Objectum quod simul cum aliis antea vidimus vel quod nihil habere imaginamur nisi quod commune est pluribus, non tamdiu contemplabimur ac illud quod aliquid singulare habere imaginamur.
An object which we have seen before at the same time with some other things or which we imagine has nothing other than what is common to more things, we will not contemplate on as long as that thing which we imagine to have something singular.
DEMONSTRATIO: Simulatque objectum quod cum aliis vidimus, imaginamur, statim et aliorum recordamur (per propositionem 18 partis II, cujus etiam scholium vide) et sic ex unius contemplatione statim in contemplationem alterius incidimus. Atque eadem est ratio objecti quod nihil habere imaginamur nisi quod commune est pluribus. Nam eo ipso supponimus nos nihil in eo contemplari quod antea cum aliis non viderimus. Verum cum supponimus nos in objecto aliquo aliquid singulare quod antea nunquam vidimus, imaginari, nihil aliud dicimus quam quod mens dum illud objectum contemplatur, nullum aliud in se habeat in cujus contemplationem ex contemplatione illius incidere potest atque adeo ad illud solum contemplandum determinata est. Ergo objectum etc. Q.E.D.
As soon as we imagine an object which we have seen with some other things, immediately we recall the others (by IIP18, see also IIP18S) and thus from only this recollection immediately do we fall into the recollection of the other. And the same is the reason for an object which we imagine has nothing other than which is common to more things. For from this itself we imagine that we contemplate nothing in it which we have not see before with other things. Truly when we suppose that we imagine in some object something singular which we have never seen before, we say nothing other than because as long as the mind contemplates some obect, there is not something it has in itself in whose contemplation it is able to fall into from contemplation of that so it is determined to contemplate that only.
SCHOLIUM: Hæc mentis affectio sive rei singularis imaginatio quatenus sola in mente versatur, vocatur admiratio, quæ si ab objecto quod timemus moveatur, consternatio dicitur quia mali admiratio hominem suspensum in sola sui contemplatione ita tenet ut de aliis cogitare non valeat quibus illud malum vitare posset. Sed si id quod admiramur sit hominis alicujus prudentia, industria vel aliquid hujusmodi, quia eo ipso hominem nobis longe antecellere contemplamur, tum admiratio vocatur veneratio; alias horror si hominis iram, invidiam etc. admiramur. Deinde si hominis quem amamus prudentiam, industriam etc. admiramur, amor eo ipso (per propositionem 12 hujus) major erit et hunc amorem admirationi sive venerationi junctum devotionem vocamus.
This affection of the mind or the imagination of a singular thing insofar as it is spun about only in the mind, it is called wonder, which if it is moved by an object which we fear, it is said to be consternation because the wonder at the evil holds a person suspended in the contemplation of only the thing itself to such a degree that one is not able to think about other things by which one might be able to avoid that evil. But if we wonder at that which is the wisdom, industry or another pattern of some person, since we contemplate by this itself this person is far superior to us, then this wonder is called veneration; elsewhere horro if we wonder at the person's anger, jealousy etc. Then if we wonder at the wisdom, industry etc of a person whom we love, the love will be greater by this itself (by IIIP12) and we call this love joined to admiration or veneration devotion.
Et ad hunc modum concipere etiam possumus odium, spem, securitatem et alios affectus admirationi junctos atque adeo plures affectus deducere poterimus quam qui receptis vocabulis indicari solent. Unde apparet affectuum nomina inventa esse magis ex eorum vulgari usu quam ex eorundem accurata cognitione. Admirationi opponitur contemptus cujus tamen causa hæc plerumque est quod scilicet ex eo quod aliquem rem aliquam admirari, amare, metuere etc. videmus vel ex eo quod res aliqua primo aspectu apparet similis rebus quas admiramur, amamus, metuimus etc. (per propositionem 15 cum ejus corollario et propositionem 27 hujus) determinamur ad eandem rem admirandum, amandum, metuendum etc. Sed si ex ipsius rei præsentia vel accuratiore contemplatione, id omne de eadem negare cogamur quod causa admirationis, amoris, metus etc. esse potest, tum mens ex ipsa rei præsentia magis ad ea cogitandum quæ in objecto non sunt quam quæ in ipso sunt, determinata manet cum tamen contra ex objecti præsentia id præcipue cogitare soleat quod in objecto est. Porro sicut devotio ex rei quam amamus admiratione sic irrisio ex rei quam odimus vel metuimus contemptu oritur et dedignatio ex stultitiæ contemptu sicuti veneratio ex admiratione prudentiæ. Possumus denique amorem, spem, gloriam et alios affectus junctos contemptui concipere atque inde alios præterea affectus deducere quos etiam nullo singulari vocabulo ab aliis distinguere solemus.
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