Spinoza's Ethics: I. Appendix III

This appendix is a startling shift from the impersonal, physics, geometry and math-like characteristics of Book I. The role of the appendix appears to answer those who respond negatively to the austerity of the articulations of Book I. Essentially, the appendix is an argument that our responses are based in our cognitive illusions driven by the fact that we are all the center of our own universe. He articulates that it is a tendency for all people to think in this way. Book I, then, is a celebration that the universe is not a subjective fact or an arbitrary universe ruled by irrationality, but is real and perfect on its own terms. If this is true, then the commonality of the universe creates an opportunity for individuals of reason to collaborate and more fully succeed in their endeavors to live a better life through a process of mutual assistance based in reasoning. Spinoza even attempts to address the failure individuals to reason as only apparent but not an intrinsic flaw. The appendix is invaluable as it lists a few common cognitive pitfalls, such as imputing human intent from lack of power to a universe which lacks no power. An extension of this is to attribute as intrinsic characteristics of parts of the universe based on their personal or human usefulness. Spinoza is not denying the usefulness of these terms for human endeavor, but clarifying that these terms are not inherent properties. Here Spinoza highlights the inherent perfection and power of all those things we term good and bad, fragrant and stinky, beautiful and ugly. A response might be, "well, if it's not all about me, then what about me?" For that he, sets out the final three books. However, to answer these questions fully, Spinoza begins by removing the greatest obstacles in a process of "uncover, discover and discard" here in Book I. After all, to live a better life is the purpose of this work as well as Spinoza's other works.  

Postquam homines sibi persuaserunt omnia quæ fiunt propter ipsos fieri, id in unaquaque re præcipuum judicare debuerunt quod ipsis utilissimum et illa omnia præstantissima æstimare a quibus optime afficiebantur. Unde has formare debuerunt notiones quibus rerum naturas explicarent scilicet bonum, malum, ordinem, confusionem, calidum, frigidum, pulchritudinem et deformitatem et quia se liberos existimant, inde hæ notiones ortæ sunt scilicet laus et vituperium, peccatum et meritum sed has infra postquam de natura humana egero, illas autem hic breviter explicabo. Nempe id omne quod ad valetudinem et Dei cultum conducit, bonum, quod autem iis contrarium est, malum vocaverunt. Et quia ii qui rerum naturam non intelligunt sed res tantummodo imaginantur, nihil de rebus affirmant et imaginationem pro intellectu capiunt, ideo ordinem in rebus esse firmiter credunt rerum suæque naturæ ignari. Nam cum ita sint dispositæ ut cum nobis per sensus repræsentantur, eas facile imaginari et consequenter earum facile recordari possimus, easdem bene ordinatas, si vero contra, ipsas male ordinatas sive confusas esse dicimus. 

Translated as,

After men have persuaded themselves that everything which has happened has been on their account, then in each and every thing they had to judge special what was the most useful to themselves and to estimate all those things as most excellent by they are most favorably affected. From here they formed these notions by which they might explain the nature of things as good, bad, ordered, confused, hot, cold, beautiful and ugly and since they think themselves free, from there these notions have arisen such as praise and blame, sin and merit. [More] about these below after I will have discussed human nature, nonetheless here I will explain those things briefly. Indeed every thing which points to the power and worship of God they call good and, moreover, whatever is contrary to these, they call bad. And because they do not understand what is the nature of things but imagine things in such a way, they affirm nothing about things and take the imagination to be intellect to such a degree that they firmly believe order to be in things of whose nature they are ignorant. For things disposed in such a way that they are represented to us through senses, these are easily imagined and consequently we are able to remember them easily, so we say that these same things are well-ordered, if truly not so, such things are poorly ordered and confused.

