Spinoza's Ethics: III.P22

Si aliquem imaginamur lætitia afficere rem quam amamus, amore erga eum afficiemur. Si contra eundem imaginamur tristitia eandem afficere, contra odio etiam contra ipsum afficiemur.

If we imagine anything to affect with joy what we love, we will be affected by love towards the thing. If, on the other hand, we imagine the same to be affected with sadness, we, on the other hand, will be affected with hatred against itself.

DEMONSTRATIO: Qui rem quam amamus lætitia vel tristitia afficit, ille nos lætitia vel tristitia etiam afficit si nimirum rem amatam lætitia illa vel tristitia affectam imaginamur (per præcedentem propositionem). At hæc lætitia vel tristitia in nobis supponitur dari concomitante idea causæ externæ; ergo (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) si aliquem imaginamur lætitia vel tristitia afficere rem quam amamus, erga eundem amore vel odio afficiemur. Q.E.D.

Whatever affects the thing which we love with joy or sadness, that also affects us with joy or sadness if without a doubt we imagine the beloved affected by that with joy or sadness (by IIIP21). But this is placed by joy or sadness in us to be with the accompanying idea of an external cause; therefore (by IIIP13S) if we imagine anything else to affect with joy or sadness the thing which we love, towards the same thing we are affected with love or hatred.

SCHOLIUM: Propositio 21 nobis explicat quid sit commiseratio quam definire possumus quod sit tristitia orta ex alterius damno. Quo autem nomine appellanda sit lætitia quæ ex alterius bono oritur, nescio. Porro amorem erga illum qui alteri bene fecit, favorem et contra odium erga illum qui alteri male fecit, indignationem appellabimus. Denique notandum nos non tantum misereri rei quam amavimus (ut in propositione 21 ostendimus) sed etiam ejus quam antea nullo affectu prosecuti sumus modo eam nobis similem judicemus (ut infra ostendam) atque adeo ei etiam favere qui simili bene fecit et contra in eum indignari qui simili damnum intulit.

IIIP21 explains to us what is commiseration which we are able to define as sadness arising from the injury of another. Moreover by which name is called joy which arises from the goodness of another, I do not know. Next love towards that who does good for another, favor and in contrast hatred towards that who does bad to another, we will call indignation. Finally it ought to be noted that we not so much to be miserable by the thing which we have loved (as we have shown in IIIP21) but also whose which before with no affect have followed in the way we have judged a like thing for us (as I have shown before) and to such a degree to him also to favor who has done good to a like and in contrast to be indignant at him who has born the injury from another.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P21 - Responsiveness to Beloved

Qui id quod amat lætitia vel tristitia affectum imaginatur, lætitia etiam vel tristitia afficietur et uterque hic affectus major aut minor erit in amante prout uterque major aut minor est in re amata.

Whoever imagines that thing which one loves affected by joy or sadness, also is affected by joy or sadness and either of these emotions will be more or less in loving just as there is more or less in the beloved one.

DEMONSTRATIO: Rerum imagines (ut in propositione 19 hujus demonstravimus) quæ rei amatæ existentiam ponunt, mentis conatum quo ipsam rem amatam imaginari conatur, juvant. Sed lætitia existentiam rei lætæ ponit et eo magis quo lætitiæ affectus major est : est enim (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) transitio ad majorem perfectionem : ergo imago lætitiæ rei amatæ in amante ipsius mentis conatum juvat hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) amantem lætitia afficit et eo majore quo major hic affectus in re amata fuerit. Quod erat primum. Deinde quatenus res aliqua tristitia afficitur eatenus destruitur et eo magis quo majore afficitur tristitia (per idem scholium propositionis 11 hujus) adeoque (per propositionem 19 hujus) qui id quod amat tristitia affici imaginatur, tristitia etiam afficietur et eo majore quo major hic affectus in re amata fuerit. Q.E.D.

