Spinoza's Ethics: III.P15 - Association

Res quæcunque potest esse per accidens causa lætitiæ, tristitiæ vel cupiditatis.

Whatsoever thing is able to be the cause of joy, sadness or desire by association.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ponatur mens duobus affectibus simul affici, uno scilicet qui ejus agendi potentiam neque auget neque minuit et altero qui eandem vel auget vel minuit (vide postulatum 1 hujus). Ex præcedenti propositione patet quod ubi mens postea illo a sua vera causa quæ (per hypothesin) per se ejus cogitandi potentiam nec auget nec minuit, afficietur, statim et hoc altero qui ipsius cogitandi potentiam auget vel minuit hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) lætitia vel tristitia afficietur atque adeo illa res non per se sed per accidens causa erit lætitiæ vel tristitiæ. Atque hac eadem via facile ostendi potest rem illam posse per accidens causam esse cupiditatis. Q.E.D.

It is posited that the mind is able to be affected by two affects at the same time, by one of course which neither increases nor diminishes the power of its acting and the other which either increases or diminishes the same (see III Postulate 1). From the preceding proposition it is clear that when the mind after by that by its true cause which (by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes the power of its thinking, it is affected, immediately and by this other which increases or diminishes the power of its thinking that is (by IIIP11S) joy or sadness if affected and to this extent that thing not through itself but by association is the cause of joy or sadness. And by this same method it is easily able to be shown that thing is able to be the cause of desire by association.

COROLLARIUM: Ex eo solo quod rem aliquam affectu lætitiæ vel tristitiæ cujus ipsa non est causa efficiens, contemplati sumus, eandem amare vel odio habere possumus.

From this alone because we have contemplated another thing by the affect of whose joy or sadness it is not the efficient cause itself, we are able to have the same thing by love or hatred.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam ex hoc solo fit (per propositionem 14 hujus) ut mens hanc rem postea imaginando affectu lætitiæ vel tristitiæ afficiatur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) ut mentis et corporis potentia augeatur vel minuatur etc. Et consequenter (per propositionem 12 hujus) ut mens eandem imaginari cupiat vel (per corollarium propositionis 13 hujus) aversetur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) ut eandem amet vel odio habeat. Q.E.D.

For from this alone it happens (by IIIP14) that the mind is affected this way later by imagining the affect of joy or sadness that is (by IIIP11) that the power of the mind and body is increased or diminished. And consequently (by IIIP12) that the mind desires the same thing to be imagined or (by IIIP13C) is averse that is (by IIIP13S) that it loves the same thing or has with hatred.

SCHOLIUM: Hinc intelligimus qui fieri potest ut quædam amemus vel odio habeamus absque ulla causa nobis cognita sed tantum ex sympathia (ut aiunt) et antipathia. Atque huc referenda etiam ea objecta quæ nos lætitia vel tristitia afficiunt ex eo solo quod aliquid simile habent objectis quæ nos iisdem affectibus afficere solent ut in sequentibus propositionibus ostendam. Scio equidem auctores qui primi hæc nomina sympathiæ et antipathiæ introduxerunt, significare iisdem voluisse rerum occultas quasdam qualitates sed nihilominus credo nobis licere per eadem notas vel manifestas etiam qualitates intelligere.

From her we understand which is able to happen so that certain things we love or have with hatred and from those thinking the cause for us but so much from sympathy (as they say) or antipathy. And from this also referring these objects which affect us with joy or sadness from that alone because they have something similar to objects which are accustomed to affect us with those affects as I will show in the following propositions. I know certain authors who have introduced these names of sympathy and antipathy, to have wished to signify with these certain hidden quality which I do not believe less permitted to us to understand by the same noted or even manifest qualities.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P14

Si mens duobus affectibus simul affecta semel fuit, ubi postea eorum alterutro afficietur, afficietur etiam altero.

If the mind is affected by two affects at the same time together, when afterward one of the two is affected, the other of the two will also be affected.