Et quoniam ea nobis præ cæteris grata sunt quæ facile imaginari possumus, ideo homines ordinem confusioni præferunt quasi ordo aliquid in natura præter respectum ad nostram imaginationem esset; dicuntque Deum omnia ordine creasse et hoc modo ipsi nescientes Deo imaginationem tribuunt nisi velint forte Deum humanæ imaginationi providentem res omnes eo disposuisse modo quo ipsas facillime imaginari possent; nec moram forsan iis injiciet quod infinita reperiantur quæ nostram imaginationem longe superant et plurima quæ ipsam propter ejus imbecillitatem confundunt. Sed de hac re satis. Cæteræ deinde notiones etiam præter imaginandi modos quibus imaginatio diversimode afficitur, nihil sunt et tamen ab ignaris tanquam præcipua rerum attributa considerantur quia ut jam diximus, res omnes propter ipsos factas esse credunt et rei alicujus naturam bonam vel malam, sanam vel putridam et corruptam dicunt prout ab eadem afficiuntur. Exempli gratia si motus quem nervi ab objectis per oculos repræsentatis accipiunt, valetudini conducat, objecta a quibus causatur pulchra dicuntur, quæ autem contrarium motum cient, deformia. 

Translated as,

And since things which we are able to imagine easily are welcome to us before the others, to this degree do men prefer order to confusion as if order might be something in nature with higher regard for our imagination. They say that God created all things by order and in this way they themselves ignorantly attribute to God an imagination unless perhaps they are wishing that God has disposed all things as an aid to the human imagination so that they are able to imagine all those things easily. And it does not put an impediment to [thinking] those things just because infinite things are found which far surpass our imagination and even more things which confound the imagination on account of [the imagination's] feebleness. But enough on this matter. Finally other notions are nothing but take priority as modes for imagining by which the imagination is diversely affected, and further from not knowing things, these [notions] are considered principal characteristics of things since as we have already said, they believe all things on account of being made for them and for such a reason they call nature good or bad, healthy or putrid and corrupt so as they are affected by the same thing. For example, a sensation which they receive by a nerve about objects seen by the eyes, is conducive to health, such objects by which [health] is caused are called beautiful, moreover whatever [objects] put into motion a contrary sensation, they call deformity.

Quæ deinde per nares sensum movent, odorifera vel fætida vocant, quæ per linguam, dulcia aut amara, sapida aut insipida etc. Quæ autem per tactum, dura aut mollia, aspera aut lævia etc. Et quæ denique aures movent, strepitum, sonum vel harmoniam edere dicuntur quorum postremum homines adeo dementavit ut Deum etiam harmonia delectari crederent. Nec desunt philosophi qui sibi persuaserint motus cælestes harmoniam componere. Quæ omnia satis ostendunt unumquemque pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicasse vel potius imaginationis affectiones pro rebus accepisse. Quare non mirum est (ut hoc etiam obiter notemus) quod inter homines tot quot experimur, controversiæ ortæ sint ex quibus tandem scepticismus. Nam quamvis humana corpora in multis conveniant, in plurimis tamen discrepant et ideo id quod uni bonum, alteri malum videtur; quod uni ordinatum, alteri confusum; quod uni gratum, alteri ingratum est et sic de cæteris quibus hic supersedeo cum quia hujus loci non est de his ex professo agere, tum quia hoc omnes satis experti sunt. Omnibus enim in ore est "quot capita tot sensus", "suo quemque sensu abundare", "non minora cerebrorum quam palatorum esse discrimina" : quæ sententiæ satis ostendunt homines pro dispositione cerebri de rebus judicare resque potius imaginari quam intelligere. Res enim si intellexissent, illæ omnes teste mathesi, si non allicerent, ad minimum convincerent.

