Spinoza'a Ethics: I.D7: Free

Here Spinoza defines "free" in a way I would not have intuitively understood it. My sense of free is skewed by a notion of will, whereas Spinoza is setting up free as a result of internal powers of "its own nature" dominating. This free or libera which is a result of its own powers, or its own nature, contrasts with necessary or necessaria which is a result of external powers dominating. One core issue then seems to be defining "its own nature" or suae naturae. Free and necessary are a function of that definition.

Ea res libera dicitur quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum determinatur. Necessaria autem vel potius coacta quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione.

Translated as,

That thing is called free which exists from only the necessity of its own nature and is determined to act by itself alone. Moreover a thing is called necessary or rather compelled which is determined by something other [than its own nature] to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.D6: God

This definition builds on I.D3 of substance as in itself. The definition of God also expands the role of attribute defined in I.D4. God is characterized as substance made up of infinite attributes. Significantly, the emphasis on attributes places God in a “view from somewhere” categorization. Without the perceiving intellect, God, as defined, does not exist. Without the intellect, God is simply substance without the “as if” or tanquam of infinite attributes. Thus, understanding God involves understanding attributes. Spinoza is defining a relationship between God and the perceiving intellect as real through connecting the expressiveness of the attribute to the perceptiveness of the intellect. 

The explanation (a first so far) highlights this. To be infinite in its own kind (echoing I.D2 where "finite in its own kind" was defined) is to be limited to one attribute only - that of itself. Spinoza states that this expressiveness of God which conveys God’s eternal and infinite essence cannot occur with something that is infinite only in its own kind. To be infinite only in its own kind is to suffer a negation, to be able to be conceived of as not existing and thus to such a degree is incompatible with the essence of substance. Thus, God is substance made expressive through infinite attributes. As God, substance as Knowing and Being also becomes substance as Thinking (and Extending) - a Spinozist variant of the Word becoming incarnate.

Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum hoc est substantiam constantem infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit.

Translated as,

By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes whose each and every one expresses eternal and infinite essence.

Explicatio: Dico absolute infinitum, non autem in suo genere; quicquid enim in suo genere tantum infinitum est, infinita de eo attributa negare possumus; quod autem absolute infinitum est, ad eius essentiam pertinet quicquid essentiam exprimit et negationem nullam involvit.

Translated as,

Explanation. I say absolutely infinite, however not infinite in its own kind; for whatever is infinite in its own kind only, we are able to deny infinite attributes concerning it; however that which is absolutely infinite, whatever pertains to its essence expresses its essence and involves no negation.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.D5: Mode

Another key concept: "mode" or modum. He uses the same verb intelligo which translates as "I mean" or "I understand." The translation "I mean" might be more accurate. "Modifications" seems to be an excellent rendering of affectiones, retaining the root of the word modum itself. "Affections" seems to be heavy with connotations that I doubt Spinoza holds here and, further, are misleading enough to create significant confusion in later books on emotions. Next, I also think that translations of "substance" should not be modified (no pun intended) by an indefinite pronoun (as in "a substance"), as it would appear from an earlier observation that substance is logically not plural.

This first part seems clear enough with his clarification following sive or "or." He describes "mode" as id quod in alio est or "that which is in another." This is as opposed to I.D3 where Spinoza describes "substance" as id quod in se est or "that which is in itself." His clarification on the meaning of this term is explained in I.D3: "is conceived through itself" as meaning "that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed." Thus, his meaning in I.D5 must follow when he states "through which it is conceived" to be roughly "that whose concept does require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed." Clearly a "mode" does not qualify as causam sui or "self-caused" of I.D1.

A remarkable issue lies in the middle of the definition. Spinoza is not always careful with his writing - particularly in the scholia. However, it would be unlikely that these first definitions were not carefully written and subsequently scrutinized. Every word is too important. Thus, the use of the plural affectiones or "modifications" to match with the singular modum or "mode" is remarkable - when the rest of the definition returns to the singular. Most translators treat it as simply a kind of categorical plural which then simply goes back to the singular after sive. Other translators convert it to a singular as a "state." But, I think both approaches are mistaken. Instead, I think that modum is a complex item which is made up of multiple modifications, which as an entity that might be in some sense considered a whole is then able to be "in another" or "conceived through another." he plural signifies the lack of such a thing as a truly simple body. Later in the work, he hypothesizes the existence of a simple body for discussions of motion and rest and then dismisses such existence after he has established the principles involving motion and rest require complex bodies made up of complex parts.

Spinoza again raises the mind-body issue as in prior definitions because he discusses not only the “body” aspect with a mode being in another, but also the “mind” aspect by the mode being in another through which it is conceived. This mind-body aspect is similar to I.D1 – I.D3 because it uses the verb “conceive” rather than the verb “perceive.” This means that the mode, even with its limited function, is discussed in a “view from nowhere,” that is the realm of Being and Knowing.

Per modum intelligo substantiae affectiones sive id quod in alio est, per quod concipitur.

