Sunday, March 10, 2024

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P31 - Confirmation Bias

Spinoza starts out with a fairly simple truth - that we seek confirmation for things which we desire to be true. This sets up a bias as we, so to speak, shop for an answer that appeals to us. Clearly this is hazardous to living our best lives but it does at least provide times during episodes of low confidence. The role that this bias plays in the marketplace is clear - during periods of euphoria or depression, market prices move dramatically. This excess variation is a product of what the proposition holds as true. The quote by Ovid is perfect for the challenges presented to investors - the difficulty of thinking for oneself. Finally, Spinoza outlines an implication of this bias - as long as we are all extracting our approval for all others, the collective sense will be frustration. It would be like a conversation where all talk and no one listens.

Si aliquem imaginamur amare vel cupere vel odio habere aliquid quod ipsi amamus, cupimus vel odio habemus, eo ipso rem constantius amabimus, etc. Si autem id quod amamus, eum aversari imaginamur vel contra, tum animi fluctuationem patiemur.

If we imagine that someone loves or desires or has hatred for something which we ourselves love, desire or have hatred for, then from this itself we will more steadily love that, etc. Moreover if we love that which, we imagine someone to oppose or vice versa, then we will undergo fluctuation of spirit.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex eo solo quod aliquem aliquid amare imaginamur, eo ipso idem amabimus (per propositionem 27 hujus). At sine hoc nos idem amare supponimus; accedit ergo amori nova causa a qua fovetur atque adeo id quod amamus hoc ipso constantius amabimus. Deinde ex eo quod aliquem aliquid aversari imaginamur, idem aversabimur (per eandem propositionem). At si supponamus nos eodem tempore id ipsum amare, eodem ergo tempore hoc idem amabimus et aversabimur sive (vide scholium propositionis 17 hujus) animi fluctuationem patiemur. Q.E.D.

From this alone because we imagine that someone loves something, by this same itself we will love (by IIIP27 [Empathy Proposition]). But without this we are subject to love the same; thus it occurs that a new cause of love by which it is nurtured and to such a degree that which we love by the same itself we will love more constantly. Next from this because we imagine that someone dislikes something, we will dislike the same (by the same proposition). But if we are subject to love at the same time the thing itself, thus at the same time, we will love and hate the same or (see IIIP17S), we undergo vacillation of the mind.

COROLLARIUM: Hinc et ex propositione 28 hujus sequitur unumquemque quantum potest conari ut unusquisque id quod ipse amat, amet et quod ipse odit, odio etiam habeat; unde illud poetæ: Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes; Ferreus est si quis quod sinit alter, amat.

From here and from IIIP28 [Following Beliefs for Power] it follows that each and every one tries as much as one can so that whatsoever one loves, one might love it and whatsoever one hates, one might have hatred for it; from where (comes) that (line) of the poet; as beloved ones let us hope together, let us fear together; one is like iron if anyone loves what another leaves alone.

SCHOLIUM: Hic conatus efficiendi ut unusquisque probet id quod ipse amat vel odio habet, revera est ambitio (vide scholium propositionis 29 hujus) atque adeo videmus unumquemque ex natura appetere ut reliqui ex ipsius ingenio vivant, quod dum omnes pariter appetunt, pariter sibi impedimento et dum omnes ab omnibus laudari seu amari volunt, odio invicem sunt.

Here the effort for doing so that each and every one might approve that what oneself loves or has hated for is held as ambition (see IIIP29S [Influence of Opinion of Others]) and to such an extent we see that each and every one desires by nature that the remaining might live by ones temperament, because as long as they all desire together, together are an impediment to themselves and as long as they all wish to be praised or loved from all, they are in turns with hate.

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