Translated as,

Whatever things move a sensation through the nostrils, they call odiferous or fetid, through the tongue, they call sweet or bitter, savory or insipid etc. Moreover, though touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth etc. And finally whatever things move their ears, are termed to form a crash, a sound or harmony some of whose men, crazed to such a degree, believe that God is even delighted by harmony. And there is not a lack of philosophers who persuade themselves that celestial motion creates harmony. What all of these things reveal enough is that each and every one has judged about matters on behalf of the disposition of the brain or rather accepted the modifications of the imagination on behalf of things. For which reason it is not suprising (as we noted here already in passing) because we experience among as many men as many controversies arise out of which finally there is skepticism. For although human bodies agree in many ways, neverthless in more ways they disagree and to this degree that which is good for one seems bad to another, that which is orderly for one is confused for another, that which is pleasing for one is displeasing for another and in this way concerning the other things which I have covered here since there is no place about these things to do from a profession, so because of this everyone is expert enough. For in all things there is a saying "so many heads, so many opinions," "each is filled with his own opinon," "there are not fewer brains than there are differences of palates." These mottos show clearly enough that man judge matters in terms of the disposition of their brain and imagine things rather than understand them. For if they had understood matters, they might at least convince, if not win over, everyone by the standard of math.

Videmus itaque omnes notiones quibus vulgus solet naturam explicare, modos esse tantummodo imaginandi nec ullius rei naturam sed tantum imaginationis constitutionem indicare et quia nomina habent, quasi essent entium extra imaginationem existentium, eadem entia non rationis sed imaginationis voco atque adeo omnia argumenta quæ contra nos ex similibus notionibus petuntur, facile propulsari possunt. Solent enim multi sic argumentari. Si omnia ex necessitate perfectissimæ Dei naturæ sunt consecuta, unde ergo tot imperfectiones in natura ortæ? Videlicet rerum corruptio ad fætorem usque, rerum deformitas quæ nauseam moveat, confusio, malum, peccatum etc. Sed ut modo dixi, facile confutantur. Nam rerum perfectio ex sola earum natura et potentia est æstimanda nec ideo res magis aut minus perfectæ sunt propterea quod hominum sensum delectant vel offendunt, quod humanæ naturæ conducunt vel quod eidem repugnant. Iis autem qui quærunt cur Deus omnes homines non ita creavit ut solo rationis ductu gubernarentur? nihil aliud respondeo quam quia ei non defuit materia ad omnia ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum creanda vel magis proprie loquendo quia ipsius naturæ leges adeo amplæ fuerunt ut sufficerent ad omnia quæ ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt producenda, ut propositione 16 demonstravi.

Hæc sunt quæ hic notare suscepi præjudicia. Si quædam hujus farinæ adhuc restant, poterunt eadem ab unoquoque mediocri meditatione emendari.

Finis partis primæ.

Thus we see all notions by which the mass is accustomed to explain nature are modes simply for the means of imagination and indicate the nature of nothing but the constitution of the imagination and because they have names, as if they are beings which exist outside the imagination, I claim that the same beings are not of reason but of the imagination and to such an extent all the arguments which divide us out of similar notions, may easily be dismissed. For many are accustomed to argue. If everuthing has followed from the necessity of the highest perfection of the nature of God, then where do all of the imperfections in nature arise? Just as the corruption of things moves toward stench, the deformity of things moves to nausea, confusion to bad, sin, etc. But as I have said in this way they are easily confused. For the perfection of things ought to be calculated as only from the nature and power of these things and not to the degree that a thing is more or less perfect on account of which delight or offend the sense of men, which is conducive to human nature or which is repugnant to it. Moreover to those who seek why God did not create all men so that they are governed only by the guidance of reason? I answer that nothing other than because matter is not lacking for [God] for creating everything from the highest no doubt to the lowest degree of perfection or to speak more properly because the laws of nature are full to such an extent that they suffice for all things produced which are able to be conceived from some infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated in P16.

These are the prejudices which I have undertaken to note here. If any of this residue remains, the same [prejudices] are able to be changed for each with even a mediocre amount of reflection. 

The end of part one.

Spinoza's Ethics: I. Appendix II

In this appendix, Spinoza tries to clarify the cognitive error of final causes. Final causes are useful to humans in the errands of their daily lives, but Spinoza views final causes as errors when ascribed to God. Essentially, a final cause in the case of a human is an idea by which to improve her or his situation. In this way, a final cause indicates some lack or some imperfection in the current situation. For Spinoza, God does not exhibit a lack at any point. Change itself, then, is not the result of the "will of God" in the sense of final cause. Rather change is a manifestation of expressive power as in the sense that "nature abhors a vacuum" - perfection is a push out from rather than a push towards. 

