Spinoza's Ethics: III.P35 - Jealousy

Si quis imaginatur rem amatam eodem vel arctiore vinculo amicitiæ quo ipse eadem solus potiebatur, alium sibi jungere, odio erga ipsam rem amatam afficietur et illi alteri invidebit.

If anyone imagines the beloved one with the same or tighter bond of friendship by which one alone possessed the same (beloved one), that joins another to oneself, by hatred is one affected toward the beloved one and will envy that other one.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quo quis majore amore rem amatam erga se affectam esse imaginatur, eo magis gloriabitur (per præcedentem propositionem ) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 30 hujus ) lætabitur adeoque (per propositionem 28 hujus ) conabitur quantum potest imaginari rem amatam ipsi quam arctissime devinctam, qui quidem conatus sive appetitus fomentatur si alium idem sibi cupere imaginatur (per propositionem 31 hujus). At hic conatus sive appetitus ab ipsius rei amatæ imagine, concomitante imagine illius quem res amata sibi jungit, coerceri supponitur; ergo (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) eo ipso tristitia afficietur concomitante idea rei amatæ tanquam causa et simul imagine alterius hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) odio erga rem amatam afficietur et simul erga illum alterum (per corollarium propositionis 15 hujus) cui propterea (per propositionem 23 hujus) quod re amata delectatur, invidebit. Q.E.D.

The more anyone imagines that the beloved one has been affected with a greater love towards oneself, so the more will one be proud (by IIIP34 [The More We Do the More We Try]), that is (by IIIP30S [Looking at Others Looking at Us]) will be overjoyed to the degree (by IIIP28 [Following Beliefs for Power]) one will try as much as one is able to imagine the beloved one bound to oneself as closely as possible, who indeed effort or desire foments if one imagines that anyone else desires the same thing for that self (by IIIP31 [Confirmation Bias]). But here effort or desire from the image of the beloved one itself, accompanied by the image of another to whom the beloved joins oneself, is thought to be forced; thus (by IIIP11S [Good for Body, Good for Mind]), by this itself sadness is affected accompanied by the idea of the beloved one as if the cause and at the same time by the image of the other, that is (by IIIP13S [Conatus to Forget]) with hatred is one affected toward the beloved one and at the same time towards that other (by IIIP15C [Association]) to whom besides (by IIIP23 [Hatred Gives Opposite]) because one is delighted by the beloved one, one will envy.

SCHOLIUM: Hoc odium erga rem amatam invidiæ junctum zelotypia vocatur, quæ proinde nihil aliud est quam animi fluctuatio orta ex amore et odio simul concomitante idea alterius cui invidetur. Præterea hoc odium erga rem amatam majus erit pro ratione lætitiæ qua zelotypus ex reciproco rei amatæ amore solebat affici et etiam pro ratione affectus quo erga illum quem sibi rem amatam jungere imaginatur, affectus erat. Nam si eum oderat, eo ipso rem amatam (per propositionem 24 hujus) odio habebit quia ipsam id quod ipse odio habet, lætitia afficere imaginatur et etiam (per corollarium propositionis 15 hujus) ex eo quod rei amatæ imaginem imagini ejus quem odit, jungere cogitur, quæ ratio plerumque locum habet in amore erga fæminam; qui enim imaginatur mulierem quam amat alteri sese prostituere, non solum ex eo quod ipsius appetitus coercetur, contristabitur sed etiam quia rei amatæ imaginem pudendis et excrementis alterius jungere cogitur, eandem aversatur; ad quod denique accedit quod zelotypus non eodem vultu quem res amata ei præbere solebat, ab eadem excipiatur, qua etiam de causa amans contristatur, ut jam ostendam.

This hatred toward a beloved one is called envy joined with jealousy, which next is nothing other than a fluctuation of spirit arising from love and at the same time hatred accompanied by the idea of another  whom one envies. Besides this hatred towards a beloved one is more on account of the joy which jealousy was accustomed to affect from a reciprocal love of the beloved one and also on account of the emotion by which toward that whom one imagines that the beloved one joins to oneself, has been affected. For if one has hated that person, from this itself will one have hatred for the beloved (by IIIP24 [Hatred gives Opposite to Others]) since oneself has hatred to that, one imagines to affect with joy and also (by IIIP15C [Association]) because one hates to imagine the image of the beloved whom he hates, is compelled to join, which reason and more has place in love towards the woman; who for he imagines the wife whom he loves to have prostituted herself, not only because ones appetite is coerced, one suffers but also since one is compelled to join the image of the privates of the beloved one and disgusting parts of the other, one avoids the same; to which next he falls since jealousy not with the same face which the beloved is accustomed to put forward to him, from the same he is excluded, by which cause also loving is misery as I have shown already.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P34 - The More We Do The More We Try

Quo majore affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis gloriabimur.

