We are familiar with a technique of beginning a story (or movie) by getting the reader (or viewer) to sympathize with the subject through establishing something similar to the reader (or viewer). Here Spinoza outlines the mechanism by which that technique operates. As we experience modifications of our bodies, our mind generates representative ideas in parallel with those modifications. Some of these ideas involve bodies which we perceive to be similar to our own. This perceived similarity has the power to generate an extension of our identity so powerful that perceived emotions become imitatively our own emotions.
Ex eo quod rem nobis similem et quam nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, eo ipso simili affectu afficimur.
In a case when we imagine a thing similar to us - even which we have pursued with no (prior) emotion, to be affected by some emotion, we are affected by a thing itself similar to the emotion.
DEMONSTRATIO: Rerum imagines sunt corporis humani affectiones quarum ideæ corpora externa veluti nobis præsentia repræsentant (per scholium propositionis 17 partis II) hoc est (per propositionem 16 partis II) quarum ideæ naturam nostri corporis et simul præsentem externi corporis naturam involvunt. Si igitur corporis externi natura similis sit naturæ nostri corporis, tum idea corporis externi quod imaginamur affectionem nostri corporis involvet similem affectioni corporis externi et consequenter si aliquem nobis similem aliquo affectu affectum imaginamur, hæc imaginatio affectionem nostri corporis huic affectui similem exprimet adeoque ex hoc quod rem aliquam nobis similem aliquo affectu affici imaginamur, simili cum ipsa affectu afficimur. Quod si rem nobis similem odio habeamus, eatenus (per propositionem 23 hujus) contrario affectu cum ipsa afficiemur, non autem simili. Q.E.D.
The images of things are modifications of the human body whose ideas represent external bodies just as things present to ourselves (by IIP17S), that is (by IIP16) whose ideas involve the nature of our body and at the same time the presenting nature of the external body. If therefore the nature of the external body is similar to the nature of our body, then the idea of the external body which we imagine involves a modification of our body similar to the modification of the external body and consequently if we imagine anyone similar to us affected by some emotion, this imagination expresses a modification of our body similar to this emotion and to such an extent from this because we imagine some thing similar to us to be affected by some emotion, we are affected similarly with the emotion itself. Since if we have hatred to a thing similar to us, just so much (by IIIP23) are we affected contrarily with the affect itself, not at all like it.
SCHOLIUM: Hæc affectuum imitatio quando ad tristitiam refertur, vocatur commiseratio (de qua vide scholium propositionis 22 hujus) sed ad cupiditatem relata æmulatio, quæ proinde nihil aliud est quam alicujus rei cupiditas quæ in nobis ingeneratur ex eo quod alios nobis similes eandem cupiditatem habere imaginamur.
This imitation of the emotions when it refers to sadness is called pity (concerning which see IIIP22S) but when related to desire (is called) emulation, which then is nothing other than the desire of something else which is implanted in us from where because we imagine others similar to us have the same desire.
COROLLARIUM I: Si aliquem quem nullo affectu prosecuti sumus, imaginamur lætitia afficere rem nobis similem, amore erga eundem afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur eandem tristitia afficere, odio erga ipsum afficiemur.
If we imagine anyone, to whom we have attended with no emotion, to affect someone similar to us with joy, we are affected by love towards this same person. If, in contrast, we imagine this same person to affect that same one with sadness, we are affected with hatred towards this self.
DEMONSTRATIO: Hoc eodem modo ex propositione præcedenti demonstratur ac propositio 22 hujus ex propositione 21.
This is demonstrated in the same way from the preceding proposition (IIIP27) as IIIP22 (is demonstrated) from IIIP21.
COROLLARIUM II: Rem cujus nos miseret, odio habere non possumus ex eo quod ipsius miseria nos tristitia afficit.
A thing which moves us to pity we are not able to hate in which case because its suffering affects us with sadness.
DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim ex eo nos eandem odio habere possemus, tum (per propositionem 23 hujus) ex ipsius tristitia lætaremur, quod est contra hypothesin.
For if from which we are able to have hatred for the same thing, then (by IIIP23) we might be joyful from sadness itself, which is contrary to hypothesis.
COROLLARIUM III: Rem cujus nos miseret, a miseria quantum possumus liberare conabimur.
A thing which moves us to pity, we will try to free from suffering as much as we are able.
DEMONSTRATIO: Id quod rem cujus nos miseret, tristitia afficit, nos simili etiam tristitia afficit (per propositionem præcedentem) adeoque omne id quod ejus rei existentiam tollit sive quod rem destruit, comminisci conabimur (per propositionem 13 hujus) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 9 hujus) id destruere appetemus sive ad id destruendum determinabimur atque adeo rem cujus miseremur, a sua miseria liberare conabimur. Q.E.D.
That which affects with sadness a thing which moves us to pity, also affects us with a similar sadness, (by IIIP27) to such a degree that we will try to invent everything which takes away the existence of the thing or which destroys the thing, (by IIIP13), that is (by IIIP9S) we seek to destroy or for its destruction we will be determined and to such a degree we will try to free which thing we pity from misery.
SCHOLIUM: Hæc voluntas sive appetitus benefaciendi qui ex eo oritur quod rei in quam beneficium conferre volumus, nos miseret, benevolentia vocatur, quæ proinde nihil aliud est quam cupiditas ex commiseratione orta. Cæterum de amore et odio erga illum qui rei quam nobis similem esse imaginamur, bene aut male fecit, vide scholium propositionis 22 hujus.
This will or appetite for doing good which arises from that which engenders pity in us for the thing into which we wish to confer good, is called benevolence, which next nothing is other than desire arising from pity. Of the rest about love and hatred towards who to the thing which we imagine is similar to us, does good or bad, see IIIP22S.
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