His satis explicui id quod primo loco promisi. Ut jam autem ostendam naturam finem nullum sibi præfixum habere et omnes causas finales nihil nisi humana esse figmenta, non opus est multis. Credo enim id jam satis constare tam ex fundamentis et causis unde hoc præjudicium originem suam traxisse ostendi quam ex propositione 16 et corollariis propositionis 32 et præterea ex iis omnibus quibus ostendi omnia naturæ æterna quadam necessitate summaque perfectione procedere. Hoc tamen adhuc addam nempe hanc de fine doctrinam naturam omnino evertere. Nam id quod revera causa est, ut effectum considerat et contra. Deinde id quod natura prius est, facit posterius. Et denique id quod supremum et perfectissimum est, reddit imperfectissimum. Nam (duobus prioribus omissis quia per se manifesta sunt) ut ex propositionibus 21, 22 et 23 constat, ille effectus perfectissimus est qui a Deo immediate producitur et quo aliquid pluribus causis intermediis indiget ut producatur, eo imperfectius est. At si res quæ immediate a Deo productæ sunt, ea de causa factæ essent ut Deus finem assequeretur suum, tum necessario ultimæ quarum de causa priores factæ sunt, omnium præstantissimæ essent. Deinde hæc doctrina Dei perfectionem tollit nam si Deus propter finem agit, aliquid necessario appetit quo caret. Et quamvis theologi et metaphysici distinguant inter finem indigentiæ et finem assimilationis, fatentur tamen Deum omnia propter se, non vero propter res creandas egisse quia nihil ante creationem præter Deum assignare possunt propter quod Deus ageret adeoque necessario fateri coguntur Deum iis propter quæ media parare voluit, caruisse eaque cupivisse, ut per se clarum. 

Translated as,

With these [demonstrations], I have explained what I promised in the first place. Moreover, as I may already have shown that nature has no end fixed for itself and all final causes are nothing except human fictions, there is no burden for more [demonstrations]. For I believe that it is already enough that I have shown not only out of what foundations and causes from where this prejudice originated, but I have also shown in P16 and P32C and in other [propositions] that all of nature proceeds by certain eternal necessity and the highest perfection. Nevertheless, I will still add that this teaching concerning final [cause] has certainly turned nature completely upside down. For that which is actually the cause is considered the effect and vice versa. Next that which is prior in nature, [this teaching] makes as posterior. And finally that which is supreme and most perfect, [this teaching] returns as most imperfect. For (omitting the first two [assertions] because they are self-evident) as is known from P22, P23 and P24, that effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God and wherever something requires more intermediate causes for it to be produced, there it is more imperfect. But if things which are immediately produced by God are such things as may be made for the reason so that God achieves [God's] own end, then necessarily the last things, the reason for whose priors were made, would be the most excellent of all. Further this teaching removes the perfection of God for if God were compelled on account of an end, necessarily [God] strives for what [God] lacks. And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between an end of need and an end of assimilation, they nevertheless confess that God did everything on behalf of them, that [God] did not act on account of things to be created because they are able to assign nothing before creation except God for which God might act and so they are necessarily forced to confess that God needs these things on behalf of which  he wants to set up means and desires them, as is self-evident.

