in the understanding that the conscious mind is a very small subset of the mind itself. As the role of consciousness is decision-making, the basis of a decision is crucial. The best "thinking" is a mind is about what is knowable - that is, the mind's knowledge of its own formative body - just as the triangleness is based in the triangle. This idea is, to some extent, verbally inexpressible as there is uniqueness to each body. Feelings are ideas which rise to consciousness and are related to the body. Feelings become the basis for the best thinking, but only if they are recognized as having close to no information of the universe around yet are sensationally wonderful for a knowledge of the body.

Spinoza's parallelism sets up a way to make quality decisions by starting by honoring the accuracy and adequacy of the body feeling ideas and then carefully exploring their connection to the world around the body. By grounding and honoring the ideas within the body without allowing these feeling ideas to generate cognitive delusions, Spinoza believes that we maximize our expressive power. His parallelism helps articulate these "objective" and "subjective" expressive forces.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P18

Here in another area, that of memory, Spinoza reemphasizes that these ideas tell more about the nature of the human body than of the world around us. A contemporary example in my world is that investment results tell less about the investing world than they do about the investor. The critical variable is the knowledge of the subject - as a kind of emphatic support for Socrates' maxim "Know Yourself." Spinoza is arguing that fundamentally all attempts at knowledge move forward with increased data about self while focusing data-gathering on the world around. Memory simply amplifies this dynamic.

Si corpus humanum a duobus vel pluribus corporibus simul affectum fuerit semel, ubi mens postea eorum aliquod imaginabitur, statim et aliorum recordabitur.

Translated as,

If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind later imagines one of them, it will immediately recall the other of them.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens (per corollarium præcedentis) corpus aliquod ea de causa imaginatur quia scilicet humanum corpus a corporis externi vestigiis eodem modo afficitur disponiturque ac affectum est cum quædam ejus partes ab ipso corpore externo fuerunt impulsæ sed (per hypothesin) corpus tum ita fuit dispositum ut mens duo simul corpora imaginaretur; ergo jam etiam duo simul imaginabitur atque mens ubi alterutrum imaginabitur, statim et alterius recordabitur. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

The mind (by IIP17C) imagines some body for this reason because, of course, if the human body is afflicted by traces of an external body in the same way as it is disposed and is affected when certain parts of it are pushed on by the external body itself but (by hypothesis) the body will be so disposed that the mind imagines the two bodies together; therefore now even will imagine the two simultaneously and the mind, when it imagines the one, will immediately imagine the other.

SCHOLIUM: Hinc clare intelligimus quid sit memoria. Est enim nihil aliud quam quædam concatenatio idearum naturam rerum quæ extra corpus humanum sunt involventium quæ in mente fit secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis humani. Dico primo concatenationem esse illarum tantum idearum quæ naturam rerum quæ extra corpus humanum sunt, involvunt, non autem idearum quæ earundem rerum naturam explicant. Sunt enim revera (per propositionem 16 hujus) ideæ affectionum corporis humani quæ tam hujus quam corporum externorum naturam involvunt. Dico secundo hanc concatenationem fieri secundum ordinem et concatenationem affectionum corporis humani ut ipsam distinguerem a concatenatione idearum quæ fit secundum ordinem intellectus quo res per primas suas causas mens percipit et qui in omnibus hominibus idem est. Atque hinc porro clare intelligimus cur mens ex cogitatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat quæ nullam cum priore habet similitudinem; ut exempli gratia ex cogitatione vocis pomi homo romanus statim in cogitationem fructus incidet qui nullam cum articulato illo sono habet similitudinem nec aliquid commune nisi quod ejusdem hominis corpus ab his duobus affectum sæpe fuit hoc est quod ipse homo sæpe vocem pomum audivit dum ipsum fructum videret et sic unusquisque ex una in aliam cogitationem incidet prout rerum imagines uniuscujusque consuetudo in corpore ordinavit. Nam miles exempli gratia visis in arena equi vestigiis statim ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem equitis et inde in cogitationem belli etc. incidet. At rusticus ex cogitatione equi in cogitationem aratri, agri etc. incidet et sic unusquisque prout rerum imagines consuevit hoc vel alio modo jungere et concatenare, ex una in hanc vel aliam incidet cogitationem.