DEMONSTRATIO: Si corpus humanum a duobus corporibus simul affectum semel fuit, ubi mens postea eorum alterutrum imaginatur, statim et alterius recordabitur (per propositionem 18 partis II). At mentis imaginationes magis nostri corporis affectus quam corporum externorum naturam indicant (per corollarium II propositionis 16 partis II) : ergo si corpus et consequenter mens (vide definitionem 3 hujus) duobus affectibus semel affecta fuit, ubi postea eorum alterutro afficietur, afficietur etiam altero. Q.E.D.

If the human bod has been affected once by two bodies at the same time, when the mind later imagines one of the two, it records immediately of the other (by IIP18). But imaginations of the mind indicate greater affects of our body than the nature of the external bodies (by IIP16C2): therefore if the body and consequently the mind (see IIID3) has been affected once by two affects, when later it is affected by one of the two of these, it is also affected by the other. 

Here Spinoza is describing how our knowledge from our body gradually builds a knowledge of the world around us. Rooted in our body, we make associations based on these impressions. It strikes me (another example of body impact on mind) as the word impressions perfectly describes the process of how memories are developed - it all references the body. Given the variety of tastes that we note in others (as in food or decor or color), this location of memory developing in bodily sensations give rise to enormous differences in experience and, thus knowledge. When someone else mentions an opinion, Spinoza is making clear that these memories are a long ways from 2+2 =4.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P13 - Conatus to Forget

This proposition reminds me of a country song lyric - "the best cure for a sunset is a sunrise." Spinoza is describing a pattern of the mind that is rooted in conatus. Here there does not seem to be exact parallelism in that the mind selects imaginations which support an increase in the power of acting. It almost sounds like a prescription for high risk-taking activities, on the one hand, and, on the other, seems to lack a correlation for the body, except that it appears to engage the body in a way that resembles will power. 

Cum mens ea imaginatur quæ corporis agendi potentiam minuunt vel coercent, conatur quantum potest rerum recordari quæ horum existentiam secludunt.

Since the mind imagines things which diminishes or restrains the power of the body for acting, it tries as much as it can to record of things which excludes the existence of these things.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quamdiu mens quicquam tale imaginatur tamdiu mentis et corporis potentia minuitur vel coercetur (ut in præcedenti propositione demonstravimus) et nihilominus id tamdiu imaginabitur donec mens aliud imaginetur quod hujus præsentem existentiam secludat (per propositionem 17 partis II) hoc est (ut modo ostendimus) mentis et corporis potentia tamdiu minuitur vel coercetur donec mens aliud imaginetur quod hujus existentiam secludit quodque adeo mens (per propositionem 9 hujus) quantum potest imaginari vel recordari conabitur. Q.E.D.

For so long as the mind imagines such a thing, so long is the power of the mind and body diminished or restrained (as we have shown in IIIP12) and nothing less it as long as it will imagine until the mind imagines something else which excludes the present existence of this (by IIP17) that is (as I have shown in the way) the power of the mind and the body as long as it is diminished or restrained until the mind imagines something else which excludes the existence of this and to such a degree the mind (by IIIP9) tries as much as it is able to imagine or remember.  

COROLLARIUM: Hinc sequitur quod mens ea imaginari aversatur quæ ipsius et corporis potentiam minuunt vel coercent.

From here it follows what the mind is averse to imagine what things diminishes or restrains the power of itself and the body.

SCHOLIUM: Ex his clare intelligimus quid amor quidque odium sit. Nempe amor nihil aliud est quam lætitia concomitante idea causæ externæ et odium nihil aliud quam tristitia concomitante idea causæ externæ. Videmus deinde quod ille qui amat necessario conatur rem quam amat præsentem habere et conservare et contra qui odit, rem quam odio habet, amovere et destruere conatur. Sed de his omnibus in sequentibus prolixius.

From these we clearly understand what love and hatred are. Of course love is nothing other than which joy is accompanied by the idea of an external cause and hatred is nothing other than sadness accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Next we see what that who loves by necessity tries to have and to keep present the thing which he loves and against which he hates the thing which he has with hatred tries to remove and destroy. But but concerning these more in all the following. 