Nec hic prætereundum est quod hujus doctrinæ sectatores qui in assignandis rerum finibus suum ingenium ostentare voluerunt, ad hanc suam doctrinam probandam novum attulerunt modum argumentandi reducendo scilicet non ad impossibile sed ad ignorantiam, quod ostendit nullum aliud fuisse huic doctrinæ argumentandi medium. Nam si exempli gratia ex culmine aliquo lapis in alicujus caput ceciderit eumque interfecerit, hoc modo demonstrabunt lapidem ad hominem interficiendum cecidisse. Ni enim eum in finem Deo id volente ceciderit, quomodo tot circumstantiæ (sæpe enim multæ simul concurrunt) casu concurrere potuerunt? Respondebis fortasse id ex eo quod ventus flavit et quod homo illac iter habebat, evenisse. At instabunt, cur ventus illo tempore flavit? Cur homo illo eodemque tempore illac iter habebat? Si iterum respondeas ventum tum ortum quia mare præcedenti die tempore adhuc tranquillo agitari inceperat et quod homo ab amico invitatus fuerat, instabunt iterum quia nullus rogandi finis, cur autem mare agitabatur? cur homo in illud tempus invitatus fuit? et sic porro causarum causas rogare non cessabunt donec ad Dei voluntatem hoc est ignorantiæ asylum confugeris. Sic etiam ubi corporis humani fabricam vident, stupescunt et ex eo quod tantæ artis causas ignorant, concludunt eandem non mechanica sed divina vel supernaturali arte fabricari talique modo constitui ut una pars alteram non lædat. Atque hinc fit ut qui miraculorum causas veras quærit quique res naturales ut doctus intelligere, non autem ut stultus admirari studet, passim pro hæretico et impio habeatur et proclametur ab iis quos vulgus tanquam naturæ Deorumque interpretes adorat. Nam sciunt quod sublata ignorantia stupor hoc est unicum argumentandi tuendæque suæ auctoritatis medium quod habent, tollitur. Sed hæc relinquo et ad id quod tertio loco hic agere constitui, pergo. 

Translated as,

And this ought to not be disregarded because the followers of this teaching who want to show their own ingenuity in assigning final [causes] of things, they have presented a proof for this teaching of theirs a new method of argument for reduction just as not to the impossible but to ignorance, because it shows that there has been no other means for arguing this teaching. For example, if a stone falls from some height on someone's head and kills him, they demonstrate in this way that the stone has fallen in order to kill the man. For if it did not kill him by the will of God as a final cause, in which way did so many circumstance occur by chance (for oftern many things occure simultaneously)? Perhaps you will reply that it came about from some wind blew and a man travelled there. But they will say, why did the wind blow at that time? Why did that man travel to that place at the same time? If you might respond again that the wind arose then because the sea on the prior day began to stir up from a tranquil time and the man had been invited by a friend, they say again, because there is no end for questions, why then did the sea get agitated? Why was the invitation for the man at that time? And thus in turn they do not quit asking about the causes of causes until you have fled to the will of God, that is the refuge of ignorance. In this way also when they see the fabric of the human body, they are stupified and ignorant out of which causes of such art, they conclude that this same fabric is not of mechanical but divine or fabricated by supernatural arts and by such method I have established that one part does not betray the other. And here it happens that who seeks the true causes of miracles and who seeks to study natural things as a doctor, not moreover eager to admire as a moron, immediately he is held as a heretic and impious one and proclaimed from others whom the crowd adores as if interpreters of nature and Gods. For they know because wonder, that is the unique means for defending their argument and their authority, is dispelled if ignorance is removed. But I leave this and for that which I mean to put here in the third section and I move on. 

Spinoza's Ethics: I.Appendix I

APPENDIX: His Dei naturam ejusque proprietates explicui ut quod necessario existit; quod sit unicus; quod ex sola suæ naturæ necessitate sit et agat; quod sit omnium rerum causa libera et quomodo; quod omnia in Deo sint et ab ipso ita pendeant ut sine ipso nec esse nec concipi possint; et denique quod omnia a Deo fuerint prædeterminata, non quidem ex libertate voluntatis sive absoluto beneplacito sed ex absoluta Dei natura sive infinita potentia. Porro ubicunque data fuit occasio, præjudicia quæ impedire poterant quominus meæ demonstrationes perciperentur, amovere curavi sed quia non pauca adhuc restant præjudicia quæ etiam imo maxime impedire poterant et possunt quominus homines rerum concatenationem eo quo ipsam explicui modo, amplecti possint, eadem hic ad examen rationis vocare operæ pretium duxi. Et quoniam omnia quæ hic indicare suscipio præjudicia pendent ab hoc uno quod scilicet communiter supponant homines omnes res naturales ut ipsos propter finem agere, imo ipsum Deum omnia ad certum aliquem finem dirigere pro certo statuant : dicunt enim Deum omnia propter hominem fecisse, hominem autem ut ipsum coleret. Hoc igitur unum prius considerabo quærendo scilicet primo causam cur plerique hoc in præjudicio acquiescant et omnes natura adeo propensi sint ad idem amplectendum. 

