Sunday, January 14, 2024

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P18

Homo ex imagine rei præteritæ aut futuræ eodem lætitiæ et tristitiæ affectu afficitur ac ex imagine rei præsentis.

A human from the image of a thing past or future is affected by the affect of the same joy or sadness as from the image of the thing present.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quamdiu homo rei alicujus imagine affectus est, rem ut præsentem tametsi non existat, contemplabitur (per propositionem 17 partis II cum ejusdem corollario) nec ipsam ut præteritam aut futuram imaginatur nisi quatenus ejus imago juncta est imagini temporis præteriti aut futuri (vide scholium propositionis 44 partis II). Quare rei imago in se sola considerata eadem est sive ad tempus futurum vel præteritum sive ad præsens referatur hoc est (per corollarium II propositionis 16 partis II) corporis constitutio seu affectus idem est sive imago sit rei præteritæ vel futuræ sive præsentis atque adeo affectus lætitiæ et tristitiæ idem est sive imago sit rei præteritæ aut futuræ sive præsentis. Q.E.D.

As long as the human is affected by the image of some other thing, the thing as present although it does not exist, will be contemplated (by IIP17 and IIP17C) and not itself as past or future is imagined unless insofar as its image is joined to the image of past or future time (see IIP44S). Therefore the image of the thing considered in itself alone is the same whether for future or past time or referred for present, that is (by IIP16C) the constitution of the body or the the same affect is whether the image is the past or future of the thing or present and to such an extent the affect of joy or sadness is the same is the image of the past thing or future or present.

SCHOLIUM I: Rem eatenus præteritam aut futuram hic voco quatenus ab eadem affecti fuimus aut afficiemur exempli gratia quatenus ipsam vidimus aut videbimus, nos refecit aut reficiet, nos læsit aut lædet etc. Quatenus enim eandem sic imaginamur eatenus ejus existentiam affirmamus hoc est corpus nullo affectu afficitur qui rei existentiam secludat atque adeo (per propositionem 17 partis II) corpus ejusdem rei imagine eodem modo afficitur ac si res ipsa præsens adesset. Verumenimvero quia plerumque fit ut ii qui plura sunt experti, fluctuent quamdiu rem ut futuram vel præteritam contemplantur deque rei eventu ut plurimum dubitent (vide scholium propositionis 44 partis II) hinc fit ut affectus qui ex similibus rerum imaginibus oriuntur, non sint adeo constantes sed ut plerumque aliarum rerum imaginibus perturbentur donec homines de rei eventu certiores fiant.

A thing insofar as past or future this I call insofar as from the same thing we have been affected or are affected for example insofar as we have seen or will see itself it has move us or will move, it pains or elates etc. For insofar as thus we imagine the same thing as far as we affirm its existence that is the body is affected by no affect which denies the existence of the thing and to such a degree (by IIP17) the mode is affected by the image of the same thing in the same way and if the thing itself present is near. Truly indeed because it happens much that this who are many experts, fluctuate as long as the thing so that we contemplate the future or past and from the occurrence of the thing so that they doubt much (see IIP44S) from her it happens that the affect which arises from similar images of the things, they are not to such a degree constant by perturbed by many other images of things until humans become more certain about the occurrence of the thing.

SCHOLIUM II: Ex modo dictis intelligimus quid sit spes, metus, securitas, desperatio, gaudium et conscientiæ morsus. Spes namque nihil aliud est quam inconstans lætitia orta ex imagine rei futuræ vel præteritæ de cujus eventu dubitamus, metus contra inconstans tristitia ex rei dubiæ imagine etiam orta. Porro si horum affectuum dubitatio tollatur, ex spe sit securitas et ex metu desperatio nempe lætitia vel tristitia orta ex imagine rei quam metuimus vel speravimus. Gaudium deinde est lætitia orta ex imagine rei præteritæ de cujus eventu dubitavimus. Conscientiæ denique morsus est tristitia opposita gaudio.

From a mode of speaking we understand what is hope, fear, security, desperation, joy and pain of conscience. For hope is nothing other than what inconstant joy arising from the image of a future or past thing about whose occurrence we are doubtful, fear against inconstant sadness from also arising the image of a doubtful thing. Further on if doubt of these affects arises, from hope is security and from fear of course desperation joy or sadness arising from the image of the thing which we have feared or hoped. Indeed joy is happiness arising from the image of a past thing about whose occurrence we have doubted. Finally pain of the conscience is a sadness opposed to joy.

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