III.D22: Disrespect Defined

Despectus est de aliquo præ odio minus justo sentire.

Disrespect is to feel less than just about someone due to hatred.

EXPLICATIO: Est itaque existimatio amoris et despectus odii effectus sive proprietas atque adeo potest existimatio etiam definiri quod sit amor quatenus hominem ita afficit ut de re amata plus justo sentiat et contra despectus quod sit odium quatenus hominem ita afficit ut de eo quem odio habet, minus justo sentiat. Vide de his scholium propositionis 26 hujus.

Thus reverence is an effect or property of love and disrespect of hatred and to such an extent reverence is also able to be defined what is love insofar as it affects a person so that one feels more than just about the beloved thing and in contrast disrespect as what affects a person so that one feels less than just about what one has hatred for. See concerning these IIIP26S.

The explanation seems redundant here and, in many ways, it is. Yet Spinoza is concerned about the shades of love and hate and the explanation allows him to introduce "insofar as" as the qualifier for the particular level or shade of love or hatred discussed here. 

III.D21: Esteem Defined

Existimatio est de aliquo præ amore plus justo sentire.

Reverence is to feel more than appropriate about someone due to love.

Spinoza is leery of religion and religious leaders. This definition seems to resonate with that meaning. To feel strongly about someone due to love is certainly a normal condition. The challenge is that such feelings can cloud appropriate judgment and it is this clouding that Spinoza is highlighting. 

 

  

III.D20: Indignation Defined

Indignatio est odium erga aliquem qui alteri malefecit.

Indignation is hatred towards someone who hurt another.

EXPLICATIO: Hæc nomina ex communi usu aliud significare scio. Sed meum institutum non est verborum significationem sed rerum naturam explicare easque iis vocabulis indicare quorum significatio quam ex usu habent, a significatione qua eadem usurpare volo, non omnino abhorret, quod semel monuisse sufficiat. Cæterum horum affectuum causam vide in corollario I propositionis 27 et scholio propositionis 22 hujus partis.

I know that these names signify something else from common usage. But my intention is not the significance of words but to explain the nature of a thing and to point out with these words whose significance which have from usage, from a significance from which same word I wish to usurp, which is not altogether opposed, let it suffice one time to have been warned. For the cause of these other affects, see IIIP27C1 and IIIP22S.

Translation is always difficult, but Spinoza warns that any philological reading may be incorrect if the reader does not search for the underlying "nature of a thing." The words are in a general sense correct, but do not have a specificity of meaning. This warning is especially relevant as we get to the end of the Ethics where many words are used to indicate the highly desirable affect accompanying our highest state.

III.D19: Favor Defined

Favor est amor erga aliquem qui alteri benefecit.

Favor is love towards someone who has benefited another. 

III.D18: Commiseration Defined

Commiseratio est tristitia concomitante idea mali quod alteri quem nobis similem esse imaginamur, evenit. Vide scholium propositionis 22 et scholium propositionis 27 hujus.

Commiseration is a sadness accompanied by the idea of a bad thing which occurs to another whom we imagine is similar to ourselves. See IIIP22S and IIIP27S. 

EXPLICATIO: Inter commiserationem et misericordiam nulla videtur esse differentia nisi forte quod commiseratio singularem affectum respiciat, misericordia autem ejus habitum.

Between commiseration and compassion there seems to be no difference unless perhaps because commiseration might reflect a singular affect, while compassion reflects one's demeanor. 

Again Spinoza situates the affect in a bodily positioning. One can almost feel the difference here with commiseration feeling like a core experience (due to personal identification), while compassion is felt more at a peripheral level - like the skin. 

III.D17: Biting of Conscience Defined

Conscientiæ morsus est tristitia concomitante idea rei præteritæ quæ præter spem evenit.

Biting of conscience (or remorse) is a sadness accompanied by the idea of a past thing which turned out beyond hope. 

Here we have a hope unmet and Spinoza uses a phrase that exactly describes the physical sensation - consistent with the concept that the mind is the idea of the body and, thus, bodily-centered. 

III.D16: Thrilling Defined

Gaudium est lætitia concomitante idea rei præteritæ quæ præter spem evenit. 

Thrilling is joy accompanied by the idea of a past thing which occurred beyond hope. 

Spinoza is describing a pattern in which not only are expectations unmet, met or exceeded, but also hopes are similarly unmet, met or exceeded. Here is where hope is exceeded. 

III.D15: Desperation Defined

Desperatio est tristitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.

Desperation is a sadness born of the idea of a future or past matter which has been raised as a cause for concern.

