Here Spinoza begins the axioms of part I and concludes the
definitions of part I. The definitions are different than the axioms in
degree of logical certainty. If the definitions were altered, the
content process of the Ethics would be changed. In contrast, if the
axioms were altered, the reasoning process of the Ethics would be
changed.
Omnia quae sunt vel in se vel in alio sunt.
Translated as,
All things which are, are either in themselves or in another.
Here Spinoza correlates "eternity" or aeternitatem with "existence itself" or ipsam existentiam.
These two concepts differ in my mind. Eternity seems unchanging and
abstract. In contrast, existence seems dynamic and concrete. But here, as in
ID.1, Spinoza takes that which is transcendent and abstract and makes it immanent and concrete.
This connecting of the transcendent with the immanent is qualified by his use of the word "itself" or ipsam.
Spinoza is laconic and for this reason, the inclusion of "itself" is
significant. If "itself" were not included, we might simply place
"eternity"and "existence" on a fully equal plane. But by adding "itself",
Spinoza connects "eternity" with the core or essence of "existence." Neatly, that “essence” of “existence” brings us back to the definition of “self-caused” in I.D1. Even more, it is fitting that eternity would be “self-caused.”
This connection is further qualified "existence itself" by the phrase beginning with "insofar as" or quatenus
as a subset of the core or essence of existence. This part of the core of existence is "conceived of" or concipitur
(a word that been addressed in the post on I.D4 implying that it is
understood not sensically, but intuitively) so that only the characteristics which follow from eternal are understood. I think that his reasoning is that substance is beyond time and, in fact, creates time and its conditions. For that reason, a connection to time is to confuse what is primacy.
His explanation confirms this and is basically describing a way in which an aspect follows in a certain necessity, as in the circularity of a circle or here, the eternity of the eternal, that is the essence of a thing, which is not altered or impacted by time.
Per aeternitatem intellego ipsam existentiam quatenus ex sola rei aeternae definitione necessario sequi concipitur.
Translated as,
By eternity I understand existence itself insofar as it is conceived to logically follow from only the definition of an eternal thing.
Explicatio: Talis enim existentia ut aeterna veritas sicut rei essentia concipitur proptereaque per durationem aut tempus explicari non potest tametsi duratio principio et fine carere concipiatur.
Translated as,
For such is existence conceived as an eternal truth just as the essence of a thing and on that account cannot be explained by duration or time even if the duration is conceived to lack a beginning or an end.
Here Spinoza defines "free" in a way I would not have intuitively
understood it. My sense of free is skewed by a notion of will, whereas
Spinoza is setting up free as a result of internal powers of "its own
nature" dominating. This free or libera which is a result of its own powers, or its own nature, contrasts with necessary or necessaria
which is a result of external powers dominating. One core issue then seems to be defining "its own nature" or
suae naturae. Free and necessary are a function of that definition.
Ea res libera dicitur quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum determinatur. Necessaria autem vel potius coacta quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione.
Translated as,
That thing is called free which exists from only the necessity of its own nature and is determined to act by itself alone. Moreover a thing is called necessary or rather compelled which is determined by something other [than its own nature] to exist and to operate in a certain and determinate manner.
This definition builds on I.D3 of substance as in itself. The definition of God also expands the role of attribute defined in I.D4. God is characterized as substance made up of infinite attributes. Significantly, the emphasis on attributes places God in a “view from somewhere” categorization. Without the perceiving intellect, God, as defined, does not exist. Without the intellect, God is simply substance without the “as if” or tanquam of infinite attributes. Thus, understanding God involves understanding attributes. Spinoza is defining a relationship between God and the perceiving intellect as real through connecting the expressiveness of the attribute to the perceptiveness of the intellect.
The
explanation (a first so far) highlights this. To be infinite in its own
kind (echoing I.D2 where "finite in its own kind" was defined) is to be
limited to one attribute only - that of itself. Spinoza states that this expressiveness of God which conveys God’s eternal and infinite essence cannot occur with something that is infinite only in its own kind. To be infinite only in its own kind is to suffer a negation, to be able to be conceived of as not existing and thus to such a degree is incompatible with the essence of substance. Thus, God is substance made expressive through infinite attributes. As God, substance as Knowing and Being also becomes substance as Thinking (and Extending) - a Spinozist variant of the Word becoming incarnate.
Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum hoc est substantiam constantem infinitis attributis quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit.
Translated as,
By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes whose each and every one expresses eternal and infinite essence.
Explicatio: Dico absolute infinitum, non autem in suo genere; quicquid enim in suo genere tantum infinitum est, infinita de eo attributa negare possumus; quod autem absolute infinitum est, ad eius essentiam pertinet quicquid essentiam exprimit et negationem nullam involvit.
Translated as,
Explanation. I say absolutely infinite, however not infinite in its own kind; for whatever is infinite in its own kind only, we are able to deny infinite attributes concerning it; however that which is absolutely infinite, whatever pertains to its essence expresses its essence and involves no negation.