Translated as,

In these [propositions], I have explained the nature of God and its properties as that which exists necessarily, as that which is the one and only, as that which is and acts from the sole necessity of its own nature, as that which is the free cause of all things and in what way [it is the free cause], that all things in God depend on [Godself] in such a way that they are unable to be or be conceived without [Godself] and finally that all things are predetermined by God, not indeed from free will or absolute well-being but from the absolute nature and infinite power of God. Further, whenever an occasion might be given, prejudices which might have impeded my demonstrations from being perceived, I have carefully worked to eliminate. But because not just a few prejudices still remain which also might even more greatly (and do) impede men from being able to grasp the sequence of things in the way in which I have explained it, I have led the scrutiny of reason to determine the worth of the work. And because all of the prejudices  which I have undertaken to show here depend on this one thing - namely that men have commonly supposed all natural things to be made as they are on account of an end, even more they have established that God itself has fashioned all things for a some specific end for a certain [purpose]: for they say that God has made all things on behalf of man, moreover so that [God] may nurture man. Thus, I consider this one thing before all by seeking the cause why so many acquiesce in this prejudice and all men are by nature inclined to such a degree to think the same way. 

Deinde ejusdem falsitatem ostendam et tandem quomodo ex hoc orta sint præjudicia de bono et malo, merito et peccato, laude et vituperio, ordine et confusione, pulchritudine et deformitate et de aliis hujus generis. Verum hæc ab humanæ mentis natura deducere non est hujus loci : satis hic erit si pro fundamento id capiam quod apud omnes debet esse in confesso nempe hoc quod omnes homines rerum causarum ignari nascuntur et quod omnes appetitum habent suum utile quærendi, cujus rei sunt conscii. Ex his enim sequitur primo quod homines se liberos esse opinentur quandoquidem suarum volitionum suique appetitus sunt conscii et de causis a quibus disponuntur ad appetendum et volendum, quia earum sunt ignari nec per somnium cogitant. Sequitur secundo homines omnia propter finem agere videlicet propter utile quod appetunt; unde fit ut semper rerum peractarum causas finales tantum scire expetant et ubi ipsas audiverint, quiescant; nimirum quia nullam habent causam ulterius dubitandi. Sin autem easdem ex alio audire nequeant, nihil iis restat nisi ut ad semet se convertant et ad fines a quibus ipsi ad similia determinari solent, reflectant et sic ex suo ingenio ingenium alterius necessario judicant. 

Translated as,

Next I will show the falsity of the same and finally the way in which prejudices arise from this concerning good and bad, merit and sin, praise and blame, order and chaos, beauty and ugliness and others of the same kind. Truly, this is not the place to deduce the nature of the human mind: it will be enough here if, on behalf of [building] a foundation, I will take that which among all men ought without doubt to be in common opinion - that all men are born ignorant of the causes of things and that all men have a desire to seek their own utility, the [desire] for which they are conscious. For from these [assertions] it follows first that men think that they are free since they are conscious of their own desires and appetites and about the causes by which they are moved to desiring and wishing, even though they are ignorant of these [causes] and do not think as though sleeping. Next it follows that men do everything on account of an end just as for the utility which they seek. From this it happens that they always seek to know the final causes of things happening so that when they hear about those things themselves, they are content. Evidently because they have no cause for further doubt. But if, however, they are unable to hear the same [final] causes from another, nothing stands firm for them unless they turn themselves into themselves and for ends by which they themselves are accustomed to determine similar things, they reflect and thus evaluate the innate tendency of another by their own innate tendency.

