Spinoza's Ethics: III.P8

Conatus quo unaquæque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nullum tempus finitum sed indefinitum involvit.

The trying by which each and every thing tries to persist to be in itself, involves no finite time, but an indefinite one.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim tempus limitatum involveret quod rei durationem determinaret, tum ex sola ipsa potentia qua res existit, sequeretur quod res post limitatum illud tempus non posset existere sed quod deberet destrui; atqui hoc (per propositionem 4 hujus) est absurdum : ergo conatus quo res existit, nullum tempus definitum involvit sed contra quoniam (per eandem propositionem 4 hujus) si a nulla externa causa destruatur, eadem potentia qua jam existit, existere perget semper, ergo hic conatus tempus indefinitum involvit. Q.E.D.

For if time involves a limitation which determines the duration of the thing, then from only the power itself by which the thing exists, it follows that the thing is not able to exist after that time limitation but ought to be destroyed; and so this (by IIIP4) is absurd; thus trying by which the thing exists, involves no definite time but against since (by IIIP4) if it is destroyed by no external cause, the same power by which it now exists, it always goes on to exist, thus trying involves an indefinite time here. 

Spinoza is articulating some persistence here. He seems to imply some effort but this would be a mischaracterization given the physics tone of his writing. One idea might be that this persistence captures some kind of energy flow that resembles an entropy move based on the interactions of physical structures. That is, because each thing has this persistence and exists within the persistence patterns of the things around it, then the thing itself exists as an energy-entropy flow which shows up as expression. This is expression is something like the play-doh getting pressed out of form making. As a result, the thing itself does not go away internally as to its structure, but due to forces outside of it. Yet this implies that the energy that powers its expression does not diminish and perhaps that warrants some thought.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P7 - Efforting

Conatus quo unaquæque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est præter ipsius rei actualem essentiam.

The efforting by which each and every thing tries to persevere to be in itself, is nothing other than the actual essence of the thing itself.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ex data cujuscunque rei essentia quædam necessario sequuntur (per propositionem 36 partis I) nec res aliud possunt quam id quod ex determinata earum natura necessario sequitur (per propositionem 29 partis I); quare cujuscunque rei potentia sive conatus quo ipsa vel sola vel cum aliis quidquam agit vel agere conatur hoc est (per propositionem 6 hujus) potentia sive conatus quo in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est præter ipsius rei datam sive actualem essentiam. Q.E.D.

From the given essence of whatsoever thing, certain things follow necessarily (by IP36) and no things are able to be something than that which follows necessarily from nature determining of them (by IP29); thus the power of whatsoever thing or the trying by which itself or alone or with others something acts or tries to act, that is (by IIIP6) the power or trying by which it tries to persevere in being in itself, is nothing other than the given or actual essence of the thing itself.

This word conatus implies some effort or attempt by a thing. This is not simply resting while the scratch on my arm heals. Instead, Spinoza is stating that things manifest their potentia as trying to persevere. This trying is the essence of the thing as it reflects the specific form of potentia which is the expressive force of substance or God. Prior to my study of Spinoza, I would have assumed that the formal essence or idea of the thing was the essence of the thing. However, the essence of the thing is the manifestation of the potentia, which is the contatus.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P6 - Persevering in Itself

Unaquæque res quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur.

Howsoever much a thing in itself, it tries to persist being in itself.

DEMONSTRATIO: Res enim singulares modi sunt quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur (per corollarium propositionis 25 partis I) hoc est (per propositionem 34 partis I) res quæ Dei potentiam qua Deus est et agit, certo et determinato modo exprimunt neque ulla res aliquid in se habet a quo possit destrui sive quod ejus existentiam tollat (per propositionem 4 hujus) sed contra ei omni quod ejusdem existentiam potest tollere, opponitur (per propositionem præcedentem) adeoque quantum potest et in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur. Q.E.D.

For singular things are modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and determinate mode (by IP25C), that is (by IP34) things which express by a certain and determinate mode the power of God by which God is and acts, and nothing has something else in itself by which it is able to be destroyed or which destroys its existence (by IIIP4) but placed against all else which is able to destroy its same existence (by IIIP5)  to the extent that it is much and is in itself, it tries to persevere being in itself.