EXPLICATIO: Oritur itaque ex spe securitas et ex metu desperatio quando de rei eventu dubitandi causa tollitur, quod fit quia homo rem præteritam vel futuram adesse imaginatur et ut præsentem contemplatur vel quia alia imaginatur quæ existentiam earum rerum secludunt quæ ipsi dubium injiciebant. Nam tametsi de rerum singularium eventu (per corollarium propositionis 31 partis II) nunquam possumus esse certi, fieri tamen potest ut de earum eventu non dubitemus. Aliud enim esse ostendimus (vide scholium propositionis 49 partis II) de re non dubitare, aliud rei certitudinem habere atque adeo fieri potest ut ex imagine rei præteritæ aut futuræ eodem lætitiæ vel tristitiæ affectu afficiamur ac ex rei præsentis imagine, ut in propositione 18 hujus demonstravimus, quam cum ejusdem scholiis vide. 

Thus security arises from hope desperation from fear when the cause for doubting the eventual outcome is raised, because it happens since a person imagines a past or future thing as present and as one contemplates the present thing or other things one imagines which exclude the existence of these things which throw themselves into doubt. For even if concerning the outcome of singular things (by IIP31C) we are unable to be certain, nonetheless it can happen that we do not doubt the outcome of them. For we have shown that it is one thing (see IIP49S) to not doubt something, something else to have certainty about a matter and to such an extent it is able to happen that from the image of a past or future thing we are affected by an affect of joy or sadness and from the image of the thing present, as we have shown in IIIP18, then see with scholia of the same. 

The explanation here is important for an insight into Spinoza's view on thinking. We might commonly hold that not doubting something is the same as being certain of something, but still most of us actually hold that not doubting someone is the same as "believing" someone. Certainty has a much higher standard and most of us have faced that dreaded question, "Are you certain?" only to find some hesitation. Spinoza is setting out a tool for managing the reactivity of hopes and fears by allowing these affects to be muted by a simple question "Are you certain?"

 

III.D14: Security Defined

Securitas est lætitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.

Security is a joy born of the idea of a past or future matter about which there has been raised as a cause for concern. 

III.D13: Fear Defined

Metus est inconstans tristitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus. Vide de his scholium II propositionis 18 hujus.

Fear is an uncertain sadness born of the idea of a future or past thing about whose outcome we are to some extent hesitant. See IIIP18S2 concerning these.

EXPLICATIO: Ex his definitionibus sequitur non dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe. Qui enim spe pendet et de rei eventu dubitat, is aliquid imaginari supponitur quod rei futuræ existentiam secludit atque adeo eatenus contristari (per propositionem 19 hujus) et consequenter dum spe pendet, metuere ut res eveniat. Qui autem contra in metu est hoc est de rei quam odit eventu dubitat, aliquid etiam imaginatur quod ejusdem rei existentiam secludit atque adeo (per propositionem 20 hujus) lætatur et consequenter eatenus spem habet ne eveniat.

From these definitions, it follows that hope does not exist without fear nor fear without hope. For whoever ponders with hope and doubts the outcome of a matter, is supposed to imagine something which excludes the existence of a future thing and to such an extent is saddened (by IIIP19) and consequently as long as one ponders with hop, fears that the thing may occur. In contrast, whoever is in fear, that is, one is hesitant about the outcome concerning a thing which one hates, also imagines something which excludes the existence of the same thing and to such an extent (by IIIP20) is overjoyed and consequently has hope to an extent that it not occur. 

III.D12: Hope Defined

Spes est inconstans lætitia orta ex idea rei futuræ vel præteritæ de cujus eventu aliquatenus dubitamus.

Hope is an uncertain joy born of the idea of a future thing or a past one about whose outcome we are somewhat hesitant.  

III.D11: Mockery Defined

Irrisio est lætitia orta ex eo quod aliquid quod contemnimus in re quam odimus inesse imaginamur.

Mockery is a joy arising from where we imagine something which we scorn to be in something which we hate.

EXPLICATIO: Quatenus rem quam odimus contemnimus eatenus de eadem existentiam negamus (vide scholium propositionis 52 hujus) et eatenus (per propositionem 20 hujus) lætamur. Sed quoniam supponimus hominem id quod irridet odio tamen habere, sequitur hanc lætitiam solidam non esse. Vide scholium propositionis 47 hujus.

Insofar as we scorn that which we hate to such a degree do we deny the existence of a thing (see IIIP52S) and to such a degree (by IIIP20) do we rejoice. But since we suppose a person has hatred for that which one mocks, it follows that this joy is not solid. See IIIP47S. 

Spinoza is highlighting the complexity of moods around memories. In order to attain blessedness, clarity or processing of past events is important. For that reason, he revisits the issues raised by the things hated in the past.