The images of things (as in IIIP19 we have shown) which confirms the existence of a beloved thing, helps the effort of the mind by which the beloved thing itself is imagined. But joy confirms the existence of the joyous thing and the greater it is the more the emotion of joy: for it is (by IIIP11S) a movement to a greater perfection; therefore the image of joy of the beloved thing helps the effort of the mind itself in loving that is (by IIIP11S) joy affects loving and the more it does the more here the emotion will have been in the beloved thing. This was first. Then insofar as another thing is affected with sadness thus far is it destroyed and the more it does the greater it is affected with sadness (by IIIP11S again) to such a degree (by IIIP19) who imagines what that person loves to be affected with sadness, also will be affected by sadness and the more so the more the emotion will have been here in the beloved thing.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P20

Qui id quod odio habet, destrui imaginatur, lætabitur.

Whoever has something which is by hatred, imagines to be destroyed, will rejoice.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens (per 13 propositionem hujus) ea imaginari conatur quæ rerum existentiam quibus corporis agendi potentia minuitur vel coercetur, secludunt hoc est (per scholium ejusdem propositionis) ea imaginari conatur quæ rerum quas odio habet, existentiam secludunt atque adeo rei imago quæ existentiam ejus quod mens odio habet, secludit, hunc mentis conatum juvat hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) mentem lætitia afficit. Qui itaque id quod odio habet, destrui imaginatur, lætabitur. Q.E.D.

The mind (by IIIP13) tries to imagine those things which hide the existence of things by which the power of the acting body is diminished or restrained, that is (by IIIP13S) tries to imagine those things which of things that have hatred of them, hide their existence and to such a degree the image of the thing hides which its existence the mind has hate, to this degree helps the effort of the mind, that is (by IIIP11S) joy affects the mind. Thus whoever has a thing which is with hatred, imagines to be destroy, will rejoice.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P19 - Impact on Loved One

Qui id quod amat destrui imaginatur, contristabitur; si contra autem conservari, lætabitur.

Whoever imagines what that person loves to be destroyed, is anguished; moreover if on the other hand, to be conserved, that person is overjoyed.

DEMONSTRATIO: Mens quantum potest ea imaginari conatur quæ corporis agendi potentiam augent vel juvant (per propositionem 12 hujus) hoc est (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) ea quæ amat. At imaginatio ab iis juvatur quæ rei existentiam ponunt et contra coercetur iis quæ rei existentiam secludunt (per propositionem 17 partis II); ergo rerum imagines quæ rei existentiam ponunt, mentis conatum quo rem amatam imaginari conatur, juvant hoc est (per scholium propositionis 11 hujus) lætitia mentem afficiunt et quæ contra rei amatæ existentiam secludunt, eundem mentis conatum coercent hoc est (per idem scholium) tristitia mentem afficiunt. Qui itaque id quod amat destrui imaginatur, contristabitur, etc. Q.E.D.

The mind as much as it is able tries to imagine things which augment the power of the body acting or aid (by IIIP12) that is (by IIIP13S) things which it loves. But the imagination from these is aided which places the existence of the thing and against it is forced by things which deny the existence of the thing (by IIP17); thus images of things which place the existence of the thing, effort of the mind in which it tries to imagine the thing loved, aid, that is (by IIIP11S) by joy they affect the mind and against which they deny the existence of the beloved thing, force the same effort of the mind, that is (by the same scolium) with sadness they affect the mind. Thus whoever imagines what that person loves to be destroyed, is saddened, etc. 

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P18

Homo ex imagine rei præteritæ aut futuræ eodem lætitiæ et tristitiæ affectu afficitur ac ex imagine rei præsentis.

A human from the image of a thing past or future is affected by the affect of the same joy or sadness as from the image of the thing present.

DEMONSTRATIO: Quamdiu homo rei alicujus imagine affectus est, rem ut præsentem tametsi non existat, contemplabitur (per propositionem 17 partis II cum ejusdem corollario) nec ipsam ut præteritam aut futuram imaginatur nisi quatenus ejus imago juncta est imagini temporis præteriti aut futuri (vide scholium propositionis 44 partis II). Quare rei imago in se sola considerata eadem est sive ad tempus futurum vel præteritum sive ad præsens referatur hoc est (per corollarium II propositionis 16 partis II) corporis constitutio seu affectus idem est sive imago sit rei præteritæ vel futuræ sive præsentis atque adeo affectus lætitiæ et tristitiæ idem est sive imago sit rei præteritæ aut futuræ sive præsentis. Q.E.D.