Here Spinoza sets up the almost inertial power of modes or singular things - they tend to persist even though they are rooted in and express the power of God. The tendency of modes to do this is viewed objectively at this point, but its attempting or trying to do something sets up the subjective element to modes.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P5 - Self-Contradiction

Res eatenus contrariæ sunt naturæ hoc est eatenus in eodem subjecto esse nequeunt quatenus una alteram potest destruere.

Things are contrary to an extent, that is, their natures are unable to exist thus in the same subject to the extent that one might destroy the other.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si enim inter se convenire vel in eodem subjecto simul esse possent, posset ergo in eodem subjecto aliquid dari quod ipsum posset destruere, quod (per propositionem præcedentem) est absurdum. Ergo res etc. Q.E.D.

For if they are able to join among themselves or be in the same subject at the same time, thus something is able to exist in the same subject which might destroy itself which (by IIIP4) is absurd. 

Here Spinoza is being propositional - inherent self-contradictions cannot exist. This is a fundamental stance of rationalists versus empiricists. Empiricists can embrace self-contradictions, e.g. a wave can't be a particle and vice versa, yet seems to do so in basic atomic physics. Rationalists cannot as logic is the structure of a coherent universe.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P4

Nulla res nisi a causa externa potest destrui.

There is no thing able to be destroyed unless it is by an external cause.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio per se patet; definitio enim cujuscunque rei ipsius rei essentiam affirmat sed non negat sive rei essentiam ponit sed non tollit. Dum itaque ad rem ipsam tantum, non autem ad causas externas attendimus, nihil in eadem poterimus invenire quod ipsam possit destruere. Q.E.D.

This proposition is evident through itself: for the definition of whatsoever thing itself affirms the essence of the thing but it does not deny or it places the essence but does not remove it. Thus as long as we attend so to the thing itself, moreover not to external causes, we are able to find nothing in the same which is able to destroy itself. 

In this proposition, Spinoza describes a tendency of a thing to persist - only externals remove or alter a thing. This inherent quality of things to persist provides a key part of the fabric of the material world. A thing whose essence is not to persist would be self-contradictory and form an unstable system. This certainly seems true at the visible scale of our world. However, it does seem like some sub-atomic dynamics contradict this proposition.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P3

Mentis actiones ex solis ideis adæquatis oriuntur, passiones autem a solis inadæquatis pendent.

The actions of the mind arise from only adequate ideas, meanwhile the passions weigh from only inadequate ones.

DEMONSTRATIO: Primum quod mentis essentiam constituit, nihil aliud est quam idea corporis actu existentis (per propositiones 11 et 13 partis II) quæ (per propositionem 15 partis II) ex multis aliis componitur quarum quædam (per corollarium propositionis 38 partis II) sunt adæquatæ, quædam autem inadæquatæ (per corollarium propositionis 29 partis II). Quicquid ergo ex mentis natura sequitur et cujus mens causa est proxima per quam id debet intelligi, necessario ex idea adæquata vel inadæquata sequi debet. At quatenus mens (per propositionem 1 hujus) ideas habet inadæquatas eatenus necessario patitur; ergo mentis actiones ex solis ideis adæquatis sequuntur et mens propterea tantum patitur quia ideas habet inadæquatas. Q.E.D.

First what establishes the essence of the mind, nothing other than which the idea of the existence of the actual body (by IIP11 and IIP13) which (by IIP15) is made up of many others of which certain (by IIP38C) are adequate, moreover certain are inadequate (by IIP29C). Thus whatever follows from the nature of the mind and of which the mind is the exact cause by which it ought to be understood, ought to follow necessarily from an idea either adequate or inadequate. But insofar as the mind (by IIIP1) has inadequate ideas it necessarily suffers thus far; therefore the actions of the mind follow from the adequate ideas alone and meanwhile the mind suffers so much because it has inadequate ideas.

SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque passiones ad mentem non referri nisi quatenus aliquid habet quod negationem involvit sive quatenus consideratur ut naturæ pars quæ per se absque aliis non potest clare et distincte percipi et hac ratione ostendere possem passiones eodem modo ad res singulares ac ad mentem referri nec alia ratione posse percipi sed meum institutum est de sola mente humana agere.

Thus we see passions do not refer to the mind unless insofar as something which involves negation or insofar as it is considered that a part of nature which is not able to be perceived clearly and distinctly through itself and from others and by this way I am able to show that the passions in this way refer to singular things as to the mind and not by some other way are able to be perceived but is my principle to discuss concerning the human mind.  