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P12 - Conatus of Mind

Spinoza is building on this wild idea that the mind is operating within a parallel but not causal relationship with the body. Here the mind observes the body as present and thus imagines connections and, from this, imagines an increase or decrease in power. It has always amazed me the extent to which I could envision a problem in a love relationship could actually put me in a bad space. Spinoza is stating that this is an imagination and it has causal power on my mind, despite its lack of bodily reality.

Mens quantum potest ea imaginari conatur quæ corporis agendi potentiam augent vel juvant.

The mind as much as it is able to imagine things tries what things increases or helps the power of the body for acting

DEMONSTRATIO: Quamdiu humanum corpus affectum est modo qui naturam corporis alicujus externi involvit tamdiu mens humana idem corpus ut præsens contemplabitur (per propositionem 17 partis II) et consequenter (per propositionem 7 partis II) quamdiu mens aliquod externum corpus ut præsens contemplatur hoc est (per ejusdem propositionis 17 scholium) imaginatur tamdiu humanum corpus affectum est modo qui naturam ejusdem corporis externi involvit atque adeo quamdiu mens ea imaginatur quæ corporis nostri agendi potentiam augent vel juvant tamdiu corpus affectum est modis qui ejusdem agendi potentiam augent vel juvant (vide postulatum 1 hujus) et consequenter (per propositionem 11 hujus) tamdiu mentis cogitandi potentia augetur vel juvatur ac proinde (per propositionem 6 vel 9 hujus) mens quantum potest eadem imaginari conatur. Q.E.D. 

As long as the human body is affected by a mode which involves the nature of an external body so long as the human mind contemplates the body as present (by IIP17) and consequently (by IIP7) as long as the mind contemplates some external body as present, that is (by IIP17S) imagines so long as the human body is affected by a mode which involves the nature of the same external body and to such a degree as long as the mind imagines that which increases or helps the power of our body for acting for so long is the body affected by modes which increase or help its power for acting (see Postulate 1) and consequently (by IIIP11) so long is the power of the mind for thinking increased or helped and next (by IIIP6 or IIIP9) the mind tries as much as it is able to imagine the same things.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P11 - Good for Body, Good for MInd

Quicquid corporis nostri agendi potentiam auget vel minuit, juvat vel coercet, ejusdem rei idea mentis nostræ cogitandi potentiam auget vel minuit, juvat vel coercet.

Whatever increases or diminishes the power of our body to act, helps or restrains, the idea of the same thing increases or diminishes the power of our mind to think, helps or restrains.

DEMONSTRATIO: Hæc propositio patet ex propositione 7 partis II vel etiam ex propositione 14 partis II.

This proposition is evident from IIP7 or even also from IIP14.

SCHOLIUM: Videmus itaque mentem magnas posse pati mutationes et jam ad majorem jam autem ad minorem perfectionem transire, quæ quidem passiones nobis explicant affectus lætitiæ et tristitiæ. Per lætitiam itaque in sequentibus intelligam passionem qua mens ad majorem perfectionem transit. Per tristitiam autem passionem qua ipsa ad minorem transit perfectionem. Porro affectum lætitiæ ad mentem et corpus simul relatum titillationem vel hilaritatem voco, tristitiæ autem dolorem vel melancholiam. Sed notandum titillationem et dolorem ad hominem referri quando una ejus pars præ reliquis est affecta; hilaritatem autem et melancholiam quando omnes pariter sunt affectæ. Quid deinde cupiditas sit in scholio propositionis 9 hujus partis explicui et præter hos tres nullum alium agnosco affectum primarium nam reliquos ex his tribus oriri in sequentibus ostendam. Sed antequam ulterius pergam, lubet hic fusius propositionem 10 hujus partis explicare ut clarius intelligatur qua ratione idea ideæ sit contraria. In scholio propositionis 17 partis II ostendimus ideam quæ mentis essentiam constituit, corporis existentiam tamdiu involvere quamdiu ipsum corpus existit. Deinde ex iis quæ in corollario propositionis 8 partis II et in ejusdem scholio ostendimus, sequitur præsentem nostræ mentis existentiam ab hoc solo pendere quod scilicet mens actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Denique mentis potentiam qua ipsa res imaginatur earumque recordatur, ab hoc etiam pendere ostendimus (vide propositiones 17 et 18 partis II cum ejus scholio) quod ipsa actualem corporis existentiam involvit. Ex quibus sequitur mentis præsentem existentiam ejusque imaginandi potentiam tolli simulatque mens præsentem corporis existentiam affirmare desinit. At causa cur mens hanc corporis existentiam affirmare desinit, non potest esse ipsa mens (per propositionem 4 hujus) nec etiam quod corpus esse desinit. Nam (per propositionem 6 partis II) causa cur mens corporis existentiam affirmat, non est quia corpus existere incepit : quare per eandem rationem nec ipsius corporis existentiam affirmare desinit quia corpus esse desinit sed (per propositionem 8 partis II) hoc ab alia idea oritur quæ nostri corporis et consequenter nostræ mentis præsentem existentiam secludit quæque adeo ideæ quæ nostræ mentis essentiam constituit, est contraria.