As long as the human is affected by the image of some other thing, the thing as present although it does not exist, will be contemplated (by IIP17 and IIP17C) and not itself as past or future is imagined unless insofar as its image is joined to the image of past or future time (see IIP44S). Therefore the image of the thing considered in itself alone is the same whether for future or past time or referred for present, that is (by IIP16C) the constitution of the body or the the same affect is whether the image is the past or future of the thing or present and to such an extent the affect of joy or sadness is the same is the image of the past thing or future or present.

SCHOLIUM I: Rem eatenus præteritam aut futuram hic voco quatenus ab eadem affecti fuimus aut afficiemur exempli gratia quatenus ipsam vidimus aut videbimus, nos refecit aut reficiet, nos læsit aut lædet etc. Quatenus enim eandem sic imaginamur eatenus ejus existentiam affirmamus hoc est corpus nullo affectu afficitur qui rei existentiam secludat atque adeo (per propositionem 17 partis II) corpus ejusdem rei imagine eodem modo afficitur ac si res ipsa præsens adesset. Verumenimvero quia plerumque fit ut ii qui plura sunt experti, fluctuent quamdiu rem ut futuram vel præteritam contemplantur deque rei eventu ut plurimum dubitent (vide scholium propositionis 44 partis II) hinc fit ut affectus qui ex similibus rerum imaginibus oriuntur, non sint adeo constantes sed ut plerumque aliarum rerum imaginibus perturbentur donec homines de rei eventu certiores fiant.

A thing insofar as past or future this I call insofar as from the same thing we have been affected or are affected for example insofar as we have seen or will see itself it has move us or will move, it pains or elates etc. For insofar as thus we imagine the same thing as far as we affirm its existence that is the body is affected by no affect which denies the existence of the thing and to such a degree (by IIP17) the mode is affected by the image of the same thing in the same way and if the thing itself present is near. Truly indeed because it happens much that this who are many experts, fluctuate as long as the thing so that we contemplate the future or past and from the occurrence of the thing so that they doubt much (see IIP44S) from her it happens that the affect which arises from similar images of the things, they are not to such a degree constant by perturbed by many other images of things until humans become more certain about the occurrence of the thing.

SCHOLIUM II: Ex modo dictis intelligimus quid sit spes, metus, securitas, desperatio, gaudium et conscientiæ morsus. Spes namque nihil aliud est quam inconstans lætitia orta ex imagine rei futuræ vel præteritæ de cujus eventu dubitamus, metus contra inconstans tristitia ex rei dubiæ imagine etiam orta. Porro si horum affectuum dubitatio tollatur, ex spe sit securitas et ex metu desperatio nempe lætitia vel tristitia orta ex imagine rei quam metuimus vel speravimus. Gaudium deinde est lætitia orta ex imagine rei præteritæ de cujus eventu dubitavimus. Conscientiæ denique morsus est tristitia opposita gaudio.

From a mode of speaking we understand what is hope, fear, security, desperation, joy and pain of conscience. For hope is nothing other than what inconstant joy arising from the image of a future or past thing about whose occurrence we are doubtful, fear against inconstant sadness from also arising the image of a doubtful thing. Further on if doubt of these affects arises, from hope is security and from fear of course desperation joy or sadness arising from the image of the thing which we have feared or hoped. Indeed joy is happiness arising from the image of a past thing about whose occurrence we have doubted. Finally pain of the conscience is a sadness opposed to joy.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P17

Si rem quæ nos tristitiæ affectu afficere solet, aliquid habere imaginamur simile alteri quæ nos æque magno lætitiæ affectu solet afficere, eandem odio habebimus et simul amabimus.

If a thing which is accustomed to affect us with the affect of sadness, we imagine something to have similar of the other which is accustomed to affect us equally with a great affect of joy, we will have hatred for the same and we will love at the same time.

DEMONSTRATIO: Est enim (per hypothesin) hæc res per se tristitiæ causa et (per scholium propositionis 13 hujus) quatenus eandem hoc affectu imaginamur, eandem odio habemus et quatenus præterea aliquid habere imaginamur simile alteri quæ nos æque magno lætitiæ affectu afficere solet, æque magno lætitiæ conamine amabimus (per propositionem præcedentem) atque adeo eandem odio habebimus et simul amabimus. Q.E.D.