Here Spinoza attempts a first discussion of the passions. His use of the verb pendere in contrast to oriri is interesting as an illustration of the power of actions versus the weight of passions. The scholium discusses that passions are either (from a thinking attribute) a negation or (from an extending attribute) a dysfunction of the body in its incapacity. This sets up that passions are truly extending things in Spinoza's parallelism. Thus, imaginations of the mind do have place in the attribute of extending. But Spinoza clarifies that he is only going to address those of the human mind or the attribute of thinking. This is important because it often seems that Spinoza's focus on imagination creates a non-match in his parallelism. 

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P2

Nec corpus mentem ad cogitandum nec mens corpus ad motum neque ad quietem nec ad aliquid (si quid est) aliud determinare potest.

And the body is not able to determine the mind for thinking and the mind is not able to determine the body for motion or for rest nor for something to determine anything else (if there is something).

"Determine" here must certainly mean something other than our typical usage. It is contrary to any notion that the body does not influence the thinking of the mind or that the mind does not influence the body for motion or rest (a few sleepless nights make that clear). Instead, the Latin word determino which is translated as "determine" seems more likely to have the true sense of "set limit" from the two Latin words de and terminus to indicate more of its limits and might be better translated as "contain." In this way, we could clearly agree that the body does not contain the mind's thinking as imagination or dreams or fantasies indicate. Likewise, the mind does not contain the body as we see from examples such as sleepwalking or talking in our sleep or doing things unconsciously.

DEMONSTRATIO: Omnes cogitandi modi Deum quatenus res est cogitans et non quatenus alio attributo explicatur, pro causa habent (per propositionem 6 partis II); id ergo quod mentem ad cogitandum determinat, modus cogitandi est et non extensionis hoc est (per definitionem 1 partis II) non est corpus : quod erat primum. Corporis deinde motus et quies ab alio oriri debet corpore quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio et absolute quicquid in corpore oritur, id a Deo oriri debuit quatenus aliquo extensionis modo et non quatenus aliquo cogitandi modo affectus consideratur (per eandem propositionem 6 partis II) hoc est a mente quæ (per propositionem 11 partis II) modus cogitandi est, oriri non potest : quod erat secundum. Ergo nec corpus mentem etc. Q.E.D.

All modes of thinking have God as a cause insofar as It is a thinking thing and not insofar as It is explicated in some other attribute (by IIP6); thus, that which determines (or "sets as a limit for" or "contains") the mind for thinking, is a mode of thinking and is not of extension, that is (by IID1), is not a body: which was the first [part of the proposition]. Next the motion and rest of the body ought to arise from another body which has also been determined (or "contained") to motion or rest from another and absolutely whatever arises in the body, that ought to have arisen from God insofar as by some mode of extension and not insofar as by some mode of thinking [God] is considered an affect (by the same IIP6), this is from the mind which (by IIP11) is a mode of thinking, that is not able to arise [in extending]: which was second [part of the proposition]. Thus, the body [is not able to determine] the mind, etc. 

Here Spinoza carefully maintains his separation of the attributes established in the first two parts of the work. The sense of "set limits" or "contain" makes more sense than the typical meaning of "determine" as strong influence.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc clarius intelliguntur ex iis quæ in scholio propositionis 7 partis II dicta sunt quod scilicet mens et corpus una eademque res sit quæ jam sub cogitationis jam sub extensionis attributo concipitur. Unde fit ut ordo sive rerum concatenatio una sit sive natura sub hoc sive sub illo attributo concipiatur, consequenter ut ordo actionum et passionum corporis nostri simul sit natura cum ordine actionum et passionum mentis : quod etiam patet ex modo quo propositionem 12 partis II demonstravimus.

These things are more clearly understood from those which were stated in IIP7S that, of course, the mind and the body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under attribute of thinking and then under the attribute of extending. From where it follows that the order or connection of things is one, whether nature is conceived under this or under that attribute, consequently that the order of actions or passions of our body is at the same time one, by nature, with the order of actions or passions of the mind; which also it is clear from the way in which we demonstrated IIP12. 

Here Spinoza reiterates that the body and mind are the same thing in God. Of course, at our individual level, our ideas are distorted or mutilated or imagined and, for that reason, do not appear to be one and the same. In fact, at this level they are not but do appear to be influential and not determinative or containing.

