Thursday, February 8, 2024

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P25 - Love Bias

Here is a proposition that I have observed in action during meditation - my recollections of joyful occasions are much easier to access than my recollections of painful occasions. I had been aware of this tendency and tried to follow the maxim, "if you can feel it, you can heal it." However, I noticed a limitation of my ability to bring those painful memories to mind. I attributed this to my ego's role of self-preservation as well as self-serving biases. Spinoza characterizes this as a function of our conatus. 

Id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur quod nos vel rem amatam lætitia afficere imaginamur et contra id omne negare quod nos vel rem amatam tristitia afficere imaginamur.

We try to affirm everything about ourselves and about a beloved thing which we imagine to affect ourselves or a beloved thing with joy and, on the other hand, to deny everything which we imagine to affect ourselves or a beloved thing with sadness.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quod rem amatam lætitia vel tristitia afficere imaginamur, id nos lætitia vel tristitia afficit (per propositionem 21 hujus). At mens (per propositionem 12 hujus) ea quæ nos lætitia afficiunt, quantum potest conatur imaginari hoc est (per propositionem 17 partis II et ejus corollarium) ut præsentia contemplari et contra (per propositionem 13 hujus) quæ nos tristitia afficiunt, eorum existentiam secludere; ergo id omne de nobis deque re amata affirmare conamur quod nos vel rem amatam lætitia afficere imaginamur et contra. Q.E.D.

That which we imagine to affect a beloved thing with joy or sadness, that thing affects us with joy or sadness (by IIIP21). But the mind (by IIIP12) tries as much as it is able to imagine things which affect us with joy, that is (by IIP17 and IIP17C) so as to contemplate as present and, on the other hand (by IIIP13) things which affect us with sadness, to exclude the existence of; thus we try to affirm everything about ourselves and a beloved thing which we imagine to affect ourselves or a beloved thing with joy and also the opposite. 

No comments:

Post a Comment

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P47

Lætitia quæ ex eo oritur quod scilicet rem quam odimus destrui aut alio malo affici imaginamur, non oritur absque ulla animi tristitia. Joy ...