Here Spinoza raises how our imagination of how others see us affects our emotions. A friend of mine coached his children by saying, "do this for a new world record!" The idea of how others perceive us has a compounding effect due first to reflecting on the impact of our action which is then amplified by how we reflect on others reflecting on the impact of our action. This compounding effect has increased power, but like all effects of the imagination, this power is temporary - as opposed to reality's power. Then Spinoza delineates between an imagination driven by an external cause versus that of in internal cause. An external cause is typically named by the object, but in the case of an internal cause we don't simply name the object, e.g. oneself, but instead name the situation. When an internal cause is revealed in a public context, it shows up as honor or shame. However, when an internal cause is revealed privately, then the same view of one's action becomes self-acceptance or repentance. It is interesting to note that as shame is to repentance so is honor to self-acceptance. In the case of the tendency for this compounding imagination to spiral upwards, then instead of self-acceptance it becomes form of self-congratulations that is annoying to others.
Si quis aliquid egit quod reliquos lætitia afficere imaginatur, is lætitia concomitante idea sui tanquam causa afficietur sive se ipsum cum lætitia contemplabitur. Si contra aliquid egit quod reliquos tristitia afficere imaginatur, se ipsum cum tristitia contra contemplabitur.
If anyone does something which one imagines that affects others with joy, one is affected with joy accompanied with the idea of oneself as the cause or will contemplate oneself with joy. If, in contrast, anyone does something which one imagines that affects others with sadness, then, in contrast, one will contemplate oneself with sadness.
DEMONSTRATIO: Qui se reliquos lætitia vel tristitia afficere imaginatur, eo ipso (per propositionem 27 hujus) lætitia vel tristitia afficietur. Cum autem homo (per propositiones 19 et 23 partis II) sui sit conscius per affectiones quibus ad agendum determinatur, ergo qui aliquid egit quod ipse imaginatur reliquos lætitia afficere, lætitia cum conscientia sui tanquam causa afficietur sive seipsum cum lætitia contemplabitur et contra. Q.E.D.
Whoever imagines oneself to affect others with joy or sadness, by this itself (by IIIP27) one is affected with joy or sadness. Moreover since a human (by IIP19 and IIP23) is aware to oneself by emotions by which one is determined to action, thus one who does something, which one imagines oneself to affect others with joy, is affected with joy with the awareness of oneself as the cause or even will contemplate oneself with joy and the opposite also.
SCHOLIUM: Cum amor (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) sit lætitia concomitante idea causæ externæ et odium tristitia concomitante etiam idea causæ externæ, erit ergo hæc lætitia et tristitia amoris et odii species. Sed quia amor et odium ad objecta externa referuntur, ideo hos affectus aliis nominibus significabimus nempe lætitiam concomitante idea causæ internæ gloriam et tristitiam huic contrariam pudorem appellabimus : intellige quando lætitia vel tristitia ex eo oritur quod homo se laudari vel vituperari credit, alias lætitiam concomitante idea causæ internæ acquiescentiam in se ipso, tristitiam vero eidem contrariam p™nitentiam vocabo. Deinde quia (per corollarium propositionis 17 partis II) fieri potest ut lætitia qua aliquis se reliquos afficere imaginatur, imaginaria tantum sit et (per propositionem 25 hujus) unusquisque de se id omne conatur imaginari quod se lætitia afficere imaginatur, facile ergo fieri potest ut gloriosus superbus sit et se omnibus gratum esse imaginetur quando omnibus molestus est.
Since love is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause and hatred also is sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause, therefore this joy and sadness are kinds of love and hatred. But since love and hatred are referring to an external object, thus we will signify these emotions by other names of course we will name honor as a joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause and contrary to this (we will name) shame as a sadness (accompanied by an internal cause): understand when joy or sadness arise from where because a person believes oneself to be praised or blamed; otherwise I will call the joy accompanying the idea of internal cause as self-acceptance, conversely the sadness for the same I call repentance. Next since by IIP17C) it can happen that joy which one imagines oneself by some things to affect others, such is imagination that (by IIIP25) each and every one tries to imagine about oneself every thing which one imagines oneself to affect with joy, thus it easily happens that one is gloriously proud and imagines that one is favorable to all when annoying to all.
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