At quamvis hæc ita se habeant ut nulla dubitandi ratio supersit, vix tamen credo nisi rem experientia comprobavero, homines induci posse ad hæc æquo animo perpendendum adeo firmiter persuasi sunt corpus ex solo mentis nutu jam moveri jam quiescere plurimaque agere quæ a sola mentis voluntate et excogitandi arte pendent.  

But although these things have themselves in such a way that no reason for doubting remains, still scarcely do I believe that unless I have proved this thing by experience that individuals might be induced to thinking these things with a calm spirit. To such an extent are they firmly persuaded that the body is now moved, then later is quiet by the will of the mind alone and that it does more things which depend on the wish of the mind alone and by the art of thinking [things] up. 

Here Spinoza tackles the cognitive illusion involved. I don't view Spinoza to be denying the impact of ideas on the body and vice versa. Instead, I think that Spinoza is trying to illuminate that the limits of the mind are set by the mind and the limits of the body are set by the body - thus establishing a sense of power correctly. Our confused tendency is to exaggerate the influences and eliminate the true sense of domain.

Etenim quid corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit hoc est neminem hucusque experientia docuit quid corpus ex solis legibus naturæ quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, possit agere et quid non possit nisi a mente determinetur. Nam nemo hucusque corporis fabricam tam accurate novit ut omnes ejus functiones potuerit explicare ut jam taceam quod in brutis plura observentur quæ humanam sagacitatem longe superant et quod somnambuli in somnis plurima agant quæ vigilando non auderent; quod satis ostendit ipsum corpus ex solis suæ naturæ legibus multa posse quæ ipsius mens admiratur. 

And indeed what thing the body is able, no one has determined up to this point, that is, experience has taught no one up to this point what the body from only the laws of its nature - insofar as nature is considered only corporeal - might do and what it is not able to do unless it were determined (or "had its limits set") [solely] by the mind. For no one up to this point knows so accurately the fabric of the body that someone has been able to explain all its functions so that I do not even mention that more things are observed in animals which surpass human wisdom by far and that sleepwalkers do more things in sleep which they do not dare while awake; which shows enough that the body itself is able to do many things by the laws of its own nature which its mind wonders at.

Here again Spinoza is attempting to set limits rather than attempt to deny influence. His examples are merely meant to set that the limits of the body are not set by the mind but rather are set by the body - sleepwalking and the patterns of animals indicate this (although there might be an argument that the "mind" of the animals is superior in some ways). Spinoza is denying the infantile image of the mind as controller or determiner of the body and the environment. Ultimately this delusion contains harmful elements and for that reason Spinoza is diligent about disrupting them.

Deinde nemo scit qua ratione quibusve mediis mens moveat corpus neque quot motus gradus possit corpori tribuere quantaque cum celeritate idem movere queat. Unde sequitur cum homines dicunt hanc vel illam actionem corporis oriri a mente quæ imperium in corpus habet, eos nescire quid dicant nec aliud agere quam speciosis verbis fateri se veram illius actionis causam absque admiratione ignorare.  

Next no one knows by what reason and by what ways the mind moves the body and how much motion of a step is attributable to the body and with how much speed the same is able to move. From this it follows that since humans say this or that action of the body arises from the mind, which has dominion over the body, they do not know what they say and do not do anything other than with beautiful words confess that they are ignorant of the true cause of their action and without wonder.  

At dicent sive sciant sive nesciant quibus mediis mens moveat corpus, se tamen experiri quod nisi mens humana apta esset ad excogitandum, corpus iners esset. Deinde se experiri in sola mentis potestate esse tam loqui quam tacere et alia multa quæ proinde a mentis decreto pendere credunt.  

But they say whether they know or do not know the ways by which the mind moves the body, nevertheless that they have experienced that unless the human mind is capable of thinking [things up], the body is inert. Next that they have experienced that it is in the sole power of the mind to speak now  and then to be silent and many other things which they believe depend on the decision from the mind.