Thus we see that the mind is able to endure great changes and to move at one time to a greater and another time to a lesser perfection which certain passions explain to us feelings of happiness and sadness. So by happy passion I understand in the following by which the mind moves to a greater perfection. Moreover by sad passion by which the mind itself moves to a lesser perfection. Next I call the feeling of happiness that relates simultaneously to the mind and the body as titillation or hilarity, moreover that of sadness as grief or depression. But noting titillation or grief is referring when one of its parts is affected more than the others; hilarity or depression when all parts are affected equally. Next what desire I have explained in IIIP9S and beyond these three I do not know any of other primary affects for I show the remaining from these three in the following. But before I move farther, it is pleasing here to explicate more widely IIIP10 so that it might be understood by what reason an idea might be contrary to an idea. In IIP17S we show the idea that constitutes the essence of the mind, involves the existence of the body insofar as the body itself exists. Next from these which we show in IIP8C and IIP8S, it follows that the present existence of our mind derives from this alone because of course the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Finally we show the power of the mind by which the thing itself is imagined and of which it is recorded, from here also to derive (see IIP17 and IIP18 and IIP18S) which involves the actual existence of the body. From which it follows that the present existence of the mind and to raise its power of imagining and the mind imitates and leaves off to affirm the present existence of the body. But why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, the mind itself is not able to be (by IIIP4) and does not even cease because the body is. For (by IIP6) the reason the mind affirms the existence of the body is not because the body begins to exist: wherefore by the same rationale it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body itself because the body ceases to be but (by IIP8) this arises from another idea which hides the present existence of our body and thus our mind which idea to such an extent constitutes the essence of our mind and is contrary.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P10

Idea quæ corporis nostri existentiam secludit in nostra mente dari nequit sed eidem est contraria.

An idea which cuts off the existence of our body is not able to be in our mind but is contrary to it.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quicquid corpus nostrum potest destruere, in eodem dari nequit (per propositionem 5 hujus) adeoque neque ejus rei idea potest in Deo dari quatenus nostri corporis ideam habet (per corollarium propositionis 9 partis II) hoc est (per propositiones 11 et 13 partis II) ejus rei idea in nostra mente dari nequit sed contra quoniam (per propositiones 11 et 13 partis II) primum quod mentis essentiam constituit, est idea corporis actu existentis, primum et præcipuum nostræ mentis conatus est (per propositionem 7 hujus) corporis nostri existentiam affirmare atque adeo idea quæ corporis nostri existentiam negat, nostræ menti est contraria etc. Q.E.D. 

Whatever our body is able to destroy, is not able to be in the same (by IIIP5) and to this extent is not able to be the idea of this thing to be in God insofar as it has the idea of our body (by IIP9C), that is (by IIP11 and IIP13) is not able to be the idea of this thing in our mind but the opposite since (by IIP11 and IIP13) first which establishes the essence of the mind is the idea of the existence of the body in actuality, first and particular is the trying of our mind (by IIIP7) to affirm the existence of our body and to such an extent the idea which denies the existence of our body is contrary of our mind, etc.

