Spinoza's Ethics: III.P15 - Association

Res quæcunque potest esse per accidens causa lætitiæ, tristitiæ vel cupiditatis.

Whatsoever thing is able to be the cause of joy, sadness or desire by association.

DEMONSTRATIO: Ponatur mens duobus affectibus simul affici, uno scilicet qui ejus agendi potentiam neque auget neque minuit et altero qui eandem vel auget vel minuit (vide postulatum 1 hujus). Ex præcedenti propositione patet quod ubi mens postea illo a sua vera causa quæ (per hypothesin) per se ejus cogitandi potentiam nec auget nec minuit, afficietur, statim et hoc altero qui ipsius cogitandi potentiam auget vel minuit hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) lætitia vel tristitia afficietur atque adeo illa res non per se sed per accidens causa erit lætitiæ vel tristitiæ. Atque hac eadem via facile ostendi potest rem illam posse per accidens causam esse cupiditatis. Q.E.D.

It is posited that the mind is able to be affected by two affects at the same time, by one of course which neither increases nor diminishes the power of its acting and the other which either increases or diminishes the same (see III Postulate 1). From the preceding proposition it is clear that when the mind after by that by its true cause which (by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes the power of its thinking, it is affected, immediately and by this other which increases or diminishes the power of its thinking that is (by IIIP11S) joy or sadness if affected and to this extent that thing not through itself but by association is the cause of joy or sadness. And by this same method it is easily able to be shown that thing is able to be the cause of desire by association.

COROLLARIUM: Ex eo solo quod rem aliquam affectu lætitiæ vel tristitiæ cujus ipsa non est causa efficiens, contemplati sumus, eandem amare vel odio habere possumus.

From this alone because we have contemplated another thing by the affect of whose joy or sadness it is not the efficient cause itself, we are able to have the same thing by love or hatred.

DEMONSTRATIO: Nam ex hoc solo fit (per propositionem 14 hujus) ut mens hanc rem postea imaginando affectu lætitiæ vel tristitiæ afficiatur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) ut mentis et corporis potentia augeatur vel minuatur etc. Et consequenter (per propositionem 12 hujus) ut mens eandem imaginari cupiat vel (per corollarium propositionis 13 hujus) aversetur hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) ut eandem amet vel odio habeat. Q.E.D.

For from this alone it happens (by IIIP14) that the mind is affected this way later by imagining the affect of joy or sadness that is (by IIIP11) that the power of the mind and body is increased or diminished. And consequently (by IIIP12) that the mind desires the same thing to be imagined or (by IIIP13C) is averse that is (by IIIP13S) that it loves the same thing or has with hatred.

SCHOLIUM: Hinc intelligimus qui fieri potest ut quædam amemus vel odio habeamus absque ulla causa nobis cognita sed tantum ex sympathia (ut aiunt) et antipathia. Atque huc referenda etiam ea objecta quæ nos lætitia vel tristitia afficiunt ex eo solo quod aliquid simile habent objectis quæ nos iisdem affectibus afficere solent ut in sequentibus propositionibus ostendam. Scio equidem auctores qui primi hæc nomina sympathiæ et antipathiæ introduxerunt, significare iisdem voluisse rerum occultas quasdam qualitates sed nihilominus credo nobis licere per eadem notas vel manifestas etiam qualitates intelligere.

From her we understand which is able to happen so that certain things we love or have with hatred and from those thinking the cause for us but so much from sympathy (as they say) or antipathy. And from this also referring these objects which affect us with joy or sadness from that alone because they have something similar to objects which are accustomed to affect us with those affects as I will show in the following propositions. I know certain authors who have introduced these names of sympathy and antipathy, to have wished to signify with these certain hidden quality which I do not believe less permitted to us to understand by the same noted or even manifest qualities.