Sed quod ad primum attinet, ipsos rogo num experientia non etiam doceat quod si contra corpus iners sit, mens simul ad cogitandum sit inepta? Nam cum corpus somno quiescit, mens simul cum ipso sopita manet nec potestatem habet veluti cum vigilat, excogitandi. Deinde omnes expertos esse credo mentem non semper æque aptam esse ad cogitandum de eodem objecto sed prout corpus aptius est ut in eo hujus vel illius objecti imago excitetur, ita mentem aptiorem esse ad hoc vel illud objectum contemplandum. At dicent ex solis legibus naturæ quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, fieri non posse ut causæ ædificiorum, picturarum rerumque hujusmodi quæ sola humana arte fiunt, possint deduci nec corpus humanum nisi a mente determinaretur ducereturque, pote esset ad templum aliquod ædificandum. Verum ego jam ostendi ipsos nescire quid corpus possit quidve ex sola ipsius naturæ contemplatione possit deduci ipsosque plurima experiri ex solis naturæ legibus fieri quæ nunquam credidissent posse fieri nisi ex mentis directione ut sunt ea quæ somnambuli in somnis agunt quæque ipsi, dum vigilant, admirantur. Addo hic ipsam corporis humani fabricam quæ artificio longissime superat omnes quæ humana arte fabricatæ sunt, ut jam taceam, quod supra ostenderim, ex natura sub quovis attributo considerata, infinita sequi.

But what pertains to the first [point], I ask those whether experience does not also teach that if, on the other hand, the body is inert, at the same time is the mind inept for thinking? For when the body rests in sleep, the mind stays lulled to sleep and does not have the power for thinking things up just as when it is awake. Next I believe that all are experienced that the mind is not always equally suited for thinking about the same object but just as the body is more capable as it is excited by this or that image of an object, so too the mind is more capable for contemplating this or that object. (Here it seems that Spinoza is at his weakest in an attempt to tie the mind and body together experientially as a means of helping others see that the mind and body are not separate entities in which the mind runs the body.) But they say from only the laws of its nature insofar as only its bodily nature is considered, it cannot happen that buildings, pictures and these things which happen by human art alone, are not able to be done, and that the human body, unless led determined by the mind alone, is not capable of building some temple. Truly I have already shown that those themselves do not know that the body is able to do or what from only contemplation of its nature is able to be deduced and that they have experienced more things that happen from only laws of its nature which they never believed able to occur unless from the direction of the mind such as what sleepwalkers do in sleep which they wonder at when they are awake. I argue here that the fabric itself of the human body which in craft surpasses by far everything which has been made by human skill, not to mention what I have shown above, that to follow from nature infinite things, considered under whatever attribute.

Quod porro ad secundum attinet, sane longe felicius sese res humanæ haberent si æque in hominis potestate esset tam tacere quam loqui. At experientia satis superque docet homines nihil minus in potestate habere quam linguam nec minus posse quam appetitus moderari suos; unde factum ut plerique credant nos ea tantum libere agere quæ leviter petimus quia earum rerum appetitus facile contrahi potest memoria alterius rei cujus frequenter recordamur sed illa minime quæ magno cum affectu petimus et qui alterius rei memoria sedari nequit. Verum enim vero nisi experti essent nos plura agere quorum postea pænitet nosque sæpe, quando scilicet contrariis affectibus conflictamur, meliora videre et deteriora sequi, nihil impediret quominus crederent nos omnia libere agere.  

What pertains further to the following, human affairs have themselves long more favorably if it were in the power of an individual to be silent rather than to speak. But experience teaches enough and above that humans have nothing less in their power than the tongue and that they are able to moderate nothing less than their appetites; from where the fact that most believe that we do freely things such as which we seek lightly because the appetite of such things are able to be controlled easily by the memory of whose other thing we recall but minimally that thing which we seek with great affect and the memory of which denies to be calmed. Unquestionably unless they had experienced that we do more things after  which it often pains us, when of course we are conflicted by opposing affects, to see the better and to do the worse, nothing might impede them from believing that that we do not do all things freely.

Sic infans se lac libere appetere credit, puer autem iratus vindictam velle et timidus fugam. Ebrius deinde credit se ex libero mentis decreto ea loqui quæ postea sobrius vellet tacuisse : sic delirans, garrula, puer et hujus farinæ plurimi ex libero mentis decreto credunt loqui cum tamen loquendi impetum quem habent, continere nequeant, ita ut ipsa experientia non minus clare quam ratio doceat quod homines ea sola de causa liberos se esse credant quia suarum actionum sunt conscii et causarum a quibus determinantur, ignari et præterea quod mentis decreta nihil sint præter ipsos appetitus, quæ propterea varia sunt pro varia corporis dispositione. Nam unusquisque ex suo affectu omnia moderatur et qui præterea contrariis affectibus conflictantur, quid velint nesciunt; qui autem nullo, facili momento huc atque illuc pelluntur. Quæ omnia profecto clare ostendunt mentis tam decretum quam appetitum et corporis determinationem simul esse natura vel potius unam eandemque rem quam quando sub cogitationis attributo consideratur et per ipsum explicatur, decretum appellamus et quando sub extensionis attributo consideratur et ex legibus motus et quietis deducitur, determinationem vocamus; quod adhuc clarius ex jam dicendis patebit.  