This proposition raises some related issues. The first one is the contemplation of our own death. If Spinoza is correct, then the inability to conceive of not existing would naturally give rise to all kinds of imaginations - such as eternal life or heaven. Our mind's conatus seems to naturally resist such notions. Further, the related concept of suicide seems particularly difficult. Suicide occurs when life is too painful to live and the alternative appears better. But if the alternative is non-existence, how is it able to be in the mind? Finally, related to both of these issues, Spinoza raises the issue that the mind has unity, but certainly we have fragmentary self-states and schizophrenia is real. Perhaps he is identifying states which are unhealthy - those that do not try to affirm the existence of our body or our life affirming. These issues need more clarity to fully grasp his message.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P9 - Awareness of Persisting

Mens tam quatenus claras et distinctas quam quatenus confusas habet ideas, conatur in suo esse perseverare indefinita quadam duratione et hujus sui conatus est conscia.

A mind has ideas just insofar as clear and distinct as confused, tries to persevere to be in itself by a certain indefinite duration and by awareness of this is its trying.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mentis essentia ex ideis adæquatis et inadæquatis constituitur (ut in propositione 3 hujus ostendimus) adeoque (per propositionem 7 hujus) tam quatenus has quam quatenus illas habet, in suo esse perseverare conatur idque (per propositionem 8 hujus) indefinita quadam duratione. Cum autem mens (per propositionem 23 partis II) per ideas affectionum corporis necessario sui sit conscia, est ergo (per propositionem 7 hujus) mens sui conatus conscia. Q.E.D. 

The essence of the mind is constituted by adequate and inadequate ideas (as we have shown in IIIP3) to the extent (by IIIP7) it has insofar as much these as those, it tries to persevere to be in itself and this (by IIIP8) with certain indefinite duration. Moreover, since the mind (by IIP23) by ideas is aware of affections of its body necessarily, thus the mind is (by IIIP7) aware of its trying.

Spinoza is focused on the mind's awareness of efforting. Clearly, since the mind is the idea of the body, it is the body which attempts to persevere, that is, the survival effort is lodged in the body. The normal thought is that the mind is attempting to persist and forces the body to engage in this effort. Instead, Spinoza states that the mind, whether from confused or adequate ideas, is aware of this fundamental trying.

SCHOLIUM: Hic conatus cum ad mentem solam refertur, voluntas appellatur sed cum ad mentem et corpus simul refertur, vocatur appetitus, qui proinde nihil aliud est quam ipsa hominis essentia ex cujus natura ea quæ ipsius conservationi inserviunt, necessario sequuntur atque adeo homo ad eadem agendum determinatus est. Deinde inter appetitum et cupiditatem nulla est differentia nisi quod cupiditas ad homines plerumque referatur quatenus sui appetitus sunt conscii et propterea sic definiri potest nempe cupiditas est appetitus cum ejusdem conscientia. Constat itaque ex his omnibus nihil nos conari, velle, appetere neque cupere quia id bonum esse judicamus sed contra nos propterea aliquid bonum esse judicare quia id conamur, volumus, appetimus atque cupimus. 

Here when trying refers to the mind alone, it is called will but when it refers to the mind and the body at the same time, it is called appetite, which thus is nothing other than the essence of humanity itself from whose nature are those which serve its own preservation, follow necessarily and to that degree a human is determined to the same acting. Next among appetite and desire there is no difference unless because desire refers to generally to humans insofar as they are aware of their appetite and besides desire is thus of course able to be defined as appetite with awareness of its same. Thus it stands from all these there is nothing we try, wish, seek and desire because we judge it to be good but in contrast, besides, something is judged to be good because we try, will, seek, and desire it.

Here Spinoza extends the notion that the essence of the human is its conatus, which is marked by its potentia. This conatus is not limited to humans, but is Spinoza's focus here. There is a pattern of the body seeking to maintain itself or expand itself. Of course, there is an issue here that resembles water running uphill. This does not seem correct. Somehow there is a persistence of order as a superior energy flow to a movement to disorder. Seemingly contrary to the principles of entropy, this persistence of order appears to be a structural anomaly - akin to the act of siphoning.