Spinoza's Ethics: I.A6: Correspondence

Here it seems that Spinoza is describing how knowing and being operate: they correspond completely. It's axiomatic. Left unclear is whether this is Knowing and Being or whether this is a function of the relationship of the attributes of thought and extension. However, it's not necessary to take a decision, as this axiom may operate fundamentally for both areas. (As for whether the iterations of an idea of an idea is a thing, it may be so in the same sense of a thing of a thing ad infinitum.)

Idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire.

Translated as,

A true idea must agree with its object.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.A5: Interactivity

invicem means "in turn, alternately, mutually, reciprocally". It seems to come from vicis which means "change, interchange or alternation" and may the basis for the English words vicissitude and vice versa. Many translations do not capture this dynamic. Even though this is an axiom, Spinoza seems to describe a dynamic process, highlighting the word invicem twice. 

Up to this point, the axioms seem somewhat static. Here, Spinoza begins to introduce the dynamic of change and process. This touches on his use of the word exprimit or "express" that he first employs in I.D6.

Quae nihil commune cum se invicem habent, etiam per se invicem intelligi non possunt sive conceptus unius alterius conceptum non involvit.

Translated as,

Things which have nothing in common with one another interactively, also cannot be understood through themselves interactively where the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.A4: Knowledge of Effect

I see I.A4 as relating to either Knowing or the attribute of thought (two significantly different interpretations) as the emphasis is on cognitio or "knowledge" in the same way as I.A3 deal with either Being or the attribute of extension (again significantly different interpretations) where cause and effect are related. He is careful to stress in this axiom the kind of connection of cause and effect. Again, a level of inherence that requires not only "depends" but also "involves." The absence of any so-called wiggle room seems to imply a level of determinism that works at large scale, but seems diminished at smaller scales. It will be interesting to see how this is addressed. 

Effectus cognitio a cognitione causae dependet et eandem involvit.

Translated as,

The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of its cause.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.A3: Effect

This tying together of cause and effect seems incredibly tight and seems to be on the order of inherence. By that I mean that the effect seems almost present to the definite cause, as in the effect of roundness is in the definite cause of a circle. It seems that this cause-effect connection moves to level of immanence as opposed to transcendence; almost definitional rather than relational. The unfolding of cause and effect appears to inhere in the true nature of the cause.

Ex data causa determinata necessario sequitur effectus et contra si nulla detur determinata causa, impossibile est ut effectus sequatur.

Translated as,

From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily; and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for an effect to follow.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.A2: Knowing

This axiom seems like a companion to 1.A1 in the way of Spinoza's parallelism of the mind and the body. One key question is whether this parallelism is employing "a view from nowhere" or "a view from somewhere." The verb used here is "conceive" or concipi which typically signifies a "view from nowhere." It may be that this is irrelevant as an axiom because Spinoza is simply outlining the operation of logic rather than content as in the definitions. If so, it would make sense to use the "view from nowhere" verbs, but not be pointing to substance versus attributes.

Id quod per aliud not potest concipi, per se concipi debet.

Translated as,

That which cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through itself.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.A1: Isness

Here Spinoza begins the axioms of part I and concludes the definitions of part I. The definitions are different than the axioms in degree of logical certainty. If the definitions were altered, the content process of the Ethics would be changed. In contrast, if the axioms were altered, the reasoning process of the Ethics would be changed.

Omnia quae sunt vel in se vel in alio sunt.

Translated as,

All things which are, are either in themselves or in another.

Spinoza's Ethics: I.D8: Eternity

Here Spinoza correlates "eternity" or aeternitatem with "existence itself" or ipsam existentiam. These two concepts differ in my mind. Eternity seems unchanging and abstract. In contrast, existence seems dynamic and concrete. But here, as in ID.1, Spinoza takes that which is transcendent and abstract and makes it immanent and concrete.

This connecting of the transcendent with the immanent is qualified by his use of the word "itself" or ipsam. Spinoza is laconic and for this reason, the inclusion of "itself" is significant. If  "itself" were not included, we might simply place "eternity"and "existence" on a fully equal plane. But by adding "itself", Spinoza connects "eternity" with the core or essence of "existence." Neatly, that “essence” of “existence” brings us back to the definition of “self-caused” in I.D1. Even more, it is fitting that eternity would be “self-caused.”

This connection is further qualified "existence itself" by the phrase beginning with "insofar as" or quatenus as a subset of the core or essence of existence. This part of the core of existence is "conceived of" or concipitur (a word that been addressed in the post on I.D4 implying that it is understood not sensically, but intuitively) so that only the characteristics which follow from eternal are understood. I think that his reasoning is that substance is beyond time and, in fact, creates time and its conditions. For that reason, a connection to time is to confuse what is primacy.

His explanation confirms this and is basically describing a way in which an aspect follows in a certain necessity, as in the circularity of a circle or here, the eternity of the eternal, that is the essence of a thing, which is not altered or impacted by time.

Per aeternitatem intellego ipsam existentiam quatenus ex sola rei aeternae definitione necessario sequi concipitur.

Translated as,

By eternity I understand existence itself insofar as it is conceived to logically follow from only the definition of an eternal thing.

Explicatio: Talis enim existentia ut aeterna veritas sicut rei essentia concipitur proptereaque per durationem aut tempus explicari non potest tametsi duratio principio et fine carere concipiatur.

Translated as,

For such is existence conceived as an eternal truth just as the essence of a thing and on that account cannot be explained by duration or time even if the duration is conceived to lack a beginning or an end.