III.D5: Contempt Defined

Contemptus est rei alicujus imaginatio quæ mentem adeo parum tangit ut ipsa mens ex rei præsentia magis moveatur ad ea imaginandum quæ in ipsa re non sunt quam quæ in ipsa sunt. Vide scholium propositionis 52 hujus. Definitiones venerationis et dedignationis missas hic facio quia nulli quod sciam affectus ex his nomen trahunt. 

Contempt is an imagination of some thing which touches the mind to such a small extent that the mind itself is moved more by the presence of the thing to imagining those things which are not in the thing itself than those things which are. See IIIP52. Outlining the definitions of veneration and disdain I do here since there are no affects which derive their name from these. 

Here Spinoza discusses contempt as something which is not related to an affect, but more like some redirected state. He includes veneration and disdain as constructed in a similar way. These are all endowed with more of a sideways force than a direct force. It is pertinent that Spinoza begins his post-primitives discussion with stating those states of mind which are not powered by the primitives, but are likely to be confused as such. The delineation of veneration as not affect-driven - like that of wonder - lends credence to the idea that any form of a religious mindset is unattractive to Spinoza. 

III.D4: Wonder Defined

Admiratio est rei alicujus imaginatio in qua mens defixa propterea manet quia hæc singularis imaginatio nullam cum reliquis habet connexionem. Vide propositionem 52 cum ejusdem scholio.

Wonder is an imagination of something in which the mind is fixated because it is locked since this imagination of a singular thing has no connection with other things.

EXPLICATIO: In scholio propositionis 18 partis II ostendimus quænam sit causa cur mens ex contemplatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat videlicet quia earum rerum imagines invicem concatenatæ et ita ordinatæ sunt ut alia aliam sequatur, quod quidem concipi nequit quando rei imago nova est sed mens in ejusdem rei contemplatione detinebitur donec ab aliis causis ad alia cogitandum determinetur. Rei itaque novæ imaginatio in se considerata ejusdem naturæ est ac reliquæ et hac de causa ego admirationem inter affectus non numero nec causam video cur id facerem quandoquidem hæc mentis distractio ex nulla causa positiva quæ mentem ab aliis distrahat, oritur sed tantum ex eo quod causa cur mens ex unius rei contemplatione ad alia cogitandum determinatur, deficit. Tres igitur (ut in scholio propositionis 11 hujus monui) tantum affectus primitivos seu primarios agnosco nempe lætitiæ, tristitiæ et cupiditatis nec alia de causa verba de admiratione feci quam quia usu factum est ut quidam affectus qui ex tribus primitivis derivantur, aliis nominibus indicari soleant quando ad objecta quæ admiramur, referuntur; quæ quidem ratio me ex æquo movet ut etiam contemptus definitionem his adjungam. 

In IIP18S we have shown what might be the cause why the mind from the contemplation of one thing immediately begins the contemplation of another thing, that is to say, since the images of these things are connected in turn and thus they are ordered so that one might follow another, which indeed cannot be conceived when the image of the thing is new but the mind will be detained by the contemplation of the same thing until from other causes it is determined to thinking about others. Thus the imagination of a new thing considered in itself is of the same nature as the others and from this cause I do not count wonder among the affects and I do not see the reason why I might make it since the distraction of the mind arises not from any positive cause which leads the mind from others, but only lacks from which cause why the mind is determined from the contemplation of one thing to thinking about others. Thus three (as I have warned in IIIP11S) I recognize only the primitive or primary affects, namely joy, sadness and desire and I have not made other reasons about wonder which since by use it is a deed so that indeed the affects which are derived from the three primitives, by other names they are accustomed to be indicated when to objects which we wonder, they are referred; which reason indeed moves me from equanimity so that I might also join contempt to the definition of these.

Spinoza defines wonder immediately after the three primary emotions - giving it a high place. I think this is because wonder would seem to qualify as a force as empowering as love in its ability to offset the many negative forces in life. However, he addresses that wonder lacks this power because 1) it is a highly disconnected space and 2) wonder is followed by familiarity and loses its power. Spinoza is highlighting the connectivity of our mind - even as we unconsciously drift from idea to idea - and the power of that ideational connectivity. 

III.D3 - Sadness Defined

Tristitia est hominis transitio a majore ad minorem perfectionem.

Sadness is the movement of a person from a greater to a lesser perfection.

EXPLICATIO: Dico transitionem. Nam lætitia non est ipsa perfectio. Si enim homo cum perfectione ad quam transit nasceretur, ejusdem absque lætitiæ affectu compos esset; quod clarius apparet ex tristitiæ affectu qui huic est contrarius. Nam quod tristitia in transitione ad minorem perfectionem consistit, non autem in ipsa minore perfectione, nemo negare potest quandoquidem homo eatenus contristari nequit quatenus alicujus perfectionis est particeps. Nec dicere possumus quod tristitia in privatione majoris perfectionis consistat nam privatio nihil est; tristitiæ autem affectus actus est qui propterea nullus alius esse potest quam actus transeundi ad minorem perfectionem hoc est actus quo hominis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur (vide scholium propositionis 11 hujus). Cæterum definitiones hilaritatis, titillationis, melancholiæ et doloris omitto quia ad corpus potissimum referuntur et non nisi lætitiæ aut tristitiæ sunt species.

I say movement. For joy is not perfection itself. For if a person were born with perfection to which one moved, one would be in control of the the same thing without the mood of joy; which is more apparent from the mood of sadness which is contrary to this. For no one is able to deny that sadness consists of the movement to a lesser perfection, not moreover in the lesser perfection itself, since a person is not said to be sad insofar as as one participates in some perfection. And we are not able to say that sadness consists of the loss of a greater perfection for loss is nothing; moreover, the affect of sadness is an action which for that reason is to be able to be nothing other than an action of moving to a lesser perfection, that is an action by which the potential power of a person's acting is diminished or restrained (see IIIP11S). The remaining definitions of hilarity, titillation, melancholy and pain are omitted since they refer to the body above all and are only kinds of joy or sadness.

The final sentence of this explanation emphasizes that the focus of The Ethics is on those desires, joys and sadnesses which have a mental component. There are forms of desire, joy and sadness which are only physical, but The Ethics is not a medical textbook. While this disconnection between the mind and body seems to split Spinoza's strict parallelism, that parallelism only applies fully to Deus Sive Natura. In the case of people, Spinoza demonstrates that the consciousness of the mind narrowly selects from the complex workings operating at any point. So, strictly speaking, Spinoza is addressing affects related to consciousness. 

III.D2 - Joy Defined

Lætitia est hominis transitio a minore ad majorem perfectionem.

Joy is the movement of a person from a lesser to a greater perfection.