Translated as,

By mode I understand a modifications of substance, or that which is in another through which it is conceived.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.D4: Attribute

From earlier discussions, we found that substance is self-caused (I.D3 and I.D1). If it is self-caused, its essence must involve existence. But these observations were made with the verb "conceive" or concipit rather than this verb "perceive" or percipit. By bringing in two new words,"intellect" or intellectus and "perceive" or percipit, Spinoza is bringing a different level of engagement to bear. Confirming this more forcefully is the presence of tanquam which has more of the sense of the translation "as if" than "as." Spinoza has stepped from the a realm of a "view from nowhere" in the first three definitions with a general logic (mathematically delimiting, but non-numerical) to a "view from somewhere" with a defined degree of specificity or number, from Knowing to Thinking.

Per attributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens.

Translated as,

By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of a substance as if constituting its essence.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.D3: Substance

This definition of "substance" is like the definition of “self-caused” (or I.D1) since it follows that substance might also be described as "cannot be conceived except as existing" due to the challenges of conceiving something which is "in itself" and "conceived through itself" which does actually not exist. Further, Spinoza implies substance as not limited (thus infinite) as defined in I.D2, since it cannot be limited in its own kind if "it is in itself and is conceived through itself." 

If these implications are true of substance, as self-caused from I.D1 and not finite from I.D2, then it may follow that nothing exists except substance - and even logically implies only one substance. 

Again, the verb is all-important. Spinoza uses “conceive” or concipit as a verb of thinking with the particular sense of having “a view from nowhere” structured by general logic (mathematically delimiting, but non-numerical). He is not using a verb of thinking that is set in a particular time or place. Instead, he is using a verb to describe something which is true for all time. 

Another way to understand “a view from nowhere” is the implication here that substance is Knowing. Knowing has a sense of seeing as a whole, while Thinking is a term that we use for more of a process. So it may mean (and I believe it does) that Knowing is intrinsic to substance. The duality from the first two definitions is carried through here as well. The “mind-body” duality identified in the first two definitions unfolds into substance duality as “conceived through itself” or Knowing and “is in itself” or Being. 

Per substantiam, intellego id quod in se est et per se concipitur hoc est id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo formari debeat.

Translated as:

By substance, I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not lack the concept of another thing by which it needs to be formed.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.D2: Finitude

In I.D2, Spinoza carefully defines something as finite "in its own kind." For anything to have limits, these limits are created jointly, not unilaterally. There needs to be something or somethings at all limiting points. For this something (or collection of somethings) to jointly create a limit outside of the primary thing itself, the outsidedness must be greater than that insidedness.

Ea res dicitur in suo genere finita quae alia ejusdem naturae terminari potest. Exempli gratia corpus dicitur finitum quia aliud semper majus concipimus. Sic cogitatio alia cogitatione terminatur. At corpus non terminatur cogitatione nec cogitatio corpore.

Translated as:

That thing is said to be finite in its own kind that can be limited by another of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite because we always conceive another that is greater. Thus a thought is limited by another thought. But a body is not limited by a thought nor a thought by a body.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.D1: Self-Caused

Here at the beginning of definitions, we ponder the nature of beginning. Almost everything that exists seems to have a start or a beginning. However, when we reflect on the essence of the things that exist, we are less likely to conceive a beginning. Within these existences and essences, Spinoza says it is inconceivable to imagine a complete nothingness out of which came somethingness. Something was always inherent in the apparent nothingness to create somethingness.

Spinoza defines self-caused under two different angles: the essence of self-caused and the nature of self-caused. These are not redundancies. In fact, taking two different approaches at once does not even seem to follow a geometric method, but he has an important reason for this dual-angled approach. To use contemporary phrasing, Spinoza unfolds our journey of happiness as a “mind-body problem” which requires a different line of reasoning for each component. Here “essence of” addresses the body, while “nature of” addresses the mind.

From the perspective of the body, he defines the essence of self-caused as involving existence. The meaning of existence is clear as there’s nothing to indicate that Spinoza means anything other than our state of existing. But the verb “involves” is not so transparent. When we say “involve,” we mean there are some necessary circumstances as in “my job involves hard work.” Hard work is the necessary circumstance around my job. Taking that approach, it might be appropriate to say that existence is the necessary circumstance of the essence of self-caused. Another way might be to look more closely at the root meaning of the verb.

"Involve” is the English translation of the Latin word involvit. This Latin word come from two Latin words – in meaning “in” and volvere meaning “to roll around.” Combining their components means “to roll around inside.” So, we could envision my job as a core, rolling round inside my hard work. That image graphically and, more importantly, bodily captures what Spinoza is doing here. He is describing the essence of self-caused as rolling around inside existence. This “rolling around inside” is just the first of many times that Spinoza’s abstract ideas, like essence, become immanent in concrete ideas, like existence. Then he shifts from body to mind.

He states that the nature of self-caused cannot be conceived except as existing. Again, the verb is all-important. Spinoza uses “conceive” or concipit as a verb of thinking with the particular sense of having “a view from nowhere” structured by general logic (mathematically delimiting, but non-numerical). He is not using a verb of thinking that is set in a particular time or place. Instead, he is using a verb to describe something which is true for all time. So, in the first aspect, the bodily aspect, it is real, but in this second aspect, it is true. Here is the first definition we are starting to see that what is real for the body is true for the mind.

Per causam sui intellego id cujus essentia involvit existentiam sive id cujus natura non potest concipi nisi existens.

Translated as:

By cause of itself, I understand that whose essence involves existence or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.