III.D4: Wonder

Admiratio est rei alicujus imaginatio in qua mens defixa propterea manet quia hæc singularis imaginatio nullam cum reliquis habet connexionem. Vide propositionem 52 cum ejusdem scholio.

Wonder is an imagination of something in which the mind is fixated because it is locked since this imagination of a singular thing has no connection with other things.

EXPLICATIO: In scholio propositionis 18 partis II ostendimus quænam sit causa cur mens ex contemplatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat videlicet quia earum rerum imagines invicem concatenatæ et ita ordinatæ sunt ut alia aliam sequatur, quod quidem concipi nequit quando rei imago nova est sed mens in ejusdem rei contemplatione detinebitur donec ab aliis causis ad alia cogitandum determinetur. Rei itaque novæ imaginatio in se considerata ejusdem naturæ est ac reliquæ et hac de causa ego admirationem inter affectus non numero nec causam video cur id facerem quandoquidem hæc mentis distractio ex nulla causa positiva quæ mentem ab aliis distrahat, oritur sed tantum ex eo quod causa cur mens ex unius rei contemplatione ad alia cogitandum determinatur, deficit. Tres igitur (ut in scholio propositionis 11 hujus monui) tantum affectus primitivos seu primarios agnosco nempe lætitiæ, tristitiæ et cupiditatis nec alia de causa verba de admiratione feci quam quia usu factum est ut quidam affectus qui ex tribus primitivis derivantur, aliis nominibus indicari soleant quando ad objecta quæ admiramur, referuntur; quæ quidem ratio me ex æquo movet ut etiam contemptus definitionem his adjungam. 

In IIP18S we have shown what might be the cause why the mind from the contemplation of one thing immediately begins the contemplation of another thing, that is to say, since the images of these things are connected in turn and thus they are ordered so that one might follow another, which indeed cannot be conceived when the image of the thing is new but the mind will be detained by the contemplation of the same thing until from other causes it is determined to thinking about others. Thus the imagination of a new thing considered in itself is of the same nature as the others and from this cause I do not count wonder among the affects and I do not see the reason why I might make it since the distraction of the mind arises not from any positive cause which leads the mind from others, but only lacks from which cause why the mind is determined from the contemplation of one thing to thinking about others. Thus three (as I have warned in IIIP11S) I recognize only the primitive or primary affects, namely joy, sadness and desire and I have not made other reasons about wonder which since by use it is a deed so that indeed the affects which are derived from the three primitives, by other names they are accustomed to be indicated when to objects which we wonder, they are referred; which reason indeed moves me from equanimity so that I might also join contempt to the definition of these.