Spinoza's Ethics: III.P26 - Hate Bias

As usual, Spinoza's scholia provide more clarity than the cumbersome geometric method and this scholium in no exception. His reasoning in this proposition follows from the prior proposition. I have experienced much of what he describes and modern psychology confirms it. However, Spinoza goes on in the scholium to what he regards as the real peril - fooling oneself. It appears that these biases are not really a problem, but in fact appear to support and encourage our endeavors. But when our biases drive us to regard ourselves too highly, it becomes a species of madness. It is interesting that he does not comment on the opposite  of regarding ourselves too lowly. This contrast he does with others in the case of honor and disdain. I believe that Spinoza implies that even when we state we view ourselves lowly, we are, in fact, regarding ourselves highly for regarding ourselves lowly - a form of Paul's "I'm the chief of sinners."

Id omne de re quam odio habemus, affirmare conamur quod ipsam tristitia afficere imaginamur et id contra negare quod ipsam lætitia afficere imaginamur.

Everything about which we have hatred, we try to affirm what we imagine to affect the thing itself with sadness and on the other hand to deny what we imagine affects the thing itself with joy.

DEMONSTRATIO: Sequitur hæc propositio ex propositione 23 ut præcedens ex propositione 21 hujus.

This proposition follows from IIIP23 as that follows from IIIP21.

SCHOLIUM: His videmus facile contingere ut homo de se deque re amata plus justo et contra de re quam odit, minus justo sentiat, quæ quidem imaginatio quando ipsum hominem respicit qui de se plus justo sentit, superbia vocatur et species delirii est quia homo oculis apertis somniat se omnia illa posse quæ sola imaginatione assequitur quæque propterea veluti realia contemplatur iisque exultat quamdiu ea imaginari non potest quæ horum existentiam secludunt et ipsius agendi potentiam determinant. Est igitur superbia lætitia ex eo orta quod homo de se plus justo sentit. Deinde lætitia quæ ex eo oritur quod homo de alio plus justo sentit, existimatio vocatur et illa denique despectus quæ ex eo oritur quod de alio minus justo sentit.

By these we see easily it happens that a person concerning oneself and a beloved thing thinks more than is just and, on the other hand, about a thing which one hates, (thinks) less than just; which indeed is called pride, when the imagination regards ones own person who thinks more about oneself more than is just, and is a species of madness because the person dreams with open eyes that one is able [to do] all those things which follow from the imagination alone on account of contemplating whatever things just as if real and is thrilled by those things for as long as that person is not able to imagine those things which exclude their existence and limit the potential of one's doing. Therefore pride is a joy which arises from the case in which a person feels about oneself more than just. Next, the joy which arises from the case in which a person feels more than just about another person, is called honor and that finally (is called) disdain which arises from the case in which one feels less than just about another.