Thus an infant believes itself to choose milk freely, moreover an angry boy to will vengeance and the timid to will flight. Next the drunk believes that he or she speaks things from a free decision of the mind after which as sober wishes to have been silent: thus, a crazy, garrulous boy and many more of this makeup believe to speak from a free decision of the mind when nevertheless they have an impetus for speaking which, they deny to restrain, in this way experience itself not less clearly than reason leads that humans believe from this cause alone themselves to be free because they are conscious of their actions and to be ignorant of the causes by which they are determined (or "constrained" or "contained"), and moreover because decisions of the mind are nothing beyond the appetites themselves, which are meanwhile varied by the varied disposition of the body. For whosoever restrains everything by his or her own affect and meanwhile is conflicted by varying affects, they know not what they want, and moroever who is not easily tossed by this moment and that moment. Which everything certainly clearly they show decision of the mind and appetite and determination (or "limitation") of the body at the same time is nature either rather one and the same thing when considered under the attribute of thinking and explained through itself, we call a decision and when it is considered under the attribute of extending and led from the laws of motion and rest, we call a determination (or "limitation"); what will be more clear to here from statements now. 

Nam aliud est quod hic apprime notari vellem nempe quod nos nihil ex mentis decreto agere possumus nisi ejus recordemur. Exempli gratia non possumus verbum loqui nisi ejusdem recordemur. Deinde in libera mentis potestate non est rei alicujus recordari vel ejusdem oblivisci. Quare hoc tantum in mentis potestate esse creditur quod rem cujus recordamur vel tacere vel loqui ex solo mentis decreto possumus. Verum cum nos loqui somniamus, credimus nos ex libero mentis decreto loqui nec tamen loquimur vel si loquimur, id ex corporis spontaneo motu fit. Somniamus deinde nos quædam homines celare idque eodem mentis decreto quo dum vigilamus ea quæ scimus, tacemus. Somniamus denique nos ex mentis decreto quædam agere quæ dum vigilamus non audemus atque adeo pervelim scire an in mente duo decretorum genera dentur, phantasticorum unum et liberorum alterum? Quod si eo usque insanire non libet, necessario concedendum est hoc mentis decretum quod liberum esse creditur, ab ipsa imaginatione sive memoria non distingui nec aliud esse præter illam affirmationem quam idea quatenus idea est, necessario involvit (vide propositionem 49 partis II). Atque adeo hæc mentis decreta eadem necessitate in mente oriuntur ac ideæ rerum actu existentium. Qui igitur credunt se ex libero mentis decreto loqui vel tacere vel quicquam agere, oculis apertis somniant.

For another is which here I especially want to be noted that we are able to do nothing from a decision of the mind unless it is recalled. For example we are not able to speak a word unless we recall the same. (Here Spinoza addresses memory as a bodily function not mind function.) Next there is not in the free power of the mind for recording of something or of forgetting the same. Thus it is believed that so much is in the power of the mind because we record its thing or we are able to be silent or to speak from a decision of the mind. Truly when we dream ourselves to speak, we do believe that we speak from a free decision of the mind and nevertheless we do not speak or if we speak that it happens as a spontaneous motion of the body. Then we dream that indeed we hide things from humans and by the same decision of mind we know things while we are awake, we are silent. Then we dream that we do certain things by a free decision of the mind which we do not dare while we are awake and to such an extent I wish greatly to know whether in the mind two categories are given - the fantastic and the other one of free things? Because if it is not permitted to be insane there to a degree, one ought to conceded necessarily that this decision of the mind is believed to be free, it is not distinguished from the imagination itself or memory and is nothing other besides that affirmation which is the idea insofar as it is an idea involves necessarily (see IIP49). And to such a degree these decisions of the mind arise with the same necessity as the actuality of the ideas of existing things. Thus, those who believe that they speak or are silent or do something from the free decision of the mind, dream with their eyes open.