For it is (by hypothesis) this thing by itself the cause of sadness and (by IIIP13S) insofar we imagine the same with this affect, we have hatred of the same and insofar as besides we imagine something to have similar to another thing which is accustomed to affect us with a great affect of joy, equally with great spirit of joy we will love (by IIIP16) and to such a degree we will have hatred and at the same time love.

SCHOLIUM: Hæc mentis constitutio quæ scilicet ex duobus contrariis affectibus oritur, animi vocatur fluctuatio, quæ proinde affectum respicit ut dubitatio imaginationem (vide scholium propositionis 44 partis II) nec animi fluctuatio et dubitatio inter se differunt nisi secundum majus et minus. Sed notandum me in propositione præcedenti has animi fluctuationes ex causis deduxisse quæ per se unius et per accidens alterius affectus sunt causa; quod ideo feci quia sic facilius ex præcedentibus deduci poterant; at non quod negem animi fluctuationes plerumque oriri ab objecto quod utriusque affectus sit efficiens causa. Nam corpus humanum (per postulatum 1 partis II) ex plurimis diversæ naturæ individuis componitur atque adeo (per axioma 1 post lemma 3, quod vide post propositionem 13 partis II) ab uno eodemque corpore plurimis diversisque modis potest affici et contra quia una eademque res multis modis potest affici, multis ergo etiam diversisque modis unam eandemque corporis partem afficere poterit. Ex quibus facile concipere possumus unum idemque objectum posse esse causam multorum contrariorumque affectuum.

This constitution of the mind which of course from two contrary affects arises, is called vacillation of the mind, which hence sees the affect as doubt to the imagination (see IIP44S) and fluctuation of the mind and doubt are not different among themselves except following greater or lesser. But it ought to be noted that I in the prior proposition these fluctuations of the mind have followed from causes which by itself at times and and by accident at times are the cause of the affect; which thus I have made because so much more easily they are able to be deduced from the preceding; but not which I deny that the fluctuations of the mind and more arise from the object which might be the efficient cause of another affect. For the human body (by II Post.1) from more individual things of diverse nature is composed and to such a degree (by Axiom 1 after Lemma 3, see IIP13) from one and the same body is able to be affect in more and diverse ways and in contrast because one and the same thing is able to be affected by many ways, therefore also by many and diverse ways one and the same part of the body is able to be affected. From which we are able to easily conceive that one and the same object is able to cause of multiple and contrary affects.

Spinoza's Ethics: III.P16 - Correlation

Ex eo solo quod rem aliquam aliquid habere imaginamur simile objecto quod mentem lætitia vel tristitia afficere solet, quamvis id in quo res objecto est similis, non sit horum affectuum efficiens causa, eam tamen amabimus vel odio habebimus.

From this one thing which we imagine one thing to have another thing like the object which is accustomed to affect the mind with joy or sadness although it in which the thing is similar to the object is not the efficient cause of these, nevertheless we will love or have hatred of the thing.

DEMONSTRATIO: Id quod simile est objecto, in ipso objecto (per hypothesin) cum affectu lætitiæ vel tristitiæ contemplati sumus atque adeo (per propositionem 14 hujus) cum mens ejus imagine afficietur, statim etiam hoc vel illo afficietur affectu et consequenter res quam hoc idem habere percipimus, erit (per propositionem 15 hujus) per accidens lætitiæ vel tristitiæ causa adeoque (per præcedens corollarium) quamvis id in quo objecto est similis, non sit horum affectuum causa efficiens, eam tamen amabimus vel odio habebimus. Q.E.D.

That which is like the object, in the object itself (by hypotheis) we have contemplated with the affect of joy or sadness and to such an extent (by IIIP14) since its mind is affected by the image, immediately also by this or by that it is affected by the affect and consequently the thing which we perceive to have the same by this, it will be (by IIIP15) by accident the cause of joy or sadness to the extent (by IIIP15C)  although that in which it is like the object, might not be the efficient cause of these affects, nevertheless we will love it or have hatred.