The greater the emotion by which we imagine that the beloved one has been affected with respect to ourselves, the more we will boast.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nos (per propositionem præcedentem) conamur quantum possumus ut res amata nos contra amet hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) ut res amata lætitia afficiatur concomitante idea nostri. Quo itaque rem amatam majore lætitia nostra de causa affectam esse imaginamur, eo magis hic conatus juvatur hoc est (per propositionem 11 hujus cum ejus scholio) eo majore lætitia afficimur. At cum ex eo lætemur quod alium nobis similem lætitia affecimus, tum nosmet cum lætitia contemplamur (per propositionem 30 hujus) : ergo quo majore affectu rem amatam erga nos affectam esse imaginamur, eo majore lætitia nosmet contemplabimur sive (per scholium propositionis 30 hujus) eo magis gloriabimur. Q.E.D.

We try (by IIIP33 [Reciprocity of Likeness]) as much as we are able that the beloved one might love us in return, that is (by IIIP13S [Conatus to Forget]) that the beloved one is affected with joy accompanied by the idea of us. Thus the more that we imagine that the beloved one has been affected with greater joy from our cause, the more this effort is aided that is (by IIIP11 with IIIP11S [Good for Body, Good for Mind]) the more we are affected with joy. But since from this we are joyous because we affect someone like us with joy, then we view ourselves with joy (by IIIP30 [Looking at Others Looking at Us]): thus, the greater the emotion by which we imagine that the beloved one has been affected with respect to us, the greater our joy we will contemplate ourselves or (by IIIP30S) the more we will boast.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P33 - Reciprocity of Likeness

Cum rem nobis similem amamus, conamur quantum possumus efficere ut nos contra amet.

Since we love a thing similar to us, we try as much as we are able to effect that it love us in return.

DEMONSTRATIO: Rem quam amamus præ reliquis quantum possumus imaginari conamur (per propositionem 12 hujus). Si igitur res nobis sit similis, ipsam præ reliquis lætitia afficere conabimur (per propositionem 29 hujus) sive conabimur quantum possumus efficere ut res amata lætitia afficiatur concomitante idea nostri hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) ut nos contra amet. Q.E.D.

A thing which we love we try to imagine as much as possible before all others (by IIIP12 [Conatus of Mind]). If therefore the thing might be similar to us, we will try to affect itself before all others with joy (by IIIP29 [Influence of Opinion of Others]) or we will try as much as we are able to effect so that the beloved object to be affected with joy accompanied by the idea of us, that is (by IIIP13S [Conatus to Forget]) so that it loves us in return.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P32 - Imitation

Si aliquem re aliqua qua unus solus potiri potest, gaudere imaginamur, conabimur efficere ne ille illa re potiatur.

If we imagine that a person rejoices about something which only one (person) is able to possess, we will try make sure that no one possesses that thing.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex eo solo quod aliquem re aliqua gaudere imaginamur (per propositionem 27 hujus cum ejusdem I corollario) rem illam amabimus eaque gaudere cupiemus. At (per hypothesin) huic lætitiæ obstare imaginamur quod ille eadem hac re gaudeat; ergo (per propositionem 28 hujus) ne ille eadem potiatur, conabimur. Q.E.D.

From this alone we imagine that because someone rejoices about some thing (by IIIP27 with IIIP27C [Empathy]) we will love that thing and desire to rejoice in it. But (by hypothesis) we imagine due to that person rejoicing in the same thing will hinder this joy; thus we will try (by IIIP28 [Following Beliefs for Power]) so that no one might possess the same thing.

SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque cum hominum natura plerumque ita comparatum esse ut eorum quibus male est, misereantur et quibus bene est, invideant et (per propositionem præcedentem) eo majore odio quo rem qua alium potiri imaginantur, magis amant. Videmus deinde ex eadem naturæ humanæ proprietate ex qua sequitur homines esse misericordes, sequi etiam eosdem esse invidos et ambitiosos. Denique si ipsam experientiam consulere velimus, ipsam hæc omnia docere experiemur præsertim si ad priores nostræ ætatis annos attenderimus. Nam pueros quia eorum corpus continuo veluti in æquilibrio est, ex hoc solo ridere vel flere experimur quod alios ridere vel flere vident et quicquid præterea vident alios facere, id imitari statim cupiunt et omnia denique sibi cupiunt quibus alios delectari imaginantur; nimirum quia rerum imagines uti diximus sunt ipsæ humani corporis affectiones sive modi quibus corpus humanum a causis externis afficitur disponiturque ad hoc vel illud agendum.