 

III.D10: Devotion Defined

Devotio est amor erga eum quem admiramur.

Devotion is love towards one whom we admire.

EXPLICATIO: Admirationem oriri ex rei novitate ostendimus propositione 52 hujus. Si igitur contingat ut id quod admiramur sæpe imaginemur, idem admirari desinemus atque adeo videmus devotionis affectum facile in simplicem amorem degenerare. 

We demonstrated in IIIP52 that admiration arises from some novelty. Thus, if it happens that we often imagine whatever we admire, we will cease to admire the same and to such an extent we see that the feeling of devotion devolves easily into simple love.

Spinoza continues his careful reading of emotions related to awe, wonder, veneration and devotion as simply aberrations based on strangeness or newness. So, these aberrations are not desirable or lofty, but are temporary experiences on the way to understanding. Religion, in contrast, holds the highest regard for such feelings. Spinoza's careful approach to this category of emotions gives weight to the argument that the power of "the intellectual love of God" is fundamentally anti-religious and rational in its nature, rather than an overpowering "spiritual experience" in support of a rational decision. The priority of such anti-religious and rational basis is its durability, because novelty fades and, as he points out here, with it the overpowering nature of the religious emotions.

III.D9: Aversion Defined

Aversio est tristitia concomitante idea alicujus rei quæ per accidens causa est tristitiæ. De his vide scholium propositionis 15 hujus.

Aversion is a sadness accompanied by the idea of some thing which is a sadness by accidental cause. On these see IIIP15S. 

Consistent with the discussion on tendency, Spinoza is arguing another behavior is rooted in the primitives - this time sadness. For centuries, people have debated the idea of boys loving, and girls hating spiders and snakes. Spinoza is arguing that this "accidental" perception is rooted in an unwillingness to acknowledge the cultivation of the emotions driving, in this case, aversion. 

III.D8: Tendency Defined

Propensio est lætitia concomitante idea alicujus rei quæ per accidens causa est lætitiæ. 

Tendency is a joy accompanied by the idea of whatever thing which is a joy by accidental cause.

Spinoza is holding consistent that a tendency is not itself a primitive, but is rooted in the primitive of joy. This is important. Many might attribute a person's lack of power to avoid self-destructive behaviors to some tendency that seems structurally embedded. Instead, Spinoza argues that it is derived from joy but assigned an accidental cause in order to minimize identity with the tendency.

 

III.D7: Hatred Defined

Odium est tristitia concomitante idea causæ externæ.

Hatred is sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause

EXPLICATIO: Quæ hic notanda sunt, ex dictis in præcedentis definitionis explicatione facile percipiuntur. Vide præterea scholium propositionis 13 hujus. 

These things which ought to be noted here, are easily perceived from statements in the explanation of the preceding definition. See besides IIIP13S. 

III.D6: Love Defined

Amor est lætitia concomitante idea causæ externæ.

Love is joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

EXPLICATIO: Hæc definitio satis clare amoris essentiam explicat; illa vero auctorum qui definiunt amorem esse voluntatem amantis se jungendi rei amatæ, non amoris essentiam sed ejus proprietatem exprimit et quia amoris essentia non satis ab auctoribus perspecta fuit, ideo neque ejus proprietatis ullum clarum conceptum habere potuerunt et hinc factum ut eorum definitionem admodum obscuram esse omnes judicaverint. Verum notandum cum dico proprietatem esse in amante se voluntate jungere rei amatæ, me per voluntatem non intelligere consensum vel animi deliberationem seu liberum decretum (nam hoc fictitium esse demonstravimus propositione 48 partis II) nec etiam cupiditatem sese jungendi rei amatæ quando abest vel perseverandi in ipsius præsentia quando adest; potest namque amor absque hac aut illa cupiditate concipi sed per voluntatem me acquiescentiam intelligere quæ est in amante ob rei amatæ præsentiam a qua lætitia amantis corroboratur aut saltem fovetur.

This definition explains the essence of love clearly enough; truly those writers who define love as the will of love to join oneself to the beloved thing, have not expressed the essence of love but its property and since the essence of love was not viewed enough by the authors, to such an extent they are not able to have any clear concept of its property and from this the fact that all judge that their definition is very obscure. Truly it ought to be noted since I say that the property is in love that one by will joins to the beloved, that I by will do not understand agreement or deliberation of the heart or free decree (for this is a fiction we have demonstrated in IIP48) and also not desire to join oneself to the beloved when away or persevering in presence of it when near; for love is able to be conceived from this or that desire but by will I understand that satisfaction which is in love on account of the presence of the beloved from which joy is corroborated by love or at least encouraged.