Porro cum in se et extra se non pauca reperiant media quæ ad suum utile assequendum non parum conducant ut exempli gratia oculos ad videndum, dentes ad masticandum, herbas et animantia ad alimentum, solem ad illuminandum, mare ad alendum pisces, hinc factum ut omnia naturalia tanquam ad suum utile media considerent et quia illa media ab ipsis inventa, non autem parata esse sciunt, hinc causam credendi habuerunt aliquem alium esse qui illa media in eorum usum paraverit. Nam postquam res ut media consideraverunt, credere non potuerunt easdem se ipsas fecisse sed ex mediis quæ sibi ipsi parare solent, concludere debuerunt dari aliquem vel aliquos naturæ rectores humana præditos libertate qui ipsis omnia curaverint et in eorum usum omnia fecerint. Atque horum etiam ingenium quandoquidem de eo nunquam quid audiverant, ex suo judicare debuerunt atque hinc statuerunt Deos omnia in hominum usum dirigere ut homines sibi devinciant et in summo ab iisdem honore habeantur; unde factum ut unusquisque diversos Deum colendi modos ex suo ingenio excogitaverit ut Deus eos supra reliquos diligeret et totam naturam in usum cæcæ illorum cupiditatis et insatiabilis avaritiæ dirigeret. 

Translated as,

Next, since they find both in themselves and outside themselves not just a few means which they assemble not just a little for achieving their own usage, for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, plants and animals for food, the sun for illuminating, the sea for nourishing fish, from here it is a fact that they consider all natural things as if [they are] means for their own usage and because they know that those means had been discovered by themselves, and yet had not been prepared [by themselves], from this they had cause for believing that there was someone else who prepared these means for their use. For after they had considered things as means, they were not able to believe that these same things had made themselves but out of means which they themselves are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they must have concluded that someone, or other governors of nature, exists endowed with human independence which may take care of all things for themselves and make everything for their own use. And indeed the character of these [governors], since they never heard from it from anywhere,  they must have judged from their own [example] and from this established that Gods configure everything for human use so that they might obligate men to themselves and be held in the highest honor by the same men. From this it is a fact that each and every [man] understands diverse ways for cultivating God from his own character so that God might choose them above all others and might fashion all of nature for the use of their blind desire and insatiable greed.

Atque ita hoc præjudicium in superstitionem versum et altas in mentibus egit radices; quod in causa fuit ut unusquisque maximo conatu omnium rerum causas finales intelligere easque explicare studeret. Sed dum quæsiverunt ostendere naturam nihil frustra (hoc est quod in usum hominum non sit) agere, nihil aliud videntur ostendisse quam naturam Deosque æque ac homines delirare. Vide quæso quo res tandem evasit! Inter tot naturæ commoda non pauca reperire debuerunt incommoda, tempestates scilicet, terræ motus, morbos etc. atque hæc statuerunt propterea evenire quod Dii irati essent ob injurias sibi ab hominibus factas sive ob peccata in suo cultu commissa et quamvis experientia indies reclamaret ac infinitis exemplis ostenderet commoda atque incommoda piis æque ac impiis promiscue evenire, non ideo ab inveterato præjudicio destiterunt : facilius enim iis fuit hoc inter alia incognita quorum usum ignorabant, ponere et sic præsentem suum et innatum statum ignorantiæ retinere quam totam illam fabricam destruere et novam excogitare. Unde pro certo statuerunt Deorum judicia humanum captum longissime superare : quæ sane unica fuisset causa ut veritas humanum genus in æternum lateret nisi mathesis, quæ non circa fines sed tantum circa figurarum essentias et proprietates versatur, aliam veritatis normam hominibus ostendisset et præter mathesin aliæ etiam adsignari possunt causæ (quas hic enumerare supervacaneum est) a quibus fieri potuit ut homines communia hæc præjudicia animadverterent et in veram rerum cognitionem ducerentur. 