We see thus since the nature of humans is mostly to be so arranged so that they pity those to whom it is bad, they are miserable and to whom it is good, they envy and (by IIIP31 [Confirmation Bias]) the greater the hatred for whom they imagine to possess the thing which they love the more. Next we see from the same property of human nature from which it follows that humans are merciful, also follows that they are envious and ambitious. Next if we prefer to consult experience itself, we will experience that it teaches all these especially experience if we attend to prior years of our life. For children since the body of them is just as if in constant equilibrium, from this alone we experience (they) laugh or  cry because they see others laugh or cry and meanwhile they see others do something, they immediately desire to imitate it and next they desire everything for themselves by which they imagine others to be pleased; too much we have said because to use the images of things are the modifications themselves of the human body or modes by which the human body is affected by external causes and is disposed for doing this or that.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P31 - Confirmation Bias

Spinoza starts out with a fairly simple truth - that we seek confirmation for things which we desire to be true. This sets up a bias as we, so to speak, shop for an answer that appeals to us. Clearly this is hazardous to living our best lives but it does at least provide times during episodes of low confidence. The role that this bias plays in the marketplace is clear - during periods of euphoria or depression, market prices move dramatically. This excess variation is a product of what the proposition holds as true. The quote by Ovid is perfect for the challenges presented to investors - the difficulty of thinking for oneself. Finally, Spinoza outlines an implication of this bias - as long as we are all extracting our approval for all others, the collective sense will be frustration. It would be like a conversation where all talk and no one listens.

Si aliquem imaginamur amare vel cupere vel odio habere aliquid quod ipsi amamus, cupimus vel odio habemus, eo ipso rem constantius amabimus, etc. Si autem id quod amamus, eum aversari imaginamur vel contra, tum animi fluctuationem patiemur.

If we imagine that someone loves or desires or has hatred for something which we ourselves love, desire or have hatred for, then from this itself we will more steadily love that, etc. Moreover if we love that which, we imagine someone to oppose or vice versa, then we will undergo fluctuation of spirit.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex eo solo quod aliquem aliquid amare imaginamur, eo ipso idem amabimus (per propositionem 27 hujus). At sine hoc nos idem amare supponimus; accedit ergo amori nova causa a qua fovetur atque adeo id quod amamus hoc ipso constantius amabimus. Deinde ex eo quod aliquem aliquid aversari imaginamur, idem aversabimur (per eandem propositionem). At si supponamus nos eodem tempore id ipsum amare, eodem ergo tempore hoc idem amabimus et aversabimur sive (vide scholium propositionis 17 hujus) animi fluctuationem patiemur. Q.E.D.

From this alone because we imagine that someone loves something, by this same itself we will love (by IIIP27 [Empathy Proposition]). But without this we are subject to love the same; thus it occurs that a new cause of love by which it is nurtured and to such a degree that which we love by the same itself we will love more constantly. Next from this because we imagine that someone dislikes something, we will dislike the same (by the same proposition). But if we are subject to love at the same time the thing itself, thus at the same time, we will love and hate the same or (see IIIP17S), we undergo vacillation of the mind.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc et ex propositione 28 hujus sequitur unumquemque quantum potest conari ut unusquisque id quod ipse amat, amet et quod ipse odit, odio etiam habeat; unde illud poetæ: Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes; Ferreus est si quis quod sinit alter, amat.

From here and from IIIP28 [Following Beliefs for Power] it follows that each and every one tries as much as one can so that whatsoever one loves, one might love it and whatsoever one hates, one might have hatred for it; from where (comes) that (line) of the poet; as beloved ones let us hope together, let us fear together; one is like iron if anyone loves what another leaves alone.

SCHOLIUM: Hic conatus efficiendi ut unusquisque probet id quod ipse amat vel odio habet, revera est ambitio (vide scholium propositionis 29 hujus) atque adeo videmus unumquemque ex natura appetere ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant, quod dum omnes pariter appetunt, pariter sibi impedimento et dum omnes ab omnibus laudari seu amari volunt, odio invicem sunt.