Another key concept: "mode" or modum. He uses the same verb intelligo
which translates as "I mean" or "I understand." The translation "I
mean" might be more accurate. "Modifications" seems to be an excellent
rendering of affectiones, retaining the root of the word modum itself. "Affections" seems to be heavy
with connotations that I doubt Spinoza holds here and, further, are misleading enough to create significant confusion in later books on emotions. Next, I also think
that translations of "substance" should not be modified (no pun
intended) by an indefinite pronoun (as in "a substance"), as it would
appear from an earlier observation that substance is logically not
plural.
This first part seems clear enough with his clarification following sive or "or." He describes "mode" as id quod in alio est or "that which is in another." This is as opposed to I.D3 where Spinoza describes "substance" as id quod in se est
or "that which is in itself." His clarification on the meaning of this
term is explained in I.D3: "is conceived through itself" as meaning
"that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from
which it must be formed." Thus, his meaning in I.D5 must follow when he
states "through which it is conceived" to be roughly "that whose concept
does require the concept of another thing, from which it must be
formed." Clearly a "mode" does not qualify as causam sui or "self-caused" of I.D1.
A remarkable issue lies in the middle of the definition. Spinoza is not always careful with his writing - particularly in the scholia. However, it would be unlikely that these first definitions were not carefully written and subsequently scrutinized. Every word is too important. Thus, the use of the plural affectiones or "modifications" to match with the singular modum or "mode" is remarkable - when the rest of the definition returns to the singular. Most translators treat it as simply a kind of categorical plural which then simply goes back to the singular after sive. Other translators convert it to a singular as a "state." But, I think both approaches are mistaken. Instead, I think that modum is a complex item which is made up of multiple modifications, which as an entity that might be in some sense considered a whole is then able to be "in another" or "conceived through another." he plural signifies the lack of such a thing as a truly simple body. Later in the work, he hypothesizes the existence of a simple body for discussions of motion and rest and then dismisses such existence after he has established the principles involving motion and rest require complex bodies made up of complex parts.
Spinoza again raises the mind-body issue as in prior definitions because he discusses not only the “body” aspect with a mode being in another, but also the “mind” aspect by the mode being in another through which it is conceived. This mind-body aspect is similar to I.D1 – I.D3 because it uses the verb “conceive” rather than the verb “perceive.” This means that the mode, even with its limited function, is discussed in a “view from nowhere,” that is the realm of Being and Knowing.
Per modum intelligo substantiae affectiones sive id quod in alio est, per quod concipitur.
Translated as,
By mode I understand a modifications of substance, or that which is in another through which it is conceived.
From earlier discussions, we found that substance is self-caused
(I.D3 and I.D1). If it is self-caused, its essence must involve
existence. But these observations were made with the verb "conceive" or concipit rather than this verb "perceive" or percipit. By bringing in two new words,"intellect" or intellectus and "perceive" or percipit, Spinoza is bringing a different level of engagement to bear. Confirming this more forcefully is the presence of tanquam
which has more of the sense of the translation "as if" than "as." Spinoza has stepped from the a realm of a "view from nowhere"
in the first three definitions with a general logic (mathematically
delimiting, but non-numerical) to a "view from somewhere" with a defined
degree of specificity or number, from Knowing to Thinking.
Per attributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens.
Translated as,
By attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of a substance as if constituting its essence.
This definition of "substance" is like the definition of “self-caused” (or I.D1) since it follows that substance might also be described as "cannot be conceived except as existing" due to the challenges of conceiving something which is "in itself" and "conceived through itself" which does actually not exist. Further, Spinoza implies substance as not limited (thus infinite) as defined in I.D2, since it cannot be limited in its own kind if "it is in itself and is conceived through itself."
If these implications are true of substance, as self-caused from I.D1 and not finite from I.D2, then it may follow that nothing exists except substance - and even logically implies only one substance.
Again, the verb is all-important. Spinoza uses “conceive” or concipit as a verb of thinking with the particular sense of having “a view from nowhere” structured by general logic (mathematically delimiting, but non-numerical). He is not using a verb of thinking that is set in a particular time or place. Instead, he is using a verb to describe something which is true for all time.
Another way to understand “a view from nowhere” is the implication here that substance is Knowing. Knowing has a sense of seeing as a whole, while Thinking is a term that we use for more of a process. So it may mean (and I believe it does) that Knowing is intrinsic to substance. The duality from the first two definitions is carried through here as well. The “mind-body” duality identified in the first two definitions unfolds into substance duality as “conceived through itself” or Knowing and “is in itself” or Being.
Per substantiam, intellego id quod in se est et per se concipitur hoc est id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo formari debeat.
Translated as:
By substance, I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not lack the concept of another thing by which it needs to be formed.