Translated as,

And in this way prejudice turns into superstition and puts the deepest roots into their minds. Because it was in [this] cause that each and every man was eager with the greatest effort to understand the final causes of all things and to explain them. But as long as they sought to show that nature does nothing in vain (that is because it might not be for the use of men), nothing else seemed to have shown than that nature and the Gods are as crazy as men. Look, I seek in what way the matter has finally turned out! Among so many conveniences of nature they must have discovered not a few inconveniences, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases etc and meanwhile they determined these happened because the Gods were angry on account of injuries to themselves caused by men or on account of sins committed in their own worship and, although experience protested against this daily and with infinite examples showed that conveniences and inconveniences happen indiscriminately to the pious and the impious alike, they did not for that reason abandon their inveterate prejudice. For it was easier for them to place this among other unknowns whose use they did not understand and thus retain their present and innate status of ignorance than to destroy the entire structure and think of something new.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P36: Expressiveness

In this proposition, Spinoza outlines the manifestation of the expressive power or potentia of God. I say expressive power as opposed to the controlling power or potestas. Within existence is a specific form of the expressive power of God from which an effect will follow. This effect is not a purposeful event, but a resulting event - highlighting nature's movement from rather than our illusory movement to. 

 
Nihil existit ex cujus natura aliquis effectus non sequatur.

Translated as,

Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid existit, Dei naturam sive essentiam certo et determinato modo exprimit (per corollarium propositionis 25) hoc est (per propositionem 34) quicquid existit, Dei potentiam quæ omnium rerum causa est, certo et determinato modo exprimit adeoque (per propositionem 16) ex eo aliquis effectus sequi debet. Q.E.D. 

Translated as,

Whatever exists, expresses the nature or essence of God in a certain and determinate manner (by P25C) that is (by P34) whatever exists, expresses the power of God which is the cause of all things, in a certain and determinate manner to such a degree (by P16) that from this some effect must follow.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P35: God's Control

Of particular interest to me here is the Latin word used for power - potestas. As discussed earlier, there are two words used by Spinoza for power: potentia and potestas. Potestas carries the sense of organized and controlling power as opposed to unfolding and expressive power. In some sense, it is analogous to a snapshot of reality as opposed to a video. Spinoza is using the static form here because it is being conceived as in the power of God or as the expressed as opposed to from the power of God or as the expressive form of power. As such, it is necessary and not optional. It can be no different than as it exists. This forms a fundamental component of Spinoza's system: "it is as it has to be."

Quicquid concipimus in Dei potestate esse, id necessario est. 

Whatever we conceive that is in the power of God, it is necessary.

Demonstratio: Quicquid enim in Dei potestate est, id (per propositionem præcedentem) in ejus essentia ita debet comprehendi ut ex ea necessario sequatur adeoque necessario est. Q.E.D. 

For whatever is in the power of God, it (by P34) must be comprehended in [God's] essence in such a way that from [the essence's necessity] it follows that it is necessary.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.P34: God's Power

The Latin word potentia is used here for power. This word is significantly different than another Latin word that Spinoza uses for power which is potestas. Potentia is closely connected with the English cognate of "potential" as potentia signifies the expressive and dynamic notion of power as the virtual becomes actual. Potestas signifies an inertial force to maintain an order. Within Spinoza's framework, potestas always gives way to potentia.

Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia. 

Translated as,

The power of God is [God's] essence itself.

Demonstratio: Ex sola enim necessitate Dei essentiae sequitur Deum esse causam sui (per propositionem 11) et (per propositionem 16 ejusque corollarium) omnium rerum. Ergo potentia Dei qua ipse et omnia sunt et agunt, est ipsa ipsius essentia. Q.E.D.

Translated as,

For from the only the necessity of the essence of God, it follows that God is the cause of itself (by P11) and (by P16 and P16C) of all things. Therefore, the power of God, by which God all things are and act, is [God's] essence itself.