Here the effort for doing so that each and every one might approve that what oneself loves or has hated for is held as ambition (see IIIP29S [Influence of Opinion of Others]) and to such an extent we see that each and every one desires by nature that the remaining might live by ones temperament, because as long as they all desire together, together are an impediment to themselves and as long as they all wish to be praised or loved from all, they are in turns with hate.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P30 - Looking at Others Looking at Us

Here Spinoza raises how our imagination of how others see us affects our emotions. A friend of mine coached his children by saying, "do this for a new world record!" The idea of how others perceive us has a compounding effect due first to reflecting on the impact of our action which is then amplified by how we reflect on others reflecting on the impact of our action. This compounding effect has increased power, but like all effects of the imagination, this power is temporary - as opposed to reality's power. Then Spinoza delineates between an imagination driven by an external cause versus that of in internal cause. An external cause is typically named by the object, but in the case of an internal cause we don't simply name the object, e.g. oneself, but instead name the situation. When an internal cause is revealed in a public context, it shows up as honor or shame. However, when an internal cause is revealed privately, then the same view of one's action becomes self-acceptance or repentance. It is interesting to note that as shame is to repentance so is honor to self-acceptance. In the case of the tendency for this compounding imagination to spiral upwards, then instead of self-acceptance it becomes form of self-congratulations that is annoying to others.

Si quis aliquid egit quod reliquos lætitia afficere imaginatur, is lætitia concomitante idea sui tanquam causa afficietur sive se ipsum cum lætitia contemplabitur. Si contra aliquid egit quod reliquos tristitia afficere imaginatur, se ipsum cum tristitia contra contemplabitur.

If anyone does something which one imagines that affects others with joy, one is affected with joy accompanied with the idea of oneself as the cause or will contemplate oneself with joy. If, in contrast, anyone does something which one imagines that affects others with sadness, then, in contrast, one will contemplate oneself with sadness.  

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui se reliquos lætitia vel tristitia afficere imaginatur, eo ipso (per propositionem 27 hujus) lætitia vel tristitia afficietur. Cum autem homo (per propositiones 19 et 23 partis II) sui sit conscius per affectiones quibus ad agendum determinatur, ergo qui aliquid egit quod ipse imaginatur reliquos lætitia afficere, lætitia cum conscientia sui tanquam causa afficietur sive seipsum cum lætitia contemplabitur et contra. Q.E.D.

Whoever imagines oneself to affect others with joy or sadness, by this itself (by IIIP27) one is affected with joy or sadness. Moreover since a human (by IIP19 and IIP23) is aware to oneself by emotions by which one is determined to action, thus one who does something, which one imagines oneself to affect others with joy, is affected with joy with the awareness of oneself as the cause or even will contemplate oneself with joy and the opposite also.

SCHOLIUM: Cum amor (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) sit lætitia concomitante idea causæ externæ et odium tristitia concomitante etiam idea causæ externæ, erit ergo hæc lætitia et tristitia amoris et odii species. Sed quia amor et odium ad objecta externa referuntur, ideo hos affectus aliis nominibus significabimus nempe lætitiam concomitante idea causæ internæ gloriam et tristitiam huic contrariam pudorem appellabimus : intellige quando lætitia vel tristitia ex eo oritur quod homo se laudari vel vituperari credit, alias lætitiam concomitante idea causæ internæ acquiescentiam in se ipso, tristitiam vero eidem contrariam p™nitentiam vocabo. Deinde quia (per corollarium propositionis 17 partis II) fieri potest ut lætitia qua aliquis se reliquos afficere imaginatur, imaginaria tantum sit et (per propositionem 25 hujus) unusquisque de se id omne conatur imaginari quod se lætitia afficere imaginatur, facile ergo fieri potest ut gloriosus superbus sit et se omnibus gratum esse imaginetur quando omnibus molestus est.

Since love is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause and hatred also is sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause, therefore this joy and sadness are kinds of love and hatred. But since love and hatred are referring to an external object, thus we will signify these emotions by other names of course we will name honor as a joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause and contrary to this (we will name) shame as a sadness (accompanied by an internal cause): understand when joy or sadness arise from where because a person believes oneself to be praised or blamed; otherwise I will call the joy accompanying the idea of internal cause as self-acceptance, conversely the sadness for the same I call repentance. Next since by IIP17C) it can happen that joy which one imagines oneself by some things to affect others, such is imagination that (by IIIP25) each and every one tries to imagine about oneself every thing which one imagines oneself to affect with joy, thus it easily happens that one is gloriously proud and imagines that one is favorable to all when annoying to all.