Translated as,

From here we understand clearly what is memory. For there is nothing else than a certain connection of ideas involving the nature of things which are outside the human body that happen in the mind following the order and connection of the affections of the human body. I say first that connection is such of those ideas which involve the nature of things which are outside the body, moreover not of ideas which explain the nature of the same things. For they are actually (by IIP16) ideas of affections of the human body which involve just the nature of this [human body] more than the nature of the external bodies. I say next that this connection happens following the order and connection of the affections of the human body so that I might distinguish this from the connection of the ideas which happen following the order of the intellect by which things the mind perceives by their first causes and which is the same in all people. And here next we understand clearly why the mind from thinking of one thing immediately moves to the thought of another thing which has no commonality with the prior one; as for example from the thought of the name fruit a roman person immediately moves in thought to fruit which has no commonality with that articulated sound and nothing in common unless some body of the same man has been often affected by these two that is because the man often has heard the word "fruit" as long as he saw the fruit itself and thus each and everyone moves from one thought to another just as the images of things and the custom of each and everyone has ordered in the body. For the soldier, for example, by seeing the tracks of a horse in the arena moves immediately from the thought of a horse into the thought of cavalry and from there into the thought of war etc. But a farmer moves from the thought of a horse into plowing, land etc and so each and everyone just as the images of things he is accustomed to connect this or join in another way, moves from one into this or another thought.

Spinoza's Ethics: II.P17

The demonstration is interesting as it moves to the mechanics of the dynamics for the persistence of an idea. Ideas persist pathologically in the cases of PTSD and OCD. Here Spinoza is arguing that the fluid parts are affected (nerves? other mechanisms?) in such a way that reflections are set up, almost as a frequency or similar to an echo in the realm of sound. Critical to losing this persistence is to affect these reflections. Recent research on deep brain stimulation (DBS) confirms mechanisms similar to those described here as a means of healing OCD. Further, the mind is the idea of the body. So when these brain reflections are altered, the new patterns allow for a different mindset. This is an apt description of the brain-mind results being discovered in DBS treatment of OCD.

Si humanum corpus affectum est modo qui naturam corporis alicujus externi involvit, mens humana idem corpus externum ut actu existens vel ut sibi præsens contemplabitur donec corpus afficiatur affectu qui ejusdem corporis existentiam vel præsentiam secludat.

Translated as,

If the human body is affected in a way which involves the nature of some external body, the human mind will contemplate the external body as actually existing or as present to itself until the body is affected by an affect which shuts off the existence or presence of the same body.

DEMONSTRATIO: Patet. Nam quamdiu corpus humanum sic affectum est tamdiu mens humana (per propositionem 12 hujus) hanc corporis affectionem contemplabitur hoc est (per propositionem præcedentem) ideam habebit modi actu existentis quæ naturam corporis externi involvit hoc est ideam quæ existentiam vel præsentiam naturæ corporis externi non secludit sed ponit adeoque mens (per corollarium I præcedentis) corpus externum ut actu existens vel ut præsens contemplabitur donec afficiatur etc. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

It is clear. For just as long as the human body is thus affected for just as long will the human mind (by IIP12) contemplate this modification of the body, that is (by IIP16) will have an idea of the mode actually existing which [idea] involves the nature of the external body, that is, an idea which does not shut off the existence or presence of the nature of the external body but places [it] to such a degree that the mind (by IIP16C) will contemplate the external body as actually existing or as present until [the mind] is affected, etc.

COROLLARIUM: Mens corpora externa a quibus corpus humanum semel affectum fuit, quamvis non existant nec præsentia sint, contemplari tamen poterit velut præsentia essent.

Translated as,

The mind will nevertheless be able to contemplate external bodies as if they are present, [bodies] by which the human body has been once affected, although the [bodies] might not exist or be present.

DEMONSTRATIO: Dum corpora externa corporis humani partes fluidas ita determinant ut in molliores sæpe impingant, earum plana (per postulatum 5) mutant, unde fit (vide axioma 2 post corollarium lemmatis 3) ut inde alio modo reflectantur quam antea solebant et ut etiam postea iisdem novis planis spontaneo suo motu occurrendo eodem modo reflectantur ac cum a corporibus externis versus illa plana impulsæ sunt et consequenter ut corpus humanum dum sic reflexæ moveri pergunt, eodem modo afficiant, de quo mens (per propositionem 12 hujus) iterum cogitabit hoc est (per propositionem 17 hujus) mens iterum corpus externum ut præsens contemplabitur et hoc toties quoties corporis humani partes fluidæ spontaneo suo motu iisdem planis occurrent. Quare quamvis corpora externa a quibus corpus humanum affectum semel fuit, non existant, mens tamen eadem toties ut præsentia contemplabitur quoties hæc corporis actio repetetur. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

As long as external bodies determine the fluid parts of a human body in such a way so that the [external bodies] impinge often into the softer parts, whose surfaces (by postulate 5) change, from this it happens (see axiom 2 after the corollary of lemma 3) so that they [fluid parts] are reflected from there in another direction than they were accustomed to before and so that even after these same [planes] they are reflected in the same way by new surfaces occurring by their own spontaneous motion and when they are driven from external bodies against those surfaces and consequently they afflict the human body in the same way as long as they travel, reflecting to be moved, concerning which the mind (by IIP12) thinks again, that is (by IIP17) the mind will contemplate the human body again as present and this as often how much the fluid parts of the human body run into the same surfaces spontaneously by its own motion. For this reason, although external bodies by which the human body has been affected once do not exist, the mind nevertheless will contemplate them in the same way often as present as much as it has been repeated by this action of the body.

SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque qui fieri potest ut ea quæ non sunt veluti præsentia contemplemur, ut sæpe fit. Et fieri potest ut hoc aliis de causis contingat sed mihi hic sufficit ostendisse unam per quam rem sic possim explicare ac si ipsam per veram causam ostendissem nec tamen credo me a vera longe aberrare quandoquidem omnia illa quæ sumpsi postulata, vix quicquam continent quod non constet experientia de qua nobis non licet dubitare postquam ostendimus corpus humanum prout ipsum sentimus, existere (vide corollarium post propositionem 13 hujus). Præterea (ex corollario præcedentis et corollario II propositionis 16 hujus) clare intelligimus quænam sit differentia inter ideam exempli gratia Petri quæ essentiam mentis ipsius Petri constituit et inter ideam ipsius Petri quæ in alio homine, puta in Paulo, est. Illa enim essentiam corporis ipsius Petri directe explicat nec existentiam involvit nisi quamdiu Petrus existit; hæc autem magis constitutionem corporis Pauli quam Petri naturam indicat et ideo durante illa corporis Pauli constitutione mens Pauli quamvis Petrus non existat, ipsum tamen ut sibi præsentem contemplabitur. Porro ut verba usitata retineamus, corporis humani affectiones quarum ideæ corpora externa velut nobis præsentia repræsentant, rerum imagines vocabimus tametsi rerum figuras non referunt. Et cum mens hac ratione contemplatur corpora, eandem imaginari dicemus. Atque hic ut quid sit error indicare incipiam, notetis velim mentis imaginationes in se spectatas nihil erroris continere sive mentem ex eo quod imaginatur, non errare sed tantum quatenus consideratur carere idea quæ existentiam illarum rerum quas sibi præsentes imaginatur, secludat. Nam si mens dum res non existentes ut sibi præsentes imaginatur, simul sciret res illas revera non existere, hanc sane imaginandi potentiam virtuti suæ naturæ, non vitio tribueret præsertim si hæc imaginandi facultas a sola sua natura penderet hoc est (per definitionem 7 partis I) si hæc mentis imaginandi facultas libera esset.

Translated as,

So we see how it can happen, as it often does, that we contemplate things which are not present as if they are. And it may be that this comes from other causes but here it suffices for me to have shown one thing through which I am able to explain the matter even if I might have shown itself by its true cause. Nevertheless I do not believe that I stray far from the truth since [of] all those postulates which I have taken, scarcely any contain something that experience does not confirm about which [experience] we cannot doubt after showing that the human body exists just as we sense it (see IIP13C). Meanwhile (from IIP17C and IIP16C2) we understand clearly what might be different within an idea, for example, [the idea] of Peter which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind itself and within the idea of Peter himself that is in another human, like think of Paul. For the former idea directly explains the essence of Peter's body itself and does not involve existence except when Peter exists; the latter idea however indicates more the constitution of the body of Paul than the nature of Peter and so by that lasting constitution of the body of Paul, the mind of Paul will nevertheless contemplate [Peter] himself although he does not exist. Again since we use common words, the modifications of the human body, the ideas of which represent external bodies as if present to us, we will call as images of things even if they do not reproduce the figures of things. And since the mind by this method contemplates bodies, we may say that the same thing is imagined. And here as I begin to show what is the error, you might note I state imaginations of the mind contain nothing of error in their own views or the mind, from which what is imagined, does not err but so much insofar as it is considered to lack the idea which excludes the existence of those things which it imagines as present to itself. For if the mind as long as things not existing as it imagines as present to itself, at the same time as it knows those things do not exist in return, this power of clear imagination by the virtue of its nature is not attributed to fault especially if this faculty of imagination ponders by its own nature alone, that is (by ID7) if this faculty